H
ig h Co ur t o f H
.P
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2024:HHC:4258
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
RSA No. 307 of 2022 a/w
RSA No.308 of 2022
Decided on 12.06.2024
RSA No.307 of 2022
Charan Singh
…Appellant
Versus
Ram Saroop
…Respondent
RSA No.308 of 2022
Charan Singh
…Appellant
Versus
Ram Saroop
…Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge
1 Whether approved for reporting? Yes For the appellant: Mr. Dheeraj K. Vashishta, Advocate, for the appellant, in both the appeals. For the respondent: Mr. Parav Sharma, Advocate, in both the appeals.
Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge
By way of these appeals, the appellant has prayed for the following relief:-
"It is, therefore, prayed that this appeal may very kindly be allowed and the judgment and decree dated 20.08.2022 passed by the learned First Appellate Court as well as the judgment dated 16.03.2021 passed by learned trial Court under appeal be set aside throughout or such other order or decree as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and
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circumstances of the case be also passed in favour of the appellant and against the respondent in the ends of law and justice."
2. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of these appeals are that appellant Charan Singh filed a suit for declaration and consequential relief of permanent prohibitory in respect of suit land against the defendant. The case of the plaintiff was that he was owner in possession of the suit land, upon which existed a pacca residential house. Two persons, who were his remote relatives, approached him for the sale of the suit land to the defendant and he agreed to sell the suit land to the defendant for a consideration of Rs.12,50,000/-. His precise case was that a fraud was played upon him by the defendant, who got executed sale deed by misrepresenting therein that the sale consideration was Rs.2,50,000/- instead of Rs.12,50,000/-. It was in this backdrop that the suit for declaration and consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction was filed. The defendant while resisting the suit, also preferred a counter claim in respect of the suit property and in terms of the counter claim, he claimed that he had become owner of the purchased property referred to in the plaint. It was
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also the contention of the counter claimant that the non-counter claimant had not delivered the possession of the house in question within the agreed time, in terms of an executed affidavit, therefore, a prayer was made in the counter claim for decree for mandatory injunction for directing the plaintiff to hand over the vacant possession of the premises as detailed in the counter claim as per sale deed registered on 07.06.2008.
3. In terms of the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court dated 16.03.2021, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed and the counter claim of the defendant was allowed. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred single composite single appeal against the dismissal of his plaint and the decree of the counter claim i.e. Civil Appeal No.27 of 2021 decided on 20.08.2022. This appeal was dismissed by the learned 1st Appellate Court on 20.08.2022. The judgment passed by the learned 1stAppellate Court now stands assailed by way of these two regular second appeals by the plaintiff/appellant.
4. When the case was taken up for admission, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that these appeals are not maintainable as composite first appeal filed by the plaintiff
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was not maintainable in the light of the fact that as learned trial Court was pleased to on one hand dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff and on the other hand allow the counter claim of the defendant on the other hand, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to have had assailed the dismissal of the suit and the decreeing of the counter claim by way of two independent appeals and in the absence of the same single appeal before the learned 1st Appellate Court was not maintainable. He has referred to the judgments of this Court reported in 2017 (Vol.1) Him L.R. 36 and also 2022 (2) Shim. LC 1145.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that as there was only one judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court though qua the dismissal of the plaint and the decree of the counter claimant and as only one decree was drawn, therefore, the plaintiff rightly filed one composite appeal against the said adjudication before the learned 1stAppellate Court. He further submits that to be on the safer side presently, the appellant has filed two separate appeals against the judgment passed by the learned 1stAppellate Court.
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6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record as well as the judgments being relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, this Court of the considered view that there appeals indeed are not maintainable and so was the composite single appeal filed by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court.
7. The reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff and the counter claimant in short have already been mentioned by me hereinabove.
8. A Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a matter reported in AIR 1993 Supreme Court 1202, titled as Premier Tyres Limited versus Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, while dealing with a situation where suits were decreed by common judgment and appeal was filed against one judgment and decree, whereas appeal was not filed in the connected case file that finality of finding recording in the connected suit, due to non-filing of appeal precludes the Court from proceedings with appeal in other suit. Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that effect of non-filing of
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appeal against a judgment or decree is that it become final and as this finality can be taken away only in accordance with law, therefore, same consequences follows when a judgment or decree in a connected suit is not appealed from. Thereafter, Hon'ble Supreme Court in a matter reported in (2015) 2 Supreme Court Cases 682, titled as Rajni Rani and another versus Khairati Lal and others, was pleased to hold that keeping in mind the conceptual meaning given to the counter- claim and the definitive character assigned to it, there can be no shadow of doubt that when the counter-claim filed by the defendants is adjudicated, finality is attached to it as far as the controversy in respect of the claim put forth by the defendants is concerned. Hon'ble Apex Court further held that in that regard nothing survives as far as the said defendants are concerned and if the definition of a decree is appropriately understood it conveys that there has to be a formal expression of an adjudication as far as that Court is concerned and the determination should conclusively put to rest the rights of the parties in that sphere. It further held that a Court may draw up a formal decree or may not, but if by virtue of the order of the
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Court, the rights have been adjudicated, irrefutably it would assume the status of a decree, Hon'ble Supreme Court, thereafter held that where are a counter-claim which is in the nature of a cross-suit has been dismissed, nothing else survives for the defendants who had filed the counter-claim and the order passed by the learned trial Judge has the status of a decree and the challenge to the same has to be made before the appropriate forum where appeal could lay by paying the requisite fee.
9. Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2015) 3 Supreme Court Cases 624, titled as Sri Gangai Vinayagar Temple and another versus Meenakshi Ammal and others, was pleased to hold as under:-
"15. The Tenants filed Appeal 581 of 1983 in the High Court of Judicature at Madras which came to be decided by the learned Single Judge on 25th April, 1997. It is indeed significant that the Transferees had not been impleaded by the Tenants in the First Appeal, although the former were parties before the Trial Court in the Tenants' own suit, viz. O.S. 5/78, and since any decision favourable to the Tenants as regards the legal propriety of the transfer of title would severely impact upon if not annihilate the Transferees' rights, and since O.S.5/78 had been 'dismissed', yet, regardless, no appeal
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there against had been preferred. Shri Sethurama Chettiar was represented through his legal representatives in Appeal 581 of 1983 which had been preferred in respect of O.S.6/78 specifically. We have perused the contents of the Tenants Appeal, and as we expected, the gravamen of the assault was the public character and nature of the Trust and the legal imperfection of its transfer. This also fortifies the analysis that the dispute raised by the Tenants in their suit as well as their defence to the Trust's suits was that mentioned in the preceding sentence. This is indeed remarkable since the Tenant was fully alive to the detrimental nature of the decision in O.S. 5/78 and that it critically crippled its rights and interests, as is evident from the fact that the Tenant filed a Review bearing CRA No. 1/1993, which by a detailed Judgment dated 19.3.1999 was dismissed. So far as the contentions of the parties are concerned, the First Appellate Court had noted, inter alia, that the Tenants had denied any liability towards the arrears of rent; that the Tenant had argued that the Trust's Suits were not maintainable in law for want of necessary sanction under Section 25 of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1972; that the Tenant did not admit the validity of the Sale Deed dated 1.7.1976 on the grounds that, having regard to Section 25 of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1972, it was a nullity. The First Appellate Court conducted an elaborate and detailed discussions as to the nature of the Temple/Trust property in order to ascertain whether it partook of a private or a public trust. We have already highlighted that O.S.5/78 filed by the Tenants was "dismissed", nevertheless, this verdict has not been appealed against. After recording the detailed arguments on both sides, the First Appellate Court
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encapsulated the following points for consideration:-
(i) Whether the present appeal by the plaintiff canvassing the findings of the trial court on issue numbers 2, 3 and 4 by the learned trial Judge is barred by the doctrine of res-judicata as contended by the respondents?
Whether findings given by the learned trial Judge on the above issues are correct, valid in law and as such it is sustainable?
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to question the validity of the sale-deed in favour of defendants 7 to 9 by the second defendant?
What relief, if any, the parties are entitled to?
Obviously, O.S. 5/78 was as focal as the other, otherwise (iii) above would not have arisen. It is evident that all concerned erroneously assumed that O.S.5/78 had also been carried in Appeal.
16. The First Appellate Court, in reversal, held that the Plaintiff in O.S.6/78 was a Public Trust and, accordingly, fell within the purview and sweep of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1972. So far as the failure of the Tenants to appeal against the dismissal of O.S.5/78, the First Appellate Court held, in our opinion questionably, that that was not necessary since there was no adverse findings against the Tenants. While we can appreciate that owing to the stands of the defendants in their Written Statements filed in O.S.5/78 there was, in actuality, no challenge to the Plaint, but nevertheless, the suit of the Tenants had been 'dismissed' and therefore, at the very least, it would have been proper and prudent to file an appeal and at least in abundant caution obtain a
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clarification thereon. The 'dismissal' of suit O.S.5/78 cannot but be indicative of the opinion that all the assertions of fact and law were in the opinion of the Trial Court legally untenable, perforce including that the Trust could not have transferred the suit property in the manner it did. For this very reason the Tenant should also have appealed against the verdict in O.S.7/78 in respect of the findings of the Trial Court common to O.S.6/78; since the Trust had not assailed the rejection of its plea that a separate tenancy governed the claim in O.S.7/78 that part of the verdict had attained finality. The First Appellate Court has opined, in the event erroneously, that the doctrine of res judicata was not attracted to the facts of the instant case. It appears to us that the First Appellate Court lost perspective of the position that Section 116 of the Evidence Act rendered impermissible and incompetent any challenge to the title of the Trust/Landlord which had put the Appellant in possession of the demised property. It is also noteworthy that the Tenant had contested the legal capacity of the Trust/Landlord to convey the property to the Transferees. Ergo, it was nobody's case that although the Trust had title to the suit property at the inception it had lost it subsequently. There is in fact a stark omission to discuss this aspect in the Judgment of the First Appellate Court, which therefore erred in concluding that the Trust/Landlord was a public trust and was, accordingly, incompetent to sell the Trust property. This is all the more significant since it reversed the opinion of the Trial Court without affording any opportunity of hearing to the Transferees who had not been impleaded by the Tenants in its Appeal although they were defendants in the Tenants suit; they were not before the High Court because the Tenant decided to not to appeal against the
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dismissal of O.S.5/78 in which it had also raised these very questions. If it is contended that all the three suits were covered by a common judgment, the Tenant ought to have impleaded the Transferees in its Appeal.
17. The Trust filed the Second Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, but inexplicably and conspicuously restricted its challenge only to the opinion of the First Appellate Court vis-à-vis the impact and effect of the principle of res judicata on that lis. The Trust had by that time already sold the property and remarkably their only subsisting interest was for the recovery of the paltry decretal sum of Rs.268/. We would have expected the Trust to vehemently assert that a decision adverse to its Transferees could legally not have been delivered in their absence; and that Section 116 of the Evidence Act disabled the Tenants from challenging the Trust's title or legal character, since it is the Trust which had put the Tenant in possession. However, as it has transpired, the Second Appellate Court agreed with the interpretation given by the First Appellate Court that res judicata did not apply against the Tenants.
18. For facility of reference Section 11 of the CPC is extracted below:
Res Judicata- No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue
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has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation I.- The expression "former suit" shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.
Explanation II.- For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court. Explanation III.- The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other. Explanation IV.- Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. Explanation V.- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused. Explanation VI.- Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. Explanation VII.- The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and references in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to a proceeding for the execution of the decree; question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.
Explanation VIII.- An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit,
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notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.
The decision rendered by three Co-ordinate Benches of this Court, namely firstly Lonankutty, secondly Prabhu and thirdly Premier Tyres have already been discussed above.
19. We must additionally advert to a Four-Judge Bench decision in Sheodan Singh vs. Daryao Kunwar (1966) 3 SCR 300, in which this Court has lucidly enumerated five constituent elements of Section 11, namely:-
(i) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly and
substantially in issue in the former suit;
(ii) The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim;
(iii) The parties must have litigated under the same title in the former suit;
(iv) The court which decided the former suit must be a court competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue is subsequently raised; and
(v) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the court in the first suit. Further Explanation 1 shows that it is not the date on which the suit is filed that matters but the date on which the suit is decided, so that even if a suit was filed later, it will be a former suit if it has been decided earlier. The conundrum in Sheodan Singh was only marginally different to what has arisen before
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us. The Appellate Court was confronted with five Appeals from five different Suits between the same parties in which the Issues were common. Two of the Appeals were dismissed, albeit, not on merits. It was in those premises argued and accepted by this Court that the principles of res judicata became operational with regard to the decrees passed in the two suits in respect of which the Appeals filed thereagainst had been dismissed. It was pithily observed that otherwise
"all that the losing party has to do to destroy the effect of a decision given by the trial court on the merits is to file an appeal and let that appeal be dismissed on some preliminary ground, with the result that the decision given on the merits also becomes useless as between the parties." Sheodan Singh took note of several judgments of the High Courts, which preferred to overlook procedural technicalities ostensibly in the interests of the merits of the matter, but did not state its final opinion, which has propelled us to do so in order so that the divergent opinions be interred and dissonance be removed.
20. On the issue of applicability of res judicata in cases where two or more suits have been disposed of by one common judgment but separate decrees, and where the decree in one suit has been appealed against but not against the others, various High Courts have given divergent and conflicting opinions and decisions. The High Court of Madras and erstwhile High Courts of Lahore, Nagpur and Oudh have held that there could be no res judicata in such cases whereas the High Courts of Allahabad, Calcutta, Patna, Orissa and erstwhile High Court of Rangoon have taken contrary views. It should also be noted that there are instances of conflicting judgments within the same High Court as well. The decision of Tek Chand, J. in
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Full Bench Judgment of the Lahore High Court in Lachhmi vs. Bhulli [AIR (1927) Lah 289] and Full Bench Judgment of the Madras High Court in Panchanda Velan vs. Vaithinatha Sastrial [ILR (1906) 29 Mad 333] and of the Oudh High Court in B. Shanker Sahai v. B. Bhagwat Sahai [AIR 1946 Oudh 33 (FB)] appear to be the leading decisions against the applicability of res judicata. Without adverting to the details of those cases, it is sufficient to note that the hesitancy or reluctance to the applicability of the rigorous of res judicata flowed from the notion that Section 11 of the Code refers only to "suits" and as such does not include "appeals" within its ambit; that since the decisions arrived in the connected suits were articulated simultaneously, there could be no "former suit" as stipulated by the said section; that substance, issues and finding being common or substantially similar in the connected suits tried together, non-filing of an appeal against one or more of those suits ought not to preclude the consideration of other appeals on merits; and that the principle of res judicata would be applicable to the judgment, which is common, and not to the decrees drawn on the basis of that common judgment.
21. On the other hand, the verdict of Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Zaharia vs. Debia ILR (1911) 33 All 51 and decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Isup Ali vs. Gour Chandra Deb 37 Cal LJ 184: AIR 1923 Cal 496 and of the Patna High Court in Mrs. Getrude Oastes vs. Mrs Millicent D'Silva ILR 12 Pat 139 : AIR 1933 Pat 78 are of the contrary persuasion. These decisions largely proceeded on the predication that the phraseology "suit" is not limited to the Court of First Instance or Trial Court but encompasses within its domain proceedings before the Appellate Courts; that non-
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applicability of res judicata may lead to inconsistent decrees and conflicting decrees, not only due to multiplicity of decrees but also due to multiplicity of the parties, and thereby creating confusion as to which decree has to be given effect to in execution; that a decree is valid unless it is a nullity and the same cannot be overruled or interfered with in appellate proceedings initiated against another decree; that the issue of res judicata has to be decided with reference to the decrees, which are appealable under Section 96 of the CPC and not with reference to the judgment (which has been defined differently), but with respect to decrees in the CPC; that non-confirmation of a decree in appellate proceedings has no consequence as far as it reaching finality upon elapsing of the limitation period is concerned in view of the Explanation II of Section 11, that provides that the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to right of appeal from the decision of such Court; and that Section 11 of the CPC is not exhaustive of the doctrine of res judicata, which springs up from the general principles of law and public policy.
22. Procedural norms, technicalities and processal law evolve after years of empirical experience, and to ignore them or give them short shrift inevitably defeats justice. Where a common judgment has been delivered in cases in which consolidation orders have specifically been passed, we think it irresistible that the filing of a single appeal leads to the entire dispute becoming sub judice once again. Consolidation orders are passed by virtue of the bestowal of inherent powers on the Courts by Section 151 of the CPC, as clarified by this Court in Chitivalasa Jute Mills vs. Jaypee Rewa Cement (2004) 3
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SCC 85. In the instance of suits in which common Issues have been framed and a common Trial has been conducted, the losing party must file appeals in respect of all adverse decrees founded even on partially adverse or contrary speaking judgments. While so opining we do not intend to whittle down the principle that appeals are not expected to be filed against every inconvenient or disagreeable or unpropitious or unfavourable finding or observation contained in a judgment, but that this can be done by way of cross-objections if the occasion arises. The decree not assailed thereupon metamorphoses into the character of a "former suit". If this is not to be so viewed, it would be possible to set at naught a decree passed in Suit A by only challenging the decree in Suit B. Law considers it an anathema to allow a party to achieve a result indirectly when it has deliberately or negligently failed to directly initiate proceedings towards this purpose. Laws of procedure have picturesquely been referred to as handmaidens to justice, but this does not mean that they can be wantonly ignored because, if so done, a miscarriage of justice inevitably and inexorably ensues. Statutory law and processal law are two sides of the judicial drachma, each being the obverse of the other. In the case in hand, had the Tenant diligently filed an appeal against the decree at least in respect of O.S. 5/78, the legal conundrum that has manifested itself and exhausted so much judicial time, would not have arisen at all."
10. After taking into consideration the said adjudication of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, this Court in H.P. State
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Forest Corporation through its Divisional Manager versus Kahan Singh 2017 (Vol.1) Him L.R. 36 held as under:-
"Reverting back to the facts of this case admittedly learned trial court while partly allowing the suit for recovery filed by plaintiff- Corporation, dismissed the counter claim filed by defendant vide which the defendant had prayed for a decree for recovery of Rs.60,031/-. In other words, learned trial court held that in lieu of the transaction subject matter of the civil suit, whereas the plaintiff-Corporation was entitled for recovery from the defendant, however, defendant was not entitled for any recovery from the plaintiff-Corporation. Defendant rather than filing two separate appeals, one against the decree which was passed in favour of the plaintiff-Corporation by learned trial court in its civil suit and second against the dismissal of his counter claim, filed only one appeal before the learned appellate court. In my considered view, the defendant erred in doing so because as the partial decreeing of the suit of the plaintiff-Corporation and dismissal of the counter claim of the defendant were two distinct adjudications though made by way of same judgment and decree by learned trial court, both these adjudications assumed the status of a decree and they required to be challenged separately and filing only one appeal against both the said adjudications was not permissible in law. As I have already discussed above, it has been categorically held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in such like matters that a Court may draw a formal decree or not but if by virtue of the judgment of the Court the rights have finally been adjudicated then the same would assume the
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status of a decree. As the adjudication on the suit filed by the plaintiff-Corporation and adjudication on the counter claim filed by the defendant assumed the status of two distinct decrees, they were required to be challenged by way of separate appeals by paying the requisite Court fee on each of them. Defendant having failed to do so he could not have been granted the relief which was granted by learned appellate court in one single appeal which was filed by defendant against the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff-Corporation by learned trial court as well as against the dismissal of his counter claim. Learned appellate court failed to appreciate that in the absence of two appeals, one appeal so filed was not maintainable, as the findings returned on plaint and counter claim acted as res judicata vis-à-vis each other which necessitated the filing of two appeals. Learned appellate court also failed to appreciate that non filing of two distinct and separate appeals amounted to having the same effect where no appeal was filed from a decree in connected case and the effect of non-filing of appeal against judgment or decree that has become final. In other words because only one appeal was filed, therefore, finality of finding recorded in connected claim on account of non-filing of appeal precluded the Court from proceeding with appeal in the other connected claim. To give an illustration, 'A' files a suit for recovery of Rs.100/- against 'B' and 'B' also files a counter claim for recovery of Rs.50/- from plaintiff 'A'. Learned trial court partly decrees the suit of 'A" against defendant 'B' for recovery of Rs.70/- but dismisses the counter claim filed by defendant. In such like circumstance defendant cannot assail the dismissal of his counter claim as well as the partial decree of the suit of the plaintiff by one appeal. The defendant will have to file two
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separate appeals, one challenging the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff and other challenging the dismissal of his counter claim. However, if plaintiff wants to assail the factum of his suit not being decreed in totality, he is not to file two appeals but he can file only one appeal against the partial allowing of his suit. 24. It is settled law that counter claim has effect of a cross suit and Court can announce a final judgment both on original claim and on the counter claim. Counter claim filed by defendant has to be treated as a plaint and the effect of counter claim is that even if suit of the plaintiff is stayed, discontinued, dismissed or withdrawn, counter claim can be decided independently on merits. In fact counter claim has to be treated as a plaint and is governed by the Rules applicable to plaint and similarly the reply filed in answer to counter claim is to be treated as written statement and is governed by Rules applicable to written statement. In view of the findings returned above, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by learned appellate court in Civil Appeal No. 59 of 2005 dated 30.11.2007 is set aside by holding that as defendant had not filed two separate appeals against the judgment and decree passed by learned trial court in favour of the plaintiff- Corporation and against the dismissal of his counter claim which findings acted as res judicata vis-a-vis each other, single appeal so filed by defendants was not maintainable before the learned appellate court. The Substantial question of law is answered accordingly. In view of findings returned in this appeal, in my considered view there is no necessity of adjudicating upon the other substantial question of law which was framed by the Court on 28.7.2008. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous application(s), if any stands disposed of."
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11. Incidentally, as there was a conflict of opinion on this issue between learned Single Judges of this Court, a reference was made to the Hon'ble Division Bench as to whether a common appeal questioning correctness of judgment and decree passed in Civil suit as well as counter claim was legally maintainable before the learned Court below and the Hon'ble Division Bench while answering the reference and while approving the judgment of this Court in 2022 (2) Shim. LC 1145, was pleased to hold as under:-
"42 The principles deducible from the afore- discussed law can be summarized as follows:-
(i) When two suits are consolidated and tried together with common issues framed and common evidence led by the parties, resulting in a common judgment and decree, the same can be subjected to challenge by way of a single appeal at the instance of the aggrieved party;
(ii) Where a single appeal is filed questioning the judgment and decree passed in two suits, which were consolidated and decided by a common judgment, decision of such single appeal, by a common judgment, reversing or modifying the claim in one suit out of the two, can be challenged by the aggrieved party also, in a single appeal.
(iii) When two suits though not consolidated but are decided by a common judgment, resulting
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into preparation of two separate decrees, the aggrieved party would be required to challenge both of them by filing separate appeals;
(iv) When both the suit and the counter claim are decreed by a common judgment, regardless of whether separate decree has been prepared in the counter claim, both would be required to be challenged by separate appeals;
(v) In a case where two separate appeals are required to be filed against judgment of the suit and the counter claim and if appeal is filed only against one and not against the other, non filing of appeal against such judgment and decree would attach finality thereto and would attract not only the principle of resjudicata but also waiver and estoppal and the judgment and decree not appealed against would be taken to have been acquiesced to by the party not filing appeal;
(vi) When however, two appeals are filed against a common judgment passed by the trial Court, both by the plaintiff and the defendant, and are disposed of by the first appellate Court by modifying/reversing/affirming judgment of the trial Court, the aggrieved party, would be required to challenge both by two separate appeals, in absence of which, non-filing of appeal against one shall attract bar of the principles of res- judicata against another.
(vii) Where more than one appeals are required to be filed or are filed and one or more of them are dismissed for default, delay or any other similar reason, any such situation would attract res judicata and such dismissal would satisfy the requirement of appeal being heard and finally decided on merits "in a former suit" for the purpose of attracting principles of res judicata.
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43. In view of the position of law delineated hereinabove, the judgment passed by this Court in RSA No.561 of 2005, titled Pohlo Ram vs. Jindu Ram and others decided on 28.10.2005 cannot be held to have laid down good law whereas judgments passed in (i) Smt. Satya Devi vs. Partap Singh and others, AIR 2006 HP 75 and (ii) H.P. State Forest Corporation through its Divisional Manager vs. Kahan Singh, 2017(1) Him. L.R. 36 and in (iii) Mohan Singh vs. Inder Singh & others 2017(1) Him. L.R. 368, are held to have been decided correctly."
12. Coming back to the facts of this case whereas on one hand the suit for declaration and consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction was filed by the plaintiff on the plea that a fraud stood played upon him by the defendant qua the execution of the sale deed of the suit property, the counter claim filed by the defendant was to the effect that despite a valid sale having been executed, possession thereof has not been handed over to the counter claimant by the plaintiff. Learned trial Court while dismissing the suit and thus while disbelieving the contention of the plaintiff that a fraud was played upon by the plaintiff decreed the suit and upheld the contention of the counter claimant that there was a valid sale deed executed qua the suit property. Now, obviously, in the absence of two separate appeals having been filed in the single
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composite was not maintainable. Therefore, as single composite appeal filed by the present appellant against the dismissal of his suit and the decreeing of the counter claim was not maintainable, same is the fate of the present appeals and the same are dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Ajay Mohan Goel) Judge
June 12, 2024 (Vinod)