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  • Section 34 (3), Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
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  • Section 34 (3), Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The matter arose from arbitral proceedings in which an award dated 18.04.2018 was subsequently corrected by the arbitral tribunal on its own initiative under Section 33(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by a corrected award dated 05.05.2018. The corrections were made within the 30-day period permitted under Section 33(3).

An objections/application for setting aside the arbitral award was filed on 03.08.2018. The High Court held that these objections were within the limitation period. A Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenged this conclusion. The Supreme Court considered the interaction between Sections 33 and 34(3) of the Act, including the effect of suo motu corrections on limitation for filing objections, and ultimately dismissed the SLP, affirming the High Court’s view on limitation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, when an arbitral tribunal makes suo motu corrections to an award under Section 33(3), the limitation period under Section 34(3) for filing objections runs from the date of the original award or from the date the corrected award is made and received by the party.
  2. Whether the objections/application for setting aside the award filed on 03.08.2018 were within the 90-day limitation period, computed with reference to the corrected award dated 05.05.2018.
  3. Whether the court retains power to condone delay for a further period of thirty days and the timing by which an application for condonation of delay may be filed.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons v. Union of India, SLP (C) No. 20195/2017, decided on 08.08.2018 The disposal of an application under Section 33 sets the starting point for limitation under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court aligned its interpretation with this reasoning and held that where the arbitral tribunal makes suo motu corrections under Section 33(3), the limitation under Section 34(3) runs from the date the correction is made and the corrected award is received by the party; the corrected award, not the original, must be challenged.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court focused on the purpose and object of Section 34(3): to allow parties sufficient time to study, examine, and understand the award and, if advised, to draft and file objections within the specified period. It reasoned that once an award is amended or corrected by the arbitral tribunal under Section 33(3), the corrected award supplants the original for purposes of challenge.

Accordingly, in cases of suo motu corrections within Section 33(3), the starting point for limitation under Section 34(3) is the date on which the correction was made and the corrected award is received by the party. The Court emphasized that it is the corrected award that must be challenged, as the original award stands modified.

This interpretation was stated to be in terms and accord with the reasoning in Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons v. Union of India, which linked the commencement of limitation under Section 34(3) to the disposal of a Section 33 application. Extending that logic, the Court treated the tribunal’s suo motu correction under Section 33(3) as similarly resetting the limitation to the corrected award.

Applying these principles, the Court found that the objections/application for setting aside the award filed on 03.08.2018 were within ninety days from the corrected award dated 05.05.2018. The Court also noted that, in any event, there exists power to condone delay for a further period of thirty days, and an application for condonation can be filed at any time while the proceedings are pending, though whether to exercise such discretion is a separate matter.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED: The Supreme Court found no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and dismissed the special leave petition.

Implications: The decision confirms that when an arbitral tribunal makes suo motu corrections within the scope of Section 33(3), the limitation period under Section 34(3) runs from the date the corrected award is made and received by the party. The corrected award must be the subject of any challenge, as the original stands modified. In the case at hand, the High Court’s conclusion that the objections filed on 03.08.2018 were within limitation stands affirmed. The Court also reiterated the availability of a further thirty days for condonation of delay, with the application for condonation permissible at any time while proceedings are pending.

    Uss Alliance Petitioner(s) v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others (s).

    1. This Court in SLP (C) No. 20195/2017 titled “Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons v. Union of India” decided on 08.08.2018 has interpreted Section 34 (3) with reference to Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to hold that the disposal of an application under Section 33 of the Act would be the starting point for limitation. This decision was in the context of an application moved by one of the parties before the arbitral tribunal under Section 33 of the Act. In the present case, the arbitral tribunal in terms of powers given under sub-section (3) of Section 33 of the Act had on its own initiative made corrections in the award dated 18.04.2018, vide the award dated 05.05.2018. The suo-moto corrections in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 33 of the Act can be made within a period of 30 days from the date of arbitral award.

    2. In our opinion, looking at the purpose and object behind Section 34 (3) of the Act, which is to enable the parties to study, examine and understand the award, thereupon, if the party chooses and is advised, draft and file objections within the time specified, the starting point for the limitation in case of suomoto correction of the award, would be the date on which the correction was made and the corrected award is received by the party. Once the arbitral award has been amended or corrected, it is the corrected award which has to be challenged and not the original award. The original award stands modified, and the corrected award must be challenged by filing objections.

    3. This interpretation would be in terms and accord with the reasoning which has been interpreted in the “Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons v. Union of India” (supra).

    4. In the present case, the objections/application for setting aside the arbitral award were filed on 03.08.2018, which is within a period of ninety days from the date of the corrected award. Hence, the High Court was right in holding that the objections were filed within the limitation period. Even otherwise, the Court has the power to condone the delay for further period of thirty days. Application for condonation of delay can be filed at anytime till the proceedings are pending. Of course, exercise of discretion and whether or not the delay should be condoned is a different matter.

    5. In view of the aforesaid position, we do not find any good ground and reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and hence, the special leave petition is dismissed.

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    Comments

    Uss Alliance Petitioner(s) v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others (s).
    (Jan 6, 2023)