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Attorney(S)

The case was argued by the attorney-general, for the United States; no counsel appeared for the defendant. The attorney-general stated that the note described in the indictment, was in all respects the same as a note of the mother bank, excepting the signatures of the president and cashier of the bank. Instead of those signatures, the names of the president and cashier of the branch bank at Fayetteville were affixed to the note. The question is, whether this bill came within the description in the eighteenth section of the act incorporating the bank, which punishes the offence charged as counterfeiting a bill or note issued by order of the bank. The question turns upon the interpretation of the word "purport" in the section. If the paper purports to be a bill or note of the bank it is enough; although it may not be signed by the proper officers of the bank. The cases which have been decided in England fully maintain this position. They are found in 2 Russell on Crimes, 338, 340, 342, 344, 345, 346, 363, 365, 366, 456, 470, 471; and in 10 Petersdorf's Abridg. 55, 56.

Judges

Joseph Story

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: The United States v. Abel Turner (January Term, 1833)

Factual and Procedural Background

Abel Turner was indicted in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of North Carolina at May term 1832 under the eighteenth section of the act incorporating the Bank of the United States (April 10, 1816, ch. 44). The indictment contained multiple counts charging Turner with forging and attempting to pass a paper in imitation of, and purporting to be, a bill or note issued by the Bank of the United States.

The principal instrument at issue purported on its face to be a Bank of the United States bill promising payment of twenty dollars on demand at "their office of discount and deposit in Fayetteville" and bore the signatures "John W. Sandford, cashier" and "John Huske, president." In fact, John Huske had not been president of the Bank of the United States (he was president of the Fayetteville office), and John W. Sandford had not been cashier of the mother bank (he was cashier of the Fayetteville office).

The indictment included counts for forging, attempting to pass, and uttering the note, and specifically included counts alleging an attempt to pass the note to one Elliott and to S.E. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on the fourth and fifth counts (related to attempts to pass the note to Elliott) and not guilty as to the other counts.

During trial, the circuit court judges were divided on whether the attempt to pass the described counterfeit, signed as described, constituted an offense under the eighteenth section of the Bank charter. Because of the division, the question was certified to the Supreme Court of the United States for decision.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether an attempt to pass a false or counterfeit paper that on its face "purports to be a bill or note issued by the order of the president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States" — but is signed by persons who were not, in fact, the president and cashier of the mother bank (rather, officers of a branch office) — falls within the eighteenth section of the 1816 act and is therefore an indictable offense under that statute.
How the word "purport" in the statutory phrase "purporting to be a bill or note issued by order of the ... Bank" should be interpreted for purposes of criminal liability under the statute.

Arguments of the Parties

United States (argued by the Attorney-General)

The paper described in the indictment was, in all respects, the same as a genuine note of the mother bank except for the signatures: it bore the names of the president and cashier of the branch office at Fayetteville rather than those of the mother bank's president and cashier.
The dispositive question is the interpretation of the word "purport" in the eighteenth section: if a paper appears on its face to be a bill or note of the bank, that is sufficient to bring it within the statutory description, even if it is not signed by the proper officers of the mother bank.
English authorities (as cited: Russell on Crimes and Petersdorf's Abridgment) support the position that such a paper, which on its face purports to be a bank note, is within the scope of forgery and uttering statutes analogous to the eighteenth section.

Defendant (Abel Turner)

No counsel appeared for the defendant at argument before the Supreme Court; therefore, no argument for the defendant is recorded in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Jones's Case (Douglas, 802)	Cited for the proposition that the word "purport" imports what appears on the face of the instrument.	The Court relied on this authority to support its textual interpretation that a note "purporting to be" a bank bill is judged by its facial appearance, bringing it within the statute if it appears on its face to be issued by the bank.
2 Russell on Crimes (multiple citations: b. 4, ch. 32, sec. 1, pp. cited)	Authority for several principles: (a) that making a false instrument in the name of a non-existent person is forgery; (b) that it is immaterial whether a forged instrument would be valid if genuine; and (c) other supporting passages interpreting forgery and uttering.	The Court invoked these passages to justify treating a forged instrument signed in the name of unauthorized or fictitious officers as forgery and to show that validity of the instrument, if genuine, is not material to the criminality of the act.
10 Petersdorf's Abridgment (pp. 55–56)	English cases compiled that, according to counsel, maintain the position that a paper purporting on its face to be a bank note falls within forgery/uttering rules.	Referenced by the Attorney-General in support of the textual and policy reading of the statute; used by the Court as part of the corpus of English authority consistent with its conclusion.
2 East, P. C., ch. 19 (sec. 44, p. 950; sec. 38, p. 940; sec. 43, p. 948)	Authorities addressing the public mischief of counterfeit paper, and principles that: (a) a false instrument made in the name of a person not existing is forgery; (b) validity of the forged instrument if genuine is not material.	The Court cited these sections to support the statutory interpretation and the public-policy rationale that the statute was meant to prevent public deception by counterfeit paper that appears to be bank issues on its face.
Deakins's Case (1 Siderf. Rep. 142)	Decided that it is not material, for the offense of forgery, whether a forged instrument would be valid if genuine.	The Court relied on this historic authority to reinforce that collateral defects (not appearing on the face) do not negate forgery liability.
1 Hawk. P. C. (Pl. Cr.), ch. 70, sec. 7	Cited (via Deakins's case reference) for the proposition that the validity of a forged instrument, if genuine, is not material to the forgery charge.	Used to corroborate the point that a forged instrument's potential substantive validity does not absolve the maker from forgery liability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the text of the eighteenth section of the Bank's charter, which penalizes persons who "falsely make ... any bill or note in imitation of, or purporting to be a bill or note issued by order of the president, directors and company of the said bank" and who pass or attempt to pass any such false bill "purporting to be" an issued bill, knowing it to be forged.

The Court focused on the meaning of the word "purport" and concluded that it refers to what the instrument shows on its face. In support of this textual reading the Court contrasted the statutory phrase "in imitation of" with "purporting to be":

"In imitation of" naturally refers to counterfeiting a genuine bill produced by the proper officers (i.e., a copy of an authentic bank bill).
"Purporting to be" refers to a bill that, on its face, appears to be signed by the proper officers (regardless of whether those signatures in fact belong to the genuine officers).

Under this construction, a paper that appears on its face to be a bank note — for example, bearing the names of persons presented as the president and cashier — "purports to be" a bank bill even if the named persons are not the actual officers of the mother bank. The Court emphasized that it is immaterial, for statutory culpability, whether the signatures are the names of real or fictitious persons, or whether the instrument would bind the bank if it were genuine.

The Court also articulated a policy rationale: the statute's object is to protect the public from counterfeit paper that appears on its face to be issued by the bank. Ordinary members of the public could not be expected to know, at particular times, who the bank's officers were, since those officers could be removed or replaced at the directors' pleasure. Therefore, the public mischief the statute sought to prevent would be just as severe if counterfeits bore fictitious or unauthorized names as if they bore the actual officers' names.

Finally, the Court surveyed English authorities on forgery and uttering counterfeit paper and found them to support the same principles: (1) forging an instrument in the name of a non-existing person is forgery; (2) the potential validity of the forged instrument, if genuine, does not negate the criminal character of the forgery; and (3) collateral objections not appearing on the face are not a defense to forgery charges. Based on the statutory language, this policy reasoning, and the cited authorities, the Court concluded the act covered the conduct charged.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Supreme Court held that the attempt to pass the counterfeit bill described in the indictment — a paper which on its face purports to be a bill or note issued by order of the president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States but which was signed by persons who were not the mother bank's president and cashier — is an offense within the meaning and provisions of the eighteenth section of the act incorporating the Bank of the United States (the act of April 10, 1816, ch. 44).

Direct consequences: The Court adjudged and ordered that this opinion be certified to the circuit court for the District of North Carolina, answering the certified question that the described attempt to pass the counterfeit bill is an offense under the statute.

Broader implications (as stated by the Court): The decision enforces a construction of the statute designed to protect the public against counterfeit paper that outwardly appears to be bank issues. The Court relied on established authorities to conclude that forgery and uttering liability extend to instruments that on their face purport to be issued by the bank, regardless of whether the named signatories are actually the bank's proper officers or whether the instrument would be valid if genuine. The opinion frames this as an application of the statute's protective policy rather than as the creation of a novel legal principle.

This summary is based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.

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THE UNITED STATES v. ABEL TURNER.

Indictment in the circuit court of North Carolina for the forgery of, and an attempt to pass, c. a certain paper writing in imitation of, and purporting to be a bill or note issued by the president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States, founded on the eighteenth section of the act of 1816, establishing the Bank of the United States. The note was signed with the name of John Huske, who had not been at any time president of the Bank of the United States, but who, at the time of the date of the counterfeit, was the president of the office of discount at Fayetteville; and was countersigned by the name of John W. Sandford, who at no time was cashier of the mother bank, but was at the said date cashier of the said office of discount and deposit. Held, that this was an offence within the provisions of the law. It is clear that the policy of the act extends to the case. The object is to guard the public from false and counterfeit paper, purporting on its face to be issued by the bank. It could not be presumed that persons in general could be cognizant of the fact who, at particular periods, were the president and cashier of the bank. They were officers liable to be removed at the pleasure of the directors, and the times of their appointment or removal, or even their names, could not ordinarily be within the knowledge of the body of the citizens. The public mischief would be equally great, whether the names were those of the genuine officers, or of fictitious or unauthorized persons, and ordinary diligence would not protect them against imposition.

ON a certificate of division from the circuit court of the United States for the district of North Carolina.

The defendant, Abel Turner, was indicted at May term 1832, in the circuit court, under the eighteenth section of the act, incorporating the Bank of the United States, passed in April 1816.

The indictment contained four counts.

The first count charged the defendant with having forged and counterfeited a bill or note issued by the orders of the president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States, the tenor of which said false, forged and counterfeited paper writing is as follows, to wit, "the president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States promise to pay twenty dollars, on demand, at their office of discount and deposit, in Fayetteville, to the order of D. Anderson, cashier thereof, Philadelphia, the 4th of July 1827, John W. Sandford, cashier, John Huske, president," with intent to defraud the president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States, against the form of the act of congress, c.

The second count charged the defendant with an attempt to pass the said note, describing it in the same form, knowing it to be forged, with intent to defraud the Bank of the United States.

The third count charged the offence of passing, uttering and publishing the same note, with intent to defraud the bank.

The fourth and fifth counts charged the defendant with an attempt to pass, and with having passed the note to one Elliott, with intent to defraud him. The note was described in these counts in the same form and terms as in the first count.

The jury found the defendant guilty on the fourth and fifth counts, and not guilty as to the residue.

Upon the trial of the cause it occurred as a question, whether the attempt to pass the counterfeit bill, in the indictment mentioned, knowing the same to be counterfeit, the said bill being signed with the name of John Huske, who had not, at any time, been president of the Bank of the United States, but at the time of the date of the said counterfeit bill was the president of the office of discount and deposit of the Bank of the United States at Fayetteville, and countersigned with the name of John W. Sandford, who at no time was cashier of the Bank of the United States, but was, at the date aforesaid, cashier of the said office of discount and deposit, was an offence within the provisions of the act entitled an act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States: upon which question, the judges, being divided in opinion, ordered that the same should be certified to the supreme court of the United States for the opinion of that court.

Mr Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause comes before the court upon a certificate of division of opinion of the judges of the circuit court for the district of North Carolina. The defendant, Abel Turner, was indicted for the forgery of, and an attempt to pass, c. a certain paper writing in imitation of, and purporting to be a bill or note issued by the president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States. The indictment contained several counts, all founded upon the eighteenth section of the act of the 10th of April 1816, ch. 44, establishing the Bank of the United States. Upon the trial of the cause it occurred as a question, whether the attempt to pass the counterfeit bill in the indictment mentioned, knowing the same to be counterfeit, the said bill being signed with the name of John Huske, who had not at any time been president of the Bank of the United States, but at the time of the date of the said counterfeit bill was the president of the office of discount and deposit of the Bank of the United States at Fayetteville, and countersigned by the name of John W. Sandford, who at no time was cashier of the Bank of the United States, but was, at the date aforesaid, cashier of the said office of discount and deposit, was an offence within the provisions of the act. Upon this question the court, being divided in opinion, ordered the same to be certified to this court.

The bill or note itself is not set forth in haec verba, except in the count on which the question arose, and which charges that the defendant, with force and arms, c. "feloniously did attempt to pass to one S.E. as and for a true and good bill or note, a certain false, forged and counterfeit paper writing, the tenor of which, c. is as follows, `the president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States promise to pay twenty dollars on demand, at their office of discount and deposit in Fayetteville, to the order of D. Anderson, cashier thereof, Philadelphia, the 4th of July 1827, John W. Sandford, cashier, John Huske, president,' with intent to defraud the president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States." The bill therefore purports on its face to be signed by persons who are respectively president and cashier of the bank.

One of the fundamental articles of the charter (sect. 11, art. 12) declares that the bills and notes which may be issued by order of the corporation, signed by the president and countersigned by the cashier, promising the payment of money to any person or persons, his, her or their order, or to bearer, shall be binding and obligatory on the same. So that the present counterfeit bill purports to be signed by officers, who were the proper officers to sign the genuine bills of the bank.

The persons named in the counterfeit bill not being in fact the president and cashier, although so called; the question arises, whether the party is liable to indictment for an attempt to pass it, under the eighteenth section of the act of 1816.

We are of opinion, that he is, within the words and true intent and meaning of the act. The words of the act are, "if any person shall falsely make, c., or cause or procure to be falsely made, c., or willingly aid or assist in falsely making, c., any bill or note in imitation of, or purporting to be a bill or note issued by order of the president, directors and company of the said bank, c. c.; or shall pass, utter or publish, or attempt to pass, utter or publish as true any false, c. bill or note, purporting to be a bill or note issued by the order of the president, directors and company of the said bank, c., knowing the same to be falsely forged or counterfeited, c., every such person, c. c." The case, therefore, falls directly within the terms of the act. It is an attempt to pass a false bill or note as true, purporting to be a bill or note issued by the order of the president, directors and company; for the word "purport" imports what appears on the face of the instrument. Jones's Case, Douglas, 802; 2 Russell on Crimes, b. 4, ch. 32, sec. 1, p. 345, 346, 2d edition; Id. 363 to 367. The preceding clause of the section very clearly shows this to be the sense of the word in this connexion. It is there said, if any person shall falsely make, c. any bill " in imitation of or purporting to be a bill," c. where the words "in imitation of" properly refer to counterfeiting a genuine bill, made by the proper, authorized officers of the bank; and the words "or purporting to be," properly refer to a counterfeit bill, which on its face appears to be signed by the proper officers. In the view of the act then, it is wholly immaterial whether the bill attempted to be passed be signed in the name of real or fictitious persons, or whether it would, if genuine, be binding on the bank or not.

And it is equally clear, that the policy of the act extends to the case. The object is to guard the public from false and counterfeit paper, purporting on its face to be issued by the bank. It could not be presumed that persons in general would be cognizant of the fact, who at particular periods were the president and cashier of the bank. They were officers liable to be removed at the pleasure of the directors; and the times of their appointment or removal, or even their names, could not ordinarily be within the knowledge of the body of the citizens. The public mischief would be equally great, whether the names were those of the genuine officers, or of fictitious or unauthorized persons; and ordinary diligence could not protect them against imposition. 2 East's P.C. ch. 19, sec. 44, p. 950; 2 Russell on Crimes, b. 4, ch. 32, sec. 1, p. 341, 2d edition.

Upon examining the English authorities upon the subject of forgery and the utterance of counterfeit paper, they appear to us fully to justify and support a similar doctrine. It is, for instance, clearly settled that the making of a false instrument, which is the subject of forgery, with a fraudulent intent, although in the name of a non-existing person, is as much a forgery as if it had been made in the name of a person known to exist, and to whom credit was due 2 Russell on Crimes, b. 4, ch. 32, sec. 1, 2d edition, p. 327 to 333, and the cases there cited; Id. 470, 474; 2 East, P. Cr. ch. 19, sec. 38, p. 940. Nor is it material whether a forged instrument be made in such a manner, as that if in truth it were such as it is counterfeited for, it would be of validity or not. This was decided as long ago as Deakins's case, 1 Siderf. Rep. 142; 1 Hawk. Pl. Cr. ch. 70, sec. 7; 2 East, P.C. ch. 19, sec. 43, p. 948. Nor is it any answer to the charge of forgery, that the instrument is not available, by reason of some collateral objection not appearing upon the face of it. 2 Russell on Crimes, b. 4, ch. 32, sec. 1, 2d edition, p. 337 to 341, Id. 470 to 474.

So that upon the words and policy of the act itself, as well as upon the footing of authority, we are of opinion, that the offence stated in the division of opinion is within the act of 1816. And we shall accordingly certify this to the circuit court.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the district of North Carolina, and on the question and point on which the judges of the said circuit court were opposed in opinion, and which was certified to this court for its opinion, agreeably to the act of congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel: on consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court, that the attempt to pass the counterfeit bill in the indictment in the proceedings mentioned under the circumstances in the said certificate of division of opinion mentioned, is an offence within the provisions of the act of congress stated in the same certificate: whereupon, it is adjudged and ordered by the court, that it be certified to the said circuit court for the district of North Carolina, that the attempt to pass the counterfeit bill in the indictment in the proceedings mentioned under the circumstances in the said certificate of division of opinion mentioned, is an offence within the provisions of the act of congress stated in the same certificate.

UNITED STATES v. TURNER