Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The disqualification of an attorney is a matter which rests within the sound discretion of the motion court ( see Folk v Gallo, 73 AD3d 685; Campolongo v Campolongo, 2 AD3d 476; Olmoz v Town of Fishkill, 258 AD2d 447). Although "[a] party's entitlement to be represented in ongoing litigation by counsel of his or her own choosing is a valued right which should not be abridged," such right will not supersede a clear showing that disqualification is warranted ( Matter of Marvin Q., 45 AD3d 852, 853, quoting Campolongo v Campolongo, 2 AD3d at 476; see Horn v Municipal Info. Servs., 282 AD2d 712). Under the circumstances here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the petitioner/plaintiffs motion to disqualify the appellants' attorney ( see Tekni-Plex, Inc. v Meyner Landis, 89 NY2d 123; M.A.C. Duff, Inc. v ASMAC, LLC, 61 AD3d 828, 828-830; Columbus Constr. Co., Inc. v Petrillo Bldrs. Supply Corp., 20 AD3d 383; Moccia v Weisfogel, 253 AD2d 800, 801). Moreover, contrary to the appellants' contention, the petitioner/plaintiff is not barred from moving to disqualify their attorney by the doctrine of laches ( cf. Natiello v Natiello, 209 AD2d 389). Since the interests of the petitioner/plaintiff and the appellants did not become materially adverse until the commencement of the present litigation, the petitioner/plaintiff could not have sought disqualification at an earlier time ( see Scafuri v DeMaso, 71 AD3d 755, 756; see generally TekniPlex, Inc. v Meyner Landis, 89 NY2d at 131). Therefore, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the petitioner/plaintiff inexcusably waited too long to seek disqualification of the appellants' attorney.