It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of, inter alia, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03), defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress the weapon that the police seized from his person. According great deference to the court's determination ( see generally People v Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759, 761), we reject that contention. It is well settled that the police may lawfully stop a vehicle where, as here, they have "probable cause to believe that the driver of [the vehicle] has committed a traffic violation" ( People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349). Contrary to defendant's contention, "[i]n making [a] determination of probable cause, neither the primary motivation of the officer nor a determination of what a reasonable traffic officer would have done under the circumstances is relevant" ( Robinson, 97 NY2d at 349). Furthermore, "out of a concern for safety, `officers may . . . exercise their discretion to require a driver who commits a traffic violation [as well as the passengers in the vehicle] to exit the vehicle even though they lack any particularized reason for believing the driver [or a passenger] possesses a weapon'" ( People v Robinson, 74 NY2d 773, 774, cert denied 493 US 966, quoting New York v Class, Alb US 106, 115 [1986]). Here, a handgun was recovered from a passenger in the vehicle and, "[t]hus, the police had the requisite reasonable suspicion to believe that at least one of the occupants of the vehicle was armed prior to conducting the pat-down search []" of defendant ( People v Edwards, 52 AD3d 1266, 1267, lv denied 11 NY3d 736).