Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of assault in the second degree ( see Penal Law § 120.05). "[A]n intoxicated person can form the requisite criminal intent to commit a crime, and it is for the trier of fact to decide if the extent of the intoxication acted to negate the element of intent" ( People v Flores, 40 AD3d 876, 877; see People v LaGuerre, 29 AD3d 820, 822; People v Mannarino, 35 AD3d 631; People v Gonzalez, 6 AD3d 457). The defendant's intent to cause physical injury ( see Penal Law § 10.00) may be inferred from his conduct and the surrounding circumstances ( see People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 303; People v Spurgeon, 63 AD3d 863, 864; People v Gumbs, 58 AD3d 641; People v Mei Ying Wang, 33 AD3d 820, 821). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410, cert denied 542 US 946; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633).