DEAN v. STATE

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Docket Number

NO. A11A0525.

Attorney(S)

Herbert E. Franklin, Jr., District Attorney, Melissa A. Pittman, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Judges

Christopher J. McFadden

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Martha Darlene Dean was involved in a series of vehicle collisions on May 21, 2009, beginning outside the city limits of Ringgold, Georgia, and continuing into the city. After colliding with multiple vehicles and driving erratically, she was cited by both a Georgia State Patrol (GSP) trooper and a Ringgold police officer for various offenses including driving under the influence (DUI) and traffic violations in two jurisdictions. The Ringgold city citations were initially set for municipal court, where Dean demanded a jury trial, prompting transfer of those charges to the Superior Court of Catoosa County. Meanwhile, prosecution of the GSP citations proceeded in the Probate Court of Catoosa County, where Dean pled guilty to DUI and following too closely in December 2009 pursuant to a plea agreement. The remaining GSP charges were nolle prossed. In June 2010, Dean moved to dismiss the Ringgold city charges pending in superior court on double jeopardy grounds, asserting that the prior plea barred further prosecution. The trial court denied the motion, and Dean appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the prosecution of the Ringgold city charges is barred under the procedural double jeopardy protection of OCGA § 16-1-7(b) due to Dean's prior guilty plea to related charges arising from the same conduct.
Whether the offenses arose from the same conduct or transaction for purposes of OCGA § 16-1-7(b).
Whether the proper prosecuting officer had knowledge of all charges at the time of the prior prosecution.
Whether all charges were within the jurisdiction of a single court, satisfying the jurisdictional requirement of OCGA § 16-1-7(b).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Dean argued that pursuant to OCGA § 16-1-7(b), the prosecution of the Ringgold city charges is precluded because all charges arose from the same conduct and should have been prosecuted in a single prosecution.
She contended that the prior guilty plea to the GSP citations bars subsequent prosecution of the Ringgold charges under the procedural double jeopardy protection.

Appellee's Arguments

The State argued that the charges arose from distinct and independent criminal conduct, not a single transaction.
The State contended that the knowledge relevant to the double jeopardy claim must be that of the district attorney handling the superior court case, not the probate court solicitor who handled the plea.
The State suggested that the probate court solicitor is not a "prosecuting officer" for purposes of OCGA § 16-1-7(b).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Waites v. State, 238 Ga. 683, 684 (1977)	OCGA § 16-1-7(b) protects against harassment by multiple prosecutions arising from the same conduct.	Supported the interpretation that multiple offenses arising from the same conduct must be prosecuted in a single prosecution.
Barlowe v. State, 286 Ga. App. 133 (2007)	Review standard for procedural double jeopardy claims is de novo; prosecutor's knowledge of all crimes is required.	Guided the court’s de novo review and established that the prosecutor handling the prior plea must have actual knowledge of all charges.
Morgan v. State, 220 Ga. App. 198, 199 (1996)	"Same conduct" is synonymous with "same transaction."	Confirmed that the offenses arose from the same transaction and thus the same conduct.
Anderson v. State, 200 Ga. App. 530, 532 (1991)	Offenses arising out of one course of conduct are considered the same conduct.	Applied to establish that Dean’s multiple offenses during the continuous driving and collisions constituted one course of conduct.
Nicely v. State, 305 Ga. App. 387, 388 (2010)	Prosecuting attorney handling the first prosecution must have actual knowledge of facts supporting charges to bar subsequent prosecution.	Used to determine that the probate court solicitor’s knowledge was sufficient to bar further prosecution.
Price v. State, 206 Ga. App. 161, 162 (1992)	"Proper prosecuting officer" means the prosecuting attorney for the State.	Supported that the probate court solicitor qualifies as a prosecuting officer for purposes of OCGA § 16-1-7(b).
Mann v. State, 160 Ga. App. 527, 528-529 (1981)	Jurisdictional principle that if any court has jurisdiction over all offenses, a plea in one court may bar prosecution in another.	Applied to show that superior court had jurisdiction over all offenses, satisfying the jurisdictional requirement.
Brock v. State, 146 Ga. App. 78, 80 (1978)	Concurrent jurisdiction of superior court over misdemeanors and effect of plea in bar.	Supported that the superior court had jurisdiction over all offenses and that the plea in probate court bars further prosecution.
Gregg v. State, 253 Ga. App. 243, 244 (2001)	Superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over misdemeanors with inferior courts.	Confirmed superior court’s jurisdiction over the misdemeanor offenses originally pending in probate court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by noting the undisputed facts surrounding the chain of events on May 21, 2009, where Dean’s continuous driving and collisions spanned two jurisdictions. It applied OCGA § 16-1-7(b), which requires that crimes arising from the same conduct and known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of prosecution, and within the jurisdiction of a single court, must be prosecuted together.

The court agreed with Dean that all the charges arose from the same conduct, equating "same conduct" with "same transaction" and "one course of conduct," citing relevant precedent. It rejected the State’s argument that the charges were independent, emphasizing the continuous nature of Dean’s conduct without interruption.

Regarding prosecutorial knowledge, the court determined that the prosecutor handling the prior plea—the probate court solicitor—had actual knowledge of all charges, as defense counsel informed him of the pending Ringgold city charges during plea negotiations. The court rejected the State’s suggestion that the probate court solicitor was not a proper prosecuting officer, relying on precedent defining the prosecuting attorney for the State as the relevant officer.

On jurisdiction, the court acknowledged the probate court lacked jurisdiction over the Ringgold charges due to Dean’s demand for a jury trial, but held that the superior court had jurisdiction over all offenses, including those originally pending in probate court, based on concurrent jurisdiction principles.

Consequently, the court concluded that all charges should have been prosecuted together in the superior court, and that the prior resolution of the GSP citations in probate court barred the subsequent prosecution of the Ringgold charges under OCGA § 16-1-7(b).

Holding and Implications

The Court reversed the trial court's denial of Dean's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.

The direct effect of this decision is that the prosecution of the Ringgold city charges pending in superior court is barred by Dean’s prior guilty plea to related charges in probate court, pursuant to the procedural double jeopardy protection of OCGA § 16-1-7(b). The court did not establish new precedent but applied existing law to ensure that multiple charges arising from the same conduct are prosecuted together to prevent harassment through multiple prosecutions.

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DEAN v. THE STATE.

McFADDEN, Judge.

Martha Darlene Dean appeals from the denial of her motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. She argues that pursuant to OCGA § 16-1-7 (b), this prosecution is precluded by her prior guilty plea to other charges arising from the same conduct. We agree and reverse.

The underlying facts are not in dispute. On May 21, 2009, Dean drove down Poplar Springs Road just outside the city limits of Ringgold, Georgia to Highway 151. She turned left onto Highway 151 and collided with another vehicle. Rather than stop her car, Dean continued down Highway 151, where she collided with yet another vehicle. She drove on, entered the Ringgold city limits, and collided with a third vehicle, leaving her car disabled. At that point, a Georgia State Patrol ("GSP") trooper and a Ringgold police officer responded. The trooper cited Dean for driving under the influence of drugs, leaving the scene of the first two collisions, and several other traffic offenses. She also received citations from the Ringgold officer for DUI and traffic offenses committed within the Ringgold city limits.

The Ringgold city citations directed Dean to appear in Ringgold Municipal Court on June 15, 2009. On that date, Dean demanded a jury trial, and the municipal court transferred the case to the Superior Court of Catoosa County. In the meantime, prosecution on the GSP citations proceeded in the Probate Court of Catoosa County. The attorney representing Dean informed the probate court solicitor about the pending Ringgold city charges, then negotiated a plea agreement regarding the GSP citations. Pursuant to that agreement, Dean pled guilty in probate court on December 17, 2009, to DUI and following too closely. The remaining GSP charges were nolle prossed.

In June 2010, Dean moved to dismiss the Ringgold city charges pending in superior court, arguing that resolution of the GSP citations precluded further prosecution of the Ringgold offenses. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.

Dean's argument focuses on the procedural double jeopardy protection set out in OCGA § 16-1-7 (b), which provides: "If the several crimes arising from the same conduct are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution." This provision was "designed to protect an accused against the harassment of multiple prosecutions arising from the same conduct." Waites v. State, 238 Ga. 683, 684 (2) ( 235 SE2d 4) (1977). Where the facts are not in dispute, we review the trial court's ruling on a procedural double jeopardy claim de novo. Barlowe v. State, 286 Ga. App. 133 ( 648 SE2d 471) (2007).

Addressing the first requirement of OCGA § 16-1-7 (b), Dean contends that all of the citations she received on May 21, 2009, arose from the same conduct. We agree. The term "same conduct" is used interchangeably with the phrase "same transaction." Morgan v. State, 220 Ga. App. 198, 199 ( 469 SE2d 340) (1996). We also consider whether the offenses at issue "arose out of one course of conduct." Anderson v. State, 200 Ga. App. 530, 532 ( 408 SE2d 829) (1991) (numerous traffic violations committed during lengthy police chase that began within a Clarke County municipality and continued into unincorporated Clarke County arose out of same conduct).

The State argues on appeal that the charges against Dean arose from distinct and independent criminal conduct that cannot be characterized as a single transaction. Each charge, however, resulted from Dean's erratic driving on May 21, 2009. There was no break in the action; she drove down the road, colliding with cars and committing numerous traffic violations in two jurisdictions until a final collision left her vehicle disabled within the city limits of Ringgold. While her actions "gave rise to several offenses, all of the offenses arose out of one course of conduct, i.e., there was only one transaction." Anderson, supra at 532. The record thus shows that all charges involved the same conduct for purposes of OCGA § 16-1-7 (b). See id.; see also Morgan, supra at 200 (offenses that "were part of an ongoing chain of events" arose out of same conduct).

The evidence further shows that the "proper prosecuting officer" was aware of all charges when Dean entered her plea. "For OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) to apply, the prosecutor handling the proceedings must actually know of the crimes." (Footnote omitted.) Barlowe, supra at 134. According to the State, the knowledge we must consider is that of the district attorney, who is handling the matter in superior court. The question, however, is whether Dean's plea in probate court bars a subsequent prosecution. The only "knowledge" that matters, therefore, is the knowledge of the prosecutor who handled that plea — the probate court solicitor. See id. (knowledge of prosecutor who dealt with prior plea is key factor in determining whether plea bars further prosecution under OCGA § 16-1-7 (b)); see also Nicely v. State, 305 Ga. App. 387, 388 (1) ( 699 SE2d 774) (2010) (defendant must show that "prosecuting attorney for the State who handled the first prosecution had actual knowledge of the facts supporting the charge allegedly subject to a plea in bar").

Although the State suggests that a probate court solicitor is not a "prosecuting officer," the phrase "proper prosecuting officer" refers to "the prosecuting attorney for the State." (Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Price v. State, 206 Ga. App. 161, 162 (1) ( 424 SE2d 841) (1992). The probate court solicitor testified that he prosecutes cases in the Probate Court of Catoosa County. He further testified that during plea negotiations, defense counsel informed him of the Ringgold city charges pending against Dean. Under these circumstances, the proper prosecuting officer actually knew about all pending charges.

Finally, we must conclude that all charges fell within the jurisdiction of a single court. In denying Dean's plea in bar, the trial court found that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the Ringgold city charges. This finding was correct, particularly given Dean's demand for a jury trial with respect to those offenses. See OCGA § 40-13-23 (probate court cannot dispose of traffic misdemeanor cases unless defendant waives trial by jury). But the issue is whether any court had jurisdiction over all offenses. See Mann v. State, 160 Ga. App. 527, 528-529 ( 287 SE2d 325) (1981) (plea to misdemeanor offenses in state court precluded subsequent prosecution for felony arising out of same conduct; although state court lacked jurisdiction over felony, superior court had jurisdiction over all offenses); Brock v. State, 146 Ga. App. 78, 80 ( 245 SE2d 442) (1978) (same).

The superior court clearly had jurisdiction over the misdemeanor charges bound over to it from Ringgold Municipal Court. And it also had jurisdiction to hear the misdemeanor offenses pending in the Probate Court of Catoosa County. See Gregg v. State, 253 Ga. App. 243, 244 (2) (a) ( 588 SE2d 729) (2001) ("Georgia superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over misdemeanors with inferior courts.") Simply put, "[a] 11 of the known offenses were within the jurisdiction of a single court — the superior court." Brock, supra.

The multiple charges against Dean could have — and should have — been prosecuted at the same time and in the same court. Accordingly, the probate court's resolution of the GSP citations bars this superior court prosecution. See OCGA § 16-1-7 (b); Nicely, supra at 390; Brock, supra at 82-83.

Judgment reversed. Phipps, P. J., and Andrews, J., concur.