AGATI, J.
The plaintiffs in this matter are Laurayne Farrar-James, who is a resident of the city of Bridgeport (Bridgeport), a Bridgeport taxpayer, and a teacher employed by the defendant Bridgeport Board of Education (Board), in addition to Shavonne Davis, who is a Bridgeport resident and parent of five minor children currently enrolled in the Dunbar Elementary School (Dunbar) located in Bridgeport, which school falls within the control and management of the Board.
The defendants are the Board, Dr. John Ramos, who is the superintendent of Bridgeport public schools, and Barbara Bellinger, who is the chairperson of the Board.
The plaintiffs instituted this action seeking injunctive relief from this court to prevent the defendants from closing Dunbar. The plaintiffs allege that in the course of the budgetary process, the Board's finance subcommittee recommended that Dunbar be closed. The finance subcommittee submitted the budget and its recommendations to the full Board for a vote. The Board failed to vote on the budget or the recommendations. The Board never followed through on the recommendation to close Dunbar. The defendants acknowledge that as a result of the Board's failure to vote on the recommendation, Dunbar will not be closed for the school year 2011-12. This position is confirmed by the affidavit submitted by Dr. Ramos, superintendent of schools. The plaintiffs in their brief and at argument have requested that the court maintain this action and provide the relief requested because the possibility exists that the defendants may close Dunbar in the future.
The defendants have moved to dismiss this action, citing the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to mootness, lack of ripeness and lack of an issue of justiciability. "Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "In general, a motion to dismiss CT Page 18526 is the proper procedural vehicle to raise a claim that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action." Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 392, 900 A.2d 82 (2006).
"A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 86, 952 A.2d 1 (2008). "[J]usticiability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine, that implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 254, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).
"[R]ipeness is a sine qua non of justiciability . . . An issue regarding justiciability . . . must be resolved as a threshold matter because it implicates [the] court's subject matter jurisdiction . . . If it becomes apparent to the court that such jurisdiction is lacking, the [cause of action] must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 812, 967 A.2d 1 (2009). A trial court properly grants a motion to dismiss if it determines that the cause of action is "unripe for adjudication." Bloom v. Miklovich, 111 Conn.App. 323, 336, 958 A.2d 1283 (2008).
"[T]he rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Paul Travelers Companies, Inc. v. Kuehl, 299 Conn. 800, 816 n. 7, 12 A.3d 852 (2011).
"`A hypothetical injury or threat is not a ripe or justiciable claim.' Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 46 Conn. 514, 518, 699 A.2d 310 (1997), quoting United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947)." Richardson v. Bloomfield Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 08 5017287 (September 3, 2008, Dubay, J.).
"Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a CT Page 18527 threshold matter because it implicates [the] court's subject matter jurisdiction . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission, 294 Conn. 534, 540, 985 A.2d 1052 (2010). "Mootness . . . implicates subject matter jurisdiction, which imposes a duty on the court to dismiss a case if the court can no longer grant practical relief to the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Curley v. Kaiser, 112 Conn.App. 213, 229, 962 A.2d 167 (2009).
"We have consistently held that we do not render advisory opinions. If there is no longer an actual controversy in which we can afford practical relief to the parties, we must dismiss the [action] . . . Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. Justiciability requires . . . that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute: Courts exist for determination of actual and existing controversies, and under the law of this state the courts may not be used as a vehicle to obtain judicial opinions on points of law . . . [W]here the question presented is purely academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal . . . A case becomes moot when due to intervening circumstances a controversy between the parties no longer exists." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Domestic Violence Services of Greater New Haven, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 240 Conn. 1, 6-7, 688 A.2d 314 (1997).
In Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542 (2011), the court reaffirmed the case law precedent regarding the issue of mootness as it relates to injunctive relief:
Connecticut courts have rejected injunctive remedies on the ground of mootness where the issue before the court has been resolved or has lost its significance because of intervening circumstances. See
Waterbury Hospital v. Connecticut Health Care Associates, 186 Conn. 247, 249-52,
440 A.2d 310 (1982) (court dismissed as moot plaintiff's request for injunctive relief to restrain picketing during strike because strike and picketing had ended while appeal was pending);
Daley v. Gaitor, 16 Conn.App. 379, 381 n. 2,
547 A.2d 1375 (court dismissed as moot plaintiff's request to enjoin city of Hartford from administering promotional CT Page 18528 examination to police officers following city's promotion of officers during pendency of appeal), cert. denied,
209 Conn. 824,
552 A.2d 430 (1988).
Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Rocque, 267 Conn. 116, 126,
836 A.2d 414 (2003).
Id., 548.
The court having reviewed the facts in this case and applying those facts to the case law concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and grants the motion to dismiss. The issue presented by the plaintiffs to this court is now moot. Based on the definition of justiciability there is no longer actual controversy for the court to adjudicate. As indicated in the case law cited, the court does not render advisory decisions nor does it act upon hypothetical controversies.
The motion to dismiss is granted and judgment enters on behalf of the defendants.
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