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NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Criminal Appeal No. 593 of 2014
Laxman Singh, S/o. Late Jairam Gond, Aged About 40 Years, R/o. Village Saraidah, Katasemar, Police Station- Baikunthpur, District Koriya, Chhattisgarh
---Appellant Versus
State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Police Station- Baikunthpur, District Koriya, Chhattisgarh
---Respondent
For Appellant :- Ms. Vijay Laxmi Shroff, Advocate For State-Respondent :- Mr. Neeraj Pradhan, Panel Lawyer
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board
(21.02.2023)
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.
1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 17.04.2014 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Koriya, Baikunthpur, in Sessions Trial No.14/2014, by which the appellant herein has been convicted for the offence under Sections 302 & 201 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced as under with a direction to run the sentences concurrently :
| CONVICTION |
|
SENTENCE |
| U/s. 302 of I.P.C. |
: |
Life imprisonment with fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of |
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|
|
fine, 6 months additional rigorous imprisonment. |
| U/s. 201 of I.P.C. |
: |
Rigorous imprisonment for 7 years with fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, 6 months additional rigorous imprisonment. |
2. Case of the prosecution, in short, is that in the intervening night of 10-11.11.2013 at village Jatasemar, Saraidah, Police Station- Baikunthpur, the appellant strangulated his mother Mangli Bai, aged about 80 years, and in order to screen himself from the offence, hanged the dead body of his mother Mangli Bai and thereby he committed the offence under Sections 302 & 201 of I.P.C. Further case of the prosecution is that immediately thereafter, appellant started shouting and then on hearing the shout, Sadan Singh (PW-2) & Ajay Kumar (PW-4) came inside the house of appellant herein then he informed that his mother had committed suicide by hanging herself with the help of Sari and also informed that he tried to save her life, but on account that he is handicapped, as he has no three fingers of right hand, he could not save her life. The matter was informed by Ajay Kumar (PW-4) to Police Station Baikunthpur about the death of Mangli Bai by hanging. The dead body was subjected to post- mortem, which was conducted by Dr. Surendra Painkra (PW-6), who has proved post-mortem report vide Ex.P-11, in which cause of death was stated to be due to strangulation and death was homicidal in nature. The appellant was arrested vide
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Ex.P-18 and after due investigation, the appellant was charge- sheeted for the aforesaid offence before the jurisdictional criminal court and the case was ultimately committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated.
3. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 22 documents and the appellant-accused in support of his defence has neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document.
4. The trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellant herein for the offence under Sections 302 & 201 of I.P.C. and sentenced as above, against which the present appeal has been preferred.
5. Ms. Vijay Laxmi Shroff, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the trial Court has convicted the appellant holding the death to be homicidal in nature and furthermore, the case to be house murder; whereas it has been argued as per statement before the trial Court that the appellant, his wife and his children were also present in the house and the incident happened in the courtyard; therefore, the conviction of the appellant is liable to be set aside and the appeal deserves to be allowed.
6. Mr. Neeraj Pradhan, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment and submits that the prosecution has been
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able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, conviction of the appellant for the offence under Sections 302 & 201 of I.P.C. is well merited and the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.
8. The first question for consideration as to whether the death of deceased Mangli Bai was homicidal in nature, has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the statement of Dr. Surendra Painkra (PW-6) who has proved the post-mortem report Ex.P-11. In our considered opinion, the finding recorded by the trial Court holding the death of Mangli Bai to be homicidal in nature is correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and accordingly we hereby affirm the said finding.
9. Now, the next question is whether the appellant is the author of the crime ?
10. The case is based on circumstantial evidence and there is no direct evidence. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1has underlined the conditions which must be fulfilled for convicting an accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence in paragraph 153 as under: -
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"153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and "must be or should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra2where the following observations were made:
Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."
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11. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid principles of law, it is quite vivid that the trial Court has firstly held the death to be homicidal in nature, which has been rightly held. Thereafter, the learned trial Court further held that Gambhir Singh (PW-1), Sadan Singh (PW-2), Shivraj (PW-3) and Madan (PW-5) have been declared hostile and they have not supported the case of the prosecution and it has not been established that it is a case of suicide.
12. Now, learned trial Court further held in para 27 that the death was homicidal in nature, but the incident occurred inside the house of the appellant in which the appellant, his wife and his children were also present and the appellant also tried to save her life but did not call his wife and children and he could not furnish any explanation in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., therefore, the appellant is author of the crime. As such by applying the principle of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C.
13. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states as under: -
"106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.—When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him."
14. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in
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Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned.
15. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer3, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word "especially" employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: -
"11. …. The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to
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the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23)
(A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B)."
Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts.
16. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra
(supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of
Nagendra Sah v. State Of Bihar . of Bihar4in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: -
"22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference.
23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the
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chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused."
17. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh
v. State of Punjab5, while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him.
18. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State Of Bihar .
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of Bihar6and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence.
19. In the matter of Harijan Bhala Teja v. State Of Gujarat . of Gujarat7, the Supreme Court has held that where the postmortem report establishes homicidal nature of death and since the accused only was staying with his wife at time of her death, it is for the accused to show has to in what manner she died and relying upon Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act in paragraph 19 of the report it was held as under: -
"19. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Since it is proved on the record that it was only the appellant who was staying with his wife at the time of her death, it is for him to show as to in what manner she died, particularly, when the prosecution has successfully proved that she died homicidal death."
20. Likewise, in the matter of Gajanan Dashrath Kharate v. State Of Maharashtra . of Maharashtra8, where the accused (Gajanan Dashrath Kharate) alleged to have killed his father and accused has not offered any explanation for homicidal death of his father, conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court by holding as under in paragraph 14: -
"14. Upon appreciation of oral evidence and the circumstance of the recovery of blood stained clothes of the accused and the conduct of the accused in not offering any explanation for the
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homicidal death of his father, by concurrent findings, the trial court and the High Court rightly convicted the appellant-accused under Section
302 IPC and we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment."
21. The Supreme Court in the matter of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra9has held in para 22 as under :
"22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes placed in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. In Nika Ram v. State Of Himachal Pradesh . AIR 1972 SC 2077 it was observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the house when she was murdered there with 'khokhri' and the fact that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State Of Maharashtra . (1992) 3 SCC 106, the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation were held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife. In State Of U.P v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal . AIR 1992 SC 2045, the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of
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the husband was that wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that time. The letters written by the wife to her relatives showed that the husband ill-treated her and their relations were strained and further the evidence showed that both of them were in one room in the night. It was held that the chain of circumstances was complete and it was the husband who committed the murder of his wife by strangulation and accordingly this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused and convicted him under Section 302 IPC. In State Of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran . (1999) 8 SCC 679 the wife was found dead in a hut which had caught fire. The evidence showed that the accused and his wife were seen together in the hut at about 9.00 p.m. and the accused came out in the morning through the roof when the hut had caught fire. His explanation was that it was a case of accidental fire which resulted in the death of his wife and a daughter. The medical evidence showed that the wife died due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation and not on account of burn injuries. It was held that there cannot be any hesitation to come to the conclusion that it was the accused (husband) who was the perpetrator of the crime"
22. Reverting to the facts of this case finally in light of the aforesaid principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above stated judgment, it is quite vivid that the prosecution has only established the death to be homicidal in nature and thereafter, applied Section 106 of the Evidence Act to hold the appellant guilty, but the trial Court in para 27 has clearly recorded a finding that on the date and time of offence, apart from the appellant, his wife Manbasiya and his children were also present in the house, as such, it is not the case that on the date and time of offence only the deceased mother and the appellant were two inmates in the house and deceased was in
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custody of the appellant. Furthermore, the primary facts to establish the commission of offence have also not been established by the prosecution and considering that the deceased was sleeping in night in the courtyard, which is not covered by any wall or window, possibility of commission of offence of murder by the outsider, cannot be ruled out.
23. In that view of the matter, we are unable to hold that the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for the offence under Sections 302 & 201 of I.P.C. The appellant is entitled for acquittal on the ground of benefit of doubt. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Sections 302 & 201 of I.P.C. is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from the charge under Sections 302 & 201 of I.P.C. The appellant is in custody, he is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
24. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge
Aks