GAYATHRI D/o. Natraj v. MRS.DR.SOOSI CHRISLOPHER OYSTER DENTAL CARE

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3. On 09.01.2025 communication was sent by the 3^rdOpposite Party to the complainant email:gayathiriabc1311@gmail.com, to take X-Ray of the teeth, and X-Raya was taken, at Pushpa Dental Clinic, Arumubakkam, vide payment of Rs. 4200/-. And the X-Ray was submitted to the 4th Opposite Party, it was approved on 21.01.2025 by conforming the Braces Plan. The 3rd Opposite Party informed that Milk Teeth has to be removed before fixing the braces.

4. The Complainant further states on 24.01.2025 that the confirmation mail was received from the 4th Opposite Party, advising the complainant to remove the

"MILK TEETH Tooth No.53. The Teeth name and number was clearly mentioned and written by 2nd opposite party, and same was communicated to the complainant to her whatsapp No. 7401466075.

5. That the complainant accompanied by her brother, approached the 1st Opposite Party on 03.02.2025, along with the medical communication mails from the 4th Opposite Party pertaining to extraction of tooth No.53 and the same was perused by the 1st Opposite Party, more particularly after seeing confirmation mail dated 24.01.2025, and soft copy of the 2^nd opposite party What's App. message on 24.01.2025, the 1st Opposite Party demanded Rs.800/- as Doctor fees to remove the" "MILK TEETH -Tooth No.53". On very same day. The 1st Opposite Party removed the tooth and she gave prescription, which clearly states about the brief history of removal teeth.

6. That on 28.03.2025 a mail received from the 4th Opposite Party, and an appointment was fixed on 10.04.2025. The complainant along with her brother met 3rd Opposite Party along with the prescription given by the 1st Opposite Party. The 3rd opposite party who examined the complainant's teeth, stated that wrong

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teeth was removed by 1st Opposite Party, hearing which, both the complainant and her brother was shocked.

7. Immediately, on very same day 10.04.2025 at about around 5.00 P.M., the complainant along with her bother visited the 1st Opposite Party clinic, and the complainant's brother recorded the conversation in his mobile, complainant and her brother questioned about the negligence of the 1st Party in kindness, about the removed wrong teeth. The lst Party tried to manipulate and later admitted her negligence. The complainant nor her brother used disrespectable words or they demand any money from the 1^stOpposite Party.

8. Later on, 11.04.2025 Advocate Abjith from his mobile no. 7337578584 called to the complainant, and requested the complainant and her brother not to precipitate the matter further.

That on, 16.04.2025 the what's app message was sent by the 3rd Opposite Party written communication to the complainant,

"patient has been advised for the Extraction of Deciduous 53 (milk tooth) and report back for Alyur delivery procedures.

Upon Delivery Appointment, It is noted that the Permanent teeth [+2] missing"

The complainant states she had sent a legal notice to the 1st Opposite Party & 2nd Opposite Party on 02.06.2025 and same was replied on 09.06.2025 by unnecessary things without counter blasting the averments made by the complainant in her legal notice.

9. Due to the wrong extraction of tooth, that the complainant had Pain, bleeding, nerve injury, psychological distress, potential need for further treatment

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like root canal or implant, and misalignment of remaining teeth, due to the negligence of the 1st Opposite Party, due to this that the complainant could not able to smile as before. Hence the receipt of the complaint. In support of the Complaint, Exhibits A-1 to A22 has been marked on the side of the Complainants.

III. Written Version by the 1^st Opposite Party is as follows:

10. The 1^stOpposite Party states that on 03.02 2025, right when she was about to leave her clinic at 8 PM, the Complainant arrived with a specific grievance, that a palatally displaced lateral incisor (Explanation an upper tooth that had grown towards the palate, i.e the inside of the mouth/roof of the mouth, instead of coming out in its usual straight outward position) on the left side of the upper palate (Tooth No. 2-2), which she mistakenly believed to be a milk tooth, was causing her severe discomfort.

11. It can be seen above that the region adjacent to the palatally placed left lateral incisor was already a missing-tooth site owing to a congenitally absent tooth; the lateral incisor (Tooth No. 2-2), which should have developed in that natural gap, instead grew abnormally on the palate. The Complainant, at that very moment, did not furnish any clear or consistent statement, or any specific report or prescription as to which tooth was involved, except repeatedly pointing out the palatally growing tooth no. 2-2 obstructing her tongue. She expressed that her tongue was unable to properly rest on her palate, and that this persistent obstruction as a result of the said "milk tooth" was interfering with normal oral function.

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12. The Complainant did not produce any prior prescription from any other dentist but hurriedly showed an OPG X-ray report of her upper jaw, withdrew it, and even connected the 1º Opposite Party on a phone call with the person who had taken the scan. During that call, the said person clearly indicated that it was Tooth No. 2-2, a palatally placed lateral incisor, that required extraction, Thereafter, the 1 Opposite Party conducted her own careful examination, and upon her independent assessment noticed a cusp on the palate (tooth No. 2-2), which the Complainant herself confirmed was obstructing her tongue and interfering with normal oral function.

13. At this stage, it is essential to point out that although the Complainant has in her possession the OPG X-ray report, which would clearly show the palatally growing tooth in question, the said report has not been produced before this Hon'ble Commission. Instead, she has merely filed two photographs as Document No. 16, placing them side by side-one depicting a right tooth and the other a left missing tooth (being the congenitally absent tooth as shown in the above diagram). Neither of these photographs is sufficient to determine with certainty which tooth was actually removed, nor do they correspond to the tooth that was infact extracted. The non-production of the OPG X-ray report, which would have conclusively shown the location of the palatally growing tooth no. 2-2, demonstrates the lack of bonafides and the clear attempt of the Complainant to obfuscate the matter, and the present compliant is liable to be dismissed with costs on the said ground by itself.

14. The 1st Opposite Party further states at this point that although the initial notation in her prescription records "Pt wants to get her milk tooth removed," the said phrase was merely a preliminary shorthand to capture the Complainant's own hurried expression of her grievance and the visual resemblance of the tooth to a

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milk tooth at first glance. However, upon detailed clinical examination, it became evident that the problematic tooth was in fact a palatally placed permanent lateral incisor (Tooth No. 2-2) towards the left side of the upper jaw. The reference in the prescription therefore cannot be read in isolation, but must be understood in the clinical context, as having simply recorded the patient's requirements, and that itself was not the course of action that was undertaken. What was crucial and decisive in this context was the Opposite Party No. 1's careful examination and the OPG X-ray report shown, both of which confirmed that Tooth No. 2-2 was the source of the obstruction and distress caused to the Complainant.

15. At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the issue of correct or incorrect appearance of the tooth is wholly irrelevant. What is material is that the very tooth which formed the subject of the complainant's grievance at the time of consultation was the one that was removed. The identification of whether it was a deciduous or permanent tooth does not, and cannot, form the subject matter of adjudication before this Hon'ble Commission. The only relevant fact is that the tooth which was causing disturbance to the complainant was removed. The circumstance that it may have been initially observed as a milk tooth but later turned out to be a permanent tooth has no bearing on the determination of negligence or deficiency of service. The distinction between correct or incorrect classification of the tooth cannot be equated with negligence. What arises for the consideration of this Hon'ble Commission is not a pedantic exercise of nomenclature but whether the first opposite party acted with due care and diligence, which, in the facts, stands fully established. Thus the opposite party claims dismissal of the complaint.

IV. 2^ndto 5^thOpposite parties set exparte:-

Notice sent to the 2^ndto 5^thopposite parties by this Commission, were was duly served. The 2^ndto 5^thopposite parties were failed to appear before this

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Commission, hence they were set exparte on 26.08.2025 and 08.09.2025 respectively.

V. To establish this case the Complainant had filed proof affidavit along with 22 documents and same were marked as Exhibits A1 to A22. The 1^stopposite party had submitted proof affidavit and Ex.B1 and Ex.B2 were marked. Brief written arguments filed by the complainant and 1^stopposite party.

VI. LAW ON MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE:

In the case of LaxmanBalkrishna Joshi (Dr) v. Dr. TrimbakBapuGodbole, reported in AIR 1969 SC 12, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that:

"11. The duties which a doctor owes to his patient are clear. A person who holds himself out ready to give medical advice and treatment impliedly undertakes that he is possessed of skill and knowledge for the purpose. Such a person when consulted by a patient owes him certain duties viz. a duty of care in deciding whether to undertake the case, a duty of care in deciding what treatment to give or a duty of care in the administration of that treatment. A breach of any of those duties gives a right of action for negligence to the patient. The practitioner must bring to his task a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge and must exercise a reasonable degree of care. Neither the very highest nor a very low degree of care and competence judged in the light of the particular circumstances of each case is what the law requires (cf. Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edn. Vol. 26 p. 17). The doctor no doubt has a discretion in choosing treatment which he proposes to give to the patient and such discretion is relatively ampler in cases of emergency." The degree of skill and care required by a medical practitioner is so stated in

Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition, Vol.30, Para 35):-

"The practitioner must bring to his task a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge, and must exercise a reasonable degree of care. Neither the very highest

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nor a very low degree of care and competence, judged in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, is what the law requires, and a person is not liable in negligence because someone else of greater skill and knowledge would have prescribed different treatment or operated in a different way; nor is he guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art, even though a body of adverse opinion also existed among medical men.

Deviation from normal practice is not necessarily evidence of negligence. To establish liability on that basis it must be shown (1) that there is a usual and normal practice; (2) that the defendant has not adopted it; and (3) that the course in fact adopted is one no professional man of ordinary skill would have taken had he been acting with ordinary care."

Above said three tests, have also been stated as determinative of negligence in professional practice by Charles Worth& Percy in their celebrated work on Negligence (ibid, para 8.110).

In the opinion of Lord Denning, as expressed in Hucks v. Cole, reported in

[1968] 118 New LJ469,a medical practitioner was not to be held liable simply because things went wrong from mischance or misadventure or through an error of judgment in choosing one reasonable course of treatment in preference of another. A medical practitioner would be liable only where his conduct fell below that of the standards of a reasonably competent practitioner in his field.

The line between civil liability and criminal liability in medico-legal cases is thin, and in the case of Dr. Suresh Gupta v. Govt. of NCT Delhi, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held:

"For fixing criminal liability on a doctor or surgeon, the standard of negligence required to be proved should be so high as can be described as "gross

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negligence" or recklessness". It is not merely lack of necessary care, attention and skill. The decision of the House of Lords in R. Vs. Adomako (Supra) relied upon on behalf of the doctor elucidates the said legal position and contains following observations :-

"Thus a doctor cannot be held criminally responsible for patient's death unless his negligence or incompetence showed such disregard for life and safety of his patient as to amount to a crime against the State."

Thus, when a patient agrees to go for medical treatment or surgical operation, every careless act of the medical man cannot be termed as 'criminal'. It can be termed 'criminal' only when the medical man exhibits a gross lack of competence or inaction and wanton indifference to his patient's safety and which is found to have arisen from gross ignorance or gross negligence. Where a patient's death results merely from error of judgment or an accident, no criminal liability should be attached to it. Mere inadvertence or some degree of want of adequate care and caution might create civil liability but would not suffice to hold him criminally liable.

This approach of the courts in the matter of fixing criminal liability on the doctors, in the course of medical treatment given by them to their patients, is necessary so that the hazards of medical men in medical profession being exposed to civil liability, may not unreasonably extend to criminal liability and expose them to risk of landing themselves in prison for alleged criminal negligence. For every mishap or death during medical treatment, the medical man cannot be proceeded against for punishment. Criminal prosecutions of doctors without adequate medical opinion pointing to their guilt would be doing great disservice to the community at large because if the courts were to impose criminal liability on hospitals and doctors for everything that goes wrong, the doctors

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would be more worried about their own safety than giving all best treatment to their patients. This would lead to shaking the mutual confidence between the doctor and patient. Every mishap or misfortune in the hospital or clinic of a doctor is not a gross act of negligence to try him for an offence of culpable negligence."

The discussion on Medical Negligence would be incomplete without referring toBolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee, reported in(1957)

1 WLR 582, where it was held:

"……Where you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill or competence, then the test as to whether there has been negligence or not is not the test of the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus, because he as not got this special skill. The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and profession to have that special skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill…..It is well established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art…"

(Emphasis supplied).

In the case of Arun Kumar Manglik v. Chirayu Health and Medicare Private Limited and Anr. reported in (2019) 7 SCC 401, The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the standard of care as enunciated in Bolam case must evolve in consonance with its subsequent interpretation by English and Indian Courts. The threshold to prove unreasonableness is set with due regard to the risks associated with medical treatment and the conditions under which medical professionals' function. The Court held as under:

"45. In the practice of medicine, there could be varying approaches to treatment. There can be a genuine difference of opinion. However, while adopting a course of treatment, the medical professional must ensure that it is not unreasonable. The threshold to prove unreasonableness is set with due regard to

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the risks associated with medical treatment and the conditions under which medical professionals' function. This is to avoid a situation where doctors resort to

"defensive medicine" to avoid claims of negligence, often to the detriment of the patient. Hence, in a specific case where unreasonableness in professional conduct has been proven with regard to the circumstances of that case, a professional cannot escape liability for medical evidence merely by relying on a body of professional opinion."

In AchutraoHaribhauKhodwa and Ors.v. State of Maharashtra and Ors, reported in 1996 SCC (2) 634, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held

"The skill of medical practitioners differs from doctor to doctor. The very nature of the profession is such that there may be more than one course of treatment which may be advisable for treating a patient. Courts would indeed be slow in attributing negligence on the part of a doctor if he has performed his duties to the best of his ability and with due care and caution. Medical opinion may differ with regard to the course of action to be taken by a doctor treating a patient, but as long as a doctor acts in a manner which is acceptable to the medical profession, and the Court finds that he has attended on the patient with due care skill and diligence and if the patient still does not survive or suffers a permanent ailment, it would be difficult to hold the doctor to be guilty of negligence." The above view was again reiterated in the case of Spring Meadows Hospital and Anr. v. HarjolAhluwalia through K.S. Ahluwalia and Anr. reported in

(1998) 4 SCC 39 was held that an error of judgment is not necessarily negligence. The Court referred to the decision in Whitehouse &Jorden, [1981] 1 ALL ER 267, and cited with approval the following statement of law contained in the opinion of Lord Fraser determining when an error of judgment can be termed as negligence:-

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"The true position is that an error of judgment may, or may not, be negligent, it depends on the nature of the error. If it is one that would not have been made by a reasonably competent professional man professing to have the standard and type of skill that the defendant holds himself out as having, and acting with ordinary care, then it is negligence. If, on the other hand, it is an error that such a man, acting with ordinary care, might have made, then it is not negligence."

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

NEERAJ SUD & ANR.-Appellants/Respondents -Vs- JASWINDER SINGH (MINOR) & ANR. -Respondents/Appellants observed

(i) Medial Negligence Actionable negligence in context of medical profession involves three constituents

(i) duty to exercise due care; (ii) breach of duty and (iii) consequential damage - Simple lack of care, error of judgment or accident is not sufficient to prove the negligence on part of medical professional so long as doctor follows the acceptable practice of medical profession in discharge of his duties - He cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative treatment or course of treatment was available or that more skilled doctors were there who could have administered better treatment - Medical professional may be held liable for negligence only when he is not possessed with requisite qualification or skill or when he fails to exercise reasonable skill which he possesses in giving treatment When reasonable care, expected of medical professional, is extended or rendered to the patient unless contrary is proved, it would not be a case for actionable negligence. Simply for reason that patient has not responded favourably to surgery or treatment administered by a doctor or that surgery has failed, doctor cannot be held liable for medical negligence straightway by applying doctrine of Res

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IpsaLoquitor unless it is established by evidence that doctor failed to exercise the due skill possessed by him in discharging of his duties.

VII. ISSUES RAISED:

16. Based on the above facts, perusing the records before us, and hearing the submissions made by both sides, the following issues have become relevant:

Issue No. 1: Whether there is medical negligence on the part of the 1^st Opposite Party / Oyster Dental Care and its doctors?

Issue No. 2: Whether the Complainant is entitled to get any relief and if so to what extent?

Let's inspect each of the above in detail.

I. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION:

Issue No. 1: Whether there is medical negligence on the part of the 1^st Opposite Party / Oyster Dental Care and its doctor?

17. Very short point involved in this case is whether the 1^stopposite party / Oyster Dental Care represented by Mrs. Dr.Soosai Christopher has committed medical negligence for wrongful extraction of permanent teeth (+) instead of milk teeth (tooth no.53) of the complainant.

18. Admittedly in this case the complainant claims to have consulted the 4^th opposite party / TOOTHSI and on their advise through whatsapp message (Ex.A8) she was advised to remove the milk teeth - Tooth No.53 for the purpose of fixing tooth clip and decided to go by their advice and said to have consulted the 1^st opposite party on 03.02.2025. It is also admitted fact that the 1^stopposite party had demanded Rs.800/- towards the said procedures as per (Ex.A14). The 1st opposite party also made notation in her prescription record dated 03.02.2025 (Ex.A9) that

"patient wants to get her milk tooth removed". However the 1^stopposite party instead of extraction of milk tooth No.53 found to have extracted the permanent

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tooth (2-2) as per their own record sheet (Ex.B2) of extractions done for the month of February 2025. The complainant alleges that it's a sheer case of medical negligence on the part of the 1^stopposite party leading to deficiency in service, which has resulted in serious harm to her resulting in mental agony pain and sufferings.

19. On the other hand, the 1^stopposite party claims that the prescription records (Ex.A9) is merely a preliminary shorthand to capture the complainant's own hurried expression of her grievance and the visual resemblance of the tooth to a milk tooth at first glance. However, upon detailed clinical examination, it became evident that the problematic tooth was infact a palatally placed permanent lateral incisor (Tooth No.2-2) towards the left side of the upper jaw. The reference in the prescription (Ex.A9) therefore cannot be read in isolation, but must be understood in the clinical context as having simply recorded the patients requirements, and that itself was not the course of action that was undertaken. What was crucial and decisive in this context was the opposite party No.1 careful examination and the OPG X-ray report shown, both of which confirmed that Tooth No.2-2 was the source of the obstruction and distress caused to the complainant. Thus claims that there is no negligence on her part. The distinction between correct or incorrect classification of the tooth cannot be equated with negligence. What arises for the consideration of this Hon'ble Commission is not a pedantic exercise of nomenclature but whether the first opposite party acted with due care and diligence, which, in the facts, stands fully established.

20. Now we will proceed to analyse the rival submission of both the parties. We would like to make it clear that this is not a case where the complainant was suffering with pain or any such symptoms has approached the 1^stopposite party for medical diagnosis and extraction of the painful teeth. This is a case where the complainant has preferred to wear braces to her teeth, two invisible braces to fix misaligned teeth on the advice of 4^thopposite party. The complainant found to have

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approached the 1^stopposite party to get herself removed the milk teeth ( Tooth No.53) for the purpose of wearing two invisible braces for her misaligned teeth.

21. The 1^stopposite party though claims that what was crucial and decisive in this context is that on careful examination and the OPG X-ray report shown, both of which confirmed that Tooth No.2-2 was the source of the obstruction and distress caused to the complainant, necessitated the extraction of the permanent teeth (Tooth No.2-2). However the 4^thopposite party has failed to place before us the medical records to establish that the complainant has suffered with any obstruction and distress with regard to the said permanent teeth (Tooth No.2-2).

22. The 1st opposite party has raised a note of caution that the distinction between correct or incorrect classification of the tooth cannot be equated with negligence. What arises for the consideration of this Hon'ble Commission is not a pedantic exercise of nomenclature but whether the first opposite party acted with due care and diligence, which, in the facts, stands fully established. However as stated supra, the 1^stopposite party has not placed any medical record to substantiate their claim to hold that only on due care and diligence they perform the procedure to extract the permanent teeth (Tooth No.2-2) instead of milk teeth (Tooth No.53).

23. We observe that the 1^stopposite party having opted to extract the different tooth of the complainant should have adopted some standard procedure / consent form before the said procedure is carried out. As stated earlier the 1^stopposite party has not come forward to place the case sheet to justify her action. Mere extraction record Ex.B2 for the month of February 2025 done by the 1^stopposite party alone is not sufficient to justify the claim of the 1^stopposite party.

24. At this juncture we are guided by various rulings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as stated supra in Law of Medical negligence and also two recent

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judgements of Hon'ble Supreme court about the applicability of "Maxim- Res ipsa loquitur" in medico legal cases.

In Civil Appeal No(s). 7175 of 2021; 26 september 2023, CPL Ashish Kumar Chauhan (Retd.) versus Commanding Officer & ORS.

It is observed that,

71. The principle of res ipsa loquitur has been described in Charlesworth& Percy on Negligence in the following terms:

"6-25. It has been said that "a prima facie case" should be the preferred terminology. It means essentially a case which calls for some answer from the defendant and will arise upon proof of: (1) the happening of some unexplained occurrence; (2) which would not have happened in the ordinary course of things without negligence on the part of somebody other than the claimant; and (3) the circumstances point to the negligence in question being that of the defendant, rather than that of any other person"

6-26 The third requirement is usually fulfilled by showing that the instrument causing the damage was in the management and control of the defendant at the time of the occurrence, but this is not essential. Where an object which causes an accident has, at all material times, been under the control of the defendants and there is no evidence to show how the accident happened, the presumption of negligence cannot be displaced by evidence of the general care that has been taken." This court has, on several occasions in the past, particularly in cases involving allegations of medical negligence, invoked the principle of res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself"). In V. KishanRao v Nikhil Super Speciality Hospital &Anr., it was observed:

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"In a case where negligence is evident, the principle of res ipsa loquitur operates and the complainant does not have to prove anything as the thing (res) proves itself'. In such a case it is for the respondent to prove that he has taken care and done his duty to repel the charge of negligence."

72. All these facts and circumstances, in the opinion of this court, prove and establish that by reasonable standards of evidence, the appellant has justified the invocation of the principle of res ipsaloquitor. The principle was applied in the Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences (supra) wherein this court held that:

"77. [..] in a case involving medical negligence, once the initial burden has been discharged by the complainant by making out a case of negligence on the part of the hospital or the doctor concerned, the onus then shifts on to the hospital or to the attending doctors and it is for the hospital to satisfy the Court that there was no lack of care or diligence."

Earlier, in SavitaGargm case (supra), the court had ruled that once the complainant or aggrieved party had adduced some evidence that the patient suffered (or died, as in that case) due to lack of care (or as in this case, suffered irremediable injury due to want of diligence) "then the burden lies on the hospital to justify that there was no negligence on the part of the treating doctor or hospital. Therefore, in any case, the hospital is in a better position to disclose what care was taken [..]."

Similarly in CIVIL APPEAL No.10347 of 2010, Mrs. KALYANI RAJAN Versus INDRAPRASTHA APOLLO HOSPITAL & ORS.

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Wherein the Supreme court held In so far as the applicability of principles of Res IpsaLocutor, in the fact and circumstances of the case, it is to bear in mind that the principles get attracted where circumstances strongly suggest partaking in negligent behaviour by the person against whom an accusation of negligence is made. For applying the principles of Res IpsaLocutor, it is necessary that a 'Res' is present to establish the allegation of negligence. Strong incriminating circumstantial or documentary evidence is required for application of the doctrine.

25. Applying the above said doctrine and the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to the facts of the case on hand, the complainant was able to establish that 'Res' is present to establish the allegation of negligence. i.e., the specific allegation that the 1^stopposite party negligently removed the permanent teeth (Tooth No.2-2) instead of milk teeth (Tooth No.53) as per the prescription (Ex.A9) of the 1^stopposite party and extraction record for the month of February 2025 (Ex.B2). However the 1^stopposite party though claims that she exercised due diligence, caution and care in extraction of permanent teeth (Tooth No.2-2) has not come forward to place before us any evidence to establish the extraction of the said permanent teeth instead of milk teeth (Tooth No.53) is necessitated. Hence by invoking the maxim 'res ipsa loquitur' and principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we hold that there is clear case of medical negligence leading to deficiency in service by the 1^stopposite party in performing the wrongful procedure of removing the permanent teeth (Tooth No.22) instead of milk teeth (Tooth No.53) of the complainant causing serious harm and injury, mental agony pain and sufferings to her. Hence the complaint against the 1^stopposite party alone is allowed and dismissed against the other opposite parties (2 to 5) as devoid of merits. This issue is answered accordingly.

Issue No. 2: Whether the complainant is entitled to get any relief and if so to what extent?

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26. In issue No.1, we arrived at a conclusion that 1^stopposite party alone is liable for medical negligence leading to deficiency in service and thus the complaint was allowed against the 1^stopposite party. we don't find merit in the complaint against the remaining opposite parties 2 to 5. Hence, the compliant is dismissed against them.

27. Now the issue to be decided is what is the relief the complainant is entitled to?

Admittedly in this case the complainant a female age 21 years who was suffering with misaligned teeth. To overcome this issue she decided to wear invisible braces to fix misaligned teeth and underwent the procedure with the 1^st opposite party. However, due to the negligence of the 1^stopposite party the removal of her permanent teeth (Tooth No.2-2) has caused serious harm and injury with mental agony pain and sufferings. The complainant based on the above facts sought the following reliefs:

1. To direct the 1^stopposite party to pay the sum of Rs.50,00,000/- to the complainant for her mental agony and other expenses. 2.To direct the 1^stopposite party to repay Rs.800/- the fees to the complainant along with travel expenses of Rs.1000/- & loss of pay of Rs.500/-. 3.To pay Rs.25,00,000/- for physical pain and dental implant to replace the missing teeth with artificial ones, cost of litigation incurred by the complainant. 4.In addition, direct the 2^ndopposite party to cancel the license of the 1^stopposite party and pay any other cost.

However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the age of the complainant, her gender, expenditure to be incurred to undergo the procedure to implant the artificial teeth and also correspondingly aligned with braces and

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invisible braces for her misaligned teeth by the complainant and considering the pain and sufferings this commission orders the following reliefs:

1.The complaint is allowed against 1^stopposite party alone and dismissed against other opposite parties.

2.The 1^stopposite party is directed to pay a compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- (inclusive of refund amount and other expenses) for medical negligence leading to deficiency in medical services with pecuniary and non pecuniary damages. 2.The 1^stopposite party is directed to pay Rs.5000/- against cost of the complaint.

In the result, the complaint is allowed against 1^st opposite party alone and dismissed against other opposite parties. The 1^st opposite party is directed to pay a compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- (inclusive of refund amount and other expenses) for medical negligence leading to deficiency in medical services with pecuniary and non pecuniary damages. The 1^st opposite party is directed to pay Rs.5000/- against cost of the complaint. The above mentioned amount of Rs.2,05,000/- is to be paid within two months from the date of receipt of this order, failing which the above said amount shall carry 9% interest p.a. from the date of this order to till the date of realisation.

Dictated to Steno Typist, transcribed, and typed by her, corrected and pronounced by us in the Open Commission, on this the 25^th day of November, 2025.

KAVITHA KANNAN T.R.SIVAKUMHAR D. GOPINATH

MEMBER - I MEMBER - II PRESIDENT List of documents filed on the side of the Complainant:

Ex.A1 05.01.2025 Scan booked for confirmation to the patient

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Ex.A3 06.01.2025 Payment of Rs.60,000

Ex.A4 09.01.2025 Toothsi instruct to take Xray

Ex.A5 21.01.2025 Xray approved mail by Toothsi

Ex.A6 21.01.2025 To visit of CLINICAL Nungambakkam

Ex.A7 24.01.2025 Confirmation form toothsi to remove milk tooth

Ex.A8 24.01.2025 Confirmation from toothsi to remove milk teeth (Teeth No.53) it

was signed by Dr.pooja

Ex.A9 03.02.2025 To respondent clinic

Ex.A10 03.02.2025 Payment to the respondent

Ex.A11 03.02.2025 Payment slip

Ex.A12 10.04.2025 Petitioner went to the Toothsi for confirmation for wear braces

Ex.A13 10.04.2025 Call recording of doctor and patient

Ex.A14 11.04.2025 Whatsapp chat with Abhijith Advocate Respondents advocate

Ex.A15 16.04.2025 Confirmation letter about wrong teeth removed by the respondent

Ex.A16 -- Picture of petitioner

Ex.A17 29.05.2025 Legal notice to 1^strespondent

Ex.A18 02.06.2025 Legal notice to 5^threspondnet

Ex.A19 09.06.2025 Reply notice to 5^threspondent

Ex.A20 -- Acknowledgement card

Ex.A21 -- X ray scan report

23

Ex.A22 -- Photo

List of documents filed on the side of the 1^st opposite party:

List of documents produced on summon:

KAVITHA KANNAN T.R.SIVAKUMHAR D. GOPINATH

MEMBER - I MEMBER - II PRESIDENT