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  • sub-section (2) of section 13
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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Mukesh Khampariya, was serving as Station House Officer (SHO) at Police Station Gadarwara, District Narsinghpur from 27.08.2016 to 24.03.2017. During this period, respondent No.7, Varsha Singh, was posted as Sub-Inspector at the same station. The petitioner supervised respondent No.7, who was alleged to have committed dereliction of duty multiple times, leading to coercive orders against her. Subsequently, respondent No.7 filed a complaint dated 16.03.2017 alleging sexual harassment by the petitioner at the workplace.

In response, an internal complaint committee was constituted under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (Act of 2013). This committee, consisting of five members, conducted an inquiry and issued a report on 26.05.2017 finding the allegations unsubstantiated. Respondent No.7 challenged this report, and a departmental authority upheld the finding of no sexual harassment on 25.12.2017.

However, on 25.06.2018, the Police Headquarters directed a fresh inquiry, resulting in a new inquiry report dated 25.07.2018 which found the petitioner guilty of sexual harassment. The petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the Police Headquarters’ order and the subsequent inquiry report.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the complaint of sexual harassment was barred by limitation under Section 9 of the Act of 2013, given the alleged incident occurred on 12.10.2016 and the complaint was filed on 16.03.2017.
  2. Whether an appeal against the internal complaint committee’s report should be preferred before the Tribunal/Court as per Section 18 of the Act and applicable service rules, rather than before departmental authorities.
  3. Whether the Police Headquarters had the legal authority under the Act of 2013 to direct a fresh inquiry after the internal committee and departmental authority had already adjudicated the matter.
  4. Whether the inquiry report dated 25.07.2018 is legally sustainable given the alleged lack of evidence and reliance on conjecture.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The complaint was barred by limitation under Section 9 of the Act of 2013 because it was filed beyond the prescribed three-month period without any recorded extension by the committee.
  • Section 18 of the Act mandates that appeals against the internal committee’s findings must be preferred before a Tribunal or Court according to service rules; departmental appeals are impermissible.
  • The Police Headquarters lacked any enabling statutory provision to order a fresh inquiry after the internal committee’s report and departmental decision, rendering the second inquiry and its report invalid.
  • The inquiry report dated 25.07.2018 was based on no concrete evidence but merely guesswork and surmises, thus legally unsustainable.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The learned counsel for the State and respondent No.7 supported the impugned orders and inquiry report, asserting no fault in the Police Headquarters’ direction or the subsequent inquiry findings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramesh Pal Vs. Union of India and Ors., 2014(2) MPLJ 500 Appeal against internal committee report is a service matter to be preferred before Tribunal/Court as per service rules. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that no appeal lies before departmental authorities under the Act of 2013, invalidating the Police Headquarters’ direction for a fresh inquiry.
Taylor Vs. Taylor [(1876) 1 Ch D 426] Statutory provisions prescribing a manner must be strictly followed; other methods are forbidden. The Court applied this principle to emphasize that since the Act prescribes the manner of complaint and appeal, deviation by Police Headquarters is impermissible.
Nazir Ahmed V. Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 Strict adherence to statutory procedure is mandatory. Referenced to support the principle of statutory compliance.
Shiv Bahadur Singh Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 322 Requirement of statutory compliance. Used to reinforce the importance of following prescribed procedures.
Deep Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1527 Statutory procedure must be adhered to. Reiterated the necessity of compliance with statutory mandates.
Ramchandra Keshav Adke (dead) by Lrs. Vs. Govind Joti Chavare, (1975) 1 SCC 559 Strict compliance with statutory provisions. Supported the Court’s insistence on statutory procedure.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai Vs. Anjitm M.H. Ghaswala, (2002) 1 SCC 633 Mandatory adherence to statutory procedure. Used to emphasize the binding nature of statutory procedures.
J & K Housing Board Vs. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul (2011) 10 SCC 714 Statutory compliance is essential. Reinforced the principle that prescribed procedures must be followed.
Union Of India v. H.C Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 Suspicion cannot replace proof; findings must be based on evidence. The Court relied on this precedent to hold the inquiry report based on surmises and conjecture as unsustainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined Section 9 of the Act of 2013, which requires that complaints of sexual harassment be made in writing within three months from the date of the incident, with a possible extension not exceeding three months if reasons are recorded in writing. The Court found that the complaint was filed beyond the prescribed period without any recorded extension, rendering it time-barred.

The Court then considered the internal complaint committee’s report dated 26.05.2017 and the departmental authority’s order dated 25.12.2017, both of which found the allegations unsubstantiated due to lack of evidence.

The Police Headquarters’ order dated 25.06.2018 directing a fresh inquiry was scrutinized. The Court noted that neither the Act of 2013 nor any other statutory provision empowers the Police Headquarters to order a fresh inquiry after the internal committee and departmental authority have adjudicated the matter. Reliance on the precedent in Ramesh Pal established that appeals against internal committee reports must be preferred before the Tribunal or Court as per service rules, not before departmental authorities.

The Court emphasized the legal maxim that when a statute prescribes a particular procedure, it must be followed strictly, and alternative methods are impermissible. The absence of any enabling provision to conduct a second inquiry rendered the Police Headquarters’ direction and the resulting inquiry report invalid.

Further, the Court analyzed the inquiry report dated 25.07.2018 and found it was based on surmises and conjecture rather than concrete evidence. Citing Union of India v. H.C. Goel, the Court held that suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute proof, and thus the inquiry report was liable to be set aside.

Holding and Implications

The Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the Police Headquarters’ order dated 25.06.2018 and the inquiry report dated 25.07.2018.

The direct consequence of this decision is the quashing of the second inquiry and its findings against the petitioner. The Court did not establish any new precedent but reaffirmed the mandatory procedural requirements under the Act of 2013 and the limits of departmental authority in such matters.

    MUKESH KHAMPARIYA v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

    1

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

    AT JABALPUR

    BEFORE

    JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL

    ON THE 05th OF OCTOBER, 2023 WRIT PETITION No. 21852 of 2018 BETWEEN :-

    MUKESH KHAMPARIYA S/O LATE DR. D.P.

    KHAMPARIYA, AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,

    OCCUPATION: INSPECTOR, M.P. POLICE

    R/O 395 SAMDARIYA COLONY MADHAV

    NAGAR DISTT. KATNI M.P. (MADHYA

    PRADESH)

    ……...PETITIONER (BY SHRI SAMRESH KATARE - ADVOCATE )

    AND

    1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

    THR. ITS SECRETARY DEPARTMENT

    OF HOME MINISTRY VALLABH

    BHAWAN BHOPAL M.P. (MADHYA

    PRADESH)

    2. ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL

    OF POLICE (ADMINISTRATION)

    POLICE HEADQUARTERS DISTT-

    BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)

    3. ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL

    OF POLICE (WOMEN CRIME)

    POLICE HEADQUARTERS DISTT-

    BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)

    2

    4. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE

    JABALPUR RAJNGE DISTT-

    JABALPUR (MADHYA PRADESH)

    5. RICHA CHOUBEY, ASSISTANT

    INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE

    (ACCOUNTS) POLICE

    HEADQUARTERS DISTT-BHOPAL

    (MADHYA PRADESH)

    6. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE

    NARSINGHPUR DISTT-

    NARSINGHPUR (MADHYA PRADESH)

    7. VARSHA SINGH D/O SHRI RANJEET

    SINGH, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,

    OCCUPATION: PRESENTLY POSTED

    AS CHOWKI PRABHARI NIWAR

    P.S.MADHAV NAGAR KATNI R/O QTR. NO.1065/B, TYPE 1, SECTOR 2,

    V.F.J.ESTATE, (MADHYA PRADESH).

    8. ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL

    OF POLICE (ADMIN.) POLICE

    HEADQUARTERS BHOPAL (MADHYA

    PRADESH)

    .….RESPONDENTS (SHRI PANKAJ TIWARI - GOVT. ADVOCATE FOR THE RESPONDENTS NO.

    1 TO 6 &8 / STATE) (SHRI DHANESH KANT TIWARI - ADVOCATE FOR THE RESPONDENT

    NO.7)

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This petition coming on for hearing this day, the court passed the following:

    O R D E R

    This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution assails the order dated 25.06.2018 (Annexure R-1) and the enquiry report

    3

    dated 25.07.2018 (Annexure P-1) whereby the petitioner was held guilty for committing sexual harassment at the workplace.

    2. Draped in brevity, the relevant facts are that the petitioner was working as Station House Officer (SHO), in Police Station Gadarwara, District Narsinghpur between 27.08.2016 to 24.03.2017. During that period, respondent No.7 was posted in the said police station as Sub- Inspector.

    3. As per the stand of the petitioner, the petitioner was an officer supervising the work and duties of respondent No.7. Since respondent No.7 committed dereliction of duty on more than one occasion, certain orders taking coercive action were passed which are filed cumulatively as Annexure P-2. Respondent No.7 as an after thought preferred a frivolous complaint dated 16.03.2017 alleging that petitioner committed sexual harassment in the workplace. Pursuant to the complaint dated 16.03.2017 (Annexure P-4), an internal complaint committee was constituted as per the Sexual Harassment of Woman at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal), 2013 (Act of 2013). The internal committee consisting of five members conducted the inquiry, recorded statement of witnesses and prepared the report on 26.05.2017 and opined that the allegations against the petitioner for committing sexual harassment in workplace are not established.

    4. The respondent No.7 preferred an application against the aforesaid report of internal complain committee dated 24.05.2017. On 25.12.2017 (Annexure P-10) the departmental authority came to hold

    4

    that allegation of sexual harassment could not be established against the petitioner.

    5. Shri Samresh Katare, learned counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of this Court to another report dated 25.07.2018 (Annexure P-

    1) whereby another inquiry report was prepared wherein charges were found to be proved against the petitioner. This report is founded upon the direction issued by the Police Headquarter dated 25.06.2018 (Annexure R-1).

    6. Shri Katare, learned counsel for the petitioner advanced four fold submissions to assail the impugned orders. Firstly, it is submitted that in the teeth of Section 9 of the Act of 2013, since the alleged incident of sexual harassment had taken place on 12.10.2016 and the complaint was preferred after the statutory period prescribed on 16.03.2017 and there was no conscious decision taken by any authority to condone the delay, complaint itself was not entertainable. It is further submitted that the date of incident can be gathered from the supplementary statement of respondent No.7 (page-136).

    7. Secondly, as per Section 18 of the Act of 2013, the appeal could have been preferred against the report dated 26.05.2017 to the Tribunal / Court as per the Service Rules. The reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court reported in 2014(2) MPLJ 500 (Ramesh Pal Vs. Union of India and Ors.) wherein it was held that the appropirate remedy is to approach the Tribunal / Court as per the service matters.

    5

    8. Thirdly, the Police Headquarter by communication dated 25/06/2018 (Annexure R/1) directed the ADGP (Accounts) to conduct another enquiry. In obedience thereof, the said authority conducted the enquiry and submitted the impugned report dated 25/07/2018. There exists no enabling provision under the Act of 2013 to conduct any further enquiry at the direction of the Police Headquarter. In absence thereof, the enquiry report is bad in law.

    9. Fourthly, the enquiry report is based on no evidence and it is based on the guess work of the Inquiring Authority. For these cumulative reasons, the impugned orders are liable to be axed.

    10. Per contra, Shri Pankaj Tiwari, learned Panel Lawyer supported the impugned order and placed reliance on the return. Shri Dhanesh Kant Tiwari, learned counsel for respondent No.7 borrowed the same argument and urged that no fault can be found in the order dated 25/06/2018 (Annexure R/1) and enquiry report dated 25/07/2018.

    11. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties.

    12. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.

    13. Before dealing with the rival contentions, it is apposite to quote relevant portion of Sections 9, 13(2) & 18 of the Act, which reads as under :-

    "9. Complaint of sexual harassment :- (1) Any aggrieved woman may make, in writing, a complaint of sexual harassment at workplace

    6

    to the Internal Committee if so constituted, or the Local Committee, in case it is not so constituted, within a period of three months from the date of incident and in case of a series of incidents, within a period of three months from the date of last incident :

    Provided that where such complaint cannot be made in writing, the Presiding Officer or any Member of the Internal Committee or the Chairperson or any Member of the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall render all reasonable assistance to the woman for making the complaint in writing; Provided further that the Internal Committee or, as the case may be, the Local Committee may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the time limit not exceeding three months, if it is satisfied that the circumstances were such which prevented the woman from filing a complaint within the said period.

    (2) Where the aggrieved woman is unable to make a complaint on account of her physical or mental incapacity or death or otherwise, her legal heir or such other person as may be prescribed may make a complaint under this section.

    13(2). Where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, arrives at the conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has not been proved, it shall recommend to the employer and the District Officer that no action is required to be taken in the matter.

    7

    18. Appeal. - (1) Any person aggrieved from the recommendations made under sub-section

    (2) of section 13 or under clause (i) or clause

    (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 13 or sub- section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 14 or Section 17 or non-implementation of such recommendations may prefer an appeal to the Court or tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the said person or where no such service rules exist then, without prejudice to provisions contained in any other law for the time being in force, the person aggrieved may prefer an appeal in such manner as may be prescribed.

    (Emphasis Supplied)

    14. A plain reading of Section 9(1) makes it clear that the complaint can be made in writing within a period of three months from the date of incident. In this case, it is clear that incident had taken place on 12/10/2016 and complaint was preferred on 16/03/2017. The second proviso to Section 9 aforesaid although provides that the local committee for the reasons to be recorded in writing may extend the time limit for another three months but no such decision of the committee is brought to the notice of this Court wherein said limitation period was extended. Thus, I find substance in the argument of Shri Samresh Katare, learned counsel for the petitioner that complaint itself was barred by time.

    15. Be that as it may, the complaint was considered by a five members committee which came to hold in the report dated 26/05/2017 that allegation of sexual harassment in work place could

    8

    not be established against the petitioner. Respondent No.7 preferred a departmental appeal/representation which was decided by order dated 25/12/2017 (Annexure P/10) and the concern authority came to hold that for want of sufficient evidence, allegation of sexual harassment in workplace could not be established.

    16. The Police Headquarter passed the order dated 25/06/2018 (Annexure R/1) and directed ADGP to conduct another enquiry. The impugned enquiry report dated 25/07/2018 (Annexure P/1) is outcome of said order. As noticed above, it was challenged by contending that there exists no enabling provision on the strength of which Police Headquarter could have issued such direction to conduct another enquiry.

    17. During the course of hearing, on a specific query from the Bench, learned counsel for the State and respondent No.7 could not point out any source of power on the strength of which Police Headquarter could have passed the order dated 25/06/2018 (Annexure R-1). This Court in Ramesh Pal (supra) opined that the report of internal/local committee is a 'service matter' and in that event, anybody aggrieved by the said report can approach the Tribunal/Court. Thus, there exists no provision of preferring appeal under the Act of 2013 to a departmental authority. In absence of showing any enabling provision, this Court is unable to countenance the order of Police Headquarter dated 25/06/2018 (Annexure R/1). This is trite that if a statute, prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in the same manner and other methods are forbidden. [See:

    Taylor Vs. Taylor [(1876) 1 Ch D 426], Nazir Ahmed V. Emperor

    9

    [ AIR 1936 PC 253], Shiv Bahadur Singh Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 322; Deep Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1527; Ramchandra Keshav Adke (dead) by Lrs. Vs. Govind Joti Chavare, (1975) 1 SCC 559; Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai Vs. Anjitm M.H. Ghaswala, (2002) 1 SCC 633 and J & K Housing Board Vs. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul (2011) 10 SCC

    714 )]

    18. In the instant case, in absence of showing any source of power for issuing direction dated 25/06/2018 (Annexure R/1), the said order and consequential enquiry report dated 25/07/2018 (Annexure P/1) cannot sustain judicial scrutiny. Apart from this, the operative portion of this report dt. 25.07.2018 reads thus :-

    **mijksDr rF;ksa ds fo'ys"k.k ds mijkar ys[k gS fd vkosfndk mfu o"kkZ flag }kjk dh x;h f'kdk;r dk ;|fi dksbZ HkkSfrd lk{; miyC/k ugha gS ftlds vk/kkj ij mfu o"kkZ flag ds vkjksiksa dks izekf.kr fd;k tk lds] rFkkfi vkosfndk ds }kjk rkRdkyhu fujh{kd eqds'k [kEfifj;k ds fo:) ckj&ckj ofj"B dk;kZy;ksa dks f'kdk;r djuk bl ckr dks bafxr djrk gS fd vkosfndk ds lkFk gqbZ ?kVuk o ?kVuk ds i'pkrorhZ izHkko ds dkj.k mlds fo:) dk;Zokgh fd;s tkus ls og vkgr gqbZ gSA vkosfndk }kjk viuh lgdfeZ;ksa ,oa ifjtkuksa dks ?kVuk crkuk ,oa vkosfndk ds ifjtuksa ij jkthukes ds fy, ncko Mkyus laca/kh rF;ksa dks utjvankt ugha fd;k tk ldrk gS tks dgha u dgha ?kVuk ?kfVr gksus dh vksj bafxr djrk gS A vr% mijksDr rF;ksa ds foospu ls Li"V gS fd mfu o"kkZ flag ds lkFk mijksDr ?kVuk ?kfVr gqbZ gS rFkk mfu o"kkZ flag dks izrkfM+r djus ds mn~ns'; ls xSjgkftjh Mkyh x;h o ofj"B dk;kZy; dks izfrosnu Hksts x;s ,oa fofHkUu ek/;eksa ds }kjk f'kdk;r okil ysus gsrq ncko cuk;k x;k tkap esa vkarfjd ifjokn lfefr dh dk;Zokgh ij iz'ufpUg yxkrs gSa ,oa lfefr }kjk ,d i{kh; dk;Zokgh fd;k tkuk izrhr gksrk gS A**

    (Emphasis Supplied)

    10

    19. Bare perusal of the aforesaid finings makes it clear that there is no material evidence available against the petitioner. Merely because the complainant preferred repeated complains, the petitioner was held to be guilty. Even assuming that this Inquiry Officer had authority to conduct the enquiry and prepare report dated 25.07.2018, her finding is based on surmises and conjecture and not on any evidence on record. Suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof [See: AIR 1964 SC 364 (Union Of India v. H.C Goel . this reason also, this enquiry report is liable to be set aside.

    20. In view of foregoing discussion, the impugned order of Police Headquarter dated 25/06/2018 (Annexure R/1) and enquiry report dated 25/07/2018 (Annexure P/1) are set aside.

    21. The writ petition is allowed.

    (SUJOY PAUL)

    JUDGE

    Sarathe / Manju

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    MUKESH KHAMPARIYA v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
    (Oct 5, 2023)