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  • Section 19 of the 2013 Act
  • Prohibition and 2 Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter
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  • Section 19 of the 2013 Act
  • Prohibition and 2 Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter
  • provisions contained in Section 10(4) of the 2013 Act.
  • Section 10 of the 2013 Act
  • Section 10(4) of the 2013 Act
Smart Summary

Case Summary: WA No.149 of 2025 — The Airports Authority of India v. Shri Praveen VS

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent No.2, a lady officer working under respondent No.1, lodged a complaint of sexual harassment against respondent No.1 which was placed before the Internal Complaints Committee ("ICC"). Both parties opted for conciliation during the ICC proceedings and agreed, inter alia, not to work in proximity. The ICC conducted a curtailed inquiry (the complainant did not press for a full inquiry because of mental distress) and recorded that "evidence was lacking."

Subsequently, the complainant objected to the ICC's observation of lack of evidence and produced a screenshot of an allegedly objectionable message sent by respondent No.1. The matter was remitted to the ICC, which declined to reopen the proceedings on account of the concluded conciliation. The employer (appellant) initiated independent departmental proceedings against respondent No.1 on the basis of the new material.

Respondent No.1 challenged the departmental proceedings by way of a writ petition (WP(C) No.949/2023). The learned Single Judge, by judgment dated 26.02.2024, quashed the orders initiating the Departmental Proceedings (including the Disciplinary Authority's order dated 13.01.2023 and the Memorandum dated 25.10.2022) and expunged the first paragraph of the ICC's conclusion stating there was no evidence. The employer filed this intra‑Court appeal against that judgment. The present judgment was pronounced on 9th December, 2025 by a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court (Ashutosh Kumar, CJ and Arun Dev Choudhury, J).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in quashing the initiation of Departmental Proceedings against respondent No.1 after conciliation, principally on the ground of Section 10(4) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 ("2013 Act").
  2. Whether the part of the Single Judge's order expunging the ICC's first paragraph of conclusion (which recorded "lack of evidence") ought to be interfered with on appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The learned Single Judge exceeded the writ jurisdiction by disturbing factual findings of the ICC.
  • Section 10(4) of the 2013 Act bars further inquiry by the ICC after conciliation but does not bar the employer from initiating disciplinary action based on independent material arising in the workplace.
  • The ICC declined to proceed after conciliation; the complainant's post-conciliation objection and a new material (screenshot) required fresh consideration, which the employer sought to address through Departmental Proceedings under the Service Rules.

Note: The opinion records that there was no effective resistance by the appellant/employer to the Single Judge's expunging of the ICC's finding of "lack of evidence."

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

  1. The court examined Section 10 of the 2013 Act (including sub‑sections (1) through (4)) and observed that Section 10(4) expressly bars "any further inquiry" by the Internal Committee or Local Committee after a settlement by conciliation. The provision, on its plain reading, limits only the Committee's power to continue inquiry after settlement by conciliation.
  2. The Division Bench held that Section 10(4) does not extend to or extinguish an employer's independent disciplinary jurisdiction under the Service Rules. The statutory bar on the Committee's own further inquiry is distinct from the employer's authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings in respect of employee misconduct.
  3. The court relied on the duty cast on the employer under Section 19 of the 2013 Act to ensure a safe workplace and noted that this statutory obligation cannot be negated merely because the complainant opted for conciliation at one stage, especially where new material emerged subsequently.
  4. The court characterized the 2013 Act as a minimum protective statute that does not curtail disciplinary jurisdiction unless it does so expressly. Reading Section 10(4) as a blanket bar on all employer action would, the court held, frustrate the object of ensuring safe workplaces.
  5. Applying these principles, the Division Bench concluded that the part of the Single Judge's order quashing initiation of the Departmental Proceedings was unsustainable and therefore set aside that part of the impugned judgment.
  6. Separately, concerning the Single Judge's expunging of the ICC's first paragraph recording "lack of evidence," the Division Bench declined to interfere. The court reasoned that the ICC's inquiry had been curtailed because the parties agreed to conciliation to avoid workplace disturbance; thus the ICC had insufficient material to conclude lack of evidence. For that reason the expunction was left undisturbed.
  7. The court directed that the departmental inquiry, being maintainable and lawful, shall be resumed from the stage at which it was stopped. The Disciplinary Authority must proceed in accordance with the Service Rules and ensure full opportunity of defence to the charged officer. All questions of fact and merits were kept open for the Inquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority to consider uninfluenced by any observation in the judgment.

Holding and Implications

PARTIALLY ALLOWED

Holding (direct effects):

  • The Division Bench set aside the portion of the Single Judge's judgment that quashed the initiation of Departmental Proceedings against respondent No.1. The Departmental Proceedings are held to be maintainable and lawful and are to be resumed from the stage at which they were stopped.
  • The Division Bench upheld the Single Judge's expunging of the ICC's first paragraph concluding "lack of evidence" and declined to interfere with that expunction.
  • The Disciplinary Authority is directed to proceed with the inquiry in accordance with the Service Rules and to afford the charged officer full opportunity of defence. Questions of fact and merits remain open for the Inquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority to decide without being influenced by observations made in this judgment.
  • The appeal was otherwise partially allowed with no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The Division Bench clarified that Section 10(4) of the 2013 Act bars further inquiry only by the ICC or Local Committee after conciliation, and does not, by itself, bar an employer from exercising its disciplinary jurisdiction under applicable Service Rules when new or independent material justifies such action.
  • Practically, employers retain the authority to initiate or continue disciplinary proceedings under Service Rules notwithstanding an ICC conciliation, subject to applicable law and procedural protections; however, the ICC's own power to inquire ceases after a settlement under Section 10(4).

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    THE AIRPORTS AUTHORITY INDIA AND 5 ORS v. PRAVEEN VS AND ANR

    Page No.# 1/7

    GAHC010147972024

    undefined

    THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

    (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

    WA NO.149 OF 2025

    1. The Airports Authority of India, represented by the Regional Executive Director, Regional Head Quarter, LGBI Airport, Guwahati.

    2.The Executive Director, Airports Authority of India, Regional Head Quarter, North Eastern Region, LGBI Airport, Assam, Guwahati.

    3. The General Manager (HR), Airports Authority of India, Safdarjung Airport, New Delhi.

    4. The Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Airports Authority of India, Safdarjung Airport, New Delhi.

    5. The General Manager (HR), Inquiry Officer, Airports Authority of India, NSCBI International Airport, Kolkata.

    6. Internal Complaint Committee, Regional Head Quarter, North Eastern Region, represented by the Chairperson.

    …..Appellants -Versus-

    1. Shri Praveen VS Son of K. Sridharan Nair, Priyas, Vamanapuram Post, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala (permanent address) and presently holding the post of Jt. GM (Commercial), Airports Authority of India and posted at Jay Prakash Narayaan International Airport, Patna.

    …..Respondent

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    2. Ms. Phibahunlang Swer, Assistant Manager (Commercial), Airports Authority of India, Imphal Airport, Imphal, presently serving as Manager (Commercial), NSCBI International Airport, Kolkata.

    …..Proforma Respondent

    - B E F O R E - HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. ASHUTOSH KUMAR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY

    For the Petitioner : Mr. R. Dubey, Advocate.

    : Ms. A.B. Kayastha, Advocate. For the Respondent(s) : Mr. R. Sharma, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. P. Phukan, Advocate for respondent No.1.

    Date of judgment : 9th December, 2025.

    J UDGMENT & O RDER (ORAL) (Ashutosh Kumar, CJ)

    We have heard Mr. R. Dubey, learned Advocate for the appellants and Mr. R. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. P. Phukan for the respondent No.1.

    2. This intra-Court appeal is directed against the judgment dated 26.02.2024 of the learned Single Judge passed in WP(C) No.949/2023, whereby the observation in the Internal Complaints Committee (hereinafter to be referred as "ICC") Report that "evidence was lacking", was expunged and the employer's decision to institute an independent Departmental Proceeding against the respondent No.1/charged officer was set aside, principally on the ground of Section 10(4) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and

    2

    Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred as the "2013 Act").

    3. The appellant/employer contends that the learned Single Judge exceeded the writ jurisdiction in disturbing the factual findings of the ICC and that Section 10(4) of the 2013 Act does not bar initiation of disciplinary action by the employer on the basis of independent material, particularly, where the ICC itself had declined to proceed after the conciliation, and that the complainant's post conciliation objection and a new material (screenshot) required fresh consideration, which the employer attempted to address through Departmental Proceedings.

    4. The respondent No.2, a lady Officer working under the supervision of respondent No.1, had lodged a complaint of sexual harassment against the respondent No.1, which was placed before the ICC. During the proceedings, both the parties opted for conciliation on account of workplace disturbance. Conciliation succeeded to the extent that both agreed not to work in proximity.

    5. The ICC, after a curtailed inquiry (the complainant/respondent No.2 not pressing for a full inquiry due to mental distress), concluded that evidence was lacking. Later, the complainant objected to such observation in the ICC Report of there being no evidence and cited a screenshot of an objectionable message sent to her by respondent No.1. The matter was remitted to ICC, which declined to reopen the proceedings in view of the concluded conciliation.

    6. The appellant/employer faced with the new material in workplace, initiated an independent departmental enquiry. The writ

    3

    petition preferred by the respondent No.1 against such disciplinary action [WP(C) No.949/2023] was allowed and the Departmental Proceedings initiated against him vide order dated 13.01.2023 issued by the Disciplinary Authority appointing the Inquiry Officer to inquire into the charges and the Memorandum dated 25.10.2022, initiating the Departmental Proceedings against the respondent No.1, were set aside and quashed.

    Simultaneously, considering the peculiar nature of the case at hand and also after considering all the materials on record and keeping in mind the dignity and reputation of the respondent No.2, the learned Single Judge expunged the first paragraph of the conclusion of the Inquiry Report dated 02.11.2022 declaring that there was no evidence regarding the sexual harassment by respondent No.1.

    7. There is no effective resistance by the appellant/employer against the impugned judgment expunging that part of the ICC Report, which held that there was lack of evidence substantiating the charge as the inquiry was curtailed midway without the Committee having sufficient material before it to say that there was lack of evidence.

    8. The question, therefore, before this Court is whether the learned Single Judge was justified in quashing the initiation of the Departmental Proceedings against the respondent No.1 after conciliation, primarily on the ground of the provisions contained in Section 10(4) of the 2013 Act.

    9. The provision contained in Section 10 of the 2013 Act is being extracted herein below for ready reference:-

    4

    "10. Conciliation.— (1) The Internal Committee or, as the case may be, the Local Committee, may, before initiating an inquiry under section 11 and at the request of the aggrieved woman take steps to settle the matter between her and the respondent through conciliation:

    Provided that no monetary settlement shall be made as a basis of conciliation.

    (2) Where settlement has been arrived at under sub-section (1), the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall record the settlement so arrived and forward the same to the employer or the District Officer to take action as specified in the recommendation.

    (3) The Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall provide the copies of the settlement as recorded under sub-section (2) to the aggrieved woman and the respondent.

    (4) Where a settlement is arrived at under sub-section (1), no further inquiry shall be conducted by the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be."

    10. A bare reading of Section 10(4) of the 2013 Act makes it very clear that what is barred is any further inquiry after the conciliation by the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, and it does not extend to the employer's independent disciplinary jurisdiction which flows from the Service Rules.

    11. On the contrary, Section 19 of the 2013 Act casts an obligation on the employer to ensure a safe workplace. The statutory duty cannot be negated merely because the complainant agreed to conciliate at one stage, particularly, when the ICC declined to proceed further on the objection by respondent No.2 due to the bar under Section 10(4) of the 2013 Act.

    12. In our considered view, the bar under Section 10(4) of the 2013 Act does not extinguish an employer's authority under the Service Rules to inquire into the misconduct of the employee.

    5

    13. The ICC proceedings do not substitute disciplinary jurisdiction unless the Service Rules so provide.

    14. The 2013 Act is a minimum protective statute and does not curtail disciplinary jurisdiction, unless expressly so provided. Reading Section 10(4) of the 2013 Act as a blanket bar will defeat the very purpose of ensuring safe workplaces. Thus, the part of the impugned judgment, which quashes initiation of the Departmental Proceedings against the respondent No.1, is not sustainable in the eyes of law and is, therefore, set aside.

    15. However, so far as the impugned judgment expunging the first paragraph of the ICC conclusion, namely, "lack of evidence" is concerned, we are of the considered opinion that the same ought not to be interfered with for the reason that the inquiry by the ICC could not be concluded because the agreement between the respondent Nos.1 & 2 to conciliate the matter to avoid workplace tension and disturbance. The Departmental Proceedings initiated by the appellant/ employer against the respondent No.1 being maintainable and lawful as well, it shall be resumed from the stage from where it was stopped. However, the Disciplinary Authority shall proceed with the inquiry in accordance with the Service Rules ensuring full opportunity of defence to the respondent No.1/ charged officer.

    16. All questions of facts and merits of the case are kept open to be examined by the Inquiry Officer/ Disciplinary Authority, uninfluenced by any observation made in this judgment.

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    17. The appeal thus stands partially allowed with no order as to costs.

    JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE

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    THE AIRPORTS AUTHORITY INDIA AND 5 ORS v. PRAVEEN VS AND ANR
    (Dec 9, 2025)