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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2026 INSC 602
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act 1925
  • The Limitation Act 1963, Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963
  • Section 263, Explanation of the Indian Succession Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2026 INSC 602
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act 1925
  • The Limitation Act 1963, Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963
  • Section 263, Explanation of the Indian Succession Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Smt. Gouriprova Sen inherited properties from her husband, Mr. Amulya Chandra Sen, as his sole legal heir. A portion of these properties was gifted to the appellant by a deed dated 15 August 1978. Gouriprova Sen executed a Will dated 9 July 1989, appointing the appellant (her nephew) as sole executor and beneficiary, and died on 8 October 1989. The transfer of properties into the appellant’s name on the basis of this Will gave rise to the dispute.

The appellant obtained probate of the Will by an order dated 28 September 1995. Around 2010–11, proceedings were initiated for changes in revenue records (mutation); the appellant asserted that notices were served on the respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, while the respondents stated they came to know of the probate only in 2019, after which they filed a title suit for declaration and injunction (pending), in which the appellant filed a written statement.

On 5 July 2022, the respondents filed an application under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 seeking revocation of the probate granted on 28 September 1995. A learned Single Judge dismissed the revocation application on 16 June 2023 as barred by limitation. On appeal, a Division Bench allowed the appeal. The matter then came before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondents’ 2022 application for revocation of probate under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 was within limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, having regard to when the “right to apply” accrued.
  2. Whether notice served on the respondents in mutation proceedings constituted constructive notice of the probate, thereby triggering limitation earlier than 2019.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Position (as recorded)

  • Limitation should run from 2013, when notice was served upon the respondents in mutation proceedings; therefore, the 2022 revocation application was time-barred.

Respondents' Position (as recorded)

  • The revocation application was within limitation because they acquired knowledge of the probate only around 2019.
  • Although notice was served in July 2013 in relation to the mutation proceedings (O.A. No. 1417 of 2012), they did not contest because mutation entries were already in their favour; the tribunal dismissed the mutation application, and a subsequent writ (WPLRT No. 103 of 2019) filed by the appellant was dismissed for default.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lynette Fernandes v. Gertie Mathias (2018) 1 SCC 271 Authoritative treatment of limitation in applications for revocation of probate. Relied upon to frame the approach that limitation for revocation under Article 137 depends on when the right to apply accrues, linked to knowledge.
Ramesh Nivrutti Bhagwat v. Surendra Manohar Parakhe (2020) 17 SCC 284 Authoritative treatment of limitation in applications for revocation of probate. Cited alongside Lynette Fernandes to support the governing limitation framework under Article 137.
Rajasthan Housing Board v. New Pink City Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. (2015) 7 SCC 601 Facets/principles concerning constructive notice. Used as part of the jurisprudential basis to deduce the attributes and operation of constructive notice.
Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi v. Syeda Arifa Parveen (2026) 3 SCC 460 Facets/principles concerning constructive notice. Considered to deduce the principles applicable to determining constructive notice as a fact/mixed question.
Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. v. Haji Abdulgafur Haji Hussenbhai (1971) 1 SCC 757 Constructive notice hinging on wilful abstention or gross negligence; guidance on what may constitute them. Applied to assess the respondents’ inaction after receipt of notice and to infer constructive notice due to conduct not expected of a reasonably prudent person.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court noted that the Indian Succession Act, 1925 does not prescribe a limitation period either for grant of probate or for seeking revocation of probate; therefore, recourse must be made to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (three years from when the right to apply accrues). The Court held that accrual of the “right to apply” depends on the date on which the applicant had knowledge—here, the respondents.

The respondents admitted that notice was served upon them in 2013 in connection with mutation proceedings initiated by the appellant, but stated that they ignored it because mutation entries were already in their favour. The Court framed the central inquiry as whether these mutation proceedings and the notice therein amounted to constructive notice of the probate.

From prior decisions, the Court deduced that constructive notice is a legal deeming fiction (distinct from actual notice), typically turning on wilful abstention or gross negligence, assessed on the standard of a reasonably prudent person in Indian conditions, and determined as a question of fact or mixed law and fact depending on circumstances.

Applying these facets, the Court found that the respondents’ conduct—choosing to do nothing despite receipt of a court/tribunal notice relating to mutation proceedings initiated by a third party—was not the conduct of a reasonably prudent person. The Court emphasized that mutation proceedings do not confer title, and that if the appellant’s mutation attempt succeeded it could create competing claims regarding the same properties; this made it incumbent upon the respondents to inquire into the basis of the proceedings and the notice. The Court also noted that, in the revocation application, the respondents’ explanation for the period 2013–2019 was limited to vague assertions that the appellant threatened dispossession, without explaining how their right and title rested with them or the details of such threats.

On these facts, the Court held that the 2013 notice in mutation proceedings constituted constructive notice, and limitation under Article 137 would therefore run from when the respondents ought to have discovered that the mutation proceedings rested on the probate of the Will in favour of the appellant. In any event, the Court held that the accrual could not be taken as 2019 so as to make the 2022 revocation application timely.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED: The Supreme Court held that the respondents’ 2022 application for revocation of probate was hopelessly time-barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as constructive notice arose from the 2013 mutation notice. The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside and the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the revocation application on limitation was restored.

The direct consequence is that the revocation proceedings fail on limitation, and “all necessary consequences will follow.” The Court disposed of pending applications and directed that “Costs will be made easy.” The opinion applies existing principles on limitation and constructive notice to the case’s facts and does not state that it lays down any new legal precedent beyond that application.

    DHIRAJ DUTTA v. ANIRBAN SEN

    2026 INSC 602

    C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP©No.3371 of 2026 Page 1 of 9

    REPORTABLE

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CIVIL APPEAL NO. __________________ OF 2026

    (Arising out of SLP (C.) No. 3371 of 2026)

    DHIRAJ DUTTA ... APPELLANT(S)

    VERSUS

    ANIRBAN SEN & ORS. ... RESPONDENT(S)

    J U D G M E N T

    SANJAY KAROL, J.

    Leave Granted.

    2. Smt. Gouriprova Sen, inherited the properties of her husband Mr. Amulya Chandra Sen, by virtue of being his sole legal heir. Certain portion of these properties stood gifted to the

    1

    appellant by a deed1. Her Will was dated 9thJuly 1989 whereby the appellant, her nephew was made the sole executor and beneficiary. She died shortly thereafter on 8thOctober 1989. The transfer of properties in his name by virtue of this will is the genesis of the present dispute.

    3. The appellant's application for probate of the said Will2 was granted vide order dated 28thSeptember 1995. Further proceedings3for necessary changes in the Revenue Record were initiated somewhere in 2010-11. As per the appellant, notices were served to the predecessor in interest of the respondent in these proceedings. As per the respondents, who are nephews-in- law of the testatrix and the only surviving members of the family of the testatrix's husband, however, they found out somewhere in 2019 consequent to which they filed suit for declaration and injunction4in which the appellant has undisputedly, filed his written statement. This suit is apparently pending before the jurisdictional Court. On 5thJuly 2022 the respondents herein filed an application under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act 19255seeking revocation6of the probate granted on 28th September 1995.

    1 bearing no.4905 of 1 978 dated 1 5 th august 1 978

    2 PLA No.2 38 of 1995

    3 O.A. No.1417 of 2012

    4 Title suit no.60 of 2019

    5 ISA

    6 G.A 02 of 2022

    2

    4. The learned single Judge in terms of order dated 16thJune 2023 dismissed the application holding the same to be barred under the provisions of the Limitation Act 1963. On appeal7, the learned Division Bench, taking a different view, allowed the appeal and as such, the matter stands before us. We are therefore, required to decide whether the application for revocation of the probate filed in 2022 is within limitation, or outside it, given the differing view of the Courts below.

    5. The provision concerned with the revocation of probate under the ISA reads thus:

    "263. Revocation or annulment for just cause.—

    The grant of probate or letters of administration may be revoked or annulled for just cause.

    Explanation. —Just cause shall be deemed to exist where—

    (a) the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance; or

    (b) the grant was obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion, or by concealing from the Court something material to the case; or

    (c) the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant, though such allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently; or

    (d) the grant has become useless and inoperative through circumstances; or

    (e) the person to whom the grant was made has wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory or account in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of this Part, or has exhibited under that

    7 A.P.O No. 125 of 2023

    3

    Chapter an inventory or account which is untrue in a material respect.

    Illustrations

    (i) The Court by which the grant was made had no jurisdiction.

    (ii) The grant was made without citing parties who ought to have been cited.

    (iii) The Will of which probate was obtained was forged or revoked.

    (iv) A obtained letters of administration to the estate of B, as his widow, but it has since transpired that she was never married to him.

    (v) A has taken administration to the estate of B as if he had died intestate, but a will has since been discovered.

    (vi) Since probate was granted, a latter Will has been discovered.

    (vii) Since probate was granted, a codicil has been discovered which revokes or adds to the appointment of executors under the Will.

    (viii) The person to whom probate was, or letters of administration were, granted has subsequently become of unsound mind."

    (emphasis supplied)

    The ISA does not provide any limitation for grant of probate or to move an application for the revocation thereof and as such recourse must be made to Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963. The same is as follows:

    PART II—OTHER APPLICATION

    137. Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division. Three years. When the right to apply

    accrues

    4

    6. In light of these provisions, we are required to undertake a determination on facts. To restate for the purposes of ease, it is the appellant's case that the limitation would apply from 2013 when notice was served to the respondents in the mutation proceedings and on the contrary the respondents contend that their application for revocation of probate is within limitation since they acquired knowledge somewhere in 2019 only.

    7. The question of limitation on revocation of probate was authoritatively dealt with by a judgment of this court in Lynette Fernandes v. Gertie Mathias8 and Ramesh Nivrutti Bhagwat v. Surendra Manohar Parakhe.9

    8. As to when "the right to apply" would accrue, that depends on the date from which the party making the application had knowledge. In this case, that would be the respondents. In 2013, when notice was served to them, that was regarding mutation proceedings initiated by the present appellant. In the revocation of probate application filed in 2022, it is submitted by the Respondents that notice was indeed served upon them with reference to the mutation proceedings but in effect, they chose to

    8 (2018 ) 1 SCC 271

    9 (2020) 17SCC 284

    5

    ignore the same, since they already enjoyed entries in their favour. The relevant extract of the application is as under:

    "9. In July, 2013, a copy of the original application being O.A. No.1417 of 2012 was served upon the said heirs of Gouriprova Sen, since deceased. But being heirs of said Gouriprova Sen, the names of Aswini and Shankar have been mutated in respect of the proprieties of said Gouriprova Sen since deceased. As the mutation has been made infavour of Aswini and Shankar, they did not contest the said original application. The Learned West Bengal Land and Land Reforms Tribunal dismissed the said original application. The Learned West Bengal Land and Land Reforms Tribunal dismissed the said original application. Against the said order Learned Tribunal, Dhiraj Dutta, the alleged legatee preferred writ petition being WPLRT No.103 of 2019 before the Hon'ble High Court Calcutta which was also dismissed from default."

    9. The question now is whether these proceedings at the instance of the appellant amounts to constructive notice to the respondents regarding the grant of probate in his favour. From perusal of the judgments of this Court [See: Rajasthan Housing Board v. New Pink City Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd.10; Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi v. Syeda Arifa Parveen11; Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. v. Haji Abdulgafur Haji Hussenbhai12], following facets can be deduced regarding constructive notice:

    10 (2015) 7 SCC 601

    11 (2026) 3 SCC 460

    12 (1971) 1 SCC 757

    6

    (a) It is a deeming fiction within law that originated from equity and is distinguishable from actual notice as it is an inferral by law;

    (b) It hinges on either wilful abstention or gross negligence. To understand what may constitute either of these two, see Haji Abdulgafur Haji Hussenbhai (supra).

    (c) The question of whether or not something qualifies as constructive notice is either a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact dependant on the facts and circumstances of each case;

    (d) The standard to be applied in determining wilful abstention or gross negligence is that of a reasonably prudent man as applied in Indian conditions;

    10. It is admitted by the respondents herein that notice was served but it is also a matter of record that they chose not to do anything. This cannot be termed to be the conduct of a reasonably prudent man. If a Court of law has sent someone a notice, the least that can be accepted is for them to make attempts to find out why the same may have been sent to them and what they would be required to do in regard thereto. This is more so the case when the respondents already had mutation entries in their favour and yet the notice received by them were in connection with mutation proceedings initiated by a third party. After all, if the mutation

    7

    proceeding by the appellant had succeeded there would be competing rights of equal stature regarding the same properties since it is well established that mutation proceedings do not confer any title. When the enjoyment of a particular property rests on such flimsy grounds, it can only be expected that they would attempt to go to the root of the matter and find out why the notice came to be issued in the first case. This was not done. It was entirely possible that the person who had initiated the subsequent mutation proceedings had a better claim over the property than the respondents. Yet no action was taken. We also notice that in the application for revocation of probate, when it comes to the time period between 2013 and 2019 when the title suit was filed, all that has been said is that the appellant attempted to threaten them and dispossess them of their right, title and interest. How the right and title came to rest with them, they are silent. How is it that the appellant threatened them nothing but more silence.

    11. In these facts and circumstances, the notice in mutation proceedings would be deemed constructive notice. Attempts ought to have been made to figure out on what basis the mutation proceedings came to be filed, and the limitation as given under Article 137 would have applied from the day they would have found out that the said proceedings rested on probate of Will

    8

    granted to the appellant. At any rate, the same would not have been 2019 to fall within the prescribed limitation in 2022. The respondents' application for revocation of probate would hopelessly be time barred. Consequently, the judgment of the learned Division Bench had to be set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is ordered to be restored. All necessary consequences will follow.

    Appeal is allowed and applications pending shall be disposed of. Costs will be made easy.

    …………………..…….J.

    ( SANJAY KAROL)

    …………………………J.

    (VIPUL M. PANCHOLI)

    New Delhi; May 29, 2026

    9

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    DHIRAJ DUTTA v. ANIRBAN SEN
    (May 29, 2026)