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NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Criminal Appeal No. 827 of 2015
Ram Prasad @ Munna, S/o. Surajlal Cherwa, Aged About 41 Years, R/o. Chhingura, P.S. Sonhat, District- Korea, Chhattisgarh.
------Appellant Versus
State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Police Station Sonhat, Civil & Revenue District Korea, Chhattisgarh.
------Respondent
For Appellant :- Mr. Brijesh Kumar Singh, Advocate For State/Respondent :- Mr. Soumya Rai, Panel Lawyer
(Division Bench) Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board
(02.08.2023)
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.
1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 25.03.2015 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Baikunthpur, District Korea, in Sessions Trial No.102/2014, by which the appellant herein has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced to life imprisonment with fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine, 6 months additional rigorous imprisonment.
2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 12.05.2014, the appellant assaulted Umakant (now deceased) by axe, by which
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he suffered grievous injuries and died. The matter was reported by Prabhu Narayan (PW-3), brother of the deceased, that dead body of the deceased was lying inside the house of appellant herein and death has been committed by the appellant. Thereafter, merg intimation was registered vide Ex.P-3, FIR was registered vide Ex.P-4, inquest was conducted vide Ex.P-9 and dead body was sent for post mortem, which was conducted by Dr. Prasun Toppo (PW-10), who proved the post-mortem report vide Ex.P-13, according to which, cause of death was cardiac failure due to hemorrhage and shock and death was homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant, axe was seized vide Ex.P-5, which was sent for examination to FSL along with other seized articles and in the FSL report (Ex.P-25), bloodstain was found on the axe and shirt of the appellant. After due investigation, the appellant was charge- sheeted for the aforesaid offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. to the jurisdictional criminal court, which was ultimately committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated.
3. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 25 documents and the appellant-accused in support of his defence has not examined any witness, but has exhibited one document Ex.D-1, which is the statement of Ramdev recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.
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4. The trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellant herein for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced him as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred.
5. Mr. Brijesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act by recording a finding, which is perverse to the record and secondly, human bloodstain was not found on the axe, which has been seized, therefore, in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh vs. State of Chhattisgarh1, recovery of weapon is of no use to the prosecution and, as such, the appellant could not be convicted for offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and he is entitled for acquittal.
6. Per contra, Mr. Soumya Rai, learned State counsel, would submit that the prosecution has been able to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and, as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.
8. The first question for consideration as to whether the death of deceased Umakant was homicidal in nature, has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the
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statement of Dr. Prasun Toppo (PW-10) who has proved the post-mortem report Ex.P-13, which in our considered opinion is correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and accordingly we hereby affirm the said finding.
9. Case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence, as the dead body of deceased was found near the courtyard of the appellant's house and furthermore, pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant, axe has been recovered, in which blood has been found in FSL report.
10. Now, the question is, whether the trial Court is justified in invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act ?
11. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states as under: -
"106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.—When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him."
12. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in
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such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned.
13. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer2, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word "especially" employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: -
"11. …. The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23)
(A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B)."
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Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts.
14. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra
(supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of
Nagendra Sah v. State Of Bihar . of Bihar3in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: -
"22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference.
23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused."
15. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh
v. State of Punjab4, while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may
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absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him.
16. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State Of Bihar . of Bihar5and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence.
17. In the matter of Harijan Bhala Teja v. State Of Gujarat . of Gujarat6, the Supreme Court has held that where the postmortem report establishes homicidal nature of death and since the accused only was staying with his wife at time of her death, it is for the accused to show has to in what manner she died and relying upon Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act in paragraph 19 of the report it was held as under: -
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"19. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Since it is proved on the record that it was only the appellant who was staying with his wife at the time of her death, it is for him to show as to in what manner she died, particularly, when the prosecution has successfully proved that she died homicidal death."
18. Likewise, in the matter of Gajanan Dashrath Kharate v. State Of Maharashtra . of Maharashtra7, where the accused (Gajanan Dashrath Kharate) alleged to have killed his father and accused has not offered any explanation for homicidal death of his father, conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court by holding as under in paragraph 14: -
"14. Upon appreciation of oral evidence and the circumstance of the recovery of blood stained clothes of the accused and the conduct of the accused in not offering any explanation for the homicidal death of his father, by concurrent findings, the trial court and the High Court rightly convicted the appellant-accused under Section
302 IPC and we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment."
19. Reverting to the facts of this case, in light of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it would be appropriate to notice the finding recorded by the trial Court, as the trial Court, in order to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, recorded the following finding in paragraph 21 of the judgment.
21. orZeku ekeys esa tks ifjfLFkfrtU; lk{; vk;k gS] mlesa igyh ifjfLFkfr ;g gS fd er̀d mekdkar dk "ko vfHk;qDr ds ?kj ds cjkEns esa Ikk;k x;k] Hkys gh lHkh lkf{k;ksa us ;g ckrk;k gs fd mekdkar dk "ko pVkbZ esa cSBs gq, voLFkk esa ik;k x;k gSA vfHk;kstu lk{kh jkenso] ekuerh] izHkqukjk;.k]
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panuizrki] xqykc flag] /keZxksiky o f"kockyd us ;g Hkh Lohdkj fd;k gS fd mekdkar ds "ko dks ns[kus ls ,slk yxrk Fkk fd mekdkar dh gR;k vU;=~ dj mlds "ko dks vfHk;qDr ds ?kj ds cjkEns esa ykdj cSBs gq, voLFkk esa j[k fn;k gksA vfHk;qDr ds ?kj ds cjkEns esa mekdkar dk "ko dSls vk;k] bl laca/k esa vfHk;qDr dh vksj ls dksbZ Li'Vhdj.k ugha fn;k x;k gSA vfHk;qDr ds fo}ku vf/koDrk us vius rdksZ ds nkSjku ;g Hkh crk;k gS fd vfHk;qDr Hkh ?kVuk dh jkr eukst ds ckjkr esa cjcliqj x;k gqvk FkkA bl ckr dks xokg panuizrki us izfrijh{k.k esa Lohdkj fd;k gSA panuizrki uked lk{kh vfHk;qDr dk HkkbZ gSA eq[; ijh{k.k esa mlds }kjk bl ckr dh iqf'V ugha dh x;h gS fd vfHk;qDr] eukst ds ckjkr esa ?kVuk dh jkr x;k gqvk Fkk vkSj lqcg okil vk;kA
20. A careful reading of the aforesaid finding and the site map, which is Ex.P-1, would make it clear that the trial Court recorded a finding relying upon the prosecution witnesses that dead body of the deceased was brought into the house of the appellant and it was kept in sitting position in the courtyard of the appellant and the only circumstance that the trial court has found relying upon the prosecution witness is that appellant has not explained as to how the dead body came into the courtyard of his house. The trial Court has not found that the dead body of the deceased was found in suspicious condition in the house of the appellant inside the room, it was found in the courtyard of the appellant's house, which is clear from the site map (Ex.P-1). It appears that the trial Court has only applied Section 106 of the Evidence Act on account that appellant has not explained as to how the dead body came into the courtyard of the house of appellant. However, in order to attract Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it was duty of the prosecution to discharge its primary burden to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt
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and mainly the witnesses as mentioned in paragraph 21 of the judgment expressed that they have only admitted that it appears that dead body of the deceased was brought into the courtyard of the appellant's house and kept in a sitting position. The trial Court did not record a finding that death of deceased Umakant occurred in the house of the appellant and therefore, he was required to explain as to how the deceased died in suspicious condition in his house, which he has failed to explain and as per the statement of Investigating Officer- R.S.Painkra (PW-11) in para 13, he has not found the evidence of blood near the said place or nearby place, on the floor or on the boundary wall, where the dead body was kept in sitting position. As such, the prosecution has failed to discharge its initial burden of proving the offence beyond reasonable doubt and merely on suspicion that dead body was found in the courtyard of the appellant's house, which was open and accessible to one and all, the burden has not shifted on the accused to explain under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
21. In that view of the matter, the application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act is absolutely unsustainable and furthermore though pursuant to memorandum statement, axe has been seized and in FSL report (Ex.P-25) blood has been found on the axe and appellant's cloth, it would be of no use to the prosecution, as it was not found stained with human blood, which is absolutely necessary in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Balwan Singh (supra). Even otherwise, only on the basis of seizure of weapon when stain of human blood
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was not found, conviction cannot be maintained. (See : Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu8).
22. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are unable to sustain the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant under Section 302 of I.P.C. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 25.03.2015 is hereby set aside. The appellant stands acquitted of the charge framed against him for the offence punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C. on the ground of benefit of doubt and he shall be forthwith set at liberty, unless he is required in connection with any other case.
23. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.
24. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and action, if any. A certified copy of the judgment may also be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent forthwith wherein the appellant is suffering the jail sentence. Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge
Ashok