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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')
  • Section 31(7)(b) of the Act
  • Section 11 of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 31(7)(a) of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')
  • Section 31(7)(b) of the Act
  • Section 11 of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 31(7)(a) of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 17 October 1997, the appellant, R.P. Garg, entered into a contract with the Telecom Department of Haryana for trenching and laying underground cables, furnishing a security deposit of ₹10 lakhs. Disputes concerning non-payment of bills were referred to arbitration on 24 October 2000 under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”).

The Arbitrator issued an award on 8 March 2001 allowing the monetary claim but denying any interest, believing the contract barred such payment. During execution proceedings, the Civil Judge (Senior Division) rejected the appellant’s plea for post-award interest on 10 October 2002. On appeal, the District Judge, by order dated 4 March 2003, granted post-award interest at 18 % p.a. from the date of the award until realisation.

The Telecom Department challenged this in a civil revision before the Punjab & Haryana High Court, which on 14 May 2019 set aside the District Judge’s order, holding that the contract (Clause 1(iv)) prohibited any interest. The present civil appeal arises from that High Court decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an award-holder is entitled to post-award interest when the arbitral award is silent on interest and the underlying contract contains a clause prohibiting interest.
  2. Whether contractual autonomy can override the statutory mandate of Section 31(7)(b) regarding post-award interest.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Section 31(7)(b) makes post-award interest mandatory; parties cannot “contract out” of this entitlement.
  • The arbitrator’s and High Court’s reliance on the contractual clause was misplaced because that clause can, at best, govern pre-award or pendente-lite interest.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • Clause 1(iv) of the contract expressly bars payment of any interest, including post-award interest, thus the award and execution court were correct in denying it.
  • The Supreme Court precedent in Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. v. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation (India) Ltd. supports the position that contractual prohibition on interest is binding.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. v. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation (India) Ltd. (2019) 17 SCC 786 Interest cannot be awarded where a contract expressly prohibits it (context: pendente-lite/pre-award interest). Distinguished; held inapplicable because it concerned pendente-lite interest, not post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b).
Morgan Securities & Credits (P) Ltd. v. Videocon Industries Ltd. (2023) 1 SCC 602 Section 31(7)(b) allows the arbitrator to vary only the rate of post-award interest; parties cannot eliminate entitlement altogether. Relied upon; affirmed that entitlement to post-award interest is statutory and not subject to contractual exclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court observed that Section 31(7) draws a clear statutory distinction between pre-award and post-award interest. Sub-section (a) begins with the phrase “unless otherwise agreed by the parties,” allowing contractual terms to govern pre-award interest. In contrast, sub-section (b) mandates that “a sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall… carry interest” from the date of the award to payment, unless the award varies the rate, not the entitlement.

Accordingly, contractual autonomy does not extend to waiving post-award interest. The High Court’s reliance on Clause 1(iv) and on Jaiprakash was therefore erroneous; the clause could not override the statutory mandate, and Jaiprakash dealt only with pendente-lite interest. The Court endorsed the interpretation in Morgan Securities, reiterating that the words “unless the award otherwise directs” in Section 31(7)(b) qualify only the rate of interest, not the entitlement itself.

Given that the arbitral award was silent on post-award interest, the statutory default applies. The District Judge had correctly awarded 18 % p.a., and the High Court erred in setting it aside.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; the High Court’s judgment dated 14 May 2019 is set aside and the District Court’s order granting 18 % p.a. post-award interest is restored.

Direct Effect: The appellant is entitled to 18 % interest from 8 March 2001 until realisation; parties to bear their own costs.

Broader Implication: The decision reinforces that Section 31(7)(b) confers a statutory, non-derogable right to post-award interest; parties cannot exclude this entitlement through contractual clauses, thereby providing greater certainty to award-holders in arbitration proceedings.

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    R. P. GARG v. THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER TELECOM DEPARTMENT

    2024 INSC 743

    REPORTABLE

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10472 OF 2024

    (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2792 of 2020) R.P. GARG …APPELLANT(S)

    VERSUS

    THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER,

    TELECOM DEPARTMENT & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

    J U D G M E N T

    PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.

    1. Leave granted.

    2. The short question before us is whether the appellant is entitled to post award interest on the sum awarded by the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator denied payment of such interest under a misplaced impression that the contract between the parties prohibited it. The executing Court1affirmed the finding of the Arbitrator and rejected the prayer. However, allowing the appeal, the District Court2held that the appellant will be entitled to post award interest. By the order

    1 Order in M.A No. 1 9 of 2001 dated 1 0.1 0.2002.

    2 Order passed by the District Judge in Civil Appeal no.86 of 11.11.2 002 dated 04.03.2 003

    1

    impugned before us, the High Court3allowed the revision and set aside the District Court order while holding that the contract between the parties did not permit grant of post award interest.

    2.1 For the reasons to follow, while allowing the appeal we have held that as this is a case arising out of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19964, by operation of Section 31(7)(b), the sum directed to be paid under the Arbitral Award shall carry interest. This is a first principle. A sum directed to be paid by an Arbitral Award must carry interest. In this view of the matter, we have restored the judgment of the District Court granting 18% interest from the date of the award to its realization. The short facts are as under:

    3. A contract was executed on 17.10.1997 between the appellant contractor, and the Telecom Department of Haryana, Respondents 1 and 2 herein, for trenching and laying of underground cables. Terms of the contract required the appellant to furnish a security of Rs. 10 Lakhs. Disputes that arose with respect to non-payment of bills submitted by the appellant during execution of the contract were referred to Arbitrator appointed under Section 11 of the Act on

    24.10.2000.

    4. The Arbitrator passed the Award on 08.03.2001. In the said Award, though the claim of the appellant was allowed, his plea for

    3 Order dated 14.05.2019 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Revision No. 2561 of 2003

    4 Hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'

    2

    interest was denied on the ground that there is a specific clause in the Arbitration Agreement prohibiting the same.

    5. During execution of the Award, the appellant claimed payment of post award interest on the Award by raising a specific objection to that effect. However, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division vide his order dated 10.10.2002 dismissed the objection and affirmed the original award.

    6. Aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal. The District Judge allowed the appeal and by Order dated 04.03.2003 directed payment of post award interest at the rate of 18% on the Award amount. The appellant was also directed to approach the trial court for recovery of the same.

    7. Being aggrieved, the Telecom Department, the respondent herein, filed a Civil Revision Petition before the High Court which was allowed by the High Court by the order impugned before us. The High Court looked into sub-clause (iv) of Clause 1 of the Contract entered between parties which provides for the scope of the grant of interest on certain payment. The sub clause is as under:-

    "No interest will be payable on the earnest money or security deposit amount or any amount payable to the contractor under the contract."

    8. Assuming that the above referred clause of interest is an agreement between the parties prohibiting the grant of interest, the

    3

    High Court proceeded to allow the Revision and set aside the grant of interest. The High court referred to the decision of this Court in Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. v. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation (India) Ltd.5 and came to the conclusion that the Supreme Court has laid down a precedent that interest cannot be paid when a contractual clause specifically prohibits it.

    9. We are of the opinion that the judgment of High Court is clearly erroneous. Firstly, the interest granted by the First Appellate Court only related to post award period, and therefore, for this period, the agreement between the parties has no bearing. Section 31(7)(b) deals with grant of interest for post award period i.e., from the date of the award till its realization. The statutory scheme relating to grant of interest provided in Section 31(7) creates a distinction between interest payable before and after the award. So far as the interest before the passing of the award is concerned, it is regulated by Section 31(7)(a) of the Act which provides that the grant of interest shall be subject to the agreement between the parties. This is evident from the specific expression at the commencement of the sub-section which says

    "unless otherwise agreed by the parties".

    10. The relevant extract of Section 31 of the Act is reproduced herein for ready reference:

    "31 Form and contents of arbitral award.

    4

    "… 7(a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where and in so far as an arbitral award is for the payment of money, the arbitral tribunal may include in the sum for which the award is made interest, at such rate as it deems reasonable, on the whole or any part of the money, for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made.

    (b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of two per cent, higher than the current rate of interest prevalent on the date of award, from the date of award to the date of payment."

    11. So far as the entitlement of the post-award interest is concerned, sub-Section (b) of Section 31(7) provides that the sum directed to be paid by the Arbitral Tribunal shall carry interest. The rate of interest can be provided by the Arbitrator and in default the statutory prescription will apply. Clause (b) of Section 31(7) is therefore in contrast with clause (a) and is not subject to party autonomy. In other words, clause (b) does not give the parties the right to "contract out"

    interest for the post-award period. The expression 'unless the award otherwise directs' in Section 31(7)(b) relates to rate of interest and not entitlement of interest. The only distinction made by Section 31(7)(b) is that the rate of interest granted under the Award is to be given precedence over the statutorily prescribed rate. The assumption of the High Court that payment of the interest for the post award period is subject to the contract is a clear error.

    12. The clear position of law that granting post-award interest is not subject to the contract between the parties was recently affirmed in

    5

    the decision of this Court in Morgan Securities & Credits (P) Ltd. v. Videocon Industries Ltd.,6 wherein the court observed as follows:

    "24. The issue before us is whether the phrase "unless the award otherwise directs" in Section 31(7)(b) of the Act only provides the arbitrator the discretion to determine the rate of interest or both the rate of interest and the "sum" it must be paid against. At this juncture, it is crucial to note that both clauses (a) and (b) are qualified. While, clause (a) is qualified by the arbitration agreement, clause (b) is qualified by the arbitration award. However, the placement of the phrases is crucial to their interpretation. The words, "unless otherwise agreed by the parties" occur at the beginning of clause (a) qualifying the entire provision. However, in clause (b), the words, "unless the award otherwise directs" occur after the words "a sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall" and before the words "carry interest at the rate of eighteen per cent". Thereby, those words only qualify the rate of post- award interest.

    25. Section 31(7)(a) confers a wide discretion upon the arbitrator in regard to the grant of pre-award interest. The arbitrator has the discretion to determine the rate of reasonable interest, the sum on which the interest is to be paid, that is whether on the whole or any part of the principal amount, and the period for which payment of interest is to be made — whether it should be for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date of the award. When a discretion has been conferred on the arbitrator in regard to the grant of pre-award interest, it would be against the grain of statutory interpretation to presuppose that the legislative intent was to reduce the discretionary power of the arbitrator for the grant of post-award interest under clause (b). Clause (b) only contemplates a situation where the arbitration award is silent on post-award interest, in which event the award-holder is entitled to a post-award interest of eighteen per cent."

    13. The High Court, therefore, committed an error in relying on the decision of this Court in Jaiprakash (supra). The judgement in Jaiprakash deals with the issue of prohibition of pendente-lite interest and will have no application to the facts of the present case where the

    6 (2023) 1 SCC 6 02.

    6

    claim relates to post-award interest.

    14. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court in Civil Revision No. 2561 of 2003 (O&M) dated 14.05.2019 is set-aside, and the decision of the First Appellate Court in C.A No. 86 of 11.11.02 dated 04.03.2003 for granting interest @ 18% p.a. is restored.

    15. Parties shall bear their own costs. ……………………………….J.

    PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

    …..………………………….J.

    [SANDEEP MEHTA]

    NEW DELHI;

    SEPTEMBER 10, 2024

    7

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    R. P. GARG v. THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER TELECOM DEPARTMENT
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