Hogan Lovells U.S. LLP, New York, N.Y. (David Dunn, Chava Brandriss, and Courtney Colligan of counsel), for appellant.
Peter A. Joseph, New York, N.Y., for respondent.
Opinion
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rothenberg, J.), dated March 6, 2014, as granted the motion of the defendant Sherifat Oladopo pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) to extend her time to answer the complaint, and denied that branch of its cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against that defendant.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion of the defendant Sherifat Oladopo pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) to extend her time to answer the complaint is denied, and that branch of the plaintiff's cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against that defendant is granted.
“To extend the time to answer the complaint and to compel the plaintiff to accept an untimely answer as timely, a defendant must provide a reasonable excuse for the delay and demonstrate a potentially meritorious defense to the action” (Mannino Dev., Inc. v. Linares, 117 A.D.3d 995, 995, 986 N.Y.S.2d 578; see CPLR 3012[d]; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Lafazan, 115 A.D.3d 647, 648, 983 N.Y.S.2d 32; Maspeth Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. McGown, 77 A.D.3d 890, 891, 909 N.Y.S.2d 642). Here, the defendant Sherifat Oladopo offered no reasonable excuse for her failure to timely answer the complaint (see Maspeth Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. McGown, 77 A.D.3d at 891, 909 N.Y.S.2d 642). Since Oladopo failed to offer a reasonable excuse, it is not necessary to consider whether she demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense (see Emigrant Bank v. O. Carl Wiseman, 127 A.D.3d 1013, 1014, 6 N.Y.S.3d 670; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Rotimi, 121 A.D.3d 855, 856, 995 N.Y.S.2d 81). Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in granting Oladopo's motion pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) to extend her time to answer the complaint.
The Supreme Court also erred in denying that branch of the plaintiff's cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against Oladopo. “On a motion for leave to enter a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215, the movant is required to submit proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting its claim, and proof of the defaulting party's default in answering or appearing” (
Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v. RJNJ Servs., Inc., 89 A.D.3d 649, 651,
932 N.Y.S.2d 109;
see CPLR 3215[f];
BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Reardon, 132 A.D.3d 790, 790,
18 N.Y.S.3d 664). Here, in support of its motion, the plaintiff satisfied these requirements (
see
BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Reardon, 132 A.D.3d at 790,
18 N.Y.S.3d 664;
U.S. Bank N.A. v. Dorestant,
131 A.D.3d 467, 469–470,
15 N.Y.S.3d 142;
Dupps v. Betancourt, 99 A.D.3d 855, 855,
952 N.Y.S.2d 585). “ [S]uccessfulopposition
to a CPLR 3215 motion for leave to enter a default judgment requires the same showing as an affirmative motion for leave to extend the time to answer,” including, inter alia, demonstrating the existence of a reasonable excuse for the default (
Fried v. Jacob Holding, Inc., 110 A.D.3d 56, 66,
970 N.Y.S.2d 260;
see
Weinstein v. Schacht, 98 A.D.3d 1106, 1107,
950 N.Y.S.2d 711). In opposition to the plaintiff's cross motion, Oladopo failed to demonstrate that she had a reasonable excuse for her default (
see
U.S. Bank N.A. v. Dorestant, 131 A.D.3d at 470,
15 N.Y.S.3d 142;
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Austin, 48 A.D.3d 720, 721,
851 N.Y.S.2d 375).
Oladopo's remaining contention is without merit.