STATE OF CHHATTISGARH v. IMMANUAL NANDA

1

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

ACQA No. 330 of 2024

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, District Balod (C.G.)

... Appellant versus

1 - Immanual Nanda S/o S.D. Nanda Aged About 56 Years R/o Dhamtari Christen Hospital Police Station And District Dhamtari (C.G.) Permanent Address Village Balodgahan, Police Station Gurur District Balod (C.G.)

... Respondent

For Appellant / State : Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, GA For Respondent(s) : Ms. Laxmi Gupta on behalf of Mr. Pragalbha Sharma, Advocate

(Hon'ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput) Judgment on Board

05/08/2025

This appeal under section 378 (3) of BNSS, 2023 has been filed by the appellant/State against the judgment dated 21.09.2023 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (for short trial Court), Gunderdehi, District- Balod CG in criminal case no. 65/2018 whereby the respondent has been acquitted from the charge punishable under Section 279 & 304-A of the Indian Panel Code,1860 (for short IPC).

2

2. Case of the prosecution in nutshell is that complainant Kumesh Kumar Sahu (PW-1), lodged a First Information Report (FIR) at Police Station Gunderdehi, stating that his father, Thakur Ram Sahu, had left home on 02.01.2018 at around 9:30 a.m. on his Scooty (Activa No. 5284). When he reached near Mundera Chowk, a Pickup vehicle bearing registration No. CG-05- D- 0813, coming from the Dhamtari side was being driven in a rash and negligent manner and collided with the Scooty. As a result of the said accident, his father Thakur Ram Sahu sustained grievous injuries on his head, face, and right leg, ultimately leading to his death. The incident was witnessed by Yuvraj Sahu and Sudama. Based on the aforesaid report, the police at Police Station Gunderdehi registered FIR bearing Crime No. 04/2018 for offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short IPC). Investigation was set on motion, spot map was prepared and statement of the witnesses were recorded. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed. The respondent was charged as stated above. He denied charges and claimed trial. Statement of the respondent under Section 313 CrPC was recorded in which he pleaded innocence and false implication.

3. By the impugned judgment, learned trial Court on the basis of evidence, acquitted the respondent of all the charges which led to filing of this appeal.

4. Mr. Rahul Tamaskar counsel for the appellant /State argues that the learned trial Court has erred in law and on facts in failing to properly appreciate the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, particularly the testimony of the eye-witness, PW-2 Yuvraj Sahu. Said witness has categorically deposed that on the date of the incident, i.e., 02.01.2018, he witnessed the accused/respondent driving the Bolero Pickup vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, which resulted

3

in the vehicle colliding with the Scooty being ridden by the deceased, Thakur Ram Sahu. PW-2 has clearly stated that due to the said collision, the deceased sustained grievous injuries on his head, face, and right leg, which ultimately led to his death. The witness further deposed that he was personally acquainted with the accused and duly identified him. He further submits that the learned trial Court failed to duly appreciate the deposition of PW-1 Kumesh Kumar Sahu, the complainant and son of the deceased, who promptly lodged the FIR narrating the sequence of events leading to the fatal accident. It is an undisputed fact on record that the offending vehicle was driven in a rash and negligent manner on a public road, thereby endangering human life and causing the death of the victim. In light of the consistent and credible testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, as well as the undisputed fact of the accident resulting in the death of Thakur Ram Sahu, the offence under Sections 279 and 304-A of IPC stood clearly established against the accused/respondent beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, he submits that the impugned judgment of acquittal is legally unsustainable and warrants interference by this Court.

5. Ms. Laxmi Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand, supports the impugned judgment and submits that that the learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and passed a reasoned judgment of acquittal. The prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused/respondent beyond reasonable doubt. She submits that the testimony of PW-2 Yuvraj Sahu, purported to be an eye-witness, lacks credibility and is not supported by any independent or corroborative evidence. No cogent proof has been adduced to establish that the respondent was, in fact, driving the offending vehicle at the time of the incident. Further, PW-1 Kumesh Kumar Sahu, being the son of the deceased and an interested witness, merely lodged the FIR based on

4

hearsay and not on the basis of personal knowledge. The prosecution failed to produce reliable forensic or mechanical evidence to establish rashness or negligence on part of the respondent. In view of the settled principle that in cases under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC, rashness and negligence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, the benefit of doubt was rightly extended to the respondent. She further submits that impugned judgment being based on sound reasoning and due appreciation of evidence, calls for no interference.

6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

7. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhim Singh v. State Of Haryana ., (2002) 10 SCC 461 observed that an appellate Court entertaining an appeal from the judgment of acquittal by the trial Court though entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and come to an independent conclusion, it should not do so as a matter of routine. It has been held in paragraph 9 as under -

"Before concluding, we would like to point out that this Court in a number of cases has held that an Appellate Court entertaining an appeal from the judgment of acquittal by the trial court though entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and come to an independent conclusion, it should not do so as a matter of routine. In other words, if from the same set of evidence two views are possible and if the trial court has taken one view on the said evidence, unless the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the trial court is either perverse or such that no reasonable person could come to that conclusion or that such a finding of the trial court is not based on any material on record, it should not merely because another conclusion is possible reverse the finding of the trial court. [See :

M/s. Mohanlal Hargovind Dass vs. Ram Narain & Ors. (1979 (3) SCC 279), State of Punjab vs. Balraj Singh alias Chhajju (1978

(3) SCC 129), State of Maharashtra vs. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar (1981 (3) SCC 199) and Ram Kumar Pandey vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975 (3) SCC 815)]. In the instant case also we find that the trial court had taken a view which the High

5

Court has not held to be either perverse, unreasonable or a finding which is not based on evidence, still on re-appreciation of the evidence, the High Court came to a different conclusion which on facts of this case and on the basis of the ratio of the law laid down by this Court in the above cited cases cannot be sustained.

8. In the case of M.C.Ali and anr. v. State of Kerala, (2010) 4 SCC 573, it has been observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal and placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 in which it has been held as under -

42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge;

(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;

(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

6

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.

9. Learned trial Court has meticulously discussed the evidence available on record in respect of all the offences which has been charged against the respondent and after analysis of the evidence of the witnesses, in paragraph 14 gave following finding -

"14. Upon analysis of the evidence on record, it is evident that the prosecution witnesses PW-1 Kumesh Kumar Sahu and PW-3 Sudama Prasad Sahu are not eyewitnesses to the incident. Although PW-2 Yuvraj Sahu is claimed to be an eyewitness as per the prosecution's case, his testimony lacks reliability. During his examination-in-chief, he identified the accused and stated that the accused caused the accident by driving the Bolero Pickup that struck the Scooty driven by the deceased, Thakur Ram. However, in his cross-examination, he admitted the suggestion of the defence that he did not know how the incident actually occurred. Moreover, PW-2 Yuvraj Sahu did not specifically state that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the accused. A close reading of his deposition reveals that he reached the spot after the accident had already taken place and merely witnessed the deceased being dragged by the vehicle. He did not witness the accused driving the vehicle in a rash or negligent manner prior to the incident. This contradiction between his examination-in-chief and cross-examination creates serious doubt as to the credibility of his testimony. No other prosecution witness has provided any concrete or conclusive evidence to prove that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash or negligent manner at the time of the incident. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. If doubt arises, the benefit must go to the accused. In the present case, substantial doubt remains as to whether the accused was indeed driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and caused the death of Thakur Ram. Accordingly, the prosecution has failed to establish the charges under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the accused Emmanuel Nanda is acquitted of the charges by extending him the benefit of doubt."

10. Upon a careful appraisal of the evidence on record and the submissions

7

advanced, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court. The prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused/respondent beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of PW-2 Yuvraj Sahu, though claimed to be that of an eyewitness, is riddled with contradictions and lacks corroboration. His admission in cross- examination that he did not know how the incident occurred casts serious doubt on his credibility. No independent or reliable evidence has been produced to prove that the respondent was indeed driving the offending vehicle rashly or negligently. Furthermore, PW-1 Kumesh Kumar Sahu, being the son of the deceased, is admittedly not an eyewitness and lodged the FIR on the basis of hearsay. His testimony, being uncorroborated and interested, is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence and extended the benefit of doubt to the accused. There is no perversity or legal infirmity in the findings warranting interference. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment of acquittal stands affirmed.

Sd/-

(Sachin Singh Rajput)

JUDGE

H.Ansari