IN RE WALKER, N.C., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

Messrs. A. M. Moore and Gilliam Gatling, for Walker. Messrs. Pruden Shaw and J. P. Whedbee, contra.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Quentin F. Simpson petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain custody of his daughter, Eliza Simpson. A writ was issued directed to Emily Corbet and Wilson Walker to produce the child before the superior court on April 1, 1879; the writ was returned executed as to Walker and not found as to Corbet. On the return day Walker appeared without the child. A second writ and a rule to show cause were issued returnable April 16 and duly served on both parties.

On April 2 Walker made an affidavit that he and Emily Corbet were willing to surrender the child and would do so if the court ordered it. The court directed delivery of the child to Jackson, the father's agent, conditioned on payment of $20 and other costs by April 17, with a provision that in default they should appear and show cause against attachment under the served rule. Walker and Corbet paid the money and Walker delivered the child to Jackson, but Mrs. Corbet refused to let Jackson take the child and instead agreed (with telegraphic assent from the father and his agent) to accompany the child to Norfolk, where she later retained counsel and instituted legal proceedings against the father.

Notice was given that the rule for contempt would be insisted upon. At the hearing Walker filed an answer denying wilful disobedience and asserting lack of possession and control of the child; nevertheless, the superior court found that Walker had caused notice of the writ to be sent to Corbet to enable her to avoid service and that he aided in sending her to Virginia and instituting suit there with intent to hinder or prevent execution of the court's orders. Walker was adjudged guilty of contempt and sentenced to ninety days' imprisonment; he appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether imprisonment for contempt may lawfully exceed thirty days under the statute cited (Bat. Rev., ch. 24, § 2).
Whether, when an accused files a sworn answer that negatives any intentional disrespect to the court or purpose to obstruct its process, the rule to show cause should be discharged rather than resulting in attachment or imprisonment.
Whether constructive contempt predicated on acts done outside the presence of the court requires proof of an intent to hinder, delay, or obstruct the court's process, and whether the accused must be required to "purge" himself or answer special interrogatories as to such intent.

Arguments of the Parties

Allegations Against Walker (Petitioner's Position)

That Walker, upon service of the writ on him, caused notice of such service to be sent to Emily Corbet (who had custody of the child) so she could avoid service herself.
That Walker aided in sending Emily Corbet and the child to Virginia and in instituting legal proceedings there, with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent execution of the court's orders.

Walker (Respondent/Appellant) — Defense and Answer

Walker swore he never had possession and control of the child and therefore personally did not wilfully disobey the writ by non-production on April 1.
He made an affidavit expressing willingness and purpose (by himself and Corbet) to surrender the child and offered to do so if the court ordered it.
In his sworn answer he averred that if his course was wrong it resulted from ignorance and that there was no disrespect to the court nor disposition to disobey the court's orders.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ex parte Moore, 63 N.C. 397	Cited for the practice in contempt proceedings out of the presence of the court—i.e., that a prima facie foundation is shown by affidavit or otherwise and the accused is then put on a rule to answer and may be required to purge or disavow intent; also cited in support of discharging a rule when the sworn answer negates intentional disrespect.	The court relied on Ex parte Moore to describe the proper procedure in out-of-court contempt matters and to approve the proposition that a sworn disavowal of intent should lead to discharge of the rule rather than adjudication of contempt.
Bond v. Bond, 69 N.C. 97	Cited for the proposition that where an answer under oath negatives any intentional disrespect to the court or purpose to obstruct its process, the rule should be discharged.	The court cited and approved Bond v. Bond to support its conclusion that Walker's sworn denial of intent required discharge of the rule and that the lower court erred in finding intents contrary to the answer and imposing imprisonment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the matter in light of the procedure for contempts committed outside the court's presence. Such proceedings require a prima facie showing (by affidavit or otherwise) followed by a rule placing the accused on notice and permitting an answer denying the charged facts or excusing the conduct; when the gravamen is intent, the accused may disavow the imputed purpose. The Court observed that Walker's answer and affidavit asserted he never had custody or control of the child and that he was willing to surrender the child if ordered to do so. The superior court's own findings accepted that Walker personally had no contempt in failing to produce the child on April 1.

The superior court, however, found additional facts alleging that Walker caused notice to be sent to Corbet and aided in sending her and the child to Virginia and in instituting suit there, with intent to obstruct the court's orders; on these findings Walker was adjudged guilty of constructive contempt and sentenced to ninety days' imprisonment.

The Supreme Court reasoned that both asserted grounds of contempt (causing notice to be sent to Corbet and aiding her trip to Virginia and litigation there) required proof of an intent to hinder or obstruct the execution of the writ. Such intent is a fact within the accused's knowledge and "one to which he should have been required to purge himself in answer to the rule, or on special interrogatories put to him by the court." The Court concluded that Walker's sworn answer did negate any intentional disrespect or purpose to obstruct the court, and therefore the rule should have been discharged rather than having the court proceed to find intents contrary to the sworn answer.

The Court further noted a statutory error: the sentence imposed—ninety days' imprisonment—exceeded the maximum lawful imprisonment for contempt specified by statute (thirty days, Bat. Rev., ch. 24, § 2).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment adjudging Walker guilty of contempt and sentencing him to ninety days' imprisonment was erroneous and is reversed.

Implications:

The Supreme Court held that where an accused, under oath, negates intentional disrespect to the court or any purpose to obstruct its process, the rule to show cause should have been discharged rather than resulting in attachment or imprisonment (approving and citing Ex parte Moore and Bond v. Bond).
The superior court's sentence also contravened the statutory limitation on imprisonment for contempt (the sentence imposed exceeded the thirty-day limit).
Direct effect: the judgment of contempt and the ninety-day sentence were reversed. The opinion does not announce a newly created rule beyond endorsing the cited precedents and applying them to the facts of this case.

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In the matter of WILSON WALKER.

Contempt — "Purging."

1. It is unlawful to imprison for more than thirty days for a contempt of court. Bat. Rev., ch. 24, § 2.

2. Where the answer to a rule to show cause why one should not be attached for contempt negatives under oath any intentional disrespect to the court or purpose to obstruct its process, the rule should be discharged.

( Ex Parte Moore, 63 N.C. 397; Bond v. Bond, 69 N.C. 97, cited and approved.)

Upon the hearing the court adjudged that Walker was guilty and ordered him to be imprisoned, from which judgment he appealed.

DILLARD, J.

On the petition of Quentin F. Simpson for a writ of habeas corpus to get his daughter, Eliza Simpson, a writ was issued directed to Emily Corbet and Wilson Walker, commanding them to produce the body of the child, with the cause of her caption and detention, before the judge of the superior court on the first day of April, 1879, at chambers in the town of Edenton, which writ was returned executed on Walker and not found as to Corbet. At the return day Walker appeared before His Honor without the child, and on that day another writ was directed to issue to the same persons returnable at chambers on the 16th of April, together with a rule to show cause why they should not be fined for a contempt in disobeying and avoiding the former writ, and this writ was duly served on both of the parties.

On the next day, to wit, on the 2nd of April, Walker made affidavit of the willingness and purpose of himself and Emily Corbet to surrender the child, and offered to do so if an order of the court to that effect were made, and thereupon the court ordered that they deliver the child to one Jackson, the agent of the father, and pay him twenty dollars, and also pay the other costs on or before the 17th day of April, and in default thereof, that they appear before him at a time and place named and show cause against being attached under the rule which had already been served on them.

Under this order Walker and Corbet waited upon the agent of the father and paid him the money required, and Walker delivered the child to Jackson, and the child being frightened and clinging to Mrs. Corbet, her grandmother, Mrs. Corbet refused to let him take the child but offered to go to Norfolk where the father was and deliver the child to him. This was assented to by the agent and also by the father by telegraph, and accordingly on the 10th of April Jackson, the agent, and Mrs. Corbet took the boat and went to Norfolk, and on their arrival Mrs. Corbet retained counsel and took out legal proceedings against the father to recover compensation for raising the child.

After these proceedings, notice was given to Walker that the rule for contempt which had been served on him would be insisted on, and pursuant thereto Walker attended before His Honor on the return day and filed an answer to the rule, and on the hearing His Honor found as facts that Walker, on the service of the writ of habeas corpus on him, caused notice of such service to be sent to Emily Corbet, in whose possession the child was, in order to enable her to avoid service on herself, and that Walker since he was put under the rule to answer for an alleged contempt, aided in sending Emily Corbet to Virginia, and in there instituting legal proceedings with intent to hinder, delay or prevent the execution of the orders of the court. Upon these facts it was adjudged by the court that Walker was guilty of contempt and he was sentenced to imprisonment in the jail for ninety days, from which judgment the appeal is taken.

In cases of alleged contempt out of the presence of the court, the practice is to have a foundation laid by facts shown forth by affidavit or otherwise, constituting a prima facie case, and then by a rule to put the accused to show cause against the attachment by an answer denying the alleged facts, of which he had notice in the rule or on the record, or excusing his conduct; or where the gravamen of the charge rested on intention, by a disavowal of the imputed purpose. 4 Blk., 286; 3 Whar. Cr. Law, 3449, 50; Ex parte Moore, 63 N.C. 397. According to the answer filed, Walker acquitted himself from any charge of wilful disobedience to the writ in the non-production of the child before His Honor on the 1st day of April, by the fact that he had never had the possession and control of her, and of this opinion was His Honor, as he found no fact to the contrary in his judgment, and hence as to this point it is to be taken that Walker personally was guilty of no contempt. But it is found by the court below that Walker, on the service of the writ on him caused notice of such service to be sent to Emily Corbet who had the custody and control of the child, in order that she might avoid the service of the writ on her, and that he, since the service of the rule to show cause, aided in sending Emily Corbet to Virginia and in the institution of legal proceedings in that state, with the intent to hinder, delay or prevent the execution of the orders of the court, and herein it is claimed that Walker was constructively guilty of a disobedience of the writ.

Manifestly as to both these grounds of contempt the existence of an intention to hinder and obstruct the service of the writ on Emily Corbet was requisite. Walker may have given notice of the service of the writ on him with no intent thereby to aid or encourage Corbet to get out of the way of the sheriff. And as to the aid given in sending her to Virginia with the child, and in the institution of suit there, it had been agreed on by the father and his agent, Jackson, that Mrs. Corbet should go with the child to Norfolk, Virginia, and deliver her to the father, and it may be that the aid given was upon the humane intent to deliver the child to the father rather than to a stranger with whom she was unwilling to go, and not upon any intent to obstruct or evade the order of the judge.

How this essential fact of intention in the constitution of the contempt was, was a matter within the breast of Walker, and one to which he should have been required to purge himself in answer to the rule, or on special interrogations put to him by the court; and if he was not so required, then His Honor should not have proceeded to adjudge the contempt unless on refusal to respond by Walker. But as we understand the rule and the answer thereto the said Walker fully acquitted himself by averring on his oath that if his course in the matter was wrong, it was through ignorance and with no disrespect to the court nor disposition to disobey His Honor's orders and decrees.

The judgment pronounced was certainly erroneous (if otherwise correct) in that it subjected Walker to imprisonment for ninety days instead of thirty days as limited by act of assembly. But all intentional disrespect to the court and purpose of hindrance or obstruction to the process of the court having been negatived by the answer, in our opinion the court should have discharged the rule and not proceeded to find intents contrary to the answer and adjudged any imprisonment at all. Ex parte Moore, supra; Bond v. Bond, 69 N.C. 97.

Error. Reversed.

IN RE WALKER