Cellino & Barnes, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Christian R. Oliver, Ellen B. Sturm, and Erica Tannenbaum of counsel), for appellants.
Kelly Rode & Kelly, LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (John W. Hoefling of counsel), for respondents.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, SANDRA L. SGROI, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
Opinion
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mayer, J.), dated August 22, 2013, as granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
“Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) apply to owners, contractors, and their agents” (Medina v. R.M. Resources, 107 A.D.3d 859, 860, 968 N.Y.S.2d 533 ; see Labor Law §§ 240[1] ; 241[6]; Albanese v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.3d 217, 219, 800 N.Y.S.2d 538, 833 N.E.2d 1213 ; Holifield v. Seraphim, LLC, 92 A.D.3d 841, 842, 940 N.Y.S.2d 100 ). “A party is deemed to be an agent of an owner or general contractor under the Labor Law when it has supervisory control and authority over the work being done where a plaintiff is injured” (Medina v. R.M. Resources, 107 A.D.3d at 860, 968 N.Y.S.2d 533 ; see Esteves–Rivas v. W2001Z/15CPW Realty, LLC, 104 A.D.3d 802, 804, 961 N.Y.S.2d 497 ; Samaroo v. Patmos Fifth Real Estate, Inc., 102 A.D.3d 944, 946, 959 N.Y.S.2d 229 ; Rodriguez v. JMB Architecture, LLC, 82 A.D.3d 949, 951, 919 N.Y.S.2d 40 ). “Similarly, where, as here, a claim against a defendant arises out of alleged defects or dangers in the methods or materials of the work, recovery cannot be had under Labor Law § 200 or pursuant to the principles of common-law negligence unless it is shown that the party to be charged under that theory of liability had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work” (Medina v. R.M. Resources, 107 A.D.3d at 860, 968 N.Y.S.2d 533 ; see Ross v. Curtis–Palmer Hydro–Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 505, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49, 618 N.E.2d 82 ).
Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) by establishing that they were not owners, contractors, or statutory agents under those provisions (see Caiazzo v. Mark Joseph Contr., Inc., 119 A.D.3d 718, 720, 990 N.Y.S.2d 529 ; Medina v. R.M. Resources, 107 A.D.3d at 861, 968 N.Y.S.2d 533 ; Holifield v. Seraphim, LLC, 92 A.D.3d at 842–843, 940 N.Y.S.2d 100 ). The defendants also established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence through the submission of evidence which demonstrated that they did not have the authority to supervise or control the manner in which the injured plaintiff performed his work (see Medina v. R.M. Resources, 107 A.D.3d at 861, 968 N.Y.S.2d 533 ; Koat v.
Consolidated Edison of N.Y., Inc.,
98 A.D.3d 474, 475–476,
949 N.Y.S.2d 699 ;
Cambizaca v. New York City Tr. Auth., 57 A.D.3d 701, 702,
871 N.Y.S.2d 220 ;
McLeod v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Sts.,
41 A.D.3d 796, 798,
839 N.Y.S.2d 164 ). To the extent that the defendants had general supervisory authority over the work, this was insufficient in itself to impose liability under the Labor Law (
see
Rodriguez v. JMB Architecture, LLC, 82 A.D.3d at 951,
919 N.Y.S.2d 40 ;
Cambizaca v. New York City Tr. Auth., 57 A.D.3d at 702,
871 N.Y.S.2d 220 ;
McLeod v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Sts., 41 A.D.3d at 798,
839 N.Y.S.2d 164 ;
Haider v. Davis, 35 A.D.3d 363, 364,
827 N.Y.S.2d 179 ;
Armentano v. Broadway Mall Props., Inc., 30 A.D.3d 450, 451,
817 N.Y.S.2d 132 ).
In opposition to the defendants' prima facie showing, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.