ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
In this petition, petitioner seeks for the following reliefs:
a) Quash the entire proceedings in C.C.No.2743/2025 arising out of Crime No.304/2024 for the offences punishable under Sections 79, 115(2), 126(2), 351(2), 352 of BNS instituted vide order dated 24.01.2025 and pending before the learned XXIV Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Bengaluru. Annexure-A.
b) The Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct the learned XXIV Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Bengaluru to complete and conclude the trial in C.C.No.2743/2025 within an outer limit of 6 Months in alternate, if the aforesaid prayer sought in para 59(a) is not allowed.
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c) Grant such other order/s as this Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant in the facts and circumstances of the case to meet the ends of justice.
2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned HCGP for the respondent No.1 and perused the material on record.
3. Respondent No.2 having been served with the notice of the petition, has chosen to remain unrepresented and has not contested the petition.
4. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that respondent No.2-defacto complainant is none other than the wife of the petitioner, has filed a complaint on 01.08.2024 against the petitioner for alleged offences punishable under Sections 76, 79, 115(2), 126(2), 351(2), 351(3) of BNS, pursuant to which, the Police Authorities registered an FIR in Crime No.304/2024, pursuant to which, respondent No.1 conducted investigation and filed the charge sheet, which is currently pending in C.C.No.2743/2025 for the offences punishable under Sections 79, 115(2), 126(2), 351(2), 352 of BNS. Aggrieved by the impugned proceedings, petitioner/ sole accused is before this Court by way of the present petition.
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5. A perusal of the material on record comprising of the complaint, FIR, charge sheet material, statement of witness, documents, charge sheet etc., will indicate that insofar as the offences punishable under Section 115(2) of BNSS is concerned, Medico Legal Certificate is issued by the KC General Hospital which clearly indicate that the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 115 is conspicuously absent in the said certificate and other material on record, identical to the facts in the case of Shivalingappa Kerakalamatti Vs. State of Karnataka and Anr., - Crl.P.No.100396/2022, a Co-ordinate bench of this Court has held as under:
"12. The other offences alleged are the ones punishable under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC. For an offence to become punishable under Section 323, there should be assault and assault resulting in hurt. Hurt, is defined under Section 319 of the IPC. Section 319 of the IPC reads as follows:
"Section 319 :- Hurt - Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt."
If the facts and the wound intimation is noticed, it nowhere can become an ingredient of Section 319, as there is not even an external injury caused due to the
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alleged assault. If there was no injury caused, there is no hurt. If there is no hurt, it cannot become an offence under Section 323 of the IPC."
6. Insofar as the offence punishable under Section 126(2) is concerned, in the case of Vikas Mohan Rathod Vs. State of Karnataka and Anr - W.P.No.1254/2023, a co-ordinate bench of this Court has held as under:
11. The only offence that remains is Section 341 of the IPC. For an offence to become punishable under Section 341 of the IPC, the ingredients as obtaining under Section 339 of the IPC is necessary to be present. Section 339 of the IPC reads as follows:
"339. Wrongful restraint - Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.
Exception.—The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section."
In terms of Section 339 of the IPC (supra) for a wrongful restraint to be proved, the foundation should be that the person against whom such wrongful restraint is made should not be permitted to move around in any direction. That is not the issue in the case at hand. The
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complaint narrates that when he wanted to step into the office of the accused he was stopped and not let in. This is not wrongful restraint as obtaining in Section 339 of the IPC for it to become an offence."
In the instant case, the necessary ingredients to constitute the commission of offence punishable under Section 126(2) as held is not obtained from the material on record and consequently, the impugned proceedings deserves to be quashed on this ground also.
7. Insofar as the offence criminal intimidation under Section 351(2), in the case of Manik Taneja and Anr., Vs. State of Karnataka - (2015) 7 SCC 423, the Apex Court has held as under:
11. Section 506 IPC prescribes punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation. "Criminal intimidation" as defined in Section 503 IPC is as under:-
"503. Criminal Intimidation.- Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
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Explanation.- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section."
A reading of the definition of "Criminal intimidation"
would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.
12. In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of "Criminal intimidation". The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the minds of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge of his duty. As far as the
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comments posted on the Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of appellants posting a comment on the Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.
In the instant case, in the light of the judgment of Manik, absent of necessary ingredients in this regard to constitute the offence, impugned proceedings qua the offence also deserves to be quashed.
8. Insofar as the unintentional insult as contemplated under Section 352 of BNSS is concerned in the case of the Fiona Shrikhande Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr.- (2013) 14 SCC 44, the Apex Court has held as under:
14. We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual words or language should figure in the complaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult so as to provoke any person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 504 IPC. It is not the law that a complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other person to commit any other offence. The background facts,
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circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504 IPC. Necessary ingredients even to this offence are not forthcoming and impugned proceedings on this offence also deserves to be quashed.
9. Insofar as the alleged offence of insult to modesty by the petitioner is concerned as provided under Section 79 of BNSS, in Abhijeet J.K. Vs. State of Kerala - 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 703,
the Kerala High Court has held as under:
10. There is distinction between an act of merely insulting a woman and an act of insulting the modesty of a woman. In order to attract Section 509 I.P.C, merely insulting a woman is not sufficient. Insult to the modesty of a woman is an essential ingredient of an offence punishable under Section 509 I.P.C. The crux of the offence is the intention to insult the modesty of a woman.
11. Section 509 I.P.C. criminalises a 'word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman' and in order to establish this offence it is necessary to show that the modesty of a particular woman or a readily
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identifiable group of women has been insulted by a spoken word, gesture or physical act (See Khushboo v. Kanniammal : (2010) 5 SCC 600 : AIR 2010 SC 3196).
12. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The modesty of an adult female is writ large on her body. Young or old, intelligent or imbecile, awake or sleeping, the woman possesses modesty (See State Of Punjab v. Major Singh . : AIR 1967 SC 63). Modesty is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex (See Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra : (2004) 4
SCC 371 : AIR 2004 SC 1677).
13. If the word uttered or the gesture made could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman, then it can be found that it is an act of insult to the modesty of the woman (See Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill : (1995) 6 SCC 194 : AIR
1996 SC 309).
Necessary ingredients even to this offence are not forthcoming and impugned proceedings on this offence also deserves to be quashed.
10. In the case of Vinti Ramakrishna and Ors Vs. Public Prosecutor - 2022 SCC OnLine AP 3516, Andhra Pradesh High Court has held as under:
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9. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that on coming to know that 2nd respondent and other officials trespassed into the land, the petitioners also filed Contempt Case as against them. The allegation mentioned in the charge sheet that the complainant and other public servants were assaulted and restrained from discharging their official duties, is absolutely an improvement for the reason that the same does not find place either in the First Information Report or in the statement of the complainant recorded under Section 161 Cr. P.C. In view of the same, this Court is of the opinion that it would be a futile exercise even if the matter is put to trial.
10. or the foregoing reasons, continuation of impugned proceedings against the petitioners would amount to abuse of process of the Court and hence, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. ccordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed, quashing the proceedings in C.C. No. 356 of 2016 on the file of the II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kovvur."
Necessary ingredients even to this offence are not forthcoming and impugned proceedings on this offence also deserves to be quashed.
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11. Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of Madhushree Datta Vs. State of Karnataka and Anr., - 2025 INSC 105, has held as under:
"25. For ascertaining whether, prima facie, the provision of Section 509 of the IPC was attracted, it is essential to first understand the meaning of the term
"modesty", to determine whether modesty has been insulted. While modesty is not explicitly defined in the IPC, this Court has addressed the essence of a woman's modesty in the decision in Ramkripal v. State of Madhya Pradesh.14 Excerpts from the decision read as under:
"12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined in IPC. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex..."
(emphasis supplied)
26. Further, this Court while discussing the test for outraging the modesty of a woman under Section 509 of the IPC in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill,15 observed as under:
"15. In State of Punjab vs. Major Singh (AIR 1967 SC 63) a question arose whether a female child of seven and a half months could be said to be possessed of 'modesty' which
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could be outraged. In answering the above question Mudholkar J., who along with Bachawat J. spoke for the majority, held that when any act done to or in the presence of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to the common notions of mankind that must fall within the mischief of Section 354 IPC. Needless to say, the `common notions of mankind' referred to by the learned Judge have to be gauged by contemporary societal standards. The other learned Judge (Bachawat J.) observed that the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex and from her very birth she possesses the modesty which is the attribute of her sex. From the above dictionary meaning of 'modesty' and the interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major Singh's case (supra) it appears to us that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is, is the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman..."
(emphasis supplied)
27. The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that it will be essential for this Court to carefully assess the evidence presented, in order to determine whether there is sufficient material to establish the intention and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult the modesty of the complainant or, to put it pithily, whether any act was intended to shock the sense of decency of the complainant being a woman."
The material on record does not establish the commission of offence of insult to modesty to respondent No.2 by the petitioner and impugned proceedings on this offence also deserves to be quashed.
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12. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and principles enunciated in the aforesaid judgments, in my view, continuation of the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner would amount to abuse of process of law warranting interference of this Court in the present petition.
13. In the result, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
i) The petition is hereby allowed.
ii) The impugned proceedings in C.C.No.2743/2025 arising out of Crime No.304/2024 for the offences punishable under Sections 79, 115(2), 126(2), 351(2), 352 of BNS on the file of XXIV Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru insofar as the petitioner is concerned are hereby quashed.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR)
JUDGE
MDS
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 30