ORDER
By Dr. Chhabilendra Roul, Member (A) The present MA has been filed by the applicant seeking condonation of delay of 467 days in filing OA No. 4549 of
2049.
2. The applicant has filed the aforementioned OA seeking setting aside of orders dated 19.03.2020 and 4.8.2022 rejecting the claim of the applicant for rectification of alleged anomaly in Grade Pay of Photographer Grade-II and Grade-I in Central Ground Water Board. The applicant has calculated the delay of 467 days.
3. Notices were issued to the respondents on MA and they have filed their counter reply.
4. Submission by the learned Counsel for the Applicant
4.1 The learned counsel for the applicant, relying on the pleadings in the OA states that the delay occurred inadvertently on account of assurance given by the respondents that the anomaly would be removed. The applicant relied on the assurance and refrained from filing the
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OA in time. The learned counsel further states that the delay was not wilful and intentional. The applicant has a case based on merit and if the OA is not allowed due to technical reasons, the applicant will suffer irreparable loss. The disparity in pay scale awarded to the applicant will perpetuate the injustice to the applicant as similarly placed employees in sister organisations having equivalent scope of work, functions and responsibilities are getting higher pay. It would violate principle of equal pay for equal work, a well settled principle in catena of judgments by the Apex Court. Under such circumstances, the courts have exercised the discretion to condone the periods of delay in filing OAs/petitions.
4.2 In support of his averment pleading a special consideration for condonation of delay, the learned counsel for the applicant cites the Apex Court Judgment in Collector (LA) Vs. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 where it has been held:
"The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression
"sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaning- ful manner which subserves the ends of justice -- that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts."
4.3 The learned counsel for the applicant has further relied on the Apex Court Judgement in Vedabai Vs, Shantaram Baburao Patil, (2000) 9 SCC 106 wherein it was held:
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"5. In exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The Court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression 'sufficient cause' the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance."
4.4 Relying on the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court, the learned counsel for the applicant states that it is a fit case for invoking the discretion of the Tribunal to condone the delay of 467 days.
5. Submission by learned Counsel for the Respondents
5.1 The learned counsel for the respondents vehemently oppose any condonation of the delay in filing the aforementioned OA. He states that the applicant had tried to conceal the exact period of delay. The first order by the respondents in rejecting the claim of the applicant was on 19.3.2020. Hence, the original cause of action arose from that day, not on the subsequent date, i.e. 4.8.2022, reiterating the earlier order by the respondents. He emphasised that repeated representation by the applicant is no reason for acceding to the prayer of the applicant for condonation of delay. Moreover, there was no proof that the respondents had given any assurance to rectify the alleged anomaly in the pay
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scales of Photographer Grade-II and Photographer Grade-I. The actual delay is 1700 days, taking the first rejection order dated 19.3.2000.
5.2 The learned counsel for the respondents' further states that the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the applicant are distinguishable because of the facts and circumstances of the present case are at variance with that obtained in those cases.
6. Analysis
6.1 The applicant has invoked Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which is reproduced bellow for better appreciation:
"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases — Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation —The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."
6.2 The afore mentioned Section of the Limitation Act, 1963 expressly refers to that the applicant or appellant has to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal/application within the prescribed period. The prescribed Period for filing Original Applications
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before the Central Administrative Tribunal has been prescribed under Section 21(1) of the Administrative Act, 1985. For better appreciation the said Section is reproduced below:
"21. Limitation
(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application, (a) (b) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of subsection
(2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months."
6.3 By strictly following the statutory provision as mentioned above, the present MA is not permissible as there is delay of 1700 days, taking the first rejection order dated 19.3.2000. However, the there are several judgments by the Apex Court which has amplified and substantiated the above statutory provision. The learned Counsel for the applicant has referred the Apex Court in Collector (LA) (supra) and Vedabai (supra) case. The Apex Court in the former case has held that when an applicant could convince the court that there was sufficient reason for the delay in filing, there could be no reason not to condone such delays in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing the matters on "merit". In the Vedabai (supra) case, a
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distinction is made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. In the instant case, the delay is of 1700 days from the first date of rejection on 19.3.2000. Moreover, in both these cases, the Apex Court has emphasised that they should be "sufficient reason" justifying the delay in filing the
petition/appeal/application.
6.4 In the instant case, the learned counsel for the applicant has averred that the delay has occurred inadvertently on account of the false assurance given by respondent No.4 verbally. This Tribunal cannot rely on the verbal assertion by the applicant that there was verbal false assurance given by the respondents. Hence, we find there is no such "sufficient reason" furnished by the applicant for the inordinate delay of 1700 days in filing the Original Application.
6.5 Apart from sufficient reason for the delay, it has to be seen whether the matter falls into the category of "continuing wrong". In this context it would be pertinent to refer to the concluding part of Paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 extracted hereunder:
"7. ………. Where a service-related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the
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grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.
6.6 The question here is whether the present case deserves to be treated as exception to exception as outlined in the aforementioned judgment of the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra). The applicant is seeking parity of pay scales of the post which he was appointed initially and to the post he was promoted subsequently, on the basis of similar pay scales and grade pay granted to similarly designated employees in sister departments/organisations in Government of India. The pay scales offered /granted to the present applicant as per the pay scales applicable to the post as contained in the Ministry of Water Resources Central Ground Water Board, Photographer Grade-II Recruitment Rules, 2011. The said Recruitment Rules has not been challenged by the Applicant in OA No.4549/2021 in respect which the present MA has been filed seeking condonation of delay in filing the said OA. Hence, without challenging the Recruitment Rules, which
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contain the scale of pay, the applicant is seeking parity with similarly designated employees in sister departments/ organisations. In other words, it is a matter which falls under the domain of policy making by the respondents as executive authorities. Hence, the matter cannot fall under the category of continuing wrong to attract invocation of the principle of
"exception to exception" as enunciated by the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) case.
7. Conclusion
7.1 This Tribunal is not convinced that there was sufficient reason to file the present OA with a delay of 1700 days. Moreover, we are of the opinion that the subject matter in the concerned OA does not fall under the category of continuing wrong to condone such inordinate delay. The Apex Court in Shri Khereshwar Mahadev Va Dauji Maharaj Samiti, Aligarh vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., SLP (Crl) Nos.13258-13259/2024 decided on 5.3.2025 held that (Paragraph 15) "Apart from that it is a settled law that when a law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner alone or not at all."
In the instant case, the Original Application No.4549 of 2024 has not been filed as per Section 21(1) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. Accordingly, the present MA seeking
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condonation of delay in filing the OA No. 4549/2024 is not allowed.
7.2 Consequently, OA No.4549/2024 is dismissed as inadmissible.
7.3 No order as to costs. (Rajveer Singh Verma) (Dr. Chhabilendra Roul) Member (J) Member (A)
'SD'
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