The Court made the following Common Order:
As these Writ Petitions raise the same issue, they are being disposed of by way of this common order:
2. In these three Writ Petitions, the first petitioner, had sold lands, whose details are given below, to the other petitioners in the said Writ Petitions. These sales were done by executing deeds of sale which were registered. The details of registration are given below:
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| Sl.No. |
W.P.No. |
Extent of land and Location |
Details of Sale Deeds |
Date of Registration |
Details of cancellations |
Date of Cancellation |
| 1. |
37336/2014 |
1. 1/1A, admeasuring Ac.0.33 cents, situated at Asakapalli Village. 2. 142/2, admeasuring Ac.0.57 cents, situated at Iruvadu Village. |
731/2013 & 730/2013, Sub- Registrar Office, Sabbaravam. |
08.03.2013 |
4107 & 4106 of 2014. (Sub- Registrar Office, Sabbavaram) |
21-11-2014 |
| 2. |
37335/2014 |
1. 1/1A, admeasuring Ac.0.85 cents situated at Asakapalli Village. 2. 142/2, admeasuring Ac.1.15 cents, situated at Iruvadu Village. |
733/2013 & 734/2013, Sub- Registrar Office, Sabbaravam. |
08.03.2013 |
4108 & 4109 of 2014. (Sub- Registrar Office, Sabbavaram) |
21-11-2014 |
| 3. |
37325/2014 |
1. 1/1A, admeasuring Ac.0.72 cents situated at Asakapalli Village. 2. 142/2, admeasuring Ac.1.28 cents, situated at Iruvadu Village. |
735/2013 & 732/2013, Sub- Registrar Office, Sabbaravam. |
08.03.2013 |
4105& 4111 of 2014. (Sub- Registrar Office, Sabbavaram) |
21-11-2014 |
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3. The said deeds of sale were cancelled, by way of deeds of cancellation, executed by the Tahsildar, Sabbavaram Mandal and registered by the Joint Sub-Registrar, Sabbavaram. The said details are also contained in the table annexed above.
4. Aggrieved by the said deeds of cancellation, the petitioners have approached this Court, by way of the present Writ Petitions seeking cancellation of the said deeds of cancellation.
5. The contention of the petitioners" is two-fold; firstly, Rule 26 (k) (i) of the Registration Rules, which provides power to the Government Officials to unilaterally cancel a registration deed of conveyance, stipulates a condition that such a cancellation can be only be done on the basis of Government Orders. However, no such Government Orders are available in the present case and such power could not have been exercised. Even if such power could be exercised, a requirement of prior hearing and opportunity to set out the case of the affected party would have to be read into the Rule. Since, no such opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners, the execution and the registration, of the deeds of cancellation, would have to be set aside.
6. The Tahsildar, Sabbavaram has filed a counter affidavit. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that the land in question is Government land, which had already been placed in the prohibitory list under Section 22-A of the
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Registration Act, 1908, and as such, the deeds of conveyance obtained by the petitioners are abinitiovoid, nonest and illegal. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that an enquiry was made in this regard by the Tahsildar and a report was submitted to the District Collector, setting out the facts and the manner in which the Government property was sought/said to be alienated in favour of the third parties, by a person, who had no right or claim over the land. On the basis of this report, dated 09.05.2013 & 10.06.2013, the District Collector, Visakhapatnam issued proceedings, dated 27.09.2014, directing cancellation of the said registered documents, by exercise of powers under Section 26 (k) (i) of the Registration Rules. The Tahsildar, further states that on the basis of these directions, the deeds of cancellation were executed and registered with the Joint Sub-Registrar, Sabbavaram on 21.11.2014.
7. On the question of title of the Government over the said land, the Tahsildar, in his counter affidavit, states that the total extent of land in Sy.No.142 of Iruvada Village is Ac.6.59 cents and the entire land was classified as „vaguporamboke" in the revenue records. Similarly, the total extent of Sy.No.1 of Asakapalli Village is Ac.257.30 cents and this land is classified as „hill (konda) poramboke", as per revenue records. The Tahsildar contends that the said land is under occupation of persons allotted home plots.
8. On the title of the first petitioner over the said property, the Tahsildar contends that the land is claimed, by the first petitioner, on the basis
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of a D-Form patta, said to have been issued, to the father of the 1stpetitioner, under Ex-servicemen category. The Tahsildar contends that no such patta had been given in as much as there is no record of such patta being given in the office of the Tahsidlar and no entries of any nature, relating to the claim of the 1stpetitioner, have been made in the revenue records. The Tahsildar contends that there is no basis for the 1stpetitioner to claim ownership over the alienated land.
Consideration of the Court:
9. The claim of the petitioners over the land is traceable to a D-Form patta said to have been issued to one Sri J. Gangayya, the father of the 1st petitioner, under the Ex-Servicemen category, on 10.11.1998, for an extent of Ac.3.00 cents in Sy.No.142/21, Iruvada village and Ac1.90 cents in Sy.No.1/1A of Asakapalli Village. This claim of the petitioners is contested by the Official Respondents, on the ground that, no such patta has been given and no such entries have been made in the revenue records, and there was no such assignment.
10. The District Collector, on the basis of the report given by the Tahsildar, has unilaterally directed cancellation of deeds of sale obtained by the petitioners, without giving any notice or opportunity to the petitioners to set out their claim over the land. The said cancellation is said to have been done on the strength of Rule 26 (k) (i) of the Registration Rules. The said Rule reads as follows:
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Rules-26 (k)(i)
"The registering officer shall ensure at the time of presentation for registration of cancellation deeds of previously registered deed of conveyances on sale before him that such cancellation deeds are executed by all the executant and claimant parties to the previously registered conveyance on sale and that such cancellation deed is accompanied by a declaration showing mutual consent or orders of a competent Civil or High Court or State or Central Government annulling the transaction contained in the previously registered deed of conveyance on sale.
[Inserted by Notification No. R.R.1/2006, Published in Andhra Pradesh Gazette R.S. to Part II, Extraordinary No.18, Dated 29.11.2006.] Provided that the registering officer shall dispense with the execution of cancellation deeds by executant and claimant parties to the previously registered deeds of conveyances on sale before him if the cancellation deed is executed by a Civil Judge or a Government Officer competent to execute Government orders declaring the properties contained in the previously registered conveyance on sale to be Government or Assigned or Endowment lands or properties not registerable by any provision of law."
11. This Rule empowers a Civil Judge, or a Government Official, entitled to execute, Government Orders declaring properties contained in previously registered conveyance of sale to be Government or assigned or endowments land or properties to be Government lands or assigned lands or endowment lands or properties which are not registerable. This provision requires the government to issue an order declaring that the lands in question fall within any of the categories mentioned above. Thereafter, an officer, who is competent to execute such orders, would have to execute the cancellation deed and register the same. In the present case, the respondents have not placed, before this court, any Government Order, which contains such a declaration. There is no mention of any such
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Government Order, in the counter affidavit, filed by the Tahsildar-7th respondent. In the absence of such a Government Order, the provision of Rule 26 (k) (i) would not be applicable.
12. A reading of the said Rule does not disclose any requirement to conduct any enquiry in relation to the character of the property. The provision simply states that it would be sufficient to exercise such power, if there is a declaration, by way of a government order.
1
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68. In a decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664], the issue was whether the Central Government was required to comply with the requirements of audi alteram partem before it took over the management of an industrial undertaking under Section 18-AA(1)(a) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. R.S. Sarkaria, J. speaking for the majority consisting of himself and D.A. Desai, J. laid down the following principles of law : (SCC p. 689, para 44)
"44. In short, the general principle — as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application — seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely, if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative progress or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play 'must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands'. The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, to recall the words of Bhagwati, J., the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise."
(emphasis supplied)
70. In Mangilal v. State of M.P. [Mangilal v. State of M.P., (2004) 2 SCC 447 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1085] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that the principles of natural justice need to be observed even if the statute
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is silent in that regard. In other words, a statutory silence should be taken to imply the need to observe the principles of natural justice where substantial rights of parties are affected : (SCC pp. 453-54, para 10)
"10. Even if a statute is silent and there are no positive words in the Act or the Rules made thereunder, there could be nothing wrong in spelling out the need to hear the parties whose rights and interest are likely to be affected by the orders that may be passed, and making it a requirement to follow a fair procedure before taking a decision, unless the statute provides otherwise. The principles of natural justice must be read into unoccupied interstices of the statute, unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. No form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant's defence or stand. Even in the absence of a provision in procedural laws, power inheres in every tribunal/court of a judicial or quasi-judicial character, to adopt modalities necessary to achieve requirements of natural justice and fair play to ensure better and proper discharge of their duties. Procedure is mainly grounded on the principles of natural justice irrespective of the extent of its application by express provision in that regard in a given situation. It has always been a cherished principle. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice where substantial rights of parties are considerably affected. The application of natural justice becomes presumptive, unless found excluded by express words of statute or necessary intendment. … Its aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. Principles of natural justice do not supplant the law, but supplement it. These rules operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They are a means to an end and not an end in themselves."
(emphasis supplied)
88. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn. [Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., (1985) 3 SCC 545] , a Constitution Bench of this Court was called upon to adjudge the validity of Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. The provision enabled the Municipal Commissioner to remove, without notice, any object, structure or fixture which was set up in or upon any street. Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. delivering
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the judgment of the Constitution Bench held that the impugned provision must be construed to ensure that the procedure contemplated is fair and reasonable. It was further held : (SCC pp. 580-81, para 44)
"44. … What Section 314 provides is that the Commissioner [Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] may [Ed. :
The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] , without notice, cause an encroachment to be removed. It does not command that the Commissioner shall, without notice, cause an encroachment to be removed. Putting it differently, Section 314 confers on the Commissioner the discretion to cause an encroachment to be removed with or without notice. That discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner so as to comply with the constitutional mandate that the procedure accompanying the performance of a public act must be fair and reasonable. We must lean in favour of this interpretation because it helps sustain the validity of the law. Reading Section 314 as containing a command not to issue notice before the removal of an encroachment will make the law invalid."
(emphasis supplied)
91. In Sahara India (Firm) (1) v. CIT [Sahara India (Firm) (1) v. CIT, (2008)
14 SCC 151], a two-Judge Bench of this Court was called upon to decide whether an opportunity of being heard has to be granted to an assessee before any direction could be issued under Section 142(2-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for special audit of the accounts of the assessee. This Court held that since the exercise of power under Section 142(2-A) of the Income Tax Act leads to serious civil consequences for the assessee, the requirement of observing the principles of natural justice is to be read into the said provision.
92. In Kesar Enterprises Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Kesar Enterprises Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 13 SCC 733] , the Court dealt with a challenge to the validity of Rule 633(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Excise Manual which allowed the imposition of a penalty for breach of the conditions of a bond without expressly issuing a show-cause notice. D.K. Jain, J. speaking on behalf of the two-Judge Bench held that a show-cause notice should be issued and an opportunity of being heard should be afforded before an Order under Rule 633(7) is made. The Court held that the rule would be
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open to challenge for being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution unless the requirement of an opportunity to show cause is read into it. The Court observed : (SCC p. 743, paras 30 & 32)
"30. Having considered the issue, framed in para 16, on the touchstone of the aforenoted legal principles in regard to the applicability of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion that keeping in view the nature, scope and consequences of direction under sub-rule (7) of Rule 633 of the Excise Manual, the principles of natural justice demand that a show-cause notice should be issued and an opportunity of hearing should be afforded to the person concerned before an order under the said Rule is made, notwithstanding the fact that the said Rule does not contain any express provision for the affected party being given an opportunity of being heard.
***
32. In our view, therefore, if the requirement of an opportunity to show cause is not read into the said Rule, an action thereunder would be open to challenge as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the power conferred on the competent authority under the provision is arbitrary."
(emphasis supplied)
14. The unilateral execution of the cancellation deeds, would terminate any rights, the affected parties may have had over the said property. The deprivation of property, without an opportunity being given to the affected parties to make out their case, would be an arbitrary exercise of power as well as a violation of principles of natural justice. Though there is no provision for an opportunity of hearing being given to the affected parties, such a condition would have to be read into the Rule.
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15. This issue may also be viewed from another angle. The rule states that the execution of the cancellation deed is on the basis of an earlier order declaring the nature and character of the land. It can be contended that nothing further survives for consideration, as the competent officer, executing the cancellation order, is only implementing a concluded order and the issuance of a prior notice is an empty formality. At first blush, this proposition looks attractive. However, the fact remains that the affected party loses his rights over the property. It would be necessary that the affected party is put on notice as to the details of the government order which has put the property in the categories mentioned in the rule. This would give an opportunity to the affected party to either dispute the statement in the notice or even the underlying order. There could be situations where the affected party is not even aware of the underlying order and had no opportunity to assail such an order. It would be difficult to hazard a guess of the permutations and combinations that may arise.
16. Since neither the government order, placing the subject land in the categories mentioned in the Rule nor the prior notice issued by the executing authority, have been placed before this court, the deeds of cancellation would have to be set aside.
17. Accordingly, these Writ Petitions are allowed and the registered cancellation deeds in W.P.No.37325 of 2014 bearing Nos.4105 of 2014 & 4111 of 2014, dated 21.11.2014, in W.P.No.37335 of 2014 bearing Nos.4109
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and 4108 of 2014, dated 21.11.2014 and in W.P.No.37336 of 2014 bearing Nos.4107 and 4106 of 2014, dated 21.11.2014, executed and registered by the respondents 4, 5 & 7, Sabbavaram, Visakhapatnam are set aside. However, this would not preclude the Revenue Authorities from undertaking a fresh exercise in this regard after due opportunity of hearing being given to the petitioners.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.
_____________________________
JUSTICE R.RAGHUNANDAN RAO
RJS
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HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO WRIT PETITION NOs: 37325, 37335 & 37336 of 2014 Dt: 06.12.2024
RJS