Commonwealth v. Labonbard

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)( a )(1). On appeal, he argues that the Commonwealth failed to present evidence sufficient to prove that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time that he operated the motor vehicle. We affirm.

Background. The jury heard the following evidence. On the evening of June 27, 2010, Sandra Labonbard, the defendant's former wife, noticed a dark colored pickup truck pulling away quickly from a cottage on her property at 52 Blue Boar Lane in Becket. The truck attempted to drive up an impassable hill several times, but couldn't make the top of the hill and went over the bank and down into the woods. Because there had been illegal break-ins in the area earlier, and because she thought that the driver of the truck might be hurt, Sandra Labonbard called the police. They arrived in maybe ten minutes. It wasn't very long. Officer Steven Hilton of the Becket police department arrived at 211 Sir Edward Way, a public way that runs parallel to Blue Boar Lane approximately one block away, at approximately 6:45 P.M. Sandra Labonbard pointed out a [truck] that was backed into the woods. Apparently it had crashed into a tree. The officer noticed that the truck was locked, with no one inside, and the engine was still warm. He checked the license plate and determined that the truck belonged to the defendant.

Chief William Elovirta also arrived at the scene and, approximately twenty minutes after Hilton arrived, the two saw the defendant walking down Sir Edward Way toward them. When he reached his truck, the defendant told Hilton that he was coming from his friend's house at 751 King Richard Drive, where he had gone to get help towing his truck out of the woods. Officer Hilton determined that the distance from King Richard Drive to the place where the defendant's truck was found was approximately one-quarter of a mile. The defendant stated that the keys to his truck were in his pocket; after his arrest, they were seized during the booking procedure.

The defendant told Hilton that he had been taking a nap inside his truck—needing a place to sleep it off—when he was startled by someone approaching his vehicle. He tried to escape the area by driving up the dirt-covered hill several times, but his truck's four-wheel drive did not work and the road was slick, causing the truck to slide back down the hill and into the woods. The defendant also told Hilton that, before he drove himself to Sir Edward Way, he had been at Uncle Larry's Tavern where he had consumed a couple of drinks and four or five shots during the course of the day. Finally, the defendant told Hilton that his last drink had been consumed within the last hour. Hilton agreed that the defendant's last drink could have been consumed at the defendant's friend's house.

Hilton testified that, in order to drive from Uncle Larry's Tavern to Sir Edward Way, the defendant would have traveled on Routes 8 and 20, then down Wells Road or Jessers Lane—each of which is a public way. He also stated that, during their conversation, he observed that the defendant had glassy, bloodshot eyes, was slurring his speech, and he could smell an alcoholic beverage on the defendant's breath.

After the officer administered field sobriety tests, the defendant was arrested and transported to the Lee State police barracks for breathalyzer testing. State police Trooper Gary Ruef, a certified breath test operator, administered the breathalyzer examination. Both breath test readings that [the defendant] provided were a .16. Based on the breathalyzer results and observations made of the defendant's bloodshot, glassy eyes, slurred speech, and the odor of alcohol coming from the defendant, Trooper Ruef opined that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Trooper Ruef agreed that the breathalyzer tests whether a person has consumed alcohol but not when that alcohol was consumed.

At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had been under the influence of alcohol at the time that he operated the truck on a public way. The trial judge denied the motion.

Discussion. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the ‘question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt’ (emphasis in original). Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). ‘A conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence alone, as long as that evidence is sufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 401 (2003). Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 835 (2011).

In this case, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find the defendant guilty. First, only about ten minutes had elapsed between the time that the defendant's former wife saw the truck struggle to get up the hill and Hilton's arrival; the hood of the truck was warm when the officer touched it; only twenty minutes more elapsed between the officer's arrival and the defendant's return, when he appeared very intoxicated. The jurors were entitled to infer that the defendant's sobriety level did not change to any material degree in that amount of time. Compare Commonwealth v. Orben, 53 Mass.App.Ct. 700, 705 (2002) ( [T]he jury may have concluded that it was unlikely that the defendant became intoxicated in the twenty-minute period which had passed between his parking the car and his leaving the bank). The suggestion that the defendant became intoxicated after he drove his truck into the woods also is belied by the fact that no alcohol was found in the truck or on the defendant's person; the argument that the defendant was drinking at his friend's house after he drove into the woods is simply speculative. There was no such evidence.

The defendant cites Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass 453, 457–458 (1984), for the proposition that his uncorroborated statements cannot sustain his conviction. We disagree. See Commonwealth v. Adams, 421 Mass. 289, 291 (1995), citing Commonwealth v. Leonard, 401 Mass. 470, 473 (1988), quoting from Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 458 (1984) (corroborative evidence needed in an operating while under the influence prosecution to support defendant's admission of operation to investigating police officers when the issue of operation is contested; that evidence would be ‘some evidence, besides the [admission] ... that the crime was real and not imaginary’). This argument also fails because, here, as in Adams, there was sufficient corroboration for the defendant's admission in the other evidence, including particularly the fact that the truck was found in the woods with no one else around, and the defendant had the keys to the truck in his pocket.

Judgment affirmed.