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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC was filed by the appellant, Talesh Kumar Chandel, against the conviction and sentence imposed by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, Chhattisgarh, dated 29.02.2016. The appellant was convicted for offences under Sections 302 and 450 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment with fines and additional rigorous imprisonment in default of fine payment.

The prosecution case was that on 21.02.2015, the appellant trespassed into the house of Khima Khutel, poured kerosene oil on her body, and set her on fire after she refused his demand to marry him. Khima Khutel suffered grievous burn injuries and died during treatment on 02.03.2015. The deceased gave a dying declaration on 22.02.2015, implicating the appellant. The prosecution examined 16 witnesses and produced 25 documents. The trial court convicted the appellant based primarily on the dying declaration and other evidence, leading to this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the dying declaration (Ex.P/14) of the deceased Khima Khutel was admissible and reliable evidence against the appellant?
  2. Whether the appellant was rightly convicted for the offences under Sections 302 and 450 IPC based on the evidence presented?
  3. Whether the appellant was in a fit physical and mental state to give the dying declaration, and whether the procedural safeguards regarding its recording were complied with?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant claimed false implication in the crime and contended that the conviction was based on a perverse finding.
  • He challenged the delay in recording the dying declaration, which was made a day after the incident, without explanation from the prosecution.
  • The appellant pointed out that the eyewitness sister of the deceased turned hostile and did not support the prosecution.
  • It was argued that the doctor who certified the deceased fit to give the dying declaration did not clearly state that the deceased was in a fit physical and mental state, thus questioning the validity of the dying declaration.
  • No material was seized from the appellant’s possession.
  • The appellant sought acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt due to these deficiencies.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The State supported the trial court’s judgment, asserting that the prosecution proved the offences beyond reasonable doubt.
  • It was submitted that the dying declaration was true, voluntary, and reliable.
  • The State argued there was no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration implicating the appellant.
  • The conviction and sentence were rightly imposed and the appeal deserved dismissal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 Principles regarding admissibility and scope of dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, including proximity of statement to death and circumstances of transaction. The Court relied on the principles to evaluate the dying declaration’s admissibility and its connection to the cause of death in this case.
Purshottam Chopra and another v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2020) 11 SCC 489 Principles relating to recording, admissibility, and reliability of dying declarations, including requirements of fit state of mind and voluntariness. The Court applied these principles to assess the fitness and voluntariness of the deceased’s dying declaration and found it credible.
Laxman v. State Of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 Certification by doctor as a rule of caution; voluntary and truthful nature of dying declaration can be established otherwise; Magistrate’s satisfaction on fitness of declarant is crucial. The Court held that the doctor’s certification and Magistrate’s satisfaction were present, supporting the admissibility and reliability of the dying declaration.
Jagbir Singh (S) v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 8 SCC 779 Absence of doctor’s certificate is not fatal if the recorder ensures the declarant was in a fit mental and physical condition to give the declaration. The Court noted that the Executive Magistrate and doctor in the present case fulfilled this requirement, reinforcing the validity of the dying declaration.
Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat (1999) 9 SCC 562 Clarification on the necessity and sufficiency of doctor’s certification for dying declarations. The Court affirmed this precedent to reject hypertechnical requirements and uphold the dying declaration’s admissibility in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully examined the evidence, focusing primarily on the dying declaration (Ex.P/14) of the deceased, Khima Khutel, recorded by Executive Magistrate Smt. Madhu Harsh (PW-10) after certification by Dr. Jigyasa (PW-16) that the deceased was capable of making the statement. The Court discussed the legal framework under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, which admits dying declarations as exceptions to the hearsay rule due to their inherent trustworthiness, supported by the maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire (a person on the verge of death is unlikely to lie).

The Court acknowledged the appellant’s objections regarding the delay in recording the dying declaration and the fitness of the deceased to make the statement. However, it found no infirmity in the certification by the doctor or the Magistrate’s satisfaction regarding the deceased’s mental and physical state. The Court also noted that the prosecution was not challenged on the delay during cross-examination of key witnesses who could have explained it.

Relying on authoritative Supreme Court precedents, the Court emphasized that a dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction if it inspires confidence and is voluntary. The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that the dying declaration was unreliable or that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence was coherent, consistent, and supported the conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed.

The Court upheld the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant for offences under Sections 302 and 450 IPC. The decision confirms that the dying declaration recorded after proper certification and by a competent authority is admissible and can form the basis of conviction even without corroboration, provided it inspires confidence. This ruling directly affects the parties by affirming the appellant’s guilt and sentence. No new legal precedent was established beyond reaffirming existing principles on dying declarations and their evidentiary value.

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    Talesh Kumar Chandel v. The State Of Chhattisgarh

    1

    CRA No. 679 of 2016

    NAFR

    HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

    CRA No. 679 of 2016

     Talesh Kumar Chandel S/o Jethuram Chandel, aged about 23 ysears, R/o Village Patora, Thana, Utai, District Durg Chhattisgarh.

    ---- Appellant Versus

     The State of Chhattisgarh through Police Station Utai, Distt. Durg Chhattisgarh.

    ---- Respondent

    For Appellant :- Mr. Jaydeep Singh Yadav, Advocate. For State :- Mr. Sameer Oraon, Government Advocate.

    Division Bench Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal & Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal

    Judgment On Board

    (19.12.2023)

    Sanjay K. Agrawal, J

    1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC preferred by the appellant-accused herein is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.02.2016 passed by 4thAdditional Sessions Judge, Durg, Chhattisgarh, in Sessions Trial No.

    2

    0000067/2015 by which appellant has been convicted for offences under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of 500/-; in₹ default of payment of fine additional rigorous imprisonment for 2 months & under Section 450 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years with fine of 500/-; in default of payment of fine₹ additional rigorous imprisonment for 2 months. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

    2. Case of the prosecution, in nutshell, is that on 21.02.2015 at 4:30 pm at village Patora, Thana, Utai, District Durg Chhattisgarh, appellant herein trespassed in the house of Khima Khutel (now deceased) and set her on fire after pouring kerosene oil on her body by which she suffered grievous burn injuries, and during treatment she died on 02.03.2015 and thereby committed the said offence. It is further case of the prosecution that on the date of offence when Khima Khutel came from the school to her house and was preparing tea for her, appellant herein, armed with scissors, trespassed in the house of Khima Khutel after crossing boundary wall of her house. Appellant threatened her to marry with him which she (deceased) denied and on that account appellant poured kerosene oil

    3

    on her body and set her ablaze; she (deceased) shouted

    "bachao bachao" and called her sister Kumari Khileshwar (PW-2). After hearing the call of her sister Khima Khutel, she (PW-2) came on the spot and extinguished the fire and called ambulance 108 and thereafter, Khima Khutel was taken to the District Hospital, Durg where during treatment she died on 02.03.2015. However, during the course of treatment on 22.02.2015 at 7:00 pm, Khima Khutel had given dying declaration (Ex.P/14) to Executive Magistrate Smt. Madhu Harsh (PW-10) in which she (deceased) implicated the appellant herein and before giving dying declaration she (deceased) was certified by Dr. Jigyasa (PW-16) that she is capable to give statement. Dehati nalsi (Ex.P/16) was registered. FIR was registered vide Ex.P/17. Inquest proceedings (Ex.P/3) were conducted and the dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem. As per postmortem report (Ex.P/24) proved by Dr. R.K. Nayak (PW-14), cause of death was shock due to extensive burn injuries with septicemia.

    3. After due investigation, appellant herein was charge- sheeted for the aforesaid offences and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance

    4

    with law. The appellant / accused abjured his guilt and entered into defence.

    4. In order to bring home the offences, prosecution has examined as many as 16 witnesses and exhibited 25 documents and defence in support of its case has not examined any witness, but exhibited one document (Ex.D/1).

    5. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted the appellant / accused for the offences as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence.

    6. Mr. Jaydeep Singh Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that appellant has falsely been implicated in crime in question and he has been convicted by recording a finding which is perverse to the record. He also submits that incident had occurred on 21.02.2015 and whereas, dying declaration of the deceased (Ex.P/14) has been recorded on 22.02.2015 at 7:00 pm and no reason has been assigned by the prosecution with regard

    5

    to delay and even eye witness Kumar Khileshwari (PW-2), sister of the deceased, has turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution and nothing has been seized from the possession of the appellant herein. He further submits that clear statement has not been given by Dr. Jigyasa (PW-16), who has given the fitness certificate to the deceased to record dying declaration, that she (deceased) was in fit physical and mental state to give dying declaration and, as such, her (deceased) physical and mental state of mind was not fit to give dying declaration and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed and appellant deserves to be acquitted on basis of benefit of doubt.

    7. On the other hand, Mr. Sameer Oraon, learned State counsel, supports the impugned judgment and submits that prosecution has been able to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt and there is sufficient evidence adduced by the prosecution showing involvement of the appellant in crime in question. He further submits that there is no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration made by Khima Khutel and her dying declaration was true and voluntary therefore, the trial Court has rightly convicted the

    6

    appellant for the aforesaid offences and the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed.

    8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the records with utmost circumspection.

    9. So far as the nature of death of Khima Khutel (deceased) is concerned, no definite opinion has been expressed by Dr. R.K. Nayak (PW-14) in postmortem report (Ex.P/24) and learned trial Court has also not answered this question specifically, therefore, it would be appropriate to consider the question of nature of death of deceased persons as well as the question of author of crime in question conjointly considering the entire evidence available on record as the case mainly based on dying declaration (Ex.P/14) recorded by Smt. Madhu Harsh (PW-10), Executive Magistrate. We shall consider both of the questions together.

    10. At this stage, it is appropriate to notice Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads thus:-

    "32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.—Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured

    7

    without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:—

    (1) when it relates to cause of death.—When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question.

    Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. xxx xxx xxx"

    11. The general ground of admissibility of the evidence mentioned in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is that in the matter in question, no better evidence is to be had. The provisions in Section 32(1) constitute further exceptions to the rule which exclude hearsay. As a general rule, oral evidence must be direct (Section 60). The eight clauses of Section 32 may be regarded as exceptions to it, which are mainly based on two conditions: a necessity for the evidence and a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. Hearsay is excluded because it is considered not sufficiently trustworthy. It is rejected because it lacks the sanction of the tests applied to admissible evidence, namely, the oath and cross- examination. But where there are special circumstances

    8

    which gives a guarantee of trustworthiness to the testimony, it is admitted even though it comes from a second-hand source. The Supreme Court emphasized on the principle enumerated in the famous legal maxim of the Law of Evidence, i.e., nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire which means a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. Our Indian Law also recognizes this fact that

    "a dying man seldom lies" or in other words "truth sits upon the lips of a dying man". The relevance or this very fact, is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence.

    12. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to as the "dying declaration" section, although the said phrase itself does not find mention under the Evidence Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions including in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1in which their Lordships have summarised the principles enumerated in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to

    "circumstances of the transaction", which are as under: -

    1 (1 984) 4 SCC 1 1 6

    9

    "21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the following propositions emerge:-

    (1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature and character of our people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.

    (2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and- dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context. Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32.

    (3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross- examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to

    10

    make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring.

    (4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide.

    (5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant."

    13. In the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)2, principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability were summed up in paragraph 21 as under: -

    "21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of the principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability could be usefully summed up as under:-

    21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the court.

    21.2. The court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.

    21.3. Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should

    2 (2 02 0) 11 SCC 489

    11

    not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.

    21.4. When the eyewitnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail.

    21.5. The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement.

    21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the dying declaration.

    21.7. As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to make the statement.

    21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration."

    14. In addition to this, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Laxman v. State Of Maharashtra . 3

    has clearly held that a certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise. Their Lordships held in paragraph 5 of the report as under: -

    12

    "5. The Court also in the aforesaid case relied upon the decision of this Court in Harjit Kaur v. State Of Punjab . of Punjab4wherein the Magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained an endorsement to that effect and merely because an endorsement was made not on the declaration but on the application would not render the dying declaration suspicious in any manner. For the reasons already indicated earlier, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observations of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P.5(at SCC p. 701, para 8) to the effect that

    "in the absence of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration, it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration"

    has been too broadly stated and is not the correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a hypertechnical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind specially when the Magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind whereafter he recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P.8must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat6.

    15. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jagbir Singh (S) v. State (Nct Of Delhi) (S).)7following the principle of law laid down in Laxman (supra) has clearly held that even

    4 (1999) 6 SCC 545

    5 (1999) 7 SCC 695

    6 (1999) 9 SCC 56 2

    7 (2019) 8 SCC 7 7 9

    13

    absence of the certificate by a doctor is not fatal to act upon a dying declaration, however, the requirement remains that the person who records dying declaration must ensure that the patient was in a fit condition, both mentally and physically, to give the declaration.

    16. Returning to the facts of the present case in the light of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the afore-stated judgments, it is quite vivid that before recording the dying declaration of Khima Khutel (deceased), she was certified by Dr. Jigyasa (PW-16) that she (deceased) is capable to give dying declaration. Thereafter her (deceased) dying declaration (Ex.P/14) has been recorded in which she has clearly implicated the appellant herein that it is the appellant who set her on fire after pouring kerosene oil on her body. Dr. Jigyasa (PW-16) in her statement before the Court has clearly supported the case of the prosecution and in her cross-examination she has clearly stated that after examining her (deceased) she had given the certificate that she (deceased) is capable to give dying declaration. Executive Magistrate Smt. Madhu Harsh (PW-10), who has recorded the dying declaration of the deceased (Ex.P/14), in her statement before the Court has stated that the deceased had given

    14

    the dying declaration in which she (deceased) has implicated the appellant herein by stating that the appellant used to pressurise her to marry with him which she (deceased) did not want to do and she (deceased) wanted to continue her studies. She (PW-10) has also been subjected to cross-examination, but, she has clearly supported the case of the prosecution that deceased had given the dying declaration to her and in which she (deceased) has implicated the appellant herein and from beginning to end she (deceased) emphatically stated that it is only the appellant herein who got her burn. In that view of the matter, nothing has been extracted from the statements of Dr. Jigyasa (PW-16) & Executive Magistrate Smt. Madhu Harsh (PW-10) to hold that she (deceased) was not in fit physical and mental state of mind to give dying declaration and she (deceased) had not given any dying declaration. As such, there is sufficient evidence available on record that the dying declaration has been

    given by Khima Khutel (deceased) and her dying declaration (Ex.P/14) is true and voluntary. The objection with regard to delay in recording the dying declaration of the deceased has not been put to the Investigating Officer K.L. Sahu (PW-12), so that he could have explained the

    15

    delay in recording dying declaration and even not asked from Dr. Jigyasa (PW-16) who certified the deceased to be in fit physical and mental state of mind to record dying declaration.

    17. In that view of the matter, the trial Court has rightly held that it is the appellant who is the author of crime in question relying upon the dying declaration (Ex.P/14) made by Khima Khutel (deceased) before Executive Magistrate Smt. Madhu Harsh (PW-10) after getting fitness certificate by Dr. Jigyasa (PW-16) that she is capable to give statement and consequently, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC for committing murder of Khima Khutel.

    18. Accordingly, this criminal appeal is dismissed.

    Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay S. Agrawal)

    Judge Judge Ankit

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    Talesh Kumar Chandel v. The State Of Chhattisgarh
    (Dec 19, 2023)