Iacovangelo v. Corr. Med. Care, Inc.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a final judgment entered on January 22, 2015, by the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, which dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint and denied his motion for reconsideration. The plaintiff, Frank B. Iacovangelo, as Administrator of the Estate of Maria Viera, challenged the circumstances surrounding Viera's death on September 2, 2010, from myocarditis allegedly caused by heroin withdrawal while in custody at the Monroe County Jail. The amended complaint alleged constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to medical indifference and supervisory liability. The district court dismissed the complaint and denied reconsideration, prompting this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the amended complaint properly pleaded a claim for indifference to the medical needs of a pre-trial detainee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Whether the amended complaint properly pleaded a Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on municipal liability.

Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's post-judgment motion for reconsideration.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff-Appellant's Arguments

The district court erred by construing facts in favor of the defendants rather than the plaintiff when reviewing the amended complaint.

The amended complaint sufficiently alleged a constitutional claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of a pre-trial detainee, satisfying both the objective and subjective prongs.

The amended complaint properly pleaded a Monell claim by alleging a municipal policy, custom, or deliberate indifference by supervisory officials.

The district court abused its discretion by denying the motion for reconsideration.

Defendants-Appellees' Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2009)	Standard for deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; objective and subjective prongs of medical indifference claims.	Used to establish that claims of medical indifference for pre-trial detainees are analyzed under the Due Process Clause but with the same standard as Eighth Amendment claims, requiring a serious medical condition and deliberate indifference.
Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013)	Clarification of the objective and subjective elements required to state an Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim.	Applied to confirm the necessity of showing an objectively serious deprivation and a culpable state of mind by officials.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)	Definition of "deliberate indifference" as knowledge of and disregard for an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.	Used to analyze the subjective prong by determining whether defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to Viera's health.
Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398 (2d Cir. 2005)	Standard for subjective deliberate indifference requiring awareness of a substantial risk.	Applied to assess the defendants' knowledge and disregard of Viera’s medical condition.
Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2012)	Requirements for pleading a Monell claim, including formal policy, widespread custom, or deliberate indifference by supervisory officials.	Used to evaluate whether the plaintiff’s allegations met the threshold for municipal liability under Monell, which the court found insufficient.
Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2013)	Standard of review for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), requiring acceptance of factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.	Guided the court’s de novo review of the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.
Williams v. Citigroup, Inc., 659 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)	Standard of review for denial of post-judgment motions for leave to replead.	Applied to review the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.

Precedent

Rule or Principle Cited For

Application by the Court

Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2009)

Standard for deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; objective and subjective prongs of medical indifference claims.

Used to establish that claims of medical indifference for pre-trial detainees are analyzed under the Due Process Clause but with the same standard as Eighth Amendment claims, requiring a serious medical condition and deliberate indifference.

Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013)

Clarification of the objective and subjective elements required to state an Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim.

Applied to confirm the necessity of showing an objectively serious deprivation and a culpable state of mind by officials.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)

Definition of "deliberate indifference" as knowledge of and disregard for an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.

Used to analyze the subjective prong by determining whether defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to Viera's health.

Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398 (2d Cir. 2005)

Standard for subjective deliberate indifference requiring awareness of a substantial risk.

Applied to assess the defendants' knowledge and disregard of Viera’s medical condition.

Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2012)

Requirements for pleading a Monell claim, including formal policy, widespread custom, or deliberate indifference by supervisory officials.

Used to evaluate whether the plaintiff’s allegations met the threshold for municipal liability under Monell, which the court found insufficient.

Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2013)

Standard of review for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), requiring acceptance of factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

Guided the court’s de novo review of the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.

Williams v. Citigroup, Inc., 659 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)

Standard of review for denial of post-judgment motions for leave to replead.

Applied to review the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the dismissal of the amended complaint de novo, accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. Regarding the medical indifference claim, the court applied the established two-prong test requiring an objectively serious medical condition and subjective deliberate indifference. The court found that the allegations about Viera’s drug use, withdrawal symptoms, and distress sufficiently pleaded an objectively serious medical condition. On the subjective prong, the court concluded that Nurse Augello’s knowledge of Viera’s condition and failure to refer her for medically supervised withdrawal met the deliberate indifference standard, but the allegations against Nurse McQueeney did not sufficiently establish knowledge of the risk.

For the Monell claim, the court applied the three recognized methods to plead municipal liability: formal policy, widespread custom, or deliberate indifference by supervisory officials. The court found that the plaintiff failed to allege a formal policy or a widespread custom related to inadequate medical supervision for withdrawal, noting only one other similar incident. Additionally, no plausible allegations showed supervisory personnel’s knowledge of constitutional violations, defeating the Monell claim.

Because the court vacated and remanded the district court’s underlying judgment, it declined to address the plaintiff’s challenge to the denial of the post-judgment motion for reconsideration. The court considered and rejected all other arguments as without merit.

Holding and Implications

The court’s final decision was to AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Specifically, the court affirmed dismissal of the Monell claim and the claims against certain defendants but vacated the dismissal of the claim against Nurse Augello for deliberate indifference and remanded for further consideration.

The direct effect is that the plaintiff’s claim against Nurse Augello may proceed, while other claims remain dismissed. The opinion does not establish new precedent, as it is a summary order and explicitly states it has no precedential effect.

FRANK B. IACOVANGELO, Public Administrator, Monroe County, as Administrator of the Estate of Maria Viera, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL CARE, INC., EMRE UMAR, REGISTERED NURSE TAMARA AUGELLO, REGISTERED NURSE MARYANNE MCQUEENEY, MARIA BIUSO, whose job title cannot presently be determined but who ser

FOR THE COURT: CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 14 day of September, two thousand fifteen. Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, PETER W. HALL, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges. For Plaintiff-Appellant: ELMER ROBERT KEACH, III, Albany, NY. For Defendants-Appellees: PAUL A. SANDERS, Hiscock & Barclay, LLP, Rochester, NY; Monroe County Law Department, Rochester, NY.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Siragusa, J.).

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

Plaintiff-Appellant appeals from a final judgment entered on January 22, 2015, by the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Siragusa, J.), which dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint and denied his motion for reconsideration. The factual gravamen of the plaintiff's amended complaint concerned Maria Viera's death on September 2, 2010, from myocarditis, allegedly as a result of heroin withdrawal, in the Monroe County Jail in Rochester, New York. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the district court failed to follow the appropriate standard of review by consistently construing facts from the amended complaint in favor of the defendants rather than the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff contends (1) that the amended complaint properly pleaded a claim for indifference to the medical needs of a pre-trial detainee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) that the amended complaint properly pleaded a Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) that the district court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff's post-judgment motion for reconsideration. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues presented for review.

We review de novo a district court's decision dismissing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), and must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2013). We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision to deny a post-judgment motion for leave to replead. See Williams v. Citigroup, Inc., 659 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

First, the plaintiff contends that the amended complaint properly pleaded a claim for indifference to the medical needs of a pre-trial detainee in state custody, in violation of her constitutional rights and actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim for indifference to the medical needs of a pre-trial detainee in state custody is properly analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, though such claims "should be analyzed under the same standard irrespective of whether they are brought under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment." Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). An inmate must allege (1) an objectively "serious medical condition"; and (2) subjective "deliberate indifference" on the part of the defendant official. Id.; see also Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that to state an Eighth Amendment claim,"an inmate must allege that: (1) objectively, the deprivation the inmate suffered was sufficiently serious" and "(2) subjectively, the defendant official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The plaintiff contends that the district court erred in finding that the amended complaint failed to satisfy both objective and subjective prongs.

Although there is no per se rule that drug or alcohol withdrawal constitutes an objectively serious medical condition, courts in this Circuit have found many such instances to satisfy the objective prong. See, e.g., Caiozzo, 581 F.3d at 69 (finding, with respect to the objective prong, that "there is no dispute that Caiozzo had a serious medical condition" where he suffered from alcohol withdrawal); Livermore v. City of New York, No. 08-cv-4442, 2011 WL 182052, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2011) ("[T]he Second Circuit often holds, frequently with little elaboration, that alcohol withdrawal satisfies the first element"). Here, the amended complaint pleaded that it was clear that Viera needed medically supervised drug detoxification because she acknowledged being under the influence of drugs, daily drug usage, and a history of drug abuse, at the time of her admission to Monroe County Jail, and that "a visual assessment" would have shown that "she was under the influence of drugs at the time of her admission." J.A. 46. Further, the amended complaint alleged that "Viera was observed vomiting in her toilet and otherwise being in distress." J.A. 47. Drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, such allegations sufficiently plead an objectively serious medical condition.

With respect to the subjective prong, the question is whether the defendants "kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [Viera's] health or safety" or were both "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and . . . also dr[e]w the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 2005). The plaintiff challenges the district court's determination that the subjective prong was not satisfied with respect to Nurse Augello and Nurse McQueeney. With respect to Augello, the amended complaint alleges that, at booking, Viera was subjected by Augello to a medical screening, during which it was evident that Viera was suffering from withdrawal. Indeed, Viera's screening form noted that "Viera admitted to the daily use of drugs . . . , that she had a history of drug and alcohol abuse, and that she acknowledged being under the influence of drugs at the time of her admission to jail." JA 45-46. Despite this, Augello failed to refer Viera to medically supervised withdrawal. With respect to McQueeney, the amended complaint alleges that "Viera was observed vomiting in her toilet and otherwise being in distress by . . . McQueen[e]y." J.A. 47. But unlike Augello, the Amended Complaint does not plead that McQueeney had any knowledge of Viera's history of drug abuse, acknowledgment of being under the influence of drugs at the time of her admission to jail, or awareness that Viera was suffering from withdrawal. Thus, drawing all inferences in the plaintiff's favor, these allegations are sufficient to plead the subjective prong with respect to Augello, but not McQueeney.

Second, the plaintiff argues on appeal that the amended complaint properly pleaded a Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To plead a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a formal policy which is officially endorsed by the municipality, or a practice so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a custom or usage of which supervisory authorities must have been aware, or that a municipal custom, policy, or usage can be inferred from evidence of deliberate indifference of supervisory officials to such abuses. See, e.g., Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2012). None of the three methods of pleading a Monell claim have been met here. First, no formal policy to provide inadequate medically supervised withdrawal has been pleaded outside of entirely conclusory allegations. Second, "a sufficiently widespread practice among [Correctional Medical Care employees] to support reasonably the conclusion that [insufficient medically supervised withdrawal] was the custom . . . and that supervisory personnel must have been aware of it" has not been shown. Id. at 82. Here, although Correctional Medical Care appears to have a troubled track record in many respects, the plaintiff has not pleaded a custom of not providing adequate medical supervision for inmates going through drug or alcohol withdrawal. Indeed, other than the plaintiff, the amended complaint provides only one additional example of a similar incident. Third, "a showing of deliberate indifference on the part of supervisory personnel" to inadequate medically supervised withdrawal has not been plausibly pleaded, as nothing in the complaint plausibly alleges knowledge of this matter on the part of any supervisory personnel. Id.; see also id. at 81 ("[t]o establish deliberate indifference a plaintiff must show that a policymaking official was aware of a constitutional injury").

Finally, the plaintiff contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff's post-judgment motion for reconsideration, filed on October 31, 2014, after the district court entered judgment dismissing the action on October 3, 2014. But because we vacate and remand the district court's underlying judgment, we need not reach the plaintiff's challenge to the district court's post-judgment motion for reconsideration.

We have considered all of the Plaintiff-Appellant's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

FOR THE COURT:

CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK