PER CURIAM
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Yannotti and Vernoia. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 22819. Lara Toomin, appellant pro se. Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondents (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Peter H. Jenkins, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Lara Toomin appeals from a final determination of the Board of Review (Board), which found her disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. We affirm.
Toomin was employed by Benjamin Moore & Company as a program specialist from May 2007 until May 7, 2014, when the company terminated her employment. Toomin filed a claim for unemployment benefits effective May 11, 2014. On June 16, 2014, the Deputy Director of the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance in the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (Department) notified Toomin that she was disqualified for benefits. Toomin appealed the Deputy's determination to the Appeal Tribunal, which conducted a hearing in the matter on August 26, 2014.
At the hearing, Toomin testified that she went on maternity leave on September 13, 2013, when she gave birth to two children. Toomin was due to return to work on May 7, 2014. Toomin and the company exchanged emails regarding her return to work. She told the company that her childcare arrangements had fallen through, and she would not be able to return to work until the end of June 2014.
On May 5, 2014, a representative of the company sent Toomin an email indicating that if she could not return by May 11, or another mutually agreeable date before the end of May 2014, her position would have to be filled by another person. Toomin responded to the email and indicated that she needed more time in order to make childcare arrangements. On May 6, 2014, Toomin received an email informing her that she would be separated from employment as of May 7, 2014.
Jeannie West, Senior Manager of Human Resources at the company testified that she notified Toomin on May 5, 2014, that unless she could return to work within a week or another mutually agreeable date in May, the company would have to fill the position. West testified that Toomin did not request additional time to resolve her childcare issues. According to West, Toomin only stated that she could not return until the end of June 2014, and inquired what "the next steps" would be if the position was filled.
West noted that the company had been holding Toomin's job for her since September 13, 2013. She indicated that Toomin held a managerial position, and the company needed to fill the position. The company wanted to keep Toomin in the position, and the company had been willing to work with her on a mutually-agreeable return date some time before the end of May 2014, even though Toomin had exhausted all of her available leave as of May 7, 2014. Toomin advised that returning to work before the end of May 2014 was not an option for her. West explained that Toomin was separated from employment because she indicated she could not return to work until the end of June 2014.
The Appeal Tribunal issued a decision finding that Toomin was disqualified for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) as of May 7, 2014, because she became unemployed for personal reasons, not for reasons attributable to the work. Toomin appealed that determination to the Board, which issued its final decision in the matter on October 17, 2014. The Board upheld the Appeal Tribunal's determination. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Toomin argues the Board erred by finding that she voluntarily left her job. Toomin contends her employer acted prematurely when it terminated her employment. We disagree.
The scope of our review in an appeal from a final determination of an administrative agency is strictly limited. The agency's decision may not be disturbed unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) (citing In re Warren, 117 N.J. 295, 296 (1989)). We can only intervene "in those rare circumstances in which an agency action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission or with other State policy." Ibid. (quoting George Harms Constr. v. Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994)).
Furthermore, "'[i]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)).
As noted, in this case, the Board found that Toomin was disqualified from unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), which states that an individual may not receive benefits if the individual "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work." Although the statute does not define the term "good cause," we have construed it to mean "'cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)).
We are convinced that there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the Board's determination that Toomin left her employment for personal reasons, not for reasons attributable to the work. As the testimony at the hearing revealed, Toomin had been on maternity leave and she was scheduled to return to work on May 7, 2014. She advised her employer she could not return on that date because her childcare arrangements had fallen through. Toomin was told that the company was willing to allow her to return on a mutually agreed-upon date prior to the end of May 2014, but Toomin indicated that she would not be able to return to work until the end of June 2014.
The company determined that it had to fill the position for business reasons. Toomin's employment with the company ended as of May 7, 2014. Thus, the record shows that Toomin was separated from employment for reasons related to the care of her children, which is deemed a voluntary quit under the Department's regulations. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e).
Toomin argues, however, that she did not abandon her job. In support of her argument, she relies upon N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.11(b), which provides in pertinent part that if an employee does not return to work within five consecutive working days after the end of an approved leave, the employee "shall be considered to have abandoned his or her employment."
However, the evidence shows that Toomin's approved leave ended on May 7, 2014, and she advised the company she could not return on that date because her childcare arrangements had fallen through. The company was willing to allow her to return on a mutually agreed-upon date before the end of May 2014, but Toomin made clear she could not return before the end of June 2014. Under the circumstances, the company reasonably determined that Toomin would not be returning to work. The company was not required to wait five consecutive work days before determining that Toomin had voluntarily quit her position.
Our decision in Espina v. Bd. of Review, 402 N.J. Super. 87 (App. Div. 2008), does not require a different result. There, the employee was due to return to work on Monday, April 24, 2006, but sought an additional week of unpaid leave due to a lack of childcare. Id. at 90. The employer denied the request and indicated that if the employee did not return to work by Wednesday, April 26, 2006, she would be deemed to have voluntarily resigned from her position. Ibid.
The employee did not return on that date, but contacted the employer on Monday, May 1, 2006, and asked her employer to allow her to return to work. Ibid. The employer advised her that she could not return to her position. Ibid. The employee filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which was denied. Id. at 90-91. The Board eventually found that the employee left work voluntarily, without good cause attributable to such work. Id. at 91.
We reversed the Board's decision. Id. at 92-93. We held that the employee could not be deemed to have abandoned her position because the employer did not wait five consecutive working days before declaring the positions abandoned, as required by N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.11(b). Id. at 92. In this case, however, Toomin made clear she could not return to work before the end of June 2014. Furthermore, Toomin did not contact her employer and indicate she was ready to return to work within five working days after her approved leave ended.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION