MANNHEIMER, Judge.
Kelly R. Carr was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, two counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor, one count of unlawful exploitation of a minor, and five counts of possession of child pornography. The evidence supporting these convictions is summarized in our prior decision in this case, Carr v. State, Alaska App. Memorandum Opinion No. 5209 (April 25, 2007), 2007 WL 1228948.
In our prior decision, we rejected Carr's various attacks on his convictions, but we vacated Carr's sentence: we concluded that the superior court had improperly relied on aggravating factor AS 12.55.155(c)(18)(B) when sentencing Carr, so we directed the court to re-sentence Carr without reliance on this aggravator. Carr, Memorandum Opinion at 14-15, 2007 WL 1228948 at *7.
At Carr's re-sentencing, Superior Court Judge Eric Smith declared that his original focus, when sentencing Carr, was to achieve a particular composite sentence (29 years' imprisonment with 14 years suspended) rather than to craft appropriate individual sentences for each of Carr's crimes. The judge therefore adjusted Carr's individual sentences — reducing some of them and increasing some of them — so as to achieve the same composite total without relying on the improper aggravating factor. (Alaska law authorizes this.)
See Cronce v. State, 216 P.3d 568, 572 (Alaska App. 2009); Allain v. State, 810 P.2d 1019, 1021-22 (Alaska App. 1991).
Carr has now filed an appeal challenging the superior court's re-sentencing decision. The Public Defender Agency has filed a brief arguing that Carr's composite sentence of 15 years to serve (29 years with 14 years suspended) is excessive. In addition, Carr has filed a pro se brief in which he raises several challenges to his underlying convictions, as well as challenges to some of his conditions of probation. In addition, Carr's pro se brief contains a supplemental argument that his composite sentence is excessive.
With respect to the argument that Carr's composite sentence is excessive, Carr is no longer entitled to pursue this claim at this point in the proceedings. Carr received the same composite sentence at his original sentencing. Thus, Carr's current claim that this composite sentence is excessive is a claim that Carr could have raised in his first appeal. He did not do so. See "Opening Brief of Appellant" in Carr v. State, Court of Appeals File No. 8876. Accordingly, Carr is barred from raising this claim now. Hurd v. State, 107 P.3d 314, 327-29 (Alaska App. 2005).
This same rule applies to Carr's several challenges to the conditions of his probation. At Carr's re-sentencing, Judge Smith simply reimposed all the conditions of probation that he had imposed at Carr's original sentencing. Carr could have challenged these conditions of probation in his first appeal; he did not do so. Accordingly, he is barred from challenging these conditions of probation now. Hurd, 107 P.3d at 327-29.
(We note that Carr is still free to ask the superior court to modify or abrogate these conditions of probation.)
Carr's pro se brief also contains several other challenges to rulings made by Judge Smith during the original trial court litigation.
Carr challenges Judge Smith's decision to impose separate convictions and sentences for Counts I and II of the indictment, and for Counts VI through X of the indictment — a reversal of the judge's earlier rulings that these two groups of charges should merge for purposes of conviction and sentencing under Whitton v. State. Carr presented these same claims in his first appeal, and we rejected them. We stand by our earlier decisions on these claims.
479 P.2d 302, 312-13 (Alaska 1970).
Carr also challenges Judge Smith's decision to allow the State to reinstate Count II of the indictment in the middle of trial. This claim could have been raised in Carr's first appeal, and it was not. Accordingly, Carr is barred from raising this claim now. Hurd, 107 P.3d at 327-29.
For these reasons, the judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED.