Ordered that the resentence is affirmed.
Since the defendant had not yet completed her originally imposed sentence of imprisonment when she was resentenced, resentencing her to a term which included the statutorily required period of postrelease supervision did not subject her to double jeopardy or violate her right to due process ( see People v Lingle, 16 NY3d 621; People v McCoy, 84 AD3d 655; People v Myrick, 84 AD3d 1272; People v Burgos, 84 AD3d 975; People v Hoffman, 84 AD3d 978; People v DeJesus, 84 AD3d 832). Moreover, the Supreme Court had no discretion to reconsider the originally imposed term of imprisonment in resentencing the defendant solely for the purpose of imposing a required term of postrelease supervision ( see People v Lingle, 16 NY3d 621; People v Myrick, 84 AD3d 1272; People v DeJesus, 84 AD3d 832).
The period of postrelease supervision imposed at resentencing was not excessive ( see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).