SIMONS
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. N102077)
Defendant James Harrison Disney (Disney) appeals from the trial court's order issuing a six-month restraining order prohibiting Disney from, among other things, having contact with City of Concord (Concord) employee Mary Rae Lehman (Lehman) for a period of six months. Disney raises various claims of error, including that there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding he committed a battery against Lehman. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On appeal we are obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and to presume in its support the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 825.) Our factual summary reflects this standard of review. (See Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1056, fn. 1.)
On December 17, 2010, Lehman was working in Concord's Permit Center in City Hall. She noticed Disney in the lobby as she was approaching a customer at the counter. Before she reached the customer, Disney stepped in front of her and firmly grabbed both of her wrists. He shook her wrists and said, "You people are headed for a lawsuit." Lehman was "shocked" when Disney grabbed her. She broke away from his grasp; he did not voluntarily release her.
Lehman then proceeded to assist the customer. Afterward, she took Disney to a private office away from the lobby area because, as Lehman testified, he "began ranting about the City going to be subject to a lawsuit. His voice was raised to a level that was interfering with the other customers at the counter." In the office, Disney "continued with his loud dialogue about lawsuits on the City." Lehman left the office when two other Concord officials arrived, including chief building official Vancel Phillips (Phillips). Phillips escorted Disney out of the Permit Center.
On December 21, 2010, Concord filed a petition against Disney seeking an injunction and a temporary restraining order. Concord submitted declarations from Lehman and Phillips in support of the application for a temporary restraining order. The trial court granted the temporary restraining order that same day.
On January 5, 2011, the trial court conducted a hearing on Concord's petition, admitting into evidence the Lehman and Phillips declarations and a declaration from Disney, and receiving testimony from Lehman, Phillips, and Disney. The court found based on Lehman's testimony that Disney's conduct on December 17, 2010, "was an unwanted touching or grabbing of her wrists and a violent shaking to constitute a criminal battery." The court concluded the battery was sufficient to support the issuance of a "limited" six-month restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure, section 527.8. On January 6, 2011, the court issued a restraining order that, among other things, prohibited Disney from contacting Lehman or from entering City Hall without an appointment; the order expired on July 4, 2011.
The trial court then referenced the wrong Penal Code section; it mentioned section 646.9 (stalking) rather than section 242 (battery).
All undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Concord does not contend that expiration of the order renders this appeal moot, and we find it unnecessary to consider that issue.
DISCUSSION
Disney makes a number of contentions that the trial court erred in issuing the January 6, 2011 restraining order. We address his contentions in turn.
Disney contends there was insufficient evidence he committed a battery. However, he largely disregards Lehman's testimony, which the trial court found credible. "[B]attery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another." (Pen. Code, § 242.) Lehman testified that Disney moved in front of her, firmly grabbed her wrists, shook her wrists, and held on to her until she broke away from his grasp. " 'Where findings of fact are challenged on a civil appeal, . . . ". . . the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted," to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor . . . .' [Citation.]" (Steinman v. Malamed (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1556.) Lehman's testimony alone provides substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Disney committed a battery, including the elements of Disney's intent, the offensiveness of the touching, and lack of consent. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614.) We defer to the court's rejection of Disney's testimony describing the encounter as a friendly greeting. (Conservatorship of McElroy (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 536, 545.) It is of no great import that, as Disney argues, Lehman admitted she had a friendly relationship with Disney and had hugged him in the past, or that she was willing to interact with him after the incident by speaking with him in a private office. Those facts are not inconsistent with Lehman's description of the events of December 17, 2010, and do not undermine the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that a battery occurred.
Disney also contends Concord failed to present evidence of any history of violent acts by him. However, he fails to present any argument or authority that any such showing was necessary to justify issuance of a restraining order under section 527.8. Section 527.8, subdivision (a) provides: "Any employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace. . . ." Under section 527.8, subdivision (b), " 'Unlawful violence' is any assault or battery, or stalking . . . but shall not include lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others." In the present case, Concord stated it was seeking an injunction based on an act of unlawful violence, and Disney's December 17, 2010 battery qualified as such an act. (§ 527.8, subd. (b).) Disney has not argued that his act was committed in self-defense or in the defense of others. (Ibid.)
Disney complains the trial court erred in largely preventing him from presenting evidence about the reasons for his presence in the Permit Center on December 17, 2010 and his ongoing dispute with Concord regarding property he owns. The court concluded such evidence was beyond the scope of the hearing, because it was irrelevant to whether Disney committed a battery on Lehman. Disney has not attempted to dispute that reasoning, and we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.) In any event, Disney has not shown that any error was prejudicial (ibid.; Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800), especially in light of the fact that his declaration was admitted into evidence and that declaration provided sufficient background context to establish the legitimacy of Disney's presence at the Permit Center. (See Guardianship of Levy (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 237, 250.)
Similarly, Disney has failed to show any prejudice from the fact that the trial court prohibited him from asking Phillips leading questions at the hearing. The absence of prejudice is especially clear because there is no indication Phillips had any personal knowledge of the alleged battery on Lehman.
Finally, Disney contends the court erred in failing to strike the Lehman and Phillips declarations, which he characterizes as containing "prejudicial and inadmissible matters, i.e., innuendo, hyperbole, ad hominem, inadmissible conclusions, hearsay, repetitions, conjectures, inadmissible opinions, and the like." However, even assuming there was some inadmissible content in those declarations, Disney has not shown that any of that content was relevant to the issue before the trial court—whether he committed a battery on Lehman. Accordingly, any error was harmless. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 9-10; Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 800.)
For the first time in his reply brief, Disney contends that section 527.8 is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous, that it violates his constitutional right to due process, that it creates an unconstitutional prior restraint, and that it is deficient on its face in other respects. We do not address these contentions, because an appellant forfeits any arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief. (Loranger v. Jones (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 847, 858, fn. 9; Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn. 8.) To the extent Disney purports to make any other claims not identified herein, we treat them as forfeited for lacking reasoned analysis and citations to supporting authority. (Loranger, at p. 858, fn. 9; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.)
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DISPOSITION
The trial court's order is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Concord.
SIMONS, Acting P.J. We concur. NEEDHAM, J. BRUINIERS, J.