Loading..
Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

High Court of Chhattisgarh — WPS No. 1473 of 2021 (Order dated 15/04/2025)

Factual and Procedural Background

(Narrative drawn only from the text of the provided opinion.)

The petitioner, Ram Prasad Nayak, was originally appointed in the Electricity Board in 1977 and was promoted to Supervisor (Civil) in 1995. A complaint by one Manshukh Lal to the Anti Corruption Bureau, Raipur, led to registration of an FIR under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Following registration of the FIR, the petitioner was placed under suspension by order dated 12.10.2007. As the trial did not conclude within three years, the suspension period was revoked by order dated 04.09.2010.

After completion of the criminal trial, the petitioner was convicted by the Court of Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption), Raipur, and, consequent to that conviction, was terminated from service by an order dated 01.04.2013. The petitioner challenged the conviction in Cr. A. No. 1153/2012 before the High Court; that criminal appeal was allowed by this Court by judgment dated 08.05.2020 and the petitioner was acquitted. The petitioner retired from service on 31.08.2018 (attaining superannuation).

Following acquittal, the petitioner made multiple representations seeking back-wages. Respondent CSPDCL rejected those representations by an order dated 05.02.2021 (annexure P-1), declining to grant back-wages. The petitioner challenged that refusal by filing the present writ petition (WPS No. 1473 of 2021).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to back-wages for the period between his dismissal (pursuant to conviction) and acquittal/reinstatement under Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules.
  2. Whether Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules applies where a government servant has been dismissed consequent to conviction by a criminal court (and later acquitted), or whether the principle of "no work, no pay" (Fundamental Rule 17(1)) governs such a situation.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that he is entitled to back-wages by virtue of Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules.
  • The petitioner relied on decisions of co-ordinate benches of the High Court: Arun Kumar Sharma v. State of C.G. (WPS No. 3904 of 2020) and Abdul Rahman Ahmed v. State of C.G. (WPS No. 3899 of 2006) to support entitlement to back-wages.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents submitted that Rule 54-B is not applicable because the petitioner was not placed under suspension and then reinstated on revocation; rather, he was dismissed from service pursuant to his conviction by the criminal court.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar, and other higher court authorities to show that a person dismissed on account of conviction is not automatically entitled to back-wages upon later acquittal; the principle of "no work, no pay" applies where services could not be taken due to the employee's facing criminal charges.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (1996) 1 SCC 603 The court stated that back-wages are to be considered only if action was taken by way of disciplinary proceedings and that action was found unsustainable in law; where the employee had involved himself in a crime (even if later acquitted) and thereby disabled himself from rendering service (conviction/incarceration), he is not entitled to back-wages. The High Court applied this principle to hold that the petitioner's conviction (even though later set aside) and the circumstances of his being unable to render service disentitle him to back-wages.
Union of India v. Jaipal Singh (2004) 1 SCC 121 Follows and approves the principle in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore regarding limits on entitlement to back-wages after conviction and subsequent acquittal. The High Court treated Jaipal Singh as a confirming authority for the view that acquittal does not automatically entitle a dismissed employee to back-wages.
Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh Panchal, AIR 1994 SC 552 When regulation confers exclusive power on the employer to treat the suspension-period as duty or otherwise, the employee is entitled to pay for that period only if the employer treats him as on duty; otherwise 'no work, no pay' applies. The court cited this to support the proposition that the authority has power to treat the period of absence as duty or not, and absent such treatment the employer is not liable for pay for the period.
State Bank of India & another v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim (2013) 11 SCC 67 Held that subsequent acquittal, while obliterating conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out legal consequences of conviction under the relevant Act; entitlement to back-wages must be judged on that basis. The court relied on this authority to conclude that acquittal does not retrospectively erase the legal consequences of conviction and therefore does not automatically create an entitlement to back-wages for the intervening period.
Baldev Singh v. Union of India (2005) 8 SCC 747 Supports proposition that acquittal does not operate retrospectively to erase legal consequences of conviction for the relevant period. Used in conjunction with other Supreme Court authorities to hold that the petitioner's acquittal does not entitle him to back-wages for the period in question.
Munnalal Mishra v. Union of India and others (2005 (3) M.P.H.T. 125 (DB)) When a government servant is dismissed/removed on account of conviction in a criminal case (not in disciplinary proceedings), FR 54, 54-A and 54-B do not apply; Fundamental Rule 17(1) ('no work, no pay') applies — reinstatement or pay from date of acquittal if not reinstated. The court relied on this Division Bench decision to conclude that FR 54-B is inapplicable where dismissal follows conviction and to invoke the 'no work, no pay' principle as the guiding rule for the period when the employee was not in service.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first quoted the text of Fundamental Rule 54-B(1), which requires that where a government servant who has been suspended is reinstated (or would have been reinstated but for retirement), the authority competent to order reinstatement must consider and make a specific order regarding (a) pay and allowances for the period of suspension ending with reinstatement or retirement, and (b) whether that period shall be treated as period spent on duty.

The court observed that the present case does not present the factual matrix contemplated by Rule 54-B because it is not the case that the petitioner "was placed under suspension and directed for reinstatement while revoking the suspension." Rather, the petitioner was ultimately dismissed from service pursuant to conviction in a criminal case. Because the dismissal flowed from conviction (and not from a suspension followed by reinstatement), Rule 54-B was held to be inapplicable.

The court considered and relied upon prior decisions (both a Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in Munnalal Mishra and multiple decisions of the Supreme Court) that establish the controlling principle: where a government servant is dismissed or removed on account of conviction by a criminal court (not as a result of disciplinary proceedings), the special provisions in FR 54/54-A/54-B do not apply and the general principle of Fundamental Rule 17(1) ('no work, no pay') governs. The court quoted the Munnalal Mishra decision and several Supreme Court authorities (notably Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore) describing the circumstances in which back-wages may or may not be awarded.

The court emphasized the consistent thread in the authorities: subsequent acquittal, while removing the conviction, does not automatically operate retrospectively to erase the legal consequences of that conviction under the applicable statute or rules; entitlement to back-wages depends on whether the employee's absence was attributable to conduct for which the employer is responsible or whether the employee disabled himself from rendering service (for example, by criminal conduct leading to conviction and incarceration). Applying these principles to the facts (conviction, dismissal, later acquittal, and retirement), the court concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to back-wages and that FR 54-B did not apply.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The writ petition is DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The petitioner is not entitled to back-wages for the period between termination (pursuant to conviction) and acquittal/reinstatement under Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules.
  • The petition is dismissed and the parties are left to bear their own costs.

Broader legal implication as stated by the court:

  • The decision applies settled principles of higher authorities (Supreme Court and relevant Division Bench) that, in cases of dismissal consequent to conviction, FR 54-B is not applicable and the doctrine of "no work, no pay" ordinarily governs the period the employee was not in service. The court did not purport to lay down a new precedent but applied established law to the facts before it.

Disposition: Writ petition dismissed; parties to bear their own costs.

    RAM PRASAD NAYAK v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

    1 / 10

    2025:CGHC:17141

    AFR

    HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

    WPS No. 1473 of 2021

    1 Ram Prasad Nayak S/o Bhagbali Nayak Aged About 67 Years R/o Shanti Vihar Colony, Dangniya Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

    ... Petitioner(s) versus

    1 State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Energy, Mantralay Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur (Chhattisgarh), District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

    2 Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited, Through Managing Director (Cspdcl) Dangniya Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

    3 Superintendent Engineer Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company (Civil- Distribution), Cercal C-6, Gudiyari Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s)

    (Cause title is taken from Case Information System)

    For Petitioner : Mr. Hemant Kesharwani, Advocate For Respondents/

    State

    : Ms. Akanksha Verma, P.L.

    JYOTI

    SHARMA

    Digitally signed by

    JYOTI

    SHARMA

    Date:

    2025.04.17

    16:29:19

    +0530

    1

    For Respondent No. 2 & 3

    : Dr. Veena Nair, Advocate

    (HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE BIBHU DATTA GURU) Order on Board

    15/04/2025

    1. The challenge in this writ petition is to the order dated 05.02.2021 (Annexure P-1) (in the relief clause wrongly mentioned as 05.02.2019) by which the respondent/ CSPDCL declined to grant back-wages to the petitioner.

    2. The case of the petitioner, as projected in the writ petition, is that the petitioner was initially appointed in the Electricity board in the year 1977. Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of Supervisor (Civil) in the year 1995. According, to the petitioner one Manshukh Lal made a complaint to the Anti Corruption Bureau, Raipur against the Additional Superintendent Engineer and the petitioner in respect of illegal demand of bribe and in the said proceeding, the FIR was registered for offence under Sections 7, 13 (1) (d), 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. On account of registration of FIR, the petitioner has been placed under suspension by order dated 12.10.2007. Since the trial could not be concluded within a period of 3 years the suspension period has been revoked by order dated 04.09.2010. In the meantime, after completion of trial, the petitioner has been convicted by the Court of Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption

    2

    Act) Raipur, C.G. The said conviction has been challenged by the petitioner before this Court in Cr. A. No. 1153/2012. Owing to conviction imposed by the Trial Court, the petitioner has been terminated from the services by order dated 01.04.2013. The Cr. A No. 1153/2012 has been allowed by this court vide judgment dated 08.05.2020 and the petitioner has been acquitted from the charges. In the meanwhile, the petitioner retried from service on 31-8-2018. Thus, after acquittal the petitioner made several representations before the authorities seeking back-wages. However, by the order impugned the representation of the petitioner has been rejected and petitioner was declined to grant back-wages. Hence this petition.

    3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is entitled for back-wages by virtue of Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the writ petition deserves to be allowed. He further placed reliance on Arun Kumar Sharma Vs. State of C.G.( WPS NO. 3904 of 2020) and Abdul Rahman Ahmed Vs. State of C.G. (WPS No. 3899 of 2006) passed by co-ordinate bench of this court.

    4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, would submit that Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would apparently be not applicable in case of the petitioner, as the petitioner was not placed under suspension and not reinstated in service on revocation of said suspension and he was not under suspension for the period of his absence, rather he was dismissed from

    3

    service pursuant to his conviction in criminal case by the jurisdictional criminal court, therefore, the said Fundamental Rule would not be applicable to him and he would not be entitled for back-wages. In light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar1, he would not be entitled for back-wages. As such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

    5. In order to answer the questions formulated herein-above, it would be appropriate to notice Rule 54-B(1) of the Fundamental Rules, which states as under: -

    F.R. 54-B (1) When a Government servant who has been suspended, is re-instated or would have been so re-instated but for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension, the authority competent to order re-instatement shall consider and make a specific order-

    (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of suspension ending with re-instatement or the date of his retirement on superannuation, as the case may be; and

    (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty."

    6. A careful perusal of sub-rule (1) of Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would show that when a Government servant, who has been suspended, is reinstated or would have been so reinstated but for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension, the competent authority to order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order regarding the pay and allowances to be

    1 (1 996) 1 1 SCC 603

    4

    paid to the Government servant for the period of suspension ending with reinstatement or the date of his retirement on superannuation, as the case may be; and whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. However, it is not the case of the petitioner that he was placed under suspension and directed for reinstatement while revoking the suspension, as he was terminated from service on conviction of criminal charges by the jurisdictional criminal court, therefore, Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would not be applicable.

    7. A Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in the matter of Munnalal Mishra v. Union of India and others2considered the issue threadbare with regard to applicability of Rules 54, 54-A & 54-B of the Fundamental Rules and held that when a Government servant is dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired, not in pursuance of any disciplinary proceedings, but without inquiry on the ground of conviction in a criminal case, then F.R. 54, 54-A and 54-B would not apply and F.R. 17(1), which deals with 'no work, no pay', would apply. It has been observed in paragraph 10 of the report as under: -

    "10. But when a Government (or Railway) servant is dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired, not in pursuance or any disciplinary proceedings, but without inquiry on the ground of conviction in a criminal case, then F.R. 54, 54-A and 54-B (or corresponding Rules 1343, 1344 and 1345 of Railway Code) would not apply. As a consequence, we will have to fall back on the general principles and Fundamental Rule No. 17 (1) which provides that no work will mean no pay. Therefore, the Government (or Railway) servant will not be entitled to any pay for the

    2 2 005(3) M.P.H.T. 12 5 (DB)

    5

    period when he was not in service. He will be entitled to be reinstated from the date of acquittal. If he is not reinstated on acquittal, he will be entitled to pay and allowances from the date of acquittal. This position is made clear by the Supreme Court in several decisions."

    8. This issue in hand is also well settled and no longer res integra and it stands conclusively determined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court by their judgment first of all in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) in which their Lordships have considered a case where an employee was dismissed from service on account of his conviction by a criminal court for his involvement in an offence under Sections of Prevention of Corruption Act and subsequently, he was acquitted and as a consequence, reinstated. Their Lordships while considering the issue whether back-wages should be paid to the employee for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement held as under: -

    "The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later

    6

    acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages."

    9. Similarly, in the matter of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh3, the principle of law laid down in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore

    (supra) has been followed with approval.

    10. In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal4, the Supreme Court has considered a provision in the service regulation which provided that an employee, who is absent from duty without any authority, shall not be entitled to any pay and allowance during the period of such absence (similar to F.R. 17) and held as under: -

    "15. … It is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty during the period of suspension that such employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the said period. In other words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. During this period, the employee renders no work. He is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances for the period. That will be against the principle of 'no work, no pay' and positively inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. …"

    11. In the matter of State Bank of India and another v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim5, the Supreme Court considering the earlier decisions in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal

    3 (2004) 1 SCC 121

    4 AIR 1994 SC 552

    5 (2013) 11 SCC 67

    7

    Singh's case (supra) and Baldev Singh v. Union of India6, held that subsequent acquittal of Government servant though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act, and observed as under: -

    "11. … During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant Bank from employing him. If the respondent could not have remained employed with the appellant Bank during the said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same has been granted by the appellant Bank."

    12. Coming back finally to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that the petitioner was convicted by the jurisdictional criminal court for offences under Sections 7 & 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 pursuant to which his services were terminated. However, in the criminal appeal this court acquitted the petitioner from the charges. But in the meanwhile, the petitioner retired from service on 31.08.2018, on attaining the age of superannuation. However, he has been denied back-wages, as the respondent CSPDCL was unable to take the services of the petitioner due to his facing criminal charges and as such, in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji

    8

    Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh's case (supra), Baldev Singh

    (supra) and Mohammed Abdul Rahim's case (supra), subsequent acquittal of the petitioner though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction and thus, he would not be entitled for back-wages. Concludingly, it is held that Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would not be applicable to the petitioner herein in the present case. Consequently, Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would not be applicable and thus, he would not be entitled for back-wages.

    13. In that view of the matter, I do not find any merit in this writ petition, it deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).

    Sd/-

    (BIBHU DATTA GURU)

    JUDGE

    Jyoti

    9

    Head Note

    " Employee involved himself in a crime but acquitted later is not entitled to back-wages, as he had disabled himself for rendering the service on account of conviction or incarceration in jail."

    " कर्मचारी, जो स्वयं अपरीध र्म लिप्त रीहा हा किकन्तु बाद र्म द षर्मक्त किकयं गयं हा वहा बाकयं व तुन प्राप्त करीन क हाकदरी नहा# हा$, क्यं&किक उसन द षलिसकि) यं जो  र्म क$ द क आधरी परी स्वयं क स व प्रादन करीन स किनयं+ग्यं करी लियं था। "

    10

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    RAM PRASAD NAYAK v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
    (Apr 15, 2025)