Aristo Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. (1971) and Aristo Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. (1985), had been diagnosed with fronto-temporal dementia by AIIMS in 2019, and that while Dr. Prasad remained ill, Smt. Satula Devi had been confined illegally, and accused persons, especially had misappropriated assets, transferred substantial sums from bank accounts, forged signatures, and had executed unauthorised transfers of shares of Aristo Pharmaceuticals and Aristo Laboratories, as well as properties at Vasant Vihar, Delhi, and Mittal Park, Mumbai. The FIR came to be registered on the basis of an order dated 09.02.2021 passed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.

3. After completion of investigation, the I.O. of the P.S. EOW submitted a cancellation report dated 08.12.2022, which came to be accepted by the learned Magistrate vide impugned order dated 12.06.2025, and by way of the same order, the protest petitions filed by the petitioners herein were also rejected.

4. Aggrieved therefrom, the petitioners, by way of present petitions filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., inter alia seek quashing of the impugned order dated 12.06.2025 passed by the learned Magistrate.

5. When the matter was listed and taken up for the first time, a preliminary objection was raised as to the maintainability of these petitions, on the ground that the petitioners had directly approached this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. without first availing the remedy of revision under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. Accordingly,

3

without issuing notice, this Court considered it appropriate to first hear arguments on the maintainability of the petition.

6. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners

has argued that the impugned order is replete with factual inaccuracies and findings unsupported by the record, which warrants interference under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice. It has been contended that the mere existence of a statutory remedy such as revision under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. does not bar the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Reliance is placed on decision in Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra: (2009) 2 SCC 370 and Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan: (2016) 16 SCC 30, wherein the Hon"ble Supreme Court held that the availability of an alternative remedy does not divest the High Court of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., particularly in cases of abuse of process or grave miscarriage of justice.

7. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned order suffers from such infirmities, as the learned Magistrate has relied upon documents not forming part of the Closure Report or the protest petition, and has adjudicated issues not even raised by the protest petitioners. Specifically, orders dated 30.01.2020 and 28.10.2020 passed in proceedings under the Mental Health Care Act, which had no bearing on the matter, were considered on the submissions of the accused persons, who had no right of audience at the stage of consideration of a protest petition. It has further been

4

argued that the learned Magistrate has erroneously stated in paragraph 40 of the impugned order that the accused were heard only on their application under Section 340 of Cr.P.C.; but in reality, the accused persons were also heard on the merits of the cancellation report and protest petition, which is impermissible in law. Reliance is placed on Samir Ahluwalia Petitioner v. State & Anr. S: 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6075, to contend that the accused have no right to be heard at the stage of protest petition, and that the hearing granted in the present case renders the order procedurally flawed.

8. The learned senior counsel also submitted that the learned Magistrate failed to consider that the conclusive finding regarding the mental condition of Dr. Prasad had attained finality in W.P. (Crl.) 2255/2019 decided on 20.09.2019, wherein a six-member Medical Board of AIIMS diagnosed him with fronto-temporal dementia, which finding was reaffirmed in W.P. (C) 1271/2020 decided on

23.07.2021.

9. It has also been argued on behalf of the petitioners that the learned Magistrate has committed a serious factual error in paragraphs 42-43 of the impugned order by observing that Smt. Satula Devi had not alleged the use of force or coercion. This finding, it was urged, is contrary to the record. In paragraph 5 of the impugned order itself, the learned Magistrate recorded the submission that the accused had used physical force to take control over the valuables of Smt. Satula Devi, yet later erroneously concluded that no such submission had been made. It was further

5

pointed out that the application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. filed by Smt. Satula Devi categorically alleges coercion, forced signatures, and illegal confinement, as well as exploitation of Dr. Prasad"s mental condition by the accused to transfer his assets.

10. It was thus contended on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned order suffers from both legal and factual errors, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the present petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is not only maintainable but is necessitated to correct the miscarriage of justice and abuse of process occasioned by the impugned order dated 12.06.2025.

11. Conversely, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos. 2 and 3 argued that the petitioners have approached this Court without first availing the equally efficacious statutory remedy of filing a revision before the learned Sessions Court under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. It has been argued that the impugned order has been passed by the learned Magistrate after a detailed appreciation of facts and law, with due application of judicial mind, leaving no occasion for interference by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.

12. It has been further contended that the reliance placed by the petitioners on the decisions in Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd.

(supra) and Prabhu Chawla (supra) is wholly misplaced, as the petitioners have failed to establish the existence of any extraordinary circumstances warranting the invocation of inherent powers. The only purported ground urged by one of the petitioners, alleging

6

„abuse of process," is that the learned Magistrate, while passing the impugned order, took judicial notice of two judicial orders which were allegedly not placed on record by the petitioners before the learned Magistrate. It is submitted that this allegation is not only baseless but also appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead this Court. In fact, the decision of this Court in W.P. (C) 1271 of 2020 specifically refers to the said two judicial orders, which were admittedly placed on record by the petitioners themselves in their Protest Petition. It is therefore evident that the learned Magistrate only referred to those two orders mentioned in the judgment of this Court. In any event, there is no bar in law on a Court taking judicial notice of orders passed by other Courts, particularly when such orders form part of the judicial record. Accordingly, the sole ground now sought to be urged by the petitioners, alleging „abuse of process," is devoid of merit and liable to be rejected.

13. It has been further contended on behalf of respondent nos. 2 and 3 that, in the present case, a thorough investigation was conducted pursuant to which the I.O. had filed a Cancellation Report. The learned Magistrate, after considering the material on record, by a detailed and reasoned order, has accepted the cancellation report and dismissed the Protest Petition filed by the petitioners. The reliance placed by the petitioners on Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. (supra) and Prabhu Chawla (supra) is also clearly distinguishable on facts, since both cases involved the quashing of summoning orders in complaint cases where the liberty of the accused was directly at stake. In contrast, the present matter arises from a police

7

investigation culminating in a detailed cancellation report, and the learned Sessions Court is fully competent to adjudicate the present challenge, if at all maintainable, in exercise of its Revisional Jurisdiction. Hence, the petitioners ought to have approached the learned Sessions Court rather than invoking the jurisdiction of this Court at the very first instance.

14. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of the Hon"ble Supreme Court in Vipin Sahani v. CBI: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 511, wherein it was held that it is not open to a party to blithely ignore the statutory remedy available under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. and resort directly to the filing of an application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It is argued that in the present case, the petitioners have failed to demonstrate any extraordinary circumstance which would justify bypassing the statutory remedy of revision before the learned Sessions Court. It was thus prayed that the present petitions be dismissed in limine.

15. This Court has heard arguments addressed on behalf of the petitioners and the respondents, and has perused the material available on record.

16. In the present case, the issue which arises for consideration is whether these petitions are maintainable before this Court, inasmuch as the petitioners have chosen to directly challenge the impugned order - by way of which their protest petition was dismissed and the cancellation report filed by the Investigating Officer was accepted - by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482

8

of the Cr.P.C., instead of preferring a revision petition under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. before the learned Sessions Court.

17. At the outset, this Court deems it appropriate to note that it is now well-settled through judicial pronouncements that there are three kinds of orders which a Court may pass, i.e., final orders, intermediate orders, and interlocutory orders. The distinction between these three categories has been clearly explained by the Hon"ble Supreme Court in Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I of Investigation: (2017) 14 SCC 809, the relevant observations of which are extracted hereunder:

"16. There are three categories of orders that a court can pass- final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction-that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.

***

21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra . by

contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind-an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an

9

intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue."

18. It thus emerges that interlocutory orders, which do not finally determine the rights of any party, cannot be challenged by way of a revision petition under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. Section 397 is confined to final orders or intermediate orders, and empowers the revisional Court to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of such orders. Interlocutory orders, however, can be assailed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., provided that such orders result in abuse of process of the Court or when such interference is otherwise necessary to secure the ends of justice.

19. In the present case, the impugned order passed by the learned ACJM is undoubtedly a final order, since by dismissing the protest petition of the complainants and accepting the cancellation report filed by the I.O., the entire proceedings arising out of the FIR in question have come to an end.

20. The short question that therefore arises at this juncture is whether such a final order, which could admittedly have been assailed before the learned Sessions Court vide a revision petition under Section 397 of Cr.P.C., can also be challenged directly before this Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

21. In this regard, reference may be made to the decision of the Hon"ble Supreme Court in Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. (supra),

10

wherein it was held that availability of alternative remedy of filing under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. could not be ground to dismiss the application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

22. However, subsequently, in Mohit alias Sonu v. State of U.P.:

(2013) 7 SCC 789, another Division Bench of the Hon"ble Supreme Court took a different view, holding that where an alternative remedy of revision under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. is available, recourse to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. ought not to be permitted.

23. It is significant to note that in view of the conflicting ratio laid down in Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. (supra) and Mohit alias Sonu (supra), both being decisions of Benches of equal strength, the matter was referred to a Three-Judge Bench of the Hon"ble Supreme Court. The larger Bench, in Prabhu Chawla (supra), resolved the controversy by upholding the decision in Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. (supra) and expressly overruling the contrary view in

Mohit alias Sonu (supra). The Hon"ble Supreme Court in Prabhu Chawla (supra) categorically held that Section 482 of Cr.P.C. preserves the inherent powers of the High Court, which may be exercised not only to prevent abuse of process of the Court but also to meet any extraordinary situation which demands the intervention of the High Court. Relying also on Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration): (1980) 1 SCC 43, it was observed that the limitation on exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., despite availability of the alternate remedy under Section 397, is not one of

11

jurisdiction but of self-restraint. It was further clarified that since Section 397 of Cr.P.C. covers all orders except interlocutory orders, which would include both final and intermediate orders, confining the scope of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. only to interlocutory orders would be both unwarranted and undesirable. Furthermore, in Prabhu Chawla (supra), the challenge was to an order of taking cognizance against the appellant under Section 228A of IPC and issuance of warrant of summons, which was assailed directly before the Rajasthan High Court. The High Court dismissed the petition holding that the remedy of the appellant lay in filing a revision petition before the Sessions Court. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the High Court"s decision and observed as under:

"4. Mr. P.K. Goswami, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants supported the view taken by this Court in Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. He pointed out that in para 6 of this judgment S.B. Sinha, J. took note of several earlier judgments of this Court including that in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab and Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka for coming to the conclusion that: (Dhariwal case, SCC p. 372)

"6. … Only because a revision petition is maintainable, the same by itself, …, would not constitute a bar for entertaining an application under Section 482 of the Code."

5. Mr. Goswami also placed strong reliance upon judgment of Krishna Iyer, J. in a Division Bench in Raj Kapoor and Ors v. State and Ors. Relying upon judgment of a Bench of three Judges in Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra and quoting therefrom, Krishna Iyer, J. in his inimitable style made the law crystal clear in para 10 which runs as follows:

(Raj Kapoor case, SCC pp. 47-48)

"10. The first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 stands repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. The opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing of the Code, not even Section 397, can

12

affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law when a specific provision is made: easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code. In Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra this Court has exhaustively and, if I may say so with great respect, correctly discussed and delineated the law beyond mistake. While it is true that Section 482 is pervasive it should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code, such, for instance, in Section 397(2). Apparent conflict may arise in some situations between the two provisions and a happy solution

„would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section

(2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction".

(SCC pp. 555-56, para 10)

In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the court or other extraordinary situation excites the court"s jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The policy of the

13

law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the court in the face. In between is a tertium quid, as Untwalia, J. has pointed out as for example, where it is more than a purely interlocutory order and less than a final disposal. The present case falls under that category where the accused complain of harassment through the court"s process. Can we state that in this third category the inherent power can be exercised? In the words of Untwalia, J.: (SCC p. 556, para 10)

"10. … The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible."

I am, therefore clear in my mind that the inherent power is not rebuffed in the case situation before us. Counsel on both sides, sensitively responding to our allergy for legalistics, rightly agreed that the fanatical insistence on the formal filing of a copy of the order under cessation need not take up this court"s time. Our conclusion concurs with the concession of counsel on both sides that merely because a copy of the order has not been produced, despite its presence in the records in the court, it is not possible for me to hold that the entire revisory power stands frustrated and the inherent power stultified."

6. In our considered view any attempt to explain the law further as regards the issue relating to inherent power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is unwarranted. …. …. We venture to add a further reason in support. Since Section 397 Cr.P.C. is attracted against all orders other than interlocutory, a contrary view would limit the availability of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. only to petty interlocutory orders! A situation wholly unwarranted and undesirable.

14

7. As a sequel, we are constrained to hold that the Division Bench, particularly in para 28, in Mohit in respect of inherent power of the High Court in Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. does not state the law correctly. We record our respectful disagreement.

8. In our considered opinion the learned Single Judge of the High Court should have followed the law laid down by this Court in the case of Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. (supra)..."

24. In the backdrop of the aforesaid judicial precedents, this Court also finds it appropriate to notice the decision of the Hon"ble Supreme Court in Amit Mittal & Anr. v. State of Punjab: Criminal Appeal No. 326/2025, where cognizance had been taken on a complaint under Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. filed before the Punjab & Haryana High Court assailing the said order was dismissed on the ground of availability of alternate remedy under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. However, the Hon"ble Supreme Court, after examining the nature of challenge raised in the petition, held that the High Court"s dismissal of the petition merely on the ground of availability of alternate remedy was bad in law. It was observed that while ordinarily the High Court may have declined interference under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., in a case when the challenge was confined only to there being absence of a prima facie case, but in this case, certain additional factual aspects had been raised before the High Court. The order of the High Court was therefore set aside and the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. was restored for adjudication on merits.

15

25. This Court, at this stage, also noted that reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the respondent on decision in Vipin Sahani (supra), to contend that in view of the availability of a specific remedy of revision under Section 397 of Cr.P.C., the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked. This Court, however, finds that the decision in Vipin Sahani (supra) was rendered by a Division Bench which, for its reasoning, relied on decision in Mohit alias Sonu (supra). However, as discussed above, the decision in Mohit alias Sonu (supra) already stood overruled by the Three-Judge Bench in Prabhu Chawla (supra), and thus, reliance on the decision in Vipin Sahani (supra) can be of no avail to the respondents herein.

26. Having regard to the aforesaid judicial precedents, this Court notes that in the present case, the impugned order of the learned Magistrate, dismissing the protest petition and accepting the cancellation report, could indeed have been challenged through a revision petition under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. before the Sessions Court. However, learned senior counsel for the petitioners has drawn attention of this Court to certain peculiar aspects which, according to the petitioners, make out a case of abuse of process of the Court and justify invocation of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

27. The first contention advanced by the petitioners is that it is well-settled that a proposed accused has no right of audience at the stage of consideration of a protest petition. It is, however, urged that

16

the learned Magistrate, while passing the impugned order, has taken into account submissions made by the accused persons. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the accused were heard only on their application under Section 340 of Cr.P.C. and not on the protest petition itself, which fact is duly recorded in the order. The petitioners, however, have placed reliance on certain order sheets of the learned Magistrate, which indicate that the application under Section 340 of Cr.P.C. was to be taken up separately for arguments. Yet, according to them, no such separate hearing was ever conducted and instead, the arguments were heard jointly on all applications, including the protest petition.

28. The second contention of the petitioners is that the learned Magistrate has relied upon certain documents, including judicial orders, which were never placed before the Court by the complainants but were referred to only by the accused during arguments. The respondents, however, contend that such judicial orders had already been referred to in the order of this Court in W.P.(C) 1271/2020, which was placed on record by the petitioners themselves, and there was no embargo on the learned Magistrate in taking judicial notice thereof.

29. In view of the above, though the submissions of the petitioners alleging abuse of process of the Court have been refuted by the respondents, the fact remains that the petitioners are not only challenging the impugned order on merits - i.e. on the grounds that the investigation was perfunctory and the commission of offence

17

stood made out against the accused persons - but also on the procedural improprieties alleged to have been committed by the learned Magistrate in considering and passing the order on the protest petition.

30. Accordingly, while this Court is of the opinion that the petitioners could have availed the remedy of filing a revision petition before the learned Sessions Court under Section 397 of Cr.P.C., yet, in view of the settled legal position enunciated by the Hon"ble Supreme Court that a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot be dismissed solely on the ground of availability of an alternate remedy, this Court is inclined to hold that the present petitions are maintainable before this Court.

31. It is, however, clarified that the above observations are confined solely to the issue of maintainability of the present petitions. The merits of the contentions advanced by the petitioners, including those pertaining to the alleged abuse of process of law, shall be examined and adjudicated independently at the stage of final disposal of these petitions.

32. Accordingly, on the petitioners taking steps, issue notice of these petitions to all the respondents, including electronically, returnable on 17.12.2025.

33. The respondents are directed to file replies to these petitions within a period of 04 weeks from date, after serving advance copy to the petitioners. The petitioners may also file rejoinder(s) to the same, if any, within a period of 04 weeks thereafter.

18

34. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.

DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J

SEPTEMBER 26, 2025/zp

T.D./T.S.

19