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citation codes
Case Number
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  • SECTION 106 EVIDENCE ACT
  • provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act,
  • Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C.
  • Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
  • Section 302 of I.P.C.
  • Section 161 of Cr.P.C. 3
  • 206 5 8 "19. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 106 EVIDENCE ACT
  • provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act,
  • Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C.
  • Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
  • Section 302 of I.P.C.
  • Section 161 of Cr.P.C. 3
  • 206 5 8 "19. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This criminal appeal arises from a conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) by the Sessions Judge, Baikunthpur, District Korea, dated 25.03.2015. The appellant, Ram Prasad @ Munna, was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine for allegedly causing the homicidal death of Umakant by assaulting him with an axe on 12.05.2014. The prosecution case was based on the discovery of the deceased's body in the appellant's courtyard, eyewitness testimony, recovery of the axe following the appellant's memorandum statement, and forensic evidence of bloodstains on the axe and the appellant's shirt. The appellant denied the charges and claimed false implication. The trial court convicted the appellant after examining 11 witnesses and 25 documents, while the appellant presented no witnesses but submitted one document in defense. The appellant challenged this conviction in the present appeal under Section 374(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the death of the deceased, Umakant, was homicidal in nature.
  2. Whether the trial court was justified in invoking Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, placing the burden of proof on the accused to explain facts especially within his knowledge.
  3. Whether the prosecution discharged its primary burden of proving the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of forensic evidence concerning the presence or absence of human blood on the recovered weapon.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The trial court wrongly invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act to shift the burden of proof to the appellant, which was perverse and unsupported by the record.
  • Human bloodstain was not found on the recovered axe, undermining the prosecution's case.
  • Reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Balwan Singh vs. State of Chhattisgarh negates the evidentiary value of the weapon recovery without human blood evidence, warranting acquittal.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
  • The trial court rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC.
  • The appeal should be dismissed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balwan Singh vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2019) 7 SCC 781 Recovery of weapon without human blood stain is insufficient for conviction. Applied to reject the evidentiary value of the axe and bloodstains found not to be human blood, undermining the prosecution's case.
Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 Section 106 Evidence Act applies only to facts especially within accused's knowledge; burden of proof remains primarily on prosecution. Affirmed that Section 106 is an exception and cannot shift the prosecution's fundamental burden; cited to assess the trial court's invocation of Section 106.
Nagendra Sah v. State Of Bihar (2021) 10 SCC 725 Section 106 applies when prosecution establishes facts from which inference on accused's special knowledge arises; accused's failure to explain can be an additional link. Used to clarify when Section 106 can be invoked and its limits in cases resting on circumstantial evidence.
Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 Burden of proving plea set up by accused lies on him but prosecution must still prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Reiterated that accused's burden arises only after prosecution establishes prima facie case; applied to evaluate burden shifting.
Sawal Das v. State Of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 778 Burden of proving case against accused remains on prosecution regardless of accused's defense. Followed to emphasize prosecution's continuing burden despite accused's defense claims.
Harijan Bhala Teja v. State Of Gujarat, AIR 2016 SC 2065 When death is homicidal and accused was sole companion, burden to explain death lies on accused under Section 106 Evidence Act. Applied to discuss circumstances justifying invocation of Section 106 when accused has special knowledge of facts.
Gajanan Dashrath Kharate v. State Of Maharashtra, AIR 2016 SC 1255 Failure of accused to offer explanation for homicidal death can justify conviction. Referenced to support that non-explanation by accused can be a factor in conviction when circumstantial evidence is strong.
Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu (2009) 17 SCC 273 Conviction cannot be sustained solely on weapon seizure without proof of human bloodstain. Applied to hold that absence of human blood on weapon precludes conviction based solely on its recovery.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined whether the death of Umakant was homicidal, affirming the trial court's finding based on the post-mortem report by Dr. Prasun Toppo, which established death due to cardiac failure caused by hemorrhage and shock, homicidal in nature.

Regarding the application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the court reviewed the legal principles: Section 106 places the burden of proof on a party when facts are especially within their knowledge but does not shift the prosecution's primary burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court relied on authoritative Supreme Court precedents, including Shambhu Nath Mehra and Gurcharan Singh, to emphasize that Section 106 is an exception and cannot be invoked unless the prosecution has first established a prima facie case.

The trial court's invocation of Section 106 was found to rest solely on the appellant's failure to explain how the deceased's dead body came to be in the courtyard of the appellant's house, which was accessible and open to others. The court noted there was no finding that death occurred inside the house or under suspicious circumstances requiring explanation from the appellant.

Furthermore, the prosecution failed to prove the presence of human blood on the recovered axe, as the forensic report did not confirm human bloodstains. This fact, combined with the failure to discharge the initial burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt, rendered the application of Section 106 unsustainable.

Consequently, the court concluded that the prosecution did not establish the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction based on circumstantial evidence and the invocation of Section 106 was not justified.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed, and the impugned judgment dated 25.03.2015 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC on the ground of benefit of doubt and is to be released forthwith unless required in connection with any other case.

The decision directly affects the parties by overturning the conviction and ordering the appellant's release. No new precedent is established; rather, the judgment reinforces established principles regarding the burden of proof under Section 106 of the Evidence Act and the necessity of proving human bloodstains on a recovered weapon for sustaining a conviction based on circumstantial evidence.

    Ram Prasad @ Munna v. State Of Chhattisgarh

    1

    NAFR

    HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

    Criminal Appeal No. 827 of 2015

    Ram Prasad @ Munna, S/o. Surajlal Cherwa, Aged About 41 Years, R/o. Chhingura, P.S. Sonhat, District- Korea, Chhattisgarh.

    ------Appellant Versus

    State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Police Station Sonhat, Civil & Revenue District Korea, Chhattisgarh.

    ------Respondent

    For Appellant :- Mr. Brijesh Kumar Singh, Advocate For State/Respondent :- Mr. Soumya Rai, Panel Lawyer

    (Division Bench) Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board

    (02.08.2023)

    Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

    1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 25.03.2015 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Baikunthpur, District Korea, in Sessions Trial No.102/2014, by which the appellant herein has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced to life imprisonment with fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine, 6 months additional rigorous imprisonment.

    2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 12.05.2014, the appellant assaulted Umakant (now deceased) by axe, by which

    2

    he suffered grievous injuries and died. The matter was reported by Prabhu Narayan (PW-3), brother of the deceased, that dead body of the deceased was lying inside the house of appellant herein and death has been committed by the appellant. Thereafter, merg intimation was registered vide Ex.P-3, FIR was registered vide Ex.P-4, inquest was conducted vide Ex.P-9 and dead body was sent for post mortem, which was conducted by Dr. Prasun Toppo (PW-10), who proved the post-mortem report vide Ex.P-13, according to which, cause of death was cardiac failure due to hemorrhage and shock and death was homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant, axe was seized vide Ex.P-5, which was sent for examination to FSL along with other seized articles and in the FSL report (Ex.P-25), bloodstain was found on the axe and shirt of the appellant. After due investigation, the appellant was charge- sheeted for the aforesaid offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. to the jurisdictional criminal court, which was ultimately committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated.

    3. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 25 documents and the appellant-accused in support of his defence has not examined any witness, but has exhibited one document Ex.D-1, which is the statement of Ramdev recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.

    3

    4. The trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellant herein for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced him as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred.

    5. Mr. Brijesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act by recording a finding, which is perverse to the record and secondly, human bloodstain was not found on the axe, which has been seized, therefore, in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh vs. State of Chhattisgarh1, recovery of weapon is of no use to the prosecution and, as such, the appellant could not be convicted for offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and he is entitled for acquittal.

    6. Per contra, Mr. Soumya Rai, learned State counsel, would submit that the prosecution has been able to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and, as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

    7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

    8. The first question for consideration as to whether the death of deceased Umakant was homicidal in nature, has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the

    1 (201 9) 7 SCC 781

    4

    statement of Dr. Prasun Toppo (PW-10) who has proved the post-mortem report Ex.P-13, which in our considered opinion is correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and accordingly we hereby affirm the said finding.

    9. Case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence, as the dead body of deceased was found near the courtyard of the appellant's house and furthermore, pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant, axe has been recovered, in which blood has been found in FSL report.

    10. Now, the question is, whether the trial Court is justified in invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act ?

    11. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states as under: -

    "106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.—When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him."

    12. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in

    5

    such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned.

    13. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer2, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word "especially" employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: -

    "11. …. The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23)

    (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B)."

    6

    Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts.

    14. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra

    (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of

    Nagendra Sah v. State Of Bihar . of Bihar3in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: -

    "22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference.

    23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused."

    15. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh

    v. State of Punjab4, while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may

    3 (2021) 10 SCC 725

    4 AIR 1956 SC 4 60

    7

    absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him.

    16. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State Of Bihar . of Bihar5and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence.

    17. In the matter of Harijan Bhala Teja v. State Of Gujarat . of Gujarat6, the Supreme Court has held that where the postmortem report establishes homicidal nature of death and since the accused only was staying with his wife at time of her death, it is for the accused to show has to in what manner she died and relying upon Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act in paragraph 19 of the report it was held as under: -

    5 AIR 1974 SC 778

    6 AIR 2016 SC 206 5

    8

    "19. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Since it is proved on the record that it was only the appellant who was staying with his wife at the time of her death, it is for him to show as to in what manner she died, particularly, when the prosecution has successfully proved that she died homicidal death."

    18. Likewise, in the matter of Gajanan Dashrath Kharate v. State Of Maharashtra . of Maharashtra7, where the accused (Gajanan Dashrath Kharate) alleged to have killed his father and accused has not offered any explanation for homicidal death of his father, conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court by holding as under in paragraph 14: -

    "14. Upon appreciation of oral evidence and the circumstance of the recovery of blood stained clothes of the accused and the conduct of the accused in not offering any explanation for the homicidal death of his father, by concurrent findings, the trial court and the High Court rightly convicted the appellant-accused under Section

    302 IPC and we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment."

    19. Reverting to the facts of this case, in light of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it would be appropriate to notice the finding recorded by the trial Court, as the trial Court, in order to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, recorded the following finding in paragraph 21 of the judgment.

    21. orZeku ekeys esa tks ifjfLFkfrtU; lk{; vk;k gS] mlesa igyh ifjfLFkfr ;g gS fd er̀d mekdkar dk "ko vfHk;qDr ds ?kj ds cjkEns esa Ikk;k x;k] Hkys gh lHkh lkf{k;ksa us ;g ckrk;k gs fd mekdkar dk "ko pVkbZ esa cSBs gq, voLFkk esa ik;k x;k gSA vfHk;kstu lk{kh jkenso] ekuerh] izHkqukjk;.k]

    9

    panuizrki] xqykc flag] /keZxksiky o f"kockyd us ;g Hkh Lohdkj fd;k gS fd mekdkar ds "ko dks ns[kus ls ,slk yxrk Fkk fd mekdkar dh gR;k vU;=~ dj mlds "ko dks vfHk;qDr ds ?kj ds cjkEns esa ykdj cSBs gq, voLFkk esa j[k fn;k gksA vfHk;qDr ds ?kj ds cjkEns esa mekdkar dk "ko dSls vk;k] bl laca/k esa vfHk;qDr dh vksj ls dksbZ Li'Vhdj.k ugha fn;k x;k gSA vfHk;qDr ds fo}ku vf/koDrk us vius rdksZ ds nkSjku ;g Hkh crk;k gS fd vfHk;qDr Hkh ?kVuk dh jkr eukst ds ckjkr esa cjcliqj x;k gqvk FkkA bl ckr dks xokg panuizrki us izfrijh{k.k esa Lohdkj fd;k gSA panuizrki uked lk{kh vfHk;qDr dk HkkbZ gSA eq[; ijh{k.k esa mlds }kjk bl ckr dh iqf'V ugha dh x;h gS fd vfHk;qDr] eukst ds ckjkr esa ?kVuk dh jkr x;k gqvk Fkk vkSj lqcg okil vk;kA

    20. A careful reading of the aforesaid finding and the site map, which is Ex.P-1, would make it clear that the trial Court recorded a finding relying upon the prosecution witnesses that dead body of the deceased was brought into the house of the appellant and it was kept in sitting position in the courtyard of the appellant and the only circumstance that the trial court has found relying upon the prosecution witness is that appellant has not explained as to how the dead body came into the courtyard of his house. The trial Court has not found that the dead body of the deceased was found in suspicious condition in the house of the appellant inside the room, it was found in the courtyard of the appellant's house, which is clear from the site map (Ex.P-1). It appears that the trial Court has only applied Section 106 of the Evidence Act on account that appellant has not explained as to how the dead body came into the courtyard of the house of appellant. However, in order to attract Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it was duty of the prosecution to discharge its primary burden to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt

    10

    and mainly the witnesses as mentioned in paragraph 21 of the judgment expressed that they have only admitted that it appears that dead body of the deceased was brought into the courtyard of the appellant's house and kept in a sitting position. The trial Court did not record a finding that death of deceased Umakant occurred in the house of the appellant and therefore, he was required to explain as to how the deceased died in suspicious condition in his house, which he has failed to explain and as per the statement of Investigating Officer- R.S.Painkra (PW-11) in para 13, he has not found the evidence of blood near the said place or nearby place, on the floor or on the boundary wall, where the dead body was kept in sitting position. As such, the prosecution has failed to discharge its initial burden of proving the offence beyond reasonable doubt and merely on suspicion that dead body was found in the courtyard of the appellant's house, which was open and accessible to one and all, the burden has not shifted on the accused to explain under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.

    21. In that view of the matter, the application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act is absolutely unsustainable and furthermore though pursuant to memorandum statement, axe has been seized and in FSL report (Ex.P-25) blood has been found on the axe and appellant's cloth, it would be of no use to the prosecution, as it was not found stained with human blood, which is absolutely necessary in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Balwan Singh (supra). Even otherwise, only on the basis of seizure of weapon when stain of human blood

    11

    was not found, conviction cannot be maintained. (See : Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu8).

    22. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are unable to sustain the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant under Section 302 of I.P.C. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 25.03.2015 is hereby set aside. The appellant stands acquitted of the charge framed against him for the offence punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C. on the ground of benefit of doubt and he shall be forthwith set at liberty, unless he is required in connection with any other case.

    23. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.

    24. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and action, if any. A certified copy of the judgment may also be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent forthwith wherein the appellant is suffering the jail sentence. Sd/- Sd/-

    (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge

    Ashok

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    Comments

    Ram Prasad @ Munna v. State Of Chhattisgarh
    (Aug 2, 2023)