| Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 740 |
Case relied on by petitioner (no specific principle distilled in the opinion text). |
The Court recorded that the petitioner relied on this citation but held that on the facts it was not applicable and did not warrant interference. |
| Allahabad University v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) — Civil Appeal Nos.12411‑12414/2024 |
Case relied on by petitioner (as recorded in the petition). |
The Court observed the citation was relied upon but found it not applicable on the facts of the present case. |
| Cochin Devaswom Board v. Vamana Setti, AIR 1966 SC 1980 |
Case relied on by petitioner (as recorded). |
Recorded as relied upon; the Court found it not applicable on the specific facts and therefore did not treat it as controlling. |
| Gram Panchayat v. Kesho Narain, AIR 1964 Punjab 462 |
Case relied on by petitioner (as recorded). |
The Court recorded reliance but found it inapposite on the facts before it. |
| Calcutta Gujarati Education Society & Anr. v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation & Ors., (2003) 10 SCC 533 |
Principle of "reading down" a provision — harmonious construction to make a statute workable; limited scope for reading down; cannot read words into statute. |
The Court relied on the passage in paragraph 35 to explain and justify the limited role of "reading down" to cure manifest defects and to ensure the statute is workable. That principle informed the Court's approach to assessing whether the retrospective provision ought to be construed or severed. |
| AFCONS Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr. v. Cherian Varket Construction Co. (P) Ltd. & Ors. (Civil Appeal No.6000 of 2010, disposed 26.07.2010) |
Principles of statutory interpretation: literal rule and the exception where literal reading leads to absurdity, repugnancy or impracticability; use of purposive interpretation in exceptional cases. |
The Court invoked these principles to justify departure from the literal effect of the retrospective date where literal compliance produced absurdity and to support correcting a legislative mistake by appropriate interpretative measures. |
| Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) — treatise |
Modification of statutory language to meet legislative intention in exceptional cases where ordinary meaning leads to contradiction or absurdity. |
The Court quoted Maxwell to support the proposition that courts may modify statutory language to give effect to the legislature's true intention when literal words would produce absurdity or defeat the statute's object. |
| Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 830 |
Judicial approval of the approach in Maxwell — ability to correct manifest errors to give effect to intended purpose. |
The Court cited Tirath Singh as authority approving the Maxwell approach to corrective interpretation where necessary. |
| Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay, AIR 1952 SC 324 |
If one construction leads to absurdity and another accords with common sense and legislative intent, choose the latter — courts may modify ordinary constructions to avoid absurdity. |
The Court referenced this case to reinforce the rule permitting departure from literal reading where it would produce absurd or impractical results. |
| Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd., (2004) (4) SCC 285 |
Affirms that literal construction is the default but there is an exception when literal application leads to absurdity or inconsistency; context may require a different meaning. |
Quoted to underline the limited but established exception to literal interpretation when necessary to avoid absurdity. |
| Mangin v. Inland Revenue Commission, [1971 (1) All.ER 179] |
Presumption that legislature did not intend injustice or absurdity; if literal interpretation produces such a result and alternate interpretation is available, adopt the latter. |
Used to support the proposition that construction aims to ascertain legislative will and avoid absurdity where possible. |
| Salem Bar-II (Order VII/Order VIII example) — (Salem Bar-II decision referenced) |
Classic example of correcting a draftsman's error by substituting words to give effect to legislative intent (Order VII/Order VIII correction). |
The Court cited Salem Bar-II as an example where the Court read a provision as if a draftsman's error had been corrected, illustrating the kind of corrective approach that may be taken in exceptional circumstances. |
| Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd., [1978 (1) All ER 948] (via Justice G.P. Singh's exposition) |
Four conditions (as extracted by G.P. Singh) to justify departing from plain words of statute: clear and gross anomaly; legislature/draftsman could not have intended the anomaly; anomaly can be obviated without detriment to legislative objective; language is susceptible to required modification. |
The Court referred to these conditions (through G.P. Singh) as guiding criteria to decide whether departure from plain words (to correct an anomaly) is justified; these conditions informed the Court's conclusion that the retrospective date was a legislative mistake. |