Loading..
Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary: High Court of Himachal Pradesh — CWP No. 1105 of 2022 a/w CWP No. 3984 of 2022

Factual and Procedural Background

These two writ petitions were heard together because they raised common questions of law and fact; this summary focuses on the facts of CWP No. 1105 of 2022 as set out in the opinion.

The petitioners in CWP No. 1105 of 2022 are permanent residents of Gwali Dogri (Parsa), Lower Koti, Tehsil Rohru, District Shimla, who allege that unscientific construction methods used in the tunnelling works for the Paurital-Lassa Hydro Electric Project (36 MW) caused damage to houses, land and orchards of villagers. The Government of Himachal Pradesh entered into a MoU with M/s Jayalakshmi Power Corporation Ltd. on 06.06.2002 and later an Implementation Agreement on 26.10.2006 that included rehabilitation and resettlement terms. On 09.04.2009 a tripartite agreement transferred the rights and obligations to M/s Greenko Hatkoti Energy Pvt. Ltd.

The petitioners repeatedly represented to authorities. A committee headed by a Sub-Divisional Officer visited the site, assessed damage to 17 families and prepared an assessment report. The Deputy Commissioner, Shimla passed an order dated 13.01.2020 directing the Project Authorities (respondents No. 3 and 4) to pay compensation of Rs. 11 lacs to the petitioners and to construct a water storage tank at a cost of Rs. 8 lacs within six months from 13.01.2020. The petitioners filed the writ petition seeking implementation of the Deputy Commissioner’s order, re-assessment of compensation (to the tune of Rs. 1 crore), and directions to provide employment to affected families.

Respondents filed replies: respondent No. 2 placed on record the committee visit and its report and supported the Deputy Commissioner’s order; respondent No. 3 contested maintainability, stating that the petition raises highly disputed questions of law and fact and challenged the basis of the committee’s assessment.

The High Court considered the materials, authorities and prior decisions, heard counsel for the parties, and issued a common judgment disposing both petitions: it declined to entertain the writ petitions under Article 226 in the circumstances and relegated the petitioners to the remedy of a civil suit. The petition filed by M/s Greenko (CWP No. 3984 of 2022) was rendered infructuous by that outcome.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether writ petitions under Article 226 are maintainable to obtain monetary compensation or enforcement of a Deputy Commissioner’s damage-assessment order where serious and complex disputed questions of fact arise which require oral and documentary evidence.
  2. Whether a writ court may act upon an assessment made by a committee (appointed by an executive authority) and order payment of compensation without providing an opportunity for evidence and cross-examination to the parties.
  3. Whether, in the circumstances of the present matters, the appropriate forum for resolving the competing claims for compensation is a civil suit rather than writ jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners alleged that unscientific tunnelling/construction methods by the project authorities caused damage to houses, land, orchards and water sources of 17 families.
  • They sought issuance of writ of mandamus directing respondents to implement the Deputy Commissioner’s order dated 13.01.2020 (release of compensation and construction of water tank) and to recover amounts from respondents No. 3 and 4 with interest.
  • The petitioners sought re-assessment/re-calculation of compensation to at least Rs. 1 crore, asserting that the assessed amounts understated the damage.
  • They sought directions to respondents No. 3 and 4 to provide employment to affected families as previously accepted in meetings ordered by the Deputy Commissioner.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Respondent No. 2 stated that a Committee headed by the Sub Divisional Officer assessed the damage to 17 inhabitants, submitted a detailed report, and the Deputy Commissioner passed the order on 13.01.2020 based on that report.
  • Respondent No. 3 did not deny potential liability in principle but contended that the petition raises highly disputed questions of law and fact and that the committee’s assessment did not provide a sufficient basis for the compensation claimed; thus the writ petition was not maintainable and the matter required evidence led in a civil forum.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishan vs. Union of India & Ors. (CWP No. 2983 of 2015, Division Bench of this Court) Division Bench decision of this Court regarding identical controversy: writ petition dismissed on ground of seriously disputed questions of law and fact which require evidence. The Court relied on this local precedent to note identical controversy and to support the view that writ jurisdiction was inappropriate where serious disputed facts exist.
State of Kerala & Ors. v. M.K. Jose, (2015) 9 SCC 433 Clarifies limits of writ jurisdiction in contractual matters and summarizes authorities on when writ courts may or may not entertain contractual disputes. Used as a principal Supreme Court authority to frame the legal approach on entertaining contractual claims and disputed facts in writ petitions.
State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 216 Writ petition under Article 226 is not the proper proceedings for adjudicating contractual disputes; alternative remedy should normally be pursued. Quoted to support the proposition that disputes arising from contractual relations and rival claims should ordinarily be investigated in a civil suit rather than by writ.
National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises, (2003) 7 SCC 410 Disputes relating to contracts cannot ordinarily be agitated under Article 226; contractual disputes are to be decided by courts of competent jurisdiction. Relied upon to reinforce the settled position that contractual disputes and related claims for money are not appropriate for writ jurisdiction in the ordinary course.
Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293; State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (1996) 6 SCC 22; Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh (1989) 2 SCC 116 Authorities cited for the settled law that contractual disputes generally are not to be agitated under Article 226 unless specific circumstances justify it. These cases were cited (via Ganga Enterprises discussion) to show that the writ court should not generally entertain disputes that are contractual in nature.
Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, (1969) 3 SCC 769 The High Court has jurisdiction to try issues of fact and law in a writ petition but may decline where questions of fact are complex and require oral evidence; discretion must be exercised on sound principles. The Court invoked this principle to explain that while factual disputes can be tried in writ jurisdiction, the High Court may decline to do so when oral evidence and a fuller trial are necessary.
ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553 In appropriate cases a writ court can entertain contractual disputes and may even take oral evidence if facts permit; writ jurisdiction is not absolutely barred for contractual matters. Used to identify exceptions where writ jurisdiction may be exercised (e.g., clear documentary record or interpretation issues not requiring oral evidence), and to caution that such power is discretionary.
Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, (1970) 1 SCC 582 Referenced as part of authorities considered on the scope of facts and writ jurisdiction. Referred to in the context of ABL International and allied precedent analysis regarding when writ courts may act on factual/contractual disputes.
Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2006) 10 SCC 236 Reiterated that each case must be decided on its facts; public interest may permit judicial review, but serious disputed questions of fact may preclude writ jurisdiction. Cited to show that in matters with public law elements judicial review may be permissible, but serious disputed factual contests ordinarily require suit proceedings; applied to determine writ jurisdiction was inappropriate.
Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons v. Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293; Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corp., (1990) 3 SCC 752; Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, (2004) 3 SCC 214 Authorities referred to in the analysis of ABL International and Noble Resources concerning scope of writ jurisdiction in contractual contexts. Referred to as part of the jurisprudential matrix confirming that each case turns on facts and public-interest considerations in deciding writ jurisdiction.
Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan (2005) 6 SCC 657; G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council (1991) 3 SCC 91 Authorities referenced for the proposition that public law elements may make judicial review permissible in certain cases. Referred to in the Court’s review of when public interest considerations might allow writ relief.
Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Atmanand Singh & Ors., (2020) 6 SCC 256 Reiterated that when a petition raises complex factual questions requiring oral and documentary evidence, the High Court should generally relegate parties to a civil suit rather than entertain writ jurisdiction. Cited and relied upon to support the Court’s decision to decline to entertain the writ petitions and to direct petitioners to pursue civil remedies.
Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 Referred to in ABL International discussion describing restrictions and self-imposed limitations on plenary writ power. Used indirectly in the exposition on the discretionary nature of Article 226 jurisdiction and its limitations.
Thansingh Nathmal v. Sudt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 Observation that Article 226 jurisdiction is wide but discretionary and subject to self-imposed limitations; not to be used as an alternative to remedies provided by statute. Quoted to emphasize that writ jurisdiction is plenary but ordinarily restrained when alternative remedies exist or when matters require elaborate evidence.
Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706 Followed Gunwant Kaur principle that the High Court may decline a writ petition where determination requires oral/documentary evidence of complex disputed facts. Referred to as supporting authority for declining to entertain writ petitions involving complex factual disputes.
Nand Lal v. State of H.P. & Ors. (CWP No. 1176 of 2018, Coordinate Bench) Declined to entertain writ petition seeking compensation for damage to structures where issues were complex and required evidence; petitioners were relegated to civil remedy. This local coordinate bench decision was cited as a directly analogous precedent supporting the approach to relegate petitioners to civil suit for compensation claims.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court’s analysis proceeded in a structured manner, informed by both Supreme Court and High Court authorities summarized in the opinion.

  1. The Court recognized that the petitioners alleged damage to houses and other properties caused by the project construction and that the Deputy Commissioner had passed an order on 13.01.2020 following a committee assessment.
  2. It noted that respondent No. 3 did not deny liability in principle but challenged the petition on the ground that the matters raised were highly disputed questions of law and fact, and that the committee’s compensation assessment provided no stated basis for computation.
  3. The Court surveyed the relevant jurisprudence (including State of Kerala v. M.K. Jose, Jain Plastics, Ganga Enterprises, Gunwant Kaur, ABL International, Noble Resources, Punjab National Bank, and other authorities) to distil governing principles about the scope of writ jurisdiction in disputes involving contractual elements and disputed facts.
  4. From those authorities the Court extracted legal principles: (a) in an appropriate case a writ petition arising out of contractual obligation may be maintainable; (b) disputed questions of fact do not per se bar writ jurisdiction, but where determination requires oral and documentary evidence a writ court may decline to try the matter; and (c) writ jurisdiction is discretionary and ordinarily not exercised to the exclusion of other adequate remedies unless there is arbitrariness or breach of constitutional mandates.
  5. Applying those principles, the Court observed that the assessment report prepared by the committee (and adopted by the Deputy Commissioner) did not disclose the basis of computation and had not been accepted by the petitioners; further, the respondents disputed the petitioners’ allegations. Given these circumstances, the Court concluded it would be unsafe and imprudent to rely on the material placed on record without giving the parties an opportunity for cross-examination and adducing evidence.
  6. The Court emphasized that a writ court cannot be used as a vehicle to collect evidence in favour of one party (for instance by appointing an expert committee to assess damages in a contractual controversy), and that where serious disputed questions of fact arise which require evidence, the matter should ordinarily be pursued in a civil suit.
  7. On this basis the Court held that these petitions involved seriously disputed questions of fact and the rival claims could only be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence to be led in a properly instituted civil suit. Consequently, the writ petitions could not be entertained in the exercise of Article 226 jurisdiction.
  8. The Court therefore declined to entertain the writ petitions, but granted limited procedural benefits should the petitioners institute civil suits: if they approached the civil court within thirty days from receipt of the judgment they would be entitled to benefit of Section 80(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the time spent pursuing the writs would be excluded for limitation purposes.
  9. The Court expressly clarified that its observations were not an adjudication on merits and would not influence any future civil suit; the civil court was directed to decide matters on merits uninfluenced by the present observations.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions were not entertained and the matters were disposed of by relegating the petitioners to the appropriate civil forum.

More specifically:

  • CWP No. 1105 of 2022 (filed by the individual petitioners seeking implementation of the Deputy Commissioner’s order and further reliefs) was held not maintainable in the writ jurisdiction and the petitioners were directed to pursue a civil suit for compensation/damages.
  • CWP No. 3984 of 2022 (filed by M/s Greenko Hatkoti Energy Pvt. Ltd.) was rendered infructuous by the foregoing conclusion.
  • The Court granted that if petitioners institute civil suits within thirty days of receipt of this judgment they would receive the benefit of Section 80(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the period spent prosecuting the writ petitions would be excluded for limitation purposes.
  • The Court expressly stated that nothing in the judgment is an expression on the merits; a civil court hearing any subsequent suits must decide the issues on merit without being influenced by the observations made in this writ disposal.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the petitioners must pursue their claims for compensation and damages before the civil court where evidence can be led and witnesses cross-examined. The High Court did not direct payment of compensation and refused to act on the committee’s assessment in the writ jurisdiction.
  • The judgment applies established principles (from Supreme Court and High Court precedents) about the limited circumstances in which writ jurisdiction may be exercised in contractual or fact-intensive monetary claims; it does not purport to lay down any novel legal precedent beyond applying these authorities to the facts of these petitions.

Disposition: The petitions stand disposed of in the terms indicated above; pending applications, if any, are also disposed.

    JAI DUTT SHARMA AND ORS v. STATE OF HP AND ORS

    H

    ig h Co ur t o f H

    .P

    . IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. CWP No. 1105 of 2022 a/w CWP No. 3984 of 2022

    Reserved on: 15.03.2022

    Decided on: 24.03.2023

    CWP No. 1105 of 2022

    Jai Dutt Sharma & Ors. …Petitioners Versus

    State of H. P. & Ors. …Respondents

    CWP No. 3984 of 2022

    M/s Greenko Hatkoti Energy Pvt. Ltd. …Petitioner Versus

    State of H. P. & Ors. …Respondents

    Coram:

    Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.

    Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes. For the Petitioners : Mr. V. D. Khidtta, Advocate, for the petitioners in CWP No. 1105 of 2022.

    Mr. Vikrant Thakur, Advocate, for the

    petitioner in CWP No. 3984 of 2022.

    For the Respondents : Mr. Anup Rattan, A.G. with Mr. I. N. Mehta, Mr. Y. W. Chauhan, Sr. Addl. A.G., Mr. J. S. Guleria, Dy. A.G. and Mr. Rajat Chauhan, Law Officer, for respondents-

    State in both the petitions.

    Mr. Vikrant Thakur, Advocate, for

    respondent No. 3 and 4 in CWP No.

    1105 of 2022.

    Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge

    1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? yes

    1

    2

    Since common questions of law and facts are involved in both these petitions, therefore, the same were taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by a common judgment. However, in order to maintain clarity, the facts of CWP No. 1105 of 2022 are being referred to.

    2. The petitioners in CWP No. 1105 of 2022 are the permanent residents of Gwali Dogri (Parsa) P.O. Lower Koti, Tehsil Rohru, District Shimla, H.P. and are aggrieved by the non- implementation of the order of the Deputy Commissioner, have filed the instant petition for grant of the following substantive reliefs:-

    (I) That writ in the nature of mandamus may kindly be issued directing the respondents to implement the order dated 13.01.2020 (Annexure P-22) in its letter and spirit by directing the respondents No. 1 and 2 to immediately release the calculated compensation amount and further ordered to be recovered by them from respondent No. 3 and 4 with interest throughout.

    (ii) That the writ in the nature of mandamus may kindly be issued directing the respondents to re-assess and re- calculate the compensation / damage amount at least to the tune of Rs. 1 crore as the house, land and orchard including water sources of 17 families have been damaged as is clear from the order passed by respondent No. 2 on 13.01.2020.

    (iii) That the respondents No. 3 and 4 may kindly be directed to provide the employment to the members of the petitioners/project affected families as and when work in future is started as the same has been accepted by the

    3

    representatives of the project authority in the meetings as ordered by the Deputy Commissioner in its order dated

    10.01.2020.

    3. On 06.06.2002, respondent No. 1- the Government of Himachal Pradesh executed an agreement (MoU) with M/s Jayalakshmi Power Corporation Ltd. to carry out a detailed investigations and submit Detailed Project Report for implementation of Paurital-Lassa Hydro Electric Project 36 MW installed capacity located in Tehsil Rohru, District Shimla.

    4. Subsequently, on 26.10.2006, respondent No. 1- Government of Himachal Pradesh had arrived at and executed Implementation Agreement with M/s Jayalakshmi Power Corporation Ltd., wherein a specific term regarding Rehabilitation and Resettlement Plan was set up.

    5. On 09.04.2009, a tripartite agreement was executed between respondent No. 1 - Government of Himachal Pradesh, M/s Jayalakshmi Power Corporation Ltd. and M/s Greenko Hatkoti Energy Pvt. Ltd., whereby all the rights or obligations of M/s Jayalakshmi Power Corporation were transferred to Greenko Hatkoti Energy Pvt. Ltd.

    6. According to the petitioners, it was on account of the unscientific methods used by the respondents for construction of tunnel for the execution of the project that the houses and other

    4

    properties of the petitioners came to be damaged. The petitioners continued to represent the authorities but to no avail.

    7. Ultimately, the petitioners submitted a representation to the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, who in turn, gave directions to the Project Authorities (respondents No. 3 and

    4) to pay a compensation of Rs. 11 lacs to the petitioners and also construct a water storage tank at the cost of Rs. 8 lacs within a period of six months from 13.01.2020.

    8. Respondent No. 2 has contested the petition by filing reply, wherein, it has been submitted that a Committee headed by Sub Divisional Officer (C), Rohru, had visited the site and assessed the damage caused to the houses of 17 inhabitants and submitted a detailed report to the replying respondents and after perusing the same, the Deputy Commissioner has passed order on 13.01.2020.

    9. As regards respondent No. 3, it would contend that since the petition raises highly disputed questions of law and fact, the same is not maintainable.

    We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case.

    10. At the outset, it may be observed that respondent No. 3 had not denied its liability to pay damages, if any, to the properties of the villagers under various agreements. The sole

    5

    contention is that not only the petition raises highly disputed questions of law and fact but even the compensation so assessed by the Committee, constituted by the Deputy Commissioner, has given no basis for assessment of the compensation.

    11. Before adverting to these contentions, the legal position may be referred to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in a batch of petitions lead case whereof CWP No. 2983 of 2015, titled as Krishan vs. Union of India & Ors., decided on 26.07.2016, authored by one of us (Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.) regarding identical controversy, whereby the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of highly serious disputed question of law and fact raised therein by observing as under:-

    7. The moot question that arises for consideration in wake of replies filed by the respondents is as to whether the reliefs as claimed by the petitioners can in fact be granted in these writ petitions, in view of the seriously disputed question fact which otherwise can only be proved by leading evidence.

    8. The Court herein is not dealing with simple case where the dispute between the parties can be decided on the basis of affidavits and counter affidavits, as the Court would be required to determine as to whether the properties of the petitioners have in fact been damaged and only after determining the same, the individual claims with respect to the compensation, if any, can be determined. However, these questions can only be

    6

    determined after the parties are given an opportunity to lead evidence, which includes cross-examining the witnesses.

    9. Though, the learned counsel for the petitioners had cited number of judgments to canvass that not only can the writ Court go into the disputed facts, but it can also award compensation. However, we find that majority of judgments as relied upon by the petitioners have already been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision in State of Kerala and others Vs. M.K. Jose (2015)

    9 SCC 433, relevant paragraphs whereof read as under:-

    "14. In State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 216 a two-Judge Bench reiterating the exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of enforcement of contractual obligations has stated: (SCC p. 217, para 3)

    "3…..It is to be reiterated that writ petition under Article 226 is not the proper proceedings for adjudicating such disputes. Under the law, it was open to the respondent to approach the court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate relief for breach of contract. It is settled law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to issue writ, but ordinarily that would be a good ground in refusing to exercise the discretion under Article 226."

    7

    In the said case, it has been further observed: (SCC p. 218, para 7)

    "7….It is true that many matters could be decided after referring to the contentions raised in the affidavits and counter-affidavits, but that would hardly be a ground for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of alleged breach of contract. Whether the alleged non-supply of road permits by the appellants would justify breach of contract by the respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Such seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather than by a court exercising prerogative of issuing writs.

    " 15. In National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises, (2003) 7 SCC 410 the respondent therein had filed a writ petition before the High Court for refund of the amount. The High Court posed two questions, namely, (a) whether the forfeiture of security deposit is without authority of law and without any binding contract between the parties and also contrary to Section 5 of the Contract Act; and (b) whether the writ petition is maintainable in a claim arising out of breach of contract. While dealing with the said issue, this Court opined that: (SCC p. 415, para 6)

    "6…It is settled law that disputes relating to contracts cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the

    8

    Constitution of India. It has been so held in the cases of Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293, State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. (1996)6 SCC 22 and Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh(1989) 2 SCC 116. This is settled law. The dispute in this case was regarding the terms of offer. They were thus contractual disputes in respect of which a writ court was not the proper forum. Mr Dave, however, relied upon the cases of Verigamto Naveen v. Govt. of A.P. (2001) 8 SCC 344 and Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India (1986) 3 SCC

    247. These, however, are cases where the writ court was enforcing a statutory right or duty. These cases do not lay down that a writ court can interfere in a matter of contract only. Thus on the ground of maintainability the petition should have been dismissed."

    16. Having referred to the aforesaid decisions, it is obligatory on our part to refer to two other authorities of this Court where it has been opined that under what circumstances a disputed question of fact can be gone into. In Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda (1969) 3 SCC 769, it has been held thus: (SCC p. 774, paras 14-16)

    "14. The High Court observed that they will not determine disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what facts were in dispute and what were admitted could only be determined after an affidavit- in-reply was filed by the State. The High Court, however, proceeded to dismiss the petition in limine. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely

    9

    because in considering the petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a petition in limine will normally be justified, where the High Court is of the view that the petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made dispute sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the party against whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is such that it would be inappropriate to try it in the writ jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons.

    15. From the averments made in the petition filed by the appellants it is clear that in proof of a large number of allegations the appellants relied upon documentary evidence and the only matter in respect of which conflict of facts may possibly arise related to the due publication of the notification under Section 4 by the Collector. 16. In the present case, in our judgment, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the petition on the ground that it will not determine disputed question of fact. The High Court has jurisdiction to determine questions of fact, even if they are in dispute and the present, in our judgment,

    10

    is a case in which in the interests of both the parties the High Court should have entertained the petition and called for an affidavit-in- reply from the respondents, and should have proceeded to try the petition instead of relegating the appellants to a separate suit. (emphasis supplied)

    17. In ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd. (2004) 3 SCC 553, a two-Judge Bench after referring to various judgments as well as the pronouncement in Gunwant Kaur (supra) and Century Spg. And Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council (1970) 1 SCC 582, has held thus: (ABL International case, SCC pp. 568-69 & 572, paras 19 & 29)

    "19. Therefore, it is clear from the above enunciation of law that merely because one of the parties to the litigation raises a dispute in regard to the facts of the case, the court entertaining such petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not always bound to relegate the parties to a suit. In the above case of Gunwant Kaur this Court even went to the extent of holding that in a writ petition, if the facts require, even oral evidence can be taken. This clearly shows that in an appropriate case, the writ court has the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions of fact and there is no absolute bar for entertaining a writ petition even if the same arises out of a contractual obligation and/or involves some disputed questions of fact.

    * * *

    11

    27. From the above discussion of ours, the following legal principles emerge as to the maintainability of a writ petition:

    (a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable.

    (b) Merely because some disputed questions of fact arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule.

    (c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of monetary claim is also maintainable. While laying down the principle, the Court sounded a word of caution as under: (ABL International case, SCC p. 572, para 28)

    "28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1.) And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14

    12

    or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction."

    18. It is appropriate to state here that in the said case, the Court granted the relief as the facts were absolutely clear from the documentary evidence brought which pertain to interpretation of certain clauses of contract of insurance. In that context, the Court opined: (ABL International Ltd. case SCC p. 578, para 51)

    "51 .... The terms of the insurance contract which were agreed between the parties were after the terms of the contract between the exporter and the importer were executed which included the addendum, therefore, without hesitation we must proceed on the basis that the first respondent issued the insurance policy knowing very well that there was more than one mode of payment of consideration and it had insured failure of all the modes of payment of consideration. From the correspondence as well as from the terms of the policy, it is noticed that existence of only two conditions has been made as a condition precedent for making the first respondent Corporation liable to pay for the insured risk, that is:

    (i) there should be a default on the part of the Kazak Corporation to pay for the goods received; and (ii) there should be a failure on the part of the Kazakhstan Government to fulfil their guarantee."

    And it eventually held: (SCC pp. 578-79, para 51)

    "51..... We have come to the conclusion that the amended clause 6 of the agreement between the

    13

    exporter and the importer on the face of it does not give room for a second or another construction than the one already accepted by us. We have also noted that reliance placed on subclause (d) of the proviso to the insurance contract by the Appellate Bench is also misplaced which is clear from the language of the said clause itself. Therefore, in our opinion, it does not require any external aid, much less any oral evidence to interpret the above clause. Merely because the first respondent wants to dispute this fact, in our opinion, it does not become a disputed fact. If such objection as to disputed questions or interpretations is raised in a writ petition, in our opinion, the courts can very well go into the same and decide that objection if facts permit the same as in this case.

    19. In this regard, a reference to Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Another (2006) 10 SCC 236 would be seemly. The two-Judge Bench referred to the ABL International, Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons

    v. Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293, Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corp. (1990) 3 SCC 752 and Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, (2004) 3 SCC 214 and opined thus: (Nobal Resources case SCC p. 246, para

    29)

    "29. Although the scope of judicial review or the development of law in this field has been noticed hereinbefore particularly in the light of the decision of this Court in ABL International Ltd. each case, however, must be decided on its own facts. Public interest as noticed hereinbefore, may be one of the

    14

    factors to exercise the power of judicial review. In a case where a public law element is involved, judicial review may be permissible. (See Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan (2005) 6 SCC 657 and G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, (1991) 3 SCC 91) Thereafter, the court in Noble Resources case, proceeded to analyse the facts and came to hold that certain serious disputed questions of facts have arisen for determination and such disputes ordinarily could not have been entertained by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review and ultimately the appeal was dismissed."

    10. It would be noticed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court after taking into consideration the whole gamut of law, has thereafter made the following pertinent observations:-

    "20. We have referred to the aforesaid authorities to highlight under what circumstances in respect of contractual claim or challenge to violation of contract can be entertained by a writ court. It depends upon facts of each case. The issue that had arisen in ABL International was that an instrumentality of a State was placing a different construction on the clauses of the contract of insurance and the insured was interpreting the contract differently. The Court thought it apt merely because something is disputed by the insurer, it should not enter into the realm of disputed questions of fact. In fact, there was no disputed question of fact, but it required interpretation of the terms of the contract of insurance. Similarly, if the materials that come on record from which it is clearly evincible, the writ court may exercise the power of judicial review but, a

    15

    pregnant one, in the case at hand, the High Court has appointed a Commission to collect the evidence, accepted the same without calling for objections from the respondent and quashed the order of termination of contract.

    21. The procedure adopted by the High Court, if we permit ourselves to say so, is quite unknown to exercise of powers under Article 226 in a contractual matter. We can well appreciate a Committee being appointed in a Public Interest Litigation to assist the Court or to find out certain facts. Such an exercise is meant for public good and in public interest. For example, when an issue arises whether in a particular State there are toilets for school children and there is an assertion by the State that there are good toilets, definitely the Court can appoint a Committee to verify the same. It is because the lis is not adversarial in nature. The same principle cannot be taken recourse to in respect of a contractual controversy. It is also surprising that the High Court has been entertaining series of writ petitions at the instance of the respondent, which is nothing but abuse of the process of extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. The Appellate Bench should have applied more restraint and proceeded in accordance with law instead of making a roving enquiry. Such a step is impermissible and by no stretch of imagination subserves any public interest."

    11. It would be evidently clear from the aforesaid exposition of law that the writ Court may in appropriate case award compensation where the facts are not in dispute; there is established negligence in the acts and

    16

    omissions of the respondent authority/authorities on the face of record and there is a consistent deprivation of a fundamental right of the petitioner or his legal representative. That apart, the Court cannot appoint an expert committee to assess the damage if any caused to the properties of the petitioners as such course would be totally impermissible as the Court cannot be used to collect evidence in favour of the petitioners.

    12. It would be noticed that the respondents have disputed all the allegations as set out by the petitioners and therefore, in such circumstances, it is not safe or even prudent for this Court to rely upon any of the material placed on record, that too without affording either of the parties a chance of cross-examination.

    13. Even otherwise, it is more than settled that the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should not interfere with the matters, which are in the realm of private laws and it can otherwise be taken to be well settled that where there is disputed question of fact, which require evidence before the same can be established, then as a matter of practice, the Court would not entertain such writ petition.

    14. It is equally settled law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue writ, but ordinarily that would be a good ground for refusing to exercise the discretion under Article 226.

    17

    15. These petitions involve seriously disputed questions of fact and even otherwise the rival claims of the parties are such, which can only be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence, which may be led by the parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather than by a court exercising prerogative of issuing writs.

    12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank & Ors. vs. Atmanand Singh & Ors. (2020) 6 SCC 256, wherein after evaluating the majority of the aforesaid judgments, the legal position was stated thus:-

    22. We restate the above position that when the petition raises questions of fact of complex nature, such as in the present case, which may for their determination require oral and documentary evidence to be produced and proved by the concerned party and also because the relief sought is merely for ordering a refund of money, the High Court should be loath in entertaining such writ petition and instead must relegate the parties to remedy of a civil suit. Had it been a case where material facts referred to in the writ petition are admitted facts or indisputable facts, the High Court may be justified in examining the claim of the writ petitioner on its own merits in accordance with law.

    13. Adverting to the facts, it would be necessary to reproduce the Assessment Report of the partially damaged houses of village Lahsa Poditall, in its entirety, which reads as under:-

    ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE PARTIALLY DAMAGED HOUSES OF

    VILLAGE LAHSA PODITALL

    18

    In compliance to the direction passed by the worthy Deputy Commissioner, Shimla dated 11-12-2019, the committee visited the site on dated 02.01.2020. Despite advance intimation to the representative of the Project Management, none were present on the spot. Each house was inspected in presence of the applicant/owner and the assessment of the damage was done with the held of technical officials present with the Committee. The committee is of the opinion that the affected families of the village should be provided compensation as per the detail of assessment given below:-

    Sr.

    no.

    Name of the Applicant Brief observation regarding damage to the house

    Assessment of

    the damage

    1 Sh. Naresh Dutt Cracks on wall flooring and slab and damages stone masonry wall etc.

    50,000/-

    2 Sh. Hari Nand Sharma Cracks in walls of store and cracks in main building walls mainly in the joint

    between beam and wall

    50,000/-

    3 Sh. Baldev Sharma Small cracks in wall in CC flooring and retaining wall damaged got slide

    70,000/-

    4 Sh. Basu Dev Sharma Cracks in wall of building and also in flooring

    75,000/-

    5 Sh. Gopal Singh Cracks in wall of building and also in flooring

    50,000/-

    6 Sh. Brijesh Sharma 1. Small cracks in walls of two no. Building and in CC flooring of veranda

    2. Very old House three No. stories made of unframed structure in stone and wooden with slate roofing structure have got dilapidated three rooms in total which is unsafe for living.

    1,30,000/-

    7 Sh. Shishu Pal Sharma Small cracks in walls and veranda and also in toilet and cow shed.

    70,000/-

    8 Sh. Narayan Dutt Sharma Small cracks in walls of building and also in cowshed etc.

    50,000/-

    9 Sh. sunil Thakur Cracks in stone masonry wall of two floors building and also the flooring etc. 75,000/-

    10 Sh. Jai Dutt Sharma Cracks in walls and small cracks in slab and veranda settled down in causing

    cracks etc.

    80,000/-

    11 Sh. Hukam Chand Damage in wall of two floors building and also in toilet dry masonry wall

    damage two floor.

    70,000/-

    12

    Sh. Brij Mohan Thakur

    Cracks in two floors and veranda, walls got damaged due to settlement of land and small cracks in toilet walls etc. 65,000/-

    13 Sh. Surinder Thakur Cracks in walls and flooring of veranda damage due to settlement of land.

    50,000/-

    19

    14 Sh. Surinder Sharma Retaining wall C/o stone masonry got tilted and cracks two no. floor & walls

    of building and stair CC railing got

    broken etc.

    65,000/-

    15 Sh. Vipan Sharma Retaining wall of on back side got tilted and cracks in building walls and RCC

    slab got damaged due to settlement of

    land causing undulation in slab.

    65,000/-

    16 Sh. Kamal Chand Small cracks in walls of building and veranda got settled and also cracks in

    cowshed and toilet block.

    65,000/-

    17 Sh. Tara Dutt Sharma Two o. Building structure one has small cracks in walls and in second one cracks

    in veranda and also in walls of building

    and damage in RCC slab due to setting

    of land.

    80,000/-

    14. It would be noticed that neither the petitioners nor respondents No. 1 and 2 i.e. Principal Secretary (Department of Multipurpose Projects and Power), to the Government of Himachal Pradesh and the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, have placed on record the basis on which the damage has been assessed. That apart, this report has not been accepted by the petitioners.

    15. Lastly and more importantly, we are of the considered view that the petition raises question of complex nature, which can be determined only on the basis of oral and documentary evidence to be produced and proved by a party concerned and in such scenario, we are loath in entertaining such writ petition and would direct the parties to relegate to the remedy of a civil suit.

    20

    16. Had it been a case where the material facts referred to in the writ petitions are admitted on disputed facts, the Court would have probably examined the claim of the writ petitioners on merits, but since such claim is neither admitted nor disputed, moreover, there are no basis of computation of such claim, we see no reason to entertain these petitions.

    17. Above all, in absence of any material on the basis of which the assessment of damages has been made by the Committee constituted by the Deputy Commissioner, it would be not only unfair but even unreasonable to direct the respondents for that matter even by the petitioners to pay the compensation or to assess the damages as set out in the assessment report. May be the petitioners would be in a position to lead evidence to show that they are entitled to compensation far beyond the one computed in the assessment report. On the other hand, the respondents could also lead evidence to show that the assessment of damage is highly exaggerated.

    18. Here we make a note of a judgment of the Coordinate Bench in CWP No. 1176 of 2018, titled as Nand Lal vs. State of H.P. & Ors., wherein while dealing with an identical issue regarding grant of compensation of the structures/houses to the petitioners in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act,

    21

    the Court decline to entertain such writ petition because of the complex question of fact, by observing as under:-

    8. A perusal of Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme indicates that it was prepared to protect the interest of the Oustees and to make adequate arrangements for their rehabilitation and resettlement. The case of the petitioners is however very peculiar. Neither their land nor their houses have been acquired. What they allege that since their village is situated adjacent to the bank of river Satluj, the soil strata of the land there is a mix of sand and clay. The Kol Dam is a big water body, which is having length of more than 30 kilometers, causes seepage deep into the adjoining land and thereby putting imminent danger to the residential houses, human life and livestock. It is asserted and not denied that certain cracks were witnessed in the houses of the petitioners. The Geological Survey Committee has assessed the damage to the houses of the petitioners and they were paid adequate compensation by the respondent-NTPC.

    9. The question however is whether it would be justified for this Court to entertain the dispute of present nature in the scope of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. What is required to be decided in the present matter is that if the land and houses of the petitioners have not actually been acquired, can be any justification for this Court to direct the respondents to pass award under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which is now replaced by Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. In our view, it is not as this Act would not apply to the present fact situation. Once the aforementioned Act is not attracted, the rehabilitation and

    22

    resettlement of the petitioners under aforementioned Act is not applicable to them. Besides, the petitioners have also to prove that on account of regular seepage into their land, it has become unusable, partly or completely and if partly, to what extent and if completely, then how? What would also be required to be decided is whether the damage caused to the houses of the petitioner is permanent and perpetual in nature. All these issues would be required to be decided in order to determine as to what extent the loss is caused to the petitioners and on that basis, then to quantify the amount of compensation. These all are the questions which can be decided only if the parties lead evidence in support of their respective cases. The petitioners for this purpose would be required to adduce evidence by producing witnesses and opinion of the experts for assessment of the damage to their land and property. This Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not be in a position to entertain all these complex issues involving questions of fact. Only the Civil Court having competent jurisdiction, would be more appropriate remedy for the petitioners to claim compensation or damages, if so advised, by filing a civil suit for such relief.

    10. It is trite that when a matter involves disputed questions of facts and law, the High Court would be slow in entertaining the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court is a plenary power which is to be used in exceptional circumstances. The petitioners have not been able to make out any such case, which can be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court would not be justified in exercising such a power to the exclusion of other available remedies only when it

    23

    finds that action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable and as such is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in a recent judgment in Punjab National Bank and others Versus Atmanand Singh and others, (2020) 6 Supreme Court Cases 256, held that where the petition raises questions of fact of complex nature, which may for their determination require oral and documentary evidence to be produced and proved by the party concerned, the High Court should be loath in entertaining such writ petition and instead must relegate the parties to the remedy of a civil suit.

    11. The Supreme Court in Thansingh Nathmal Vs. Sudt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419, held that exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions, but it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. It was held that very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. The following observations of the Supreme Court in para-7 of the report are useful to quote:-

    "7... The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an

    24

    alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up."

    12. In Gunwant Kaur Versus Municipal Committee, Bhatinda (1969) 3 SCC 769, which was followed in Babubhai Muljibhai Patel Vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706, the Supreme Court held that when a writ petition raises disputed questions of fact of complex nature, which may for their determination require oral and documentary evidence, the High Court may decline to entertain such petition. The following observations of the Supreme Court in para-14 of the report, are relevant to quote:-

    25

    "14. The High Court observed that they will not determine disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what facts were in dispute and what were admitted could only be determined after an affidavit in reply was filed by the State. The High Court, however, proceeded to dismiss the petition in limine. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account theHigh Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a petition in limine will normally be justified, where the High Court is of the view that the petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made dispute sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the party against whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is analogous reasons."

    13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are not inclined to entertain these writ petitions, however, with liberty to the petitioners to avail the remedy of claiming compensation/damages before the appropriate Civil Court.

    26

    19. Adverting to the writ petition No. 3894 of 2022, it would be noticed that the same has been filed for the grant of following substantive reliefs:

    I) Issue writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order dated 13.01.2022 (Annexure P-2) passed by Ld. Deputy Commissioner.

    ii) The Deputy Commissioner, Shimla may kindly be directed to utilize the amount deposited under LADF by the petitioner for the development works in the Project Affected Area (PAA).

    20. Now that we have held the compensation, as determined by the Deputy Commissioner to be not payable to the petitioners, therefore, the writ petition (CWP No. 1105 of 2022) filed by the individual(s)/land owners is not maintainable and as regards the writ petition (CWP No. 3984 of 2022) filed by M/s Greenko, the same has been rendered infructuous as the proper remedy of claiming compensation/damages lies with the petitioners before the civil court for redressal of their respective grievances. However, we make it clear that in the event of the petitioners approaching the civil Court within a period of thirty days from the receipt of this judgment, not only shall the petitioners be entitled to benefit of Section 80(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, but even the period of limitation spent in pursuing these litigations shall be excluded.

    27

    21. Before parting, we may observe that nothing observed herein above shall be construed to be an opinion on merits of the case and in the event of the petitioners filing civil suit(s), the Court shall proceed to determine the case on merits without being persuaded or influenced by any of the observations made herein above, which essentially have been made only for the determination and disposal of these writ petitions.

    22. The petitions stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also pending applications, if any.

    (Tarlok Singh Chauhan) Judge

    (Virender Singh) 24th March, 2023 Judge

    (sanjeev)

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    JAI DUTT SHARMA AND ORS v. STATE OF HP AND ORS
    (Mar 24, 2023)