The record supports Family Court's determination that the mother willfully violated the all purpose short order by contacting and communicating with the father's family on more than one occasion ( see Matter of Bronson v Bronson, 37 AD3d 1036, 1037; see also Matter of Dyandria D., 22 AD3d 354, 355). The subject order "expressed an unequivocal mandate" that the mother neither contact nor communicate with the father's family ( Bronson, 37 AD3d at 1037). The mother's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive because they attempt to justify the violation based upon matters outside the record ( see Matter of Kent v Kent, 29 AD3d 123, 134), or speak to credibility and the weight of the evidence, which are within the exclusive province of Family Court, as the factfinder, to determine ( see Matter of Denzel F., 44 AD3d 389, 389-390; Matter of Giovanni C., 35 AD3d 220, 220, lv denied 9 NY3d 809).
We also reject the mother's `argument that Family Court committed reversible error by not appointing an attorney for the child. While the appointment of an attorney for the child is mandatory in certain proceedings ( see Family Ct Act § 249 [a]), such is not the case here ( see Richard D. v Wendy P., 47 NY2d 943, 944-945).
We have considered the mother's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.