State v. Hasson

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. A15A1368.

Attorney(S)

Wystan Getz, Sherry Boston, for Appellant. Elizabeth Ann Geoffroy, Raymond V. Giudice, Atlanta, for Appellee.

Judges

William M. Ray

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Lawrence Martin Hasson was charged with multiple offenses including driving without headlights, violation of the open container law, driving while license suspended, reckless driving, and two counts of driving under the influence. He filed a motion challenging venue as improper and requested a transfer of the case from DeKalb County to Fulton County. The DeKalb County trial court granted the motion but characterized it as a motion to suppress evidence rather than a venue challenge. The State appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding venue improper in DeKalb County and in treating the venue challenge as a pretrial motion to suppress. The case involves testimony from an officer who described the events leading to the traffic stop at the border of Fulton and DeKalb counties, with the stop and subsequent investigation occurring in DeKalb County.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in finding venue improper in DeKalb County.
Whether a venue challenge can be properly considered and decided in the context of a pretrial motion styled as a motion to suppress evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Moon v. State, 287 Ga. 304, 696 S.E.2d 55 (2010)	Pretrial venue changes under OCGA § 17–7–150(a)(1) require showing that an impartial jury cannot be obtained in the county where the crime was committed.	Referenced to explain that Hasson did not seek venue transfer under this statute and made no showing of prejudice required for such a change.
Bates v. State, 322 Ga.App. 319, 744 S.E.2d 841 (2013)	To prevail on a motion to change venue, petitioner must show inherent prejudice or actual prejudice in jury selection making a fair trial impossible.	Used to emphasize Hasson's failure to argue or show these grounds for venue change.
State v. Al-Khayyal, 322 Ga.App. 718, 744 S.E.2d 885 (2013)	Pretrial dismissal of indictment for improper venue requires showing it would be impossible for the State to prove venue in the alleged county.	Cited to highlight that Hasson did not move to dismiss the indictment based on improper venue.
Babbitt v. State, 314 Ga.App. 115, 723 S.E.2d 10 (2012)	Review of trial court’s pretrial venue determination following a motion to dismiss indictment.	Referenced in the context of proper procedures for venue challenges.
State v. Johnson, 269 Ga. 370, 499 S.E.2d 56 (1998)	Similar to Babbitt, reviewing pretrial venue determinations.	Used to support procedural context for venue challenges.
State v. Barber, 193 Ga.App. 397, 388 S.E.2d 350 (1989)	Review of pretrial venue dismissal motions.	Supports procedural context and standards for venue dismissal.
State v. Mayze, 280 Ga. 5, 622 S.E.2d 836 (2005)	Review of demurrer to indictment in the context of constitutional venue challenges.	Referenced to illustrate venue challenges in indictment context.
Patterson v. Hragyil, 322 Ga.App. 329, 744 S.E.2d 851 (2013)	Pleadings and motions should be judged by their substance and function, not by their titles.	Applied to interpret Hasson's motion and the trial court’s order despite their titles.
Jones v. State, 329 Ga.App. 439, 765 S.E.2d 639 (2014)	Venue is a jurisdictional fact the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt; defendants should be tried where the crime occurred.	Reiterated the principle that venue must be proven and is generally for the jury to decide.
Graham v. State, 275 Ga. 290, 565 S.E.2d 467 (2002)	Whether venue has been sufficiently proved is an issue for the jury.	Emphasized that venue determination is reserved for the factfinder at trial.
Heard v. State, 280 Ga. 348, 627 S.E.2d 12 (2006)	Not explicitly discussed in the opinion's analysis.	Listed in notes without direct application discussed in the opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by clarifying the nature of Hasson's motion, noting that although it was styled as a "Motion to Challenge Venue," it was not brought under the statutory provision for pretrial venue changes based on jury impartiality, nor did it seek dismissal of the indictment for improper venue. The court emphasized the principle that pleadings and motions must be judged by their substance rather than their titles, concluding that Hasson's motion functioned as a substantive challenge to the State's burden to prove venue.

The trial court's order, although titled as an order denying a motion to suppress, effectively granted the venue challenge by concluding venue was improper in DeKalb County. The appellate court found this to be an error because venue is a jurisdictional fact that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, typically through direct and circumstantial evidence, and the determination of venue is a question for the jury, not for resolution on a pretrial motion. The court noted that the traffic stop and investigation occurred within DeKalb County’s jurisdiction, supporting the State’s position.

Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the correct legal standard that venue is to be determined at trial by the factfinder.

Holding and Implications

The appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the venue challenge and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The direct effect of this decision is that the venue determination remains with the jury at trial, and the case will proceed in DeKalb County. The opinion does not establish new legal precedent but reaffirms established principles that venue is a jurisdictional fact for the jury to decide and that pretrial motions styled as suppression motions cannot substitute for proper venue challenges under the law.

Show full summary ...

The STATE v. HASSON.

Ray, Judge.

Wystan Getz, Sherry Boston, for Appellant.

Elizabeth Ann Geoffroy, Raymond V. Giudice, Atlanta, for Appellee.

Opinion

Ray, Judge.

Lawrence Martin Hasson was charged with driving without headlights (OCGA § 40–8–20); violation of open container law (OCGA § 40–6–253); driving while license suspended (OCGA § 40–5–121(a)); reckless driving (OCGA § 40–6–390); driving under the influence (less safe-alcohol) (OCGA § 40–6–391(a)(1)); and driving under the influence (per se) (OCGA § 40–6–391(a)(5)). He filed a motion challenging venue as improper and seeking a transfer of the case from DeKalb County to Fulton County. After a hearing, a DeKalb County trial court issued an order granting the motion but characterizing the issue as a motion for suppression of evidence. The State appeals,arguing that the trial court erred in finding venue improper in DeKalb County and in considering the venue challenge in the context of a pretrial motion. Finding error, we reverse.

The State moved for reconsideration of the trial court's grant of the suppression motion, but filed its notice of appeal before receiving a ruling. Therefore, the trial court lost jurisdiction. See

At the hearing on Hasson's motion challenging venue, Officer John Thompson IV with the Atlanta Police Department's DUI Task Force testified that on May 24, 2014, another officer was dispatched to check out “a person asleep behind the wheel at Ponce de Leon and Moreland Avenue” after a “concerned citizen” made a 911 call. Thompson testified that the 911 call was placed to “City of Atlanta ... Zone 6” which is “partially in DeKalb and partially in Fulton County[.]” He testified that the initial call to the other officer took place “right on the line, but on the Fulton County side.” The other officer activated his blue lights, but the subject vehicle proceeded through an intersection where

Moreland splits the DeKalb and Fulton County line. So the vehicle proceeded over Moreland and into DeKalb County. As it proceeded into DeKalb County, [the other officer] observed [that] the vehicle did not have its lights on. He initiated a traffic stop. The vehicle stopped at Ponce and Springdale, which is within DeKalb County's jurisdiction.

Officer Thompson testified that Hasson was stopped at “the border of Fulton and DeKalb County[,]” which is “literally, the dividing line ... for the zone, and for jurisdiction[,]” approximately “a half mile” over the county line. He testified that “we have jurisdiction in DeKalb ... to that particular point, we hadn't left the City of Atlanta in DeKalb County's jurisdiction.” Officer Thompson then conducted a DUI investigation in DeKalb County and arrested Hasson. Hasson was booked through the City of Atlanta Jail and had a first appearance hearing in Atlanta Municipal Court.

1. As an initial matter, we must discuss the nomenclature and the substance of both the motion and the order at issue in this appeal.

Hasson filed a motion entitled “Motion to Challenge Venue,” which argues that venue is improper in DeKalb County and requests that venue be transferred from DeKalb County State Court to Fulton County State Court. While Hasson sought a transfer of venue, he did not do so pursuant to OCGA § 17–7–150(a)(1), which provides for pretrial venue changes where an impartial jury cannot be obtained in the county where the crime was committed. See Moon v. State,287 Ga. 304, 312(3), 696 S.E.2d 55 (2010)(Nahmias, J., concurring). “To prevail

on a motion to change venue, the petitioner must show (1) that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial or (2) that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bates v. State,322 Ga.App. 319, 321(2), 744 S.E.2d 841 (2013). Hasson has made no argument or showing on these points.

Nor did Hasson's pretrial motion seek dismissal of the DeKalb County indictment based on improper venue. See State v. Al–Khayyal,322 Ga.App. 718, 720–721, 725, 744 S.E.2d 885 (2013)(reversing a trial court's grant of a pretrial motion to dismiss indictment for lack of venue where the record did not support a finding that it would be impossible for the State to show defendant committed the offenses in a particular county, as alleged in the indictment); Babbitt v. State,314 Ga.App. 115, 116–117(1), 723 S.E.2d 10 (2012)(reviewing a trial court's pretrial venue determination following defendant's motion to dismiss indictment); State v. Johnson,269 Ga. 370, 372(2), 499 S.E.2d 56 (1998)(same); State v. Barber,193 Ga.App. 397, 398–399, 388 S.E.2d 350 (1989)(same). See also State v. Mayze,280 Ga. 5, 5, 10–11, 622 S.E.2d 836 (2005)(reviewing defendant's demurrer to indictment in the context of a constitutional challenge to the venue provision of a particular Code section).

We recognize that “[t]here is no magic in nomenclature, and we judge pleadings, motions and orders not by their name but by their function and substance, being always mindful to construe such documents in a manner compatible with the best interests of justice.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Patterson v. Hragyil,322 Ga.App. 329, 331, n. 2, 744 S.E.2d 851 (2013). Here, Hasson's motion functions as a substantive challenge as to whether the State can meet its burden of proving venue, and his motion seeks to transfer venue on that basis.

The trial court responded to that motion with a determination titled “Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress.” The order states that “Defendant's [m]otion to [s]uppress is hereby GRANTED[.]” Hasson made no motion to suppress. The trial court's order does not dismiss the DeKalb County indictment. Rather, it states that it is granting Hasson's motion because

1. The Defendant's case was presented to the City of Atlanta Municipal Court for an Inquiry Hearing on July 17, 2014. 2. That the initial proba[ble] cause for the stop of Defendant's vehicle [occurred] in the City of Atlanta, Fulton County[,] where the officer activated Blue Lights[.] 3. The City of Atlanta Police Dept. prepared the initial police report.

Again, we judge orders not by their names or titles, but by their function and substance. Id. The substance of the trial court's order is a per se determination of venue and, apparently, a grant of Hasson's motion to transfer the case to Fulton County on the basis that venue is improper in DeKalb County. As the State contends in its second enumeration, a determination of venue in the particular context presented to us is reserved for the finder of fact at trial.

“Venue is a jurisdictional fact and an essential element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt for every crime. The State may use both direct and circumstantial evidence to prove venue. In general, defendants should be tried in the county where the crime occurred.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State,329 Ga.App. 439, 444(1)(b), 765 S.E.2d 639 (2014)(reiterating that if a crime is committed in transit or in more than one county, Georgia law provides special methods to establish venue). See also OCGA § 17–2–2(a), (b), (e), (h). Pertinently, “[w]hether venue has been sufficiently proved is an issue for the juryto determine.” (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Graham v. State,275 Ga. 290, 292(2), 565 S.E.2d 467 (2002). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

2. Because the trial court erred as outlined above and we reverse on that basis, we do not address the State's remaining enumeration.

Judgment reversed.

ELLINGTON, P.J., and DILLARD, J., concur.

--------

Notes:

Heard v. State,280 Ga. 348, 349(2), 627 S.E.2d 12 (2006).