Hayes v. Colvin

Hon. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge

(ECF Nos. 11, 12, 15)

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Michael Hayes's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl.'s MSJ," ECF No. 11), Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff's MSJ ("Def.'s Cross-MSJ & Opp'n," ECF No. 12), and Plaintiff's Reply Brief and Opposition to Defendant's Cross-MSJ ("Pl.'s Reply," ECF No. 14). On December 19, 2016, Magistrate Judge Mitchell D. Dembin issued his Report and Recommendation on both parties' MSJs. ("R&R," ECF No. 15.) Defendant filed timely objections to Judge Dembin's R&R on January 3, 2017. ("R&R Obj.," ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff filed a timely response in opposition to Defendant's objections on January 10, 2017. ("R&R Obj. Opp'n," ECF No. 17.) After considering the parties' arguments and the law, the Court OVERRULES Defendant's objections and ADOPTS Judge Dembin's R&R in its entirety.

The R&R adequately details the administrative record in this case. (See R&R 2-13, ECF No. 15; see also ECF No. 9 (Administrative Record).) The Court will not repeat it here, but notes relevant facts were necessary in assessing Defendant's objections.

A district judge "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition" of a magistrate judge on a dispositive matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). "[T]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the [report and recommendation] that has been properly objected to." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). However, "[t]he statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise." United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); see also Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005). "Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct." Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121.

The Social Security Act provides for judicial review of a final agency decision denying a claim for disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court must affirm the denial of benefits if the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence and applies the correct legal standards. Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence is a term of art that means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999)). Put another way, it is "more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the agency's decision must be upheld. Id.; Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193.

Defendant solely objects to Judge Dembin's recommendation that the Court remand the case for further proceedings because the administrative law judge ("ALJ") did not adequately address Plaintiff's claim of right knee disability. (See generally R&R Obj., ECF No. 16.) Judge Dembin concluded that the ALJ's finding on Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") based on Plaintiff's alleged right knee disability is not supported by substantial evidence. (R&R 19, ECF No. 15.) Specifically, Judge Dembin found that "[n]o physician has opined and no medical evidence is present in the record that supports the ALJ's RFC finding of what Plaintiff can do physically." (Id.) To be sure, the medical records contain several diagnoses regarding Plaintiff's right knee. (See id. at 13-20.) But Judge Dembin found that "notably absent in these records is any evidence about how Plaintiff's right knee impairment affects Plaintiff's current ability to function." (Id. at 17 (emphasis added).) Thus, Judge Dembin concluded that "the ALJ's RFC assessment regarding Plaintiff's knee impairment was not based on substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to develop the record about how Plaintiff's knee impairment affects his ability to function." (Id.)

Defendant argues that Judge Dembin erred because the RFC assessment is not a medical issue and thus no doctor's opinion or testimony is conclusive on the issue; rather, the RFC assessment is based on the evidence as a whole. (R&R Obj. 2, ECF No. 16.) Thus, Defendant argues that the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff's RFC after reviewing all the evidence in the record. (Id. at 3.)

As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Defendant that no doctor's opinion or testimony is conclusive on the issue, since where "the record contains conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ is charged with determining credibility and resolving conflict." Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003); Batson v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). The problem in this case, as Judge Dembin notes, is that there is no medical evidence at all regarding the effect of Plaintiff's right knee issues on his residual functional capacity. The ALJ solely relied on general diagnoses of Plaintiff's right knee condition in assessing Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. (See R&R 15-17 (collecting evidence relied upon by the ALJ, including diagnoses such as osteoarthritis of the right knee, a torn meniscus, and post-surgical pain from a previously inserted surgical screw).) This is insufficient. As Judge Dembin correctly noted, "the ALJ's RFC determination or finding must be supported by medical evidence, particularly the opinion of a treating or an examining physician." Banks v. Barnhart, 434 F. Supp. 2d 800, 805 (C.D. Cal. 2006); see also de Lopez v. Astrue, 643 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ("When 'the administrative record does not contain any opinion by a treating or examining physician regarding plaintiff's RFC,' the ALJ has a duty to obtain 'such an opinion. Thus, the ALJ also did not fully and fairly develop the record in this regard.' Here, the ALJ also failed to develop the record, and this is an additional reason to remand this matter, as discussed below." (internal citation omitted)); Mendoza v. Barnhart, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2006) ("Moreover, the administrative record does not contain any opinion by a treating or examining physician regarding plaintiff's RFC, and the ALJ failed to get such an opinion. Thus, the ALJ also did not fully and fairly develop the record in this regard."). And Defendant fails to provide a single case upholding an ALJ's RFC on substantial evidence grounds where the RFC was similarly devoid of any support from a medical opinion or other medical evidence specifically regarding a claimant's physical ability to function in the workplace. Without more, the Court declines to overrule Judge Dembin's conclusion that "the ALJ incorrectly determined the record was sufficiently complete to allow him to reach a conclusion on this issue." (R&R 19, ECF No. 15 (citing Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001).)

Finally, Defendant argues that Judge Dembin improperly relied on out-of-circuit cases stating that ALJs may not draw inferences in assessing the evidence, which, according to Defendant, is contrary to Ninth Circuit authority stating that ALJs are entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence. (R&R Obj. 3, ECF No. 16 (citing Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 632 (9th Cir. 1982).) The Court disagrees. Judge Dembin did not err by relying on Eighth Circuit cases as persuasive authority, especially because those cases speak directly to the issue at hand. (See, e.g., R&R 17, ECF No. 15 (citing Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Because a claimant's RFC is a medical question, an ALJ's assessment of it must be supported by some medical evidence of the claimant's ability to function in the workplace." (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added))).) Defendant is right that in the Ninth Circuit an ALJ "is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence." Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1972)). The problem, of course, is the predicate issue that here the ALJ was lacking substantial evidence from which to properly draw an inference. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendant's objections. / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

After conducting a de novo review, the Court is satisfied that Judge Dembin's R&R is analytically sound. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendant's objections, ADOPTS Judge Dembin's R&R in its entirety (ECF No. 15), and REMANDS the matter to the Social Security Administration for further review consistent with this Opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: March 1, 2017

/s/_________

Hon. Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge