PER CURIAM
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Messano, Simonelli and Gooden Brown. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FV-14-0480-15. William J. VonDerHeide argued the cause for appellant (Law Office of Sara Sencer McArdle, LLC, attorneys; Mr. VonDerHeide, of counsel and on the brief; Janice L. Massaro, on the briefs). Elizabeth Szabo argued the cause for respondent (Legal Services of Northwest Jersey, attorneys; Dawn F. Manning, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant I.I. appeals from a December 2, 2014 final restraining order (FRO) entered against him in favor of plaintiff M.M.-C. pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35 (PDVA) based on harassment N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). On appeal, defendant argues that the trial judge's factual findings and legal conclusions lacked the requisite specificity and were based on a flawed assessment of credibility and misplaced sympathy. For the first time on appeal, defendant argues that the judge failed to review the restraints or make findings as to their necessity, unnecessarily burdening his constitutional right to freely exercise his religion by prohibiting him from attending his mosque.
Applying our deferential scope of review, we find that the judge's findings are amply supported by evidence in the record. Further, since defendant failed to raise in the trial court the constitutional challenge to the prohibition against him attending his mosque, that issue is not properly before this Court and will not be considered on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
The record indicates that the parties were married in a Muslim religious ceremony in December 2013. Although the couple never formalized the union civilly, they shared a household at times until about July of 2014.
Neither party disputes their domestic status.
Plaintiff first obtained a FRO against defendant on August 6, 2014 (first FRO). In September 2014, while the first FRO was in place, defendant's sister, with whom plaintiff had a good relationship, began contacting plaintiff in an effort to rekindle the couple's relationship.
The first FRO was issued by the same judge who issued the FRO that is the subject of this appeal. The first FRO was based on the predicate acts of harassment and assault.
Defendant's sister relayed to plaintiff that defendant was facing expulsion from college. She reassured plaintiff that defendant loved her (plaintiff), implored plaintiff to forgive him and begged plaintiff not to hurt him. She assured plaintiff that defendant would not make the same mistake again and stated "god will fix everything." During this period, defendant also communicated with plaintiff, begging her forgiveness. Defendant said to plaintiff "I've done atrocities to you, just give me a chance to make them better." Shortly thereafter, the couple resumed their relationship.
On October 31, 2014, plaintiff returned to the Morris County Courthouse to request dismissal of the first FRO. At defendant's urging, plaintiff falsely reported to the court that she had not been in contact with defendant and was seeking dismissal because she had obtained employment in another state and planned to relocate. Based on plaintiff's request, the judge vacated the first FRO.
Defendant also urged plaintiff to dismiss the criminal contempt charge that was pending against him in Passaic County for violating the first FRO. As a result, plaintiff spoke with a Passaic County Assistant Prosecutor on November 10, 2014, who explained to her that the Prosecutor's Office had already intended to dismiss the case for evidentiary deficiencies.
The incident that triggered plaintiff's domestic violence complaint that is the subject of this appeal occurred later that same day, when plaintiff returned to defendant's residence to prepare dinner and do laundry. At about 5:45 p.m., defendant arrived home and confronted plaintiff, berating her and questioning why his criminal contempt charge had not been dismissed earlier that day.
First, defendant put a pot of water on the stove to boil. Then, defendant beckoned plaintiff into the living room. Defendant bellowed "you couldn't sit your ass in court for four hours, now you're going to sit now." Plaintiff sat on the sofa as directed by defendant. Next, defendant sat on the coffee table directly across from plaintiff, pulled the coffee table closer to plaintiff and pointed at her while he continued to berate her.
Defendant specifically accused plaintiff of "want[ing] to ruin [his] life." He called plaintiff "dumb," "fucking stupid" and a "pathological liar," and argued "[n]o court order is going to come and tell me to do what the fuck I want to do." Defendant threatened:
I know when you're going to stop fucking ruining my life[,] . . . you're going to stop [] when you're dead. When you're dead, when god is going to come to you on the day of judgment[,] he's going to tell you why have you done this stuff to [me]. That's when I'm going to have my revenge . . . not the court, not the jail.
After throwing court papers at plaintiff, defendant portended:
It's . . . just a matter of time until I do this again, you understand. . . . You should go back to Judge Sceusi and put the order back on, because I'm going to fucking do this. I'm just going to do it, because when you're dead it's the only way you're going to stop ruin[ing] my life[. L]ike when you're not here, that's it. Like just—because [you're] alive[,] like you['re] just—you['re] going to ruin me.
When defendant left the living room to attend to the boiling water, plaintiff fled. She left all her belongings and drove to her mother's house. Plaintiff admitted that she did not contact the police that night. She explained that she was embarrassed. She also indicated that defendant had given her the impression that the police were on his side.
Two days later, after relocating to a new apartment and purchasing a new phone, plaintiff visited her former advocate and lawyer at the local women's center and explained what had occurred. With the advocate's assistance, on November 13, 2014, plaintiff filed a domestic violence complaint against defendant alleging that defendant harassed her on the evening of November 7, 2014.
Plaintiff was granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing defendant from contacting plaintiff or her parents, appearing at plaintiff's residence or college, and attending a mosque where plaintiff regularly attended services, among other things. Four days later, plaintiff amended her complaint, correcting the date of the alleged harassment to November 10, 2014, and expanding the prior history of domestic violence. Accordingly, an amended TRO was issued on November 17, 2014.
At the FRO hearing, plaintiff detailed prior incidents of domestic violence between her and defendant. Specifically, plaintiff testified about an incident that occurred on March 14, 2014, in which defendant texted menacing and degrading expletives to her, calling her a "creature," "stupid and retarded" and a "fucking whore," and threatening to "smash" her face and "murder [her] if [she does not] leave [him] alone." Defendant's text messages to plaintiff on that date were precipitated by plaintiff calling him repeatedly to tell him that she had called AAA because she had a flat tire.
Defendant did not contend in his merits brief or at oral argument of this appeal that he was deprived of fair notice of his alleged prior acts of domestic violence before the hearing.
Plaintiff also recounted that about two months later, on May 18, 2014, her parents hired a realtor to help the couple find a house, but defendant "didn't want [plaintiff] to be in charge of things" and became angry when she told him that her parents had retained the realtor for them. During the ensuing argument, defendant grabbed plaintiff's left arm and neck and pushed her into the wall, repeatedly calling her "fucking stupid" and "fucking dumb" and yelling "you don't fucking listen, when I tell you to shut up you shut up, when I tell you to leave you leave." Plaintiff testified further that on June 1, 2014, defendant assaulted her dog by putting his feet on the dog's neck until the dog urinated on itself. When plaintiff questioned him about his actions, defendant grabbed her and growled that he could "hit . . . whoever the fuck [he] want[s], [she] do[esn't] tell [him] what to do."
According to plaintiff, on July 6, 2014, defendant became enraged when plaintiff described visiting a Halal market in New York, with a friend the week before. He called plaintiff "fucking stupid" and struck her in the mouth. When the parties arrived home at about 11:30 p.m. later that night, defendant snatched plaintiff's bag, containing her house keys and cellphone, and refused to allow her to enter the house. Defendant kicked her and repeatedly slammed the door into her.
This incident was the basis for the predicate act that was found by the judge in entering the first FRO.
After standing outside in the rain, plaintiff began to climb through the unlocked kitchen window. Defendant grabbed her by the hair, dragged her to the floor and repeatedly hit her on her arms and legs, while calling her a "fucking slut" and "whore."
During the December 2, 2014 FRO hearing, plaintiff testified that she was afraid of defendant and needed a restraining order to protect herself because "he's going to do something to me" and "he said he was going to kill me." Plaintiff also admitted that she had testified falsely when she applied to vacate the first FRO on October 31, 2014. Plaintiff explained that she "tried to come up with [an] excuse, so [defendant] . . . d[idn't] get in trouble anymore." She conceded that she did not have steady employment out of state and was not relocating, and admitted that she lied about her contact with defendant. Plaintiff expounded that she "had to say it, he would have . . . got[ten] in trouble if . . . I didn't drop the restraining order, his school would have kick[ed] him out, his job. Like just everything was just accumulating . . . . I was scared." Plaintiff also admitted signing a blank document at defendant's request, knowing that the document would be filled in and used by defendant to avoid expulsion from school.
Defendant testified at the FRO hearing and denied plaintiff's allegations. According to defendant, on November 10, 2014, he was upset about the contempt charge not being dismissed but denied berating or threatening plaintiff. Defendant explained that plaintiff's allegations were prompted by her finding a text message on his phone that led her to believe he was cheating on her.
Defendant also denied all of the prior incidents of domestic violence except for the menacing, degrading and threatening March 14, 2014 text messages, which defendant attributed to being awakened out of a sound sleep to "a lot of flooded messages." Defendant testified "I did not commit any act of violence towards [plaintiff], . . . I've said verbally abusive thing[s] at points, you know foul language, . . . but I've never laid my hands on her, ever [.]" Defendant stated that:
[A]fter I had a hearing here on August 6th and I saw those text messages for the first time actually, I changed my attitude. And after— beyond August 6th, beyond that point where I was here and I—I had a hearing, I left the courtroom, I changed, I wasn't using the same tone with her. I wasn't—I—everything that I've done in the past, I didn't continue to do after August 6th.
Defendant continued, positing, "I would love to believe that [plaintiff is] here for a reason, I would love to, but provide me with one—one document." Referring to the first FRO, defendant denied plaintiff's domestic violence allegations, contending:
[While] I have full respect for the court finding . . . I was there at the time and I know for a fact that I did not commit—I did not hurt her, I did not slam her. I did not push . . . I . . . pulled her out the door but . . . I did not assault [her] . . . I was there at the time and I know for a fact that I did not hit her or anything.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge initially indicated that the domestic relationship between the parties confers jurisdiction under the PDVA. Next, the judge acknowledged that his decision "boil[ed] down to" his evaluation of the evidence that he had heard, and his determination regarding the credibility of the parties. Although the judge admitted, "that[] it's very difficult sometimes to evaluat[e] a person's credibility when they come in here and they've told you that they lied," he noted "I had the benefit of sitting here through almost three hours of testimony, and I had the opportunity not only to listen to testimony, to observe a tremendous amount of body language, a lot of demeanor of both . . . witnesses."
The judge found plaintiff's testimony "particularly compelling" and "very convincing." The judge noted, "I believe [] plaintiff, I believe her testimony. I believe that her body language here, the trembling. . . . I certainly believe that one can't control the trembling that I saw here." In contrast, the trial judge found that defendant testified "curiously reserved" and "very calmly, almost robotically." The judge concluded that defendant "learned from his testimony on August 6th in the previous domestic violence hearing. . . . [D]efendant . . . learned to be reserved. He learned how to describe some evidence."
Ultimately, the judge ruled in plaintiff's favor, finding that defendant committed an act of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). The trial judge declared that "the [PDVA] is to protect not just against physical harm, but it's also to protect when another party asserts mental and emotional control of another." The judge continued:
I do believe that [defendant's] actions on 11/10 amounted to harassment under all the circumstances and based on all of the previous acts of domestic violence, which I do believe occurred. He even admitted some of them that he called her some names, some vile names. He couldn't deny them, because those were—there were text messages indicating that he clearly had said that. And ironically they almost mirror the incident—the—the comments that he made. And it's interesting that those comments were made really to focus on degrading her, making her feel worthless, and emotionally controlling her. And that's what the [PDVA] is here to protect against.
The judge concluded that based on the previous acts of domestic violence, there was an immediate threat of future domestic violence, and granted plaintiff's request for a FRO. The judge continued the same prohibitions from the amended TRO in the FRO, imposed a civil penalty of $250 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29 and ordered defendant into a Batterers Intervention Program. This appeal followed.
In the FRO, defendant was also barred from plaintiff's place of employment.
II.
In reviewing a decision of a family court, we "defer to the factual findings of the trial court," N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008), in recognition of the "family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). Deference is particularly appropriate when the evidence is testimonial and involves credibility issues because the judge who observes the witnesses and hears the testimony has a perspective the reviewing court does not enjoy. Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988). We must especially "defer to the trial court's credibility determinations . . . 'because it has the opportunity to make first-hand credibility determinations about the witnesses who appear on the stand; it has a "feel of the case" that can never be realized by a review of the cold record.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014) (citation omitted) (quoting E.P., supra, 196 N.J. at 104).
Generally, findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence. Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 411-12. It is only "when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark'" that we will intervene and make our own findings "to ensure that there is not a denial of justice." E.P., supra, 196 N.J. at 104 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)). We do, however, review the trial judge's legal conclusions de novo. Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 433-34 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
Under the PDVA, "domestic violence" is defined as the infliction of one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) upon a person protected under the PDVA. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(a) authorizes a victim to file a complaint alleging an act of domestic violence in the Family Part of the Chancery Division and to seek temporary restraints. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(f)-(j). Under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29, following a hearing, the judge may, among other relief, issue a final order "restraining the defendant from subjecting the victim to domestic violence, as defined in [the] act." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).
In determining whether to issue a FRO under the PDVA, the court must perform a two-step analysis. Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-26 (App. Div. 2006). "First, the judge must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125. Second, "upon a finding of the commission of a predicate act of domestic violence," the court must determine whether it "should enter a restraining order that provides protection for the victim." Id. at 126.
Here, the judge initially determined that jurisdiction was established under the PDVA based on the nature of the relationship between plaintiff and defendant. The judge described that relationship as follows:
I think the case is very clear with respect to establishing a domestic relationship, there's no doubt that there's a domestic relationship here. I think the plaintiff believes she's married to the defendant. The defendant, at least, has gotten through at least one step in his religion in terms of setting up a relationship. I think he admits that there's at least a relationship. She sees it perhaps as a marriage. But nevertheless I think there's clearly a relationship. They live together, stood together, they've been together, they've dated, and they even had a religious ceremony together. So, I believe that the Domestic Violence Act applies, and provides for protection.
Next, the judge found defendant's conduct constituted harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), an enumerated predicate act under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). Three elements are necessary to establish harassment proscribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), namely:
(1) Defendant made or caused to be made a communication; (2) defendant's purpose in making or causing the communication to be made was to harass another person; and (3) the communication was in one of the specified manners or any other manner similarly likely to cause annoyance or alarm to its intended recipient.
[State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 576 (1997).]
"Annoyance" under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) means to "disturb, irritate or bother." Id. at 580. The purpose to be served by the enactment of the harassment statute is to make criminal, private "annoyances" that are not entitled to constitutional protection. Ibid. Thus, subsection (a) proscribes "a single act of communicative conduct when its purpose is to harass," ibid., and "is directed at the purpose behind and motivation for" making or causing the communication to be made. State v. Mortimer, 135 N.J. 517, 528, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 970, 115 S. Ct. 440, 130 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1994).
"'A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result.'" Hoffman, supra, 149 N.J. at 577 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1)). "A finding of purpose to harass may be inferred from the evidence" as well as from common sense and experience. Ibid. Moreover, a purpose to harass can be inferred from a history between the parties. See id. at 585.
In the present case, the judge considered defendant's alarming words and disturbing warning to plaintiff on November 10, 2014, and, in conjunction with the prior acts of domestic violence, determined that defendant committed the predicate act of harassment. That determination is amply supported by the record and will not be disturbed.
Defendant contends that the judge failed to make specific findings of fact and neglected to explicitly correlate them with the harassment statute. However, the judge clearly delineated the elements of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), specifically explained his credibility findings in favor of plaintiff, reviewed prior incidents of domestic violence between the parties, and correlated those findings to the harassment statute.
First, the judge detailed his credibility assessments of both plaintiff and defendant. He noted "[t]he opportunity that [he] had to observe the plaintiff here at the witness stand" and characterized her testimony as "particularly compelling." He described plaintiff's tearful testimony, her body language as manifested in "trembling," and emphasized "I believe plaintiff, I believe her testimony. I believe [] her body language here." In contrast, the judge noted that defendant's testimony was "curiously" calm, reserved and robotic.
After finding plaintiff credible, the judge referenced prior incidents of domestic violence between plaintiff and defendant. He referred to defendant locking plaintiff out of the house in the rain, and physically and verbally assaulting her after she confessed to visiting a Halal market in Brooklyn with a friend. He also described the incident when plaintiff called defendant with a flat tire, and he berated her with a barrage of degrading expletives and threats.
The judge then correlated these factual findings with the harassment statute and concluded that defendant's harassing actions were likely to cause annoyance and alarm to her, thus satisfying the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). The judge's factual findings were supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence in the record, and were sufficiently specific and particularly correlated to the harassment statute. Thus, given the deference afforded to the family court's factual findings, E.P., supra, 196 N.J. at 104, these findings will not be disturbed as they clearly demonstrate that defendant's conduct satisfied the first prong in Silver, supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 125.
Defendant contends that an objective review of the record does not support the judge's determination that plaintiff's testimony was credible, and demonstrates that the judge's subjective assessment of credibility was mistaken, flawed and not based on the objective testimony and facts presented at trial. However, the judge's assessment of credibility is accorded due deference by this court, particularly where, as here, those assessments are clearly delineated and well-supported by the record.
In that regard, the judge meticulously analyzed the body language and demeanor of both plaintiff and defendant, and created a coherent record documenting his reasoning and his findings. The judge acknowledged and grappled with the fact that plaintiff had requested a dismissal of the prior FRO and had offered conflicting testimony to obtain the dismissal. However, the judge ultimately reconciled the inconsistency and accepted plaintiff's explanation that she was motivated by guilt to make the false statements. The judge determined "I believe very strongly that when he saw her, he made her feel guilty through [his] sister . . . He made statements such as you weren't there for me."
In assessing plaintiff's credibility, the judge continued, "I think sometimes things that aren't said or are said in the manner that they are said in convinces me or at least convinced me in this case that they occurred." The judge concluded, "I believe the plaintiff, I believe her testimony. I believe [] her body language here, the trembling. I may not believe all the tears, but I certainly believe that one can't control the trembling that I saw here."
In contrast, in assessing defendant's credibility, the judge noted, "[defendant] said he learned from his testimony on August 6th in the previous domestic violence hearing, and it occurred to me that he learned very well." The judge emphasized, "[s]ome of [defendant's] comments I think, at least in this court's view, [were] said very calmly, almost robotically[.]"
The judge also commented that defendant did not dispute some of the alleged abuse but instead calmly explained his actions. The judge noted "[defendant] even admitted [to some allegations] that he called her [] names, some vile names. He couldn't deny them, because . . . there were text messages indicating that he clearly had said that," and "counsel asked [defendant] did you say [the verbal insult] in the same tone of voice as you said here today? . . . And [he] actually answered no, which I thought was truthful, cause I'm sure it wasn't."
Once the court finds the defendant committed a predicate act under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a), the court must then consider whether a restraining order is "necessary." Silver, supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 126-27. Although this determination may be "perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary . . . to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127.
Commission of one of the enumerated acts of domestic violence does not "automatically mandate[] the [entry] of a domestic violence [restraining] order." Kamen v. Egan, 322 N.J. Super. 222, 227 (App. Div. 1999). The court must determine whether a restraining order is necessary to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse based upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1). Silver, supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 127. The statutory factors to be considered include:
(1) [t]he previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse;
(2) [t]he existence of immediate danger to person or property;
(3) [t]he financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant; [and]
(4) [t]he best interests of the victim[.]
[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).]
In this case, the numerous prior acts of domestic violence, which the judge determined had occurred, confirmed that plaintiff was in need of protection from further abuse by defendant. The judge specifically determined that based on the prior acts of domestic violence, plaintiff faced an immediate threat of future domestic violence. These findings are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence in the record.
Defendant argues that even if the evidence supported his commission of the predicate act of harassment, the testimony provided no support for the proposition that restraints were necessary because all the factors cited in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) were not found by the judge. Defendant's argument is without merit.
The intent of the Legislature in enacting the PDVA was to protect victims of domestic violence by affording them "the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." State v. Harris, 211 N.J. 566, 579 (2012) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18). "To confront the problem of domestic violence, the Legislature provided a panoply of remedies . . . and encouraged their 'broad application.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18). To require the trial court to find every statutory factor in order to satisfy the second prong of Silver would thwart that legislative intent. Clearly, some of the factors, such as "the best interests of . . . any child," N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(4), are inapplicable in some cases, as here.
Following the hearing, the judge may, among other relief, issue a final order "restraining the defendant from subjecting the victim to domestic violence, as defined in this act" or from making contact with the plaintiff. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a). The judge here made a specific finding that a FRO was necessary to prevent future acts of domestic violence from occurring. After hearing extensive testimony and making well-supported credibility findings, the judge determined that a FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from further abusive behavior by defendant and issued a FRO with the necessary restraints in accordance with the PDVA. That determination is fully supported by this record.
Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the judge denied him due process and unnecessarily burdened his fundamental right to exercise his religion. According to defendant, the judge completely barred him from attending his mosque without first holding a hearing to determine if a total restraint was necessary or if there was a less burdensome but no less effective restraint available. Because defendant failed to raise this constitutional challenge before the judge, the issue is not properly preserved for appellate review and will not be considered by this court. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 18-19 (2009).
Defendant was on notice from the amended TRO and from the PDVA that the trial court could order numerous forms of restrictions and relief. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b). Despite that notice, defendant failed to raise the issue below.
Indeed, defendant did raise this issue in the trial court at the first FRO hearing. When defendant objected to the continuation of the ban from the Paterson and Boonton Mosques, as contained in the amended TRO that preceded the first FRO hearing, the trial judge addressed defendant's objection by barring defendant from the Paterson Mosque, which was in proximity to plaintiff's then residence, and dismissing the prohibition against defendant attending the Boonton Mosque, which was closer to defendant's residence. Defendant was, therefore, permitted to attend the Boonton Mosque and no restraint entered in connection with the FRO that is the subject of this appeal disturbs that ruling. --------
[I]t is a well settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest.
[Robinson, supra, 200 N.J. at 20 (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)].
In this case, defendant's untimely-raised issue is neither jurisdictional nor a matter of great public interest. Accordingly, we will not consider on appeal defendant's belated challenge to the prohibition against him attending his mosque.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION