HARPREET FORD V. JAI SINGH & ANR.
12.04.2023
IA NO.548/2023 IN FA NO.100/2023
The present Appeal was filed by the Appellant on 09.03.2023 challenging the impugned order dated 13.12.2022 passed by Ld. District Commission (West) in CC No. 66/2018 titled as Jai Singh v. Harpreet Ford & Anr. Alongwith the appeal, there is an application filed by the Appellant seeking condonation of 22 days' delay in filing the present appeal.
Therefore, vide this order we shall dispose of the aforesaid application for condonation of delay in the above appeal. The application has been moved on behalf of the Appellant bearing IA No.548/2023 seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal on the following ground:
1. …….
2. That this Commission's Registry has put forth an objection about the appeal having been filed beyond the period of limitation although the objection, as the Appellant humbly understand is not tenable. While the reasons therefor are put forth vide paragraph below, the Appellant herein is moving the present application by way of an explanation to the objection of the Registry although with a prayer no less to condone the delay in case any filing of the instant appeal.
3. That the Appellant would like to state that it has at no point of time fetch a receipt of the certified copy of the impugned order. The
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Applicant herein came to know about the impugned order on or about 09.01.2023 when it fetch receipt of letter dated 02.01.2023 from the Complainant's counsel which referred to the impugned order having been passed and further called upon the Appellant to pay the sum of Rs.10,81,897/- in compliance thereof. Post receipt of the said letter, the Appellant herein contacted its counsel before the District Forum on or about 10.01.2023 and called upon him to provide the final order copy. The same was extracted from the net and provided to the Appellant. The latter after going through the final order requested the counsel to apply for the certified copy of the final order and return the file. This was sometime on or about 18.01.2023 but the request regretfully was not responded to. The Appellant through its responsible officer continued to chase the counsel to obtain the certified copy and the brief although to no avail. This followed the Appellant on 11.02.2023 to write a mail to the counsel whereafter the brief was returned but the same was incomplete and without certified copy of the final order. The Appellant thereafter sought the support of its present counsel to help extract certified copies of the final order and the entire District Forum record which was done on 15.02.2023. The certified copies of the record and impugned order were received on 02.03.2023. The detail above is further being explained using the following table:
| Date of receipt of letter from the Complainant’s counsel |
On or about 09.01.2023 |
| Period of 45 days end on |
23.02.2023 |
| Date of applying for certified copies |
15.02.2023 |
| Date of receipt of certified copies |
02.03.2023 |
| Period from the date of knowledge of impugned order until date of filing of appeal (i.e. 09.01.2023 to 07.03.2023) [A] |
57 days |
| Period of exclusion [B] |
16 |
| [A]- [B] |
41 days |
4. That the present appeal is thus being filed within the short possible period thereafter. There is no delay if limitation is reckoned with effect from the date of knowledge of the impugned order i.e. 09.01.2023. Likewise, there is no delay in case the limitation is reckoned with effect from the date of receipt of the certified copy i.e. 02.03.2023. While the Registry has caused to reckon the limitation
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with effect from the date of the impugned order i.e. 13.12.2022, the same is not tenable given the obligation imposed upon the Consumer Forums to make the final order available (the reference here may be had to Rule 4(10) of the Delhi Consumer Protection Rules 1987). Be that as it may, the delay if limitation is reckoned with effect from date of impugned order comes to about 22 days. The Applicant herein seeks the indulgence of this Commission to condone the delay basis reasons provided above.
To adjudicate this issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as the complaint filed by the Respondent/Complainant was filed under the old Consumer Protection Act, which provides as under:
"Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed.
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:
Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent of the amount or rupees thirty-five thousand, whichever is less." Perusal of the aforesaid statutory position reflects that the appeal against an impugned order should be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of such order, as the complaint filed by the Appellant
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was filed under the old Consumer Protection Act. On perusal of record before us, it is clear that the impugned judgment was pronounced on 13.12.2022 and the present appeal was filed on 09.03.2023 with a delay of 86 days.
In order to condone the delay, the Appellant has to satisfy this commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the stipulated period. The term 'sufficient cause' has been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported at AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or
"enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
"sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context,
"sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any
"sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the
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Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose." We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. reported at
IV(2015)CPJ453(NC), wherein the Hon'ble NCDRC held as under: -
"12. ………we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained."
We further deem it appropriate to refer to judgment dated 25.02.2022 passed in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.2054-2055/2022 titled as Lingeswaran Etc. Versus Thirunagalingam, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: -
"5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence
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it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble National Commission, it is clear that 'sufficient cause' means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.
On perusal of record before us, Para 2 to Para 4 of the application for condonation of delay is the explanation given by the Appellant for the delay caused in filing this appeal. It has been stated that the Registry refused to take the same without application for condonation as the limitation period for filing the appeal was 30 days. It is further stated that the Appellant was under the bonafide belief that the limitation period was 45 days and not 30 days. There is a maxim that "ignorance of law is no excuse". Further, it is clear that the impugned judgment was
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pronounced on 13.12.2022 and the present appeal was filed on 09.03.2023 with a delay of 86 days, calculated from the date of order in terms of Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as the complaint was filed in the old Act, though the Appellant has stated that there is delay of 22 days' in filing the appeal.
The period for filing the present appeal expired on 12.01.2023. However, the Appellant failed to file the Appeal within stipulated time and the reason stated by the Appellant is that he came to know about the impugned order on 09.01.2023 upon receipt of the letter from the counsel for the Complainant and thereafter contact the counsel for obtaining the certified copy of the order, which was applied on 15.02.2023 and was received on 02.03.2023.
The question for consideration before us is whether the time period between the date of impugned order and the date on which the application was made to get the certified copy is to be excluded from computing the period of limitation or not.
To resolve this, we deem it appropriate to refer to Section 12 of The Limitation Act, 1963, which is as follows:
"12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.—
(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or or for review of a judgment, the day on which the
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judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded.
(3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed, or where is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment shall also be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. Explanation.—In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded."
Bare perusal of the above statutory position reflects that the period commencing from the date on which the applicant files an application to get certified copy till the date when he receives the certified copy has to be excluded from computing the period of limitation. In the appeal except from stating that it contacted the counsel before the District Commission for obtaining the certified copy, nothing has been stated. To our considered opinion, it was their internal arrangement, therefore, we do not find any cogent reason for condoning the delay including the delay of 15 days, which has remained unexplained. Further, The Appellant failed to explain the day-to-day delay caused after the pronouncement of the impugned judgment.
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Having regard to the statutory position discussed above and the facts of the case, the Appellant failed to show any sufficient cause for the delay in filing the present appeal. Therefore, the application filed by the appellant seeking condonation of delay cannot be allowed and accordingly, the same is dismissed on the above grounds. Consequently, the present appeal filed beyond the stipulated period shall also stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no orders as to cost.
File be consigned to record room.
(Justice Sangita Dhingra Sehgal)
President
(J.P. Agrawal)
Member
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