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Case Summary: AI Champdany Industries Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (FMA 385 of 2020)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was preferred by AI Champdany Industries Limited (the Company) and a functionary challenging the order dated 31 January 2018 in W.P. 2319 (W) of 2016, which refused to interfere with administrative orders dated 8 July 2015 and 19/20 November 2015 issued by the Under Secretary, Ministry of Textiles. Those administrative orders had been passed pursuant to directions given in an earlier judgment dated 6 May 2015 in W.P. 5365 (W) of 2010.

The background facts, as set out in the opinion, are:

  • With effect from 8 February 1989 the Government introduced the External Market Assistance Scheme (EMA) to boost exports of jute goods; the scheme has been extended and modified from time to time.
  • By a notification dated 25 September 1998, food grade jute products (FGJP) were included under the EMA scheme and claimants were required to submit pre-shipment certificates to the National Jute Board (NJB) signed by IJIRA (Indian Jute Industries' Research Association) and/or its licensee SGS.
  • The Company submitted EMA claims supported by certificates issued by SGS or IJIRA and initially received payments. By a letter dated 12 December 2007 the Central Government informed NJB that FGJP certificates issued by SGS did not conform to the EMA procedure and accordingly claims based on SGS certificates would not be entertained.
  • The Company challenged the 12 December 2007 notification in W.P. 5365 (W) of 2010; that writ was disposed on 6 May 2015 with observations that the notification had been issued arbitrarily and the Secretary, Ministry of Textiles and his delegate were directed to consider the writ petitioners' claim in accordance with law and in light of the observations in the judgment.
  • Following consideration, the appellants' claim was rejected by order dated 8 July 2015; a representation dated 30 July 2015 was denied by order dated 19/20 November 2015.
  • The appellants filed a subsequent writ petition (W.P. 2319 (W) of 2016) challenging the 8 July and 19/20 November 2015 orders. The Single Judge dismissed that writ petition on 31 January 2018, holding it not maintainable because a civil suit (CS No.293 of 2010) was pending that raised the same cause of action.
  • The present appeal challenges the Single Judge's refusal to grant relief in W.P. 2319 (W) of 2016 and seeks interference with the orders dated 8 July 2015 and 19/20 November 2015.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the second writ petition (W.P. 2319 (W) of 2016) challenging the 8 July 2015 and 19/20 November 2015 orders was maintainable in view of an existing civil suit (CS No.293 of 2010) that, according to respondents, involved the same cause of action.
  2. Whether the orders of 8 July 2015 and 19/20 November 2015 were separable from the earlier quashed notification (12 December 2007) and whether they could be challenged independently by way of a writ petition despite the pendency of the suit.
  3. Whether the relief sought in the second writ petition (a monetary disbursement of Rs.10,97,86,570/-) constituted a consequential relief that was maintainable in the writ jurisdiction after the earlier decision dated 6 May 2015.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Single Judge erred in refusing the writ petition on the ground of availability of an alternative efficacious remedy (the civil suit), because the orders dated 8 July 2015 and 19/20 November 2015 were not and could not have been the subject-matter of the earlier civil suit filed in 2010.
  • When an order passed purportedly in compliance with a High Court direction merely reproduces grounds from a notification that has already been quashed, that amounts to a procedural irregularity; the Single Judge did not address these contentions on merits.
  • The order dated 6 May 2015 had found the 12 December 2007 notification arbitrary and illegal and held that certificates issued ought to have been accepted; thus the only remanded issue was the quantum payable (Rs.10,97,86,570/-), and the consequential monetary relief in the second writ petition was maintainable because the certification issue was already finally decided in the appellants' favour.
  • The suit CS No.293 of 2010 was filed without prejudice to W.P. 5365 (W) of 2010 to avoid limitation; the pendency of the first writ was pleaded in the plaint; the cause of action for the second writ petition arose later when a part claim was allowed and the remainder denied, and therefore the cause of action was different.
  • Reliance was placed, by the appellants' counsel, upon judgments including S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2004) 7 SCC 166; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sujit Kumar Banerjee (2016 Supreme (Cal) 353); and Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Co. (1997) 1 SCC 99.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Union of India: The second writ petition sought the same monetary relief (Rs.10,97,86,570/-) that was claimed in CS No.293 of 2010; accordingly the writ was barred because an alternative remedy (the civil suit) was already availed. The Court was rightly cautious about issuing a writ of mandamus to refund money when a civil suit seeking recovery for the same amount was pending. Reliance was placed on Suganmal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1965 SC 1740).
  • Limitation: The Union argued that the last payment received by the Company was on 24 June 2005 and the alleged outstanding amount pertained to April 2002–March 2007; the suit was filed more than three years thereafter and therefore may be time-barred.
  • EMA procedure and certification: The EMA claims are governed by Ministry of Textiles guidelines and minutes dated 19 September 1998 which specified that certificates for disbursement must be signed by both SGS and IJIRA. The appellants lacked IJIRA certification, and payment was therefore properly withheld. The factual disputes about certification and other irregularities required evidence and could not be resolved in writ proceedings without trial.
  • SGS's position: SGS said it had no obligation under the EMA to IJIRA or to jute mills/exporters; the MOU between SGS and IJIRA (dated 16 October 1998) did not create a legal obligation that precluded SGS from issuing certificates when exporters approached it directly. SGS emphasized factual distinctions between contractual inspection/certification and EMA-prescribed procedure.
  • Respondents relied on multiple precedents to support the proposition that parallel remedies should not be pursued and that the writ jurisdiction is discretionary and restricted when a civil remedy is available.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Others, (2004) 7 SCC 166 The opinion records that this case was cited by the appellants; the specific rule or principle relied upon was not explicitly stated in the provided opinion. The Court recorded that the appellants cited this judgment; the Court considered the authorities cited but found no error in the Single Judge's factual-applicatory conclusion. No discrete rule-from-this-case was extracted in the text.
National Insurance Company Limited & Ors. v. Sujit Kumar Banerjee, reported in 2016 Supreme (Cal) 353 (as cited) The opinion notes this case was cited by the appellants; the specific rule/principle relied upon was not expressly stated in the provided opinion. The Court noted the citation but did not elaborate a distinct application; the point about how a quotation from Suganmal was used in National Insurance was discussed by respondent counsel when addressing precedential value.
Bengal Waterproof Limited v. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Company & Another, (1997) 1 SCC 99 Cited by the appellants; the opinion does not specify the exact legal proposition taken from this case. The Court noted the citation among those argued on behalf of the appellants but did not identify any specific application of this precedent beyond considering it in argument.
Suganmal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1740 Explicitly cited by respondents for the proposition that a writ of mandamus to refund money is not ordinarily maintainable when a civil suit seeking recovery of the same amount is pending. The Court recorded that respondents relied on Suganmal to support the proposition that the writ jurisdiction should not be used to recover money where a civil suit for the same relief is pending; the Single Judge's approach was held to be consistent with that principle.
Union of India & Another v. K.S. Subramaniam, (1976) 3 SCC 677 Cited by respondents' counsel in the course of argument to critique the treatment of Suganmal in other decisions; the specific principle drawn from this case is not detailed in the opinion. The opinion records the citation in argument; the Court considered the submissions about precedential value and plurality of authority but did not derive a separate operative rule from this case in disposing the appeal.
Harminder Kar & Others v. Union of India & Others, (2009) 13 SCC 90 Cited by respondents' counsel; the provided opinion does not state the precise rule relied upon from this case. The Court recorded the citation and considered it among the authorities relied upon to support respondents' submissions about precedential weight and applicability to the facts.
Jai Singh v. Union of India & Others, (1977) 1 SCC 1 Cited by respondent no.2 to support the proposition that parallel remedies should not be pursued; the opinion does not set out a detailed rule from the case. The precedent was listed among several relied upon to demonstrate established principles about parallel proceedings and the discretionary nature of writ jurisdiction; the Court noted these but held the Single Judge's factual conclusions to be reasonable.
Satya Pal Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others, (2016) 10 SCC 767 Cited by respondent no.2; the specific rule invoked was not explicitly stated in the opinion. Included among authorities relied on by respondents to support the proposition that the matter was properly relegated to the civil forum or administrative reconsideration; the Court addressed these precedents collectively in assessing the Single Judge's decision.
Kasturchand v. Qazi Syed Saifuddin, 1983 SCC OnLine Bom 140 Cited by respondent no.2; the court text does not specify the explicit rule from this decision. Recorded in the list of citations presented by respondents; the Court considered all cited cases in the round and found no patent error in the impugned order.
S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) By Lrs. v. Jagannath (Dead) By Lrs. & Others, (1994) 1 SCC 1 Cited by respondent no.2; the opinion does not set out a specific extract or rule derived from this authority. The Court considered this case as part of respondents' compilation of authorities on the discretionary limits of writ jurisdiction and the consequences of parallel proceedings; no separate application beyond that contextual use is recorded.
Bachan Singh v. Union of India & Others, (2008) 9 SCC 161 Cited by respondents in support of the submission that the Single Judge's exercise of discretion was appropriate; the opinion does not quote a particular principle from the case. The Court noted the citation among others used to defend the impugned order and observed that the Single Judge had dealt with the authorities; the Court found no jurisdictional error in the impugned decision.
Management of Narendra & Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Workmen of Narendra & Company, (2016) 3 SCC 340 Referenced by respondents; the opinion does not articulate a particular rule extracted from this authority. Included in the set of authorities relied upon to justify the Single Judge's approach; the appellate court found that the Single Judge had considered citations and reached defensible findings.
Dr. Utpal Sharma v. Akshay Pant & Others, 2019 (1) CHN 328 Cited by respondents; the precise rule or principle cited is not stated in the opinion. Recorded as one of the decisions placed before the Court in support of respondents' submissions; the appellate court treated it as part of the broader body of authorities considered.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate Court reviewed the Single Judge's order of 31 January 2018 and the arguments on behalf of all parties. The Court's analysis, as reflected in the opinion, proceeded in the following steps:

  1. Characterization of relief and identity of claim: The Court noted that both in the writ petition and in the civil suit the appellants sought disbursement of the same amount — Rs.10,97,86,570/-. It observed that the notification of 12 December 2007, the order of 8 July 2015 and the order of 19/20 November 2015 all affected the appellants' entitlement to that same sum.
  2. Focus on cause of action: The Court emphasized that facts which have direct bearing on the lis give rise to the cause of action and that facts should be considered collectively (not in isolation) to determine whether the cause of action is the same. Improper certification and other irregularities were identified as the ultimate reasons for non-disbursement and were held to be inextricably connected to the same web of facts underlying both proceedings.
  3. Application of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC: The Court applied the statutory principle that every suit must include the whole of the claim which a plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action. The Court observed that on the date the suit was filed the whole claim relating to the existing cause of action (including the amount claimed) was available and that the subsequent writ petition asserted the same claim; accordingly the parallel writ was treated as barred.
  4. Examination of the contention that the 6 May 2015 judgment had conclusively decided certification: The Court rejected the appellants' contention that certification had been finally decided in their favour so as to render the second writ petition purely consequential. The appellate court found that while the earlier judgment criticized the 12 December 2007 notification, the later administrative orders (8 July 2015 and 19/20 November 2015) raised issues including certification and other irregularities that were integral to the same cause of action.
  5. On precedential material and factual distinctions: The Court observed that precedent is authoritative for what it decides, and slight distinctions of fact may lead to different outcomes. It recorded that no party disputed the legal propositions in the authorities cited but stressed that application of those propositions depends on specific facts. The Single Judge had considered the cited judgments and reached specific findings; the appellate Court found no patent error of law in those findings.
  6. Limited scope of judicial review: The Court reiterated that judicial review is narrow and discretionary and should be exercised sparingly. Finding no jurisdictional error, substantial failure of justice or manifest injustice in the Single Judge's order, the appellate Court concluded there was no basis to interfere.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal and the connected application are dismissed.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The Single Judge's order of 31 January 2018 (holding W.P. 2319 (W) of 2016 not maintainable because the civil suit raised the same cause of action) stands affirmed.
  • The appellants' attempt to obtain the alleged monetary disbursement of Rs.10,97,86,570/- by way of the second writ petition has been held to be barred by the existence of the civil suit and the principle that a suit should include the whole claim arising from a cause of action (Order 2 Rule 2 CPC).
  • No costs were awarded: the Court ordered "no order as to costs".
  • The Court did not indicate that a new legal principle or precedent was being laid down; in the opinion the Court expressly noted that precedents were considered but the outcome turned on application to the specific facts and that there was no jurisdictional error warranting interference. Accordingly, this decision operates as an affirmation of the Single Judge's exercise of discretion on these facts rather than as a novel legal pronouncement.

Administrative note from the judgment: urgent photostat copy of the judgment shall be granted upon compliance of formalities.

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    AI CHAMPADANY INDUSTRIES LIMITED & ANR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS

    IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

    Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

    APPELLATE SIDE

    Present:

    The Hon'ble Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty &

    The Hon'ble Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee FMA 385 of 2020

    with IA No.: CAN 1 of 2018 (Old No.: CAN 1916 of 2018)

    AI Champdany Industries Limited & Anr. versus

    Union of India & Ors.

    For the Appellants : Mr. Joydip Kar, Sr. Adv., Mr. Sabyasachi Chaudhury,

    Mr. Siddhartha Banerjee,

    Mr. Abhijit Guha Roy,

    Mr. Deborshi Das,

    Mr. Shounak Mukhopadhyay.

    For the Union of India : Mr. Indrajeet Dasgupta, Mr. Dibashis Basu,

    Ms. Rima Biswas,

    Mr. Arun Bandyopadhyay.

    For the Respondent No.2 : Mr. Saikat Chatterjee, Mr. Rahul Karmakar,

    Mr. Surya Prasad Chattopadhyay.

    For the Respondent No.4 : Mr. Suddhasatva Banerjee, Mr. Cedric Fernandez,

    Mr. Rajdeep Mantha.

    Hearing is concluded on : 1st February, 2023.

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    2

    Judgment On : 23rd February, 2023. Tapabrata Chakraborty, J.

    1. The present appeal has been preferred by AI Champdany Industries Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Company) and its functionary challenging an order dated 31stJanuary, 2018 passed in a writ petition being W.P. 2319 (W) of 2016 refusing to interfere with the orders dated 8thJuly, 2015 and 19th/20thNovember, 2015 passed by the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Textiles pursuant to the order dated 6thMay, 2015 passed in a writ petition being W.P. 5365 (W) of 2010.

    2. The appellants preferred the writ petition being W.P. 2319 (W) of 2016 stating inter alia that the respondent no.1 (hereinafter referred to as UOI) with effect from 8thFebruary, 1989 introduced the External Market Assistance Scheme (hereinafter referred to as 'the EMA scheme') with the basic object of boosting exports of jute goods from India. Under the EMA Scheme, market assistance is provided at a specified rate on export of specified jute products. The EMA scheme since its inception has got extension and has undergone modification from time to time and was valid till 31stMarch, 2007. By a notification dated 25thSeptember, 1998, food grade jute products (FGJP) were brought under the purview of the EMA scheme and it was, inter alia, specified that the exporters in order to claim the EMA scheme would have to submit pre-shipment certificates to the respondent no.2 (hereinafter referred to as NJB) along

    3

    with diverse documents specified therein. Such pre-shipment certificates would have to be signed by duly constituted authority of respondent no.3 (hereinafter referred to as IJIRA) and/or their licensee being the respondent no. 4 (hereinafter referred to as SGS) for the said purpose. On the basis of such EMA scheme the Company submitted its claim with the NJB and the goods which were manufactured and exported by the Company were inspected either by the SGS or by IJIRA and after such inspection of the products, payment was also received by the Company in respect of such claim but all on a sudden vide letter dated 12th December, 2007 issued by the Central Government to NJB it was inter alia indicated that FGJP certificates issued by SGS do not conform to the procedure laid down in the EMA Scheme, therefore, the claim made on the basis of the certificate issued by SGS would not be entertained. Challenging the said notification, the appellants earlier preferred a writ petition being W.P. 5365 (W) of 2010. Upon contested hearing the said writ petition was disposed of by a judgment and order dated 6thMay, 2015 observing inter alia that the notification/order dated 12th December, 2007 has been arbitrarily, erroneously, whimsically, given with retrospective effect by the authority without any valid reason. By the said order the Secretary, Ministry of Textiles and his delegate were directed to consider the writ petitioners/appellants' claim, in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in the judgment. As directed, an opportunity of hearing was granted and an order was passed on 8thJuly, 2015 rejecting the appellants' claim. Pointing out the

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    infirmities in the said order, the appellants submitted a representation dated 30thJuly, 2015 to review the earlier decision but such prayer was denied by an order dated 19th/20thNovember, 2015.

    3. The said writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 31st January, 2018 observing inter alia that 'in the situation, while the suit is pending for adjudication upon evidence of the parties, any observation or decision about the impugned report, as revisited, may cause prejudice to either of the parties. Therefore, refraining myself from entering into merits and keeping liberty of the parties in tact and keeping all points pertaining to the report of EMA claims dated 8th July, 2015, as was assailed in the writ petition, open for raising in the civil suit (supra), if so requires, the writ petition being held not maintainable, is disposed of without going into merits'.

    4. Mr. Kar, learned advocate, assisted by Mr. Chaudhury, learned advocate appearing for the appellants submits that the learned Judge erred in law in refusing the appellants' prayer on the ground of availability of alternative efficacious remedy by reason of filing of prior suit, failing to appreciate that the subject matter of the writ petition was the orders dated 8thJuly, 2015 and 19th/20thNovember, 2015 rejecting the appellants' claim and that the said orders are not and could not be the subject matter of the civil suit, which was filed in the year 2010.

    5. He contends that the learned Judge failed to appreciate that when the order passed in purported compliance of the order of the Hon'ble High Court is a reproduction of the grounds from a notification

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    which has already been quashed, the same amounts to procedural irregularity. The learned Judge disposed of the matter abruptly without dealing with the contentions as urged by the appellants on merits.

    6. Mr. Kar argues that notwithstanding the pendency of the suit in 2010, the order dated 6thMay, 2015 was passed observing that the notification dated 12thDecember, 2007 was arbitrary and illegal and in view thereof, the orders dated 8thJuly, 2015 and 19th/20thNovember, 2015 impugned in the second writ petition did not and could not have any connection with the pending suit.

    7. According to him, the suit being CS No.293 of 2010 was filed without prejudice to the pending writ petition being WP No.5365 (W) of 2010. The appellants were constrained to prefer the suit during the pendency of the writ petition to prevent their claim from being barred by limitation and the fact of pendency of the writ petition was averred in paragraph 33 of the plaint. The cause of action of the instant writ petition cannot be said to be the same or even continuing, as because the order which was assailed in the earlier writ petition, was quashed by this Court, and after revisiting the issue a fresh cause of action arose when the part claim of the appellants was considered favourably, denying the rest for no fault on their part. The order dated 8thJuly, 2015 was not even born at the stage of the first writ petition. In support of his arguments, Mr. Chaudhury has placed reliance upon the judgments delivered in the cases of S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. -vs- State of Bihar and Others, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 166 and National Insurance

    6

    Company Limited & Ors. -vs- Sujit Kumar Banerjee, reported in 2016 0 Supreme(Cal) 353 and Bengal Waterproof Limited -vs- Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Company and Another, reported in (1997) 1 SCC 99.

    8. Mr. Kar contends that the certification issue was never remanded by the order dated 6thMay, 2015. A perusal of the said order would reveal that the Hon'ble Court arrived at a categoric finding that the notification dated 12thDecember, 2007 had been issued arbitrarily and as the conditions of the EMA scheme stood satisfied, the certificates issued ought to have been accepted. The only issue thus remanded was to ascertain as to whether the quantum of dues payable to the appellants was Rs.10,97,86,570/-. The relief thus claimed through the second writ petition was a consequential relief of a monetary claim which was illegally turned down by the impugned order dated 8thJuly, 2015. A writ petition involving such consequential relief of monetary claim is maintainable moreso when the amount has been withheld on the sole ground of certification though such issue has already been finally decided. The order dated 6thMay, 2015 has reached its finality since no appeal has been preferred against the same by the respondents.

    9. Per contra, Mr. Dasgupta, learned advocate appearing for UOI submits that the writ petition was preferred inter alia praying for issuance of necessary direction upon the respondents 'to forthwith release the pending claim of EMA of the petitioners in terms of annexure

    "P11" hereto'. The said annexure would reveal that the claim was of Rs.10,97,86,570/-. The same amount has also been claimed by the

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    appellants in the Civil Suit No.293 of 2010. In view thereof, the learned Single Judge rightly observed that the second writ petition is barred since alternative remedy has already been availed by the appellants by filing a civil suit on similar cause of action. A prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the appropriate authority to refund money is not ordinarily maintainable, moreso when a suit is pending before the competent civil forum seeking a decree for recovery of the self-same amount. In support of such contention reliance has been placed upon a judgment delivered in the case of Suganmal -vs- State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1740.

    10. Drawing our attention to the documents annexed at pages 97 and 105 of the stay application, Mr. Dasgupta submits that the Company last received payment on 24thJune, 2005 and the outstanding amount of Rs.10,97,86,570/- pertains to a period from April, 2002 till March, 2007 and as such the appellants' claim is also barred by limitation. The suit has been filed by the appellants more than three years thereafter.

    11. According to Mr. Dasgupta, the EMA claims are subject to the guidelines of the Ministry of Textiles and the procedure enumerated in the minutes of the meeting dated 19thSeptember, 1998 which clearly specified that for disbursement of the amount claimed 'certificates will be signed by both by SGS & IJIRA'. Indisputably, the appellants were not having certification from IJIRA and as such payment was rightly withheld. The discrepancies and the irregularities, as pointed out in

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    paragraph 10 of the order dated 8thJuly, 2015 involves disputed questions of facts which can only be decided upon leading evidence.

    12. He further argues that it is the specific stand of SGS that the EMA scheme was a scheme to govern only the dealings by and between the jute mills/exporters including the appellants and IJIRA and that SGS had no obligation towards IJIRA or jute mills/exporters under the EMA scheme. In support of such contention he has drawn our attention to the averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by SGS in the writ petition.

    13. He contends that the judgment in the case of Suganmal (supra) was a judgment delivered by five Hon'ble Judges. In the case of National Insurance Company Limited & Others (supra) only a part of paragraph 6 of the judgment delivered in the case of Suganmal (supra) was merely quoted but the ratio was not discussed in detail and the same was not distinguished with reasons though the practice for such discussion has now crystallized into a rule of law. In support of such contention reliance has been placed upon judgments delivered in the cases of Union of India and Another -vs- K.S. Subramaniam, reported in (1976) 3 SCC 677 and Harminder Kar and Others -vs- Union of India and Others, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 90.

    14. Mr. Banerjee, learned advocate appearing for SGS submits that SGS had no obligation towards IJIRA or jute mills/exporters under the EMA scheme. It is true that a Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter referred to as MOU) was entered into by and between SGS

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    and IJIRA on 16thOctober, 1998. However, the said MOU did not restrain SGS from carrying out tests if jute mills/exporters directly approached it for obtaining test certificates. There existed a clear distinction between the procedure to be followed in respect of EMA scheme and the consignments which have the contractual obligation between the buyer and the exporter for inspection and certification by

    SGS.

    15. Drawing our attention to a representation dated 31stJanuary, 2005, annexed at page 485 of the stay application, Mr. Karmakar, learned advocate appearing for the respondent no.2 submits that the benefits of EMA scheme were being syphoned off in an unscrupulous manner by the appellants without obtaining proper certification from the appropriate authorities. Upon receipt of such complaint, the matter was enquired into and thereafter the notification dated 12thDecember, 2007 was issued observing inter alia that EMA claims have been disbursed based on certification from SGS only and without following due procedure as prescribed and as such 'there is a necessity to look into these cases from recovery point of view separately'.

    16. According to Mr. Karmakar, the Hon'ble Judge while deciding the first writ petition on 6thMay, 2015 did not set aside the notification dated 12thDecember, 2007 but disposed of the writ petition relegating the matter to the Secretary, Ministry of Textile and his delegate for consideration of the writ petitioners' claim, in accordance with law and

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    in the light of the observations made in the judgment since in view of the Court, justice would be sub-served if such procedure is adopted.

    17. He contends that the cause of action involves a bundle of facts and the averments made in the writ petition coupled with those made in the plaint reflects a single story. The Court by the earlier order dated 6th May, 2015 did not stop the investigation but relegated the matter for further consideration in accordance with law and such remand is not conclusive between the parties and the issues can be reopened at the time of final determination of the dispute. The enquiry initiated was thus not stalled or set aside. The issues agitated in the first writ petition were identical to the questions involved in the suit and the appellants cannot pursue two parallel remedies. Such clinching facts do not warrant exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. In support of such arguments reliance has been placed upon the judgments delivered in the cases of Jai Singh -vs- Union of India and Others, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 1, Satya Pal Anand -vs- State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, reported in (2016) 10 SCC 767, Kasturchand -vs- Qazi Syed Saifuddin, reported in 1983 SCC OnLine Bom 140 and S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) By Lrs. -vs- Jagannath (Dead) By Lrs. and Others, reported in

    (1994) 1 SCC 1.

    18. He argues that the authorities have acted in strict consonance with the directions issued by the learned Single Judge in the earlier writ petition and considered the appellants' grievances, upon granting an opportunity of hearing and there is no error in such decision making

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    process warranting interference in exercise of the jurisdiction of judicial review. Considering the materials on record, the Hon'ble Judge arrived at a finding and there is no justification in entering a different finding without any further material before this appellate Court. In support of such contention reliance has been placed upon the judgments delivered in the cases of Bachan Singh -vs- Union of India and Others, reported in (2008) 9 SCC 161, Management of Narendra & Company Private Limited - vs- Workmen of Narendra & Company, reported in (2016) 3 SCC 340 and Dr. Utpal Sharma -vs- Akshay Pant and Others, reported in 2019 (1) CHN

    328.

    19. Mr. Kar, in reply, submits that the subject matter of the first writ petition was a notification dated 12thDecember, 2007 whereas the subject matter of the second writ petition are the orders dated 8thJuly, 2015 and 19th/20thNovember, 2015. The orders impugned in the second writ petition were not even born at the time of preference of the first writ petition and the civil suit and as such the learned Judge erred in law in arriving at a finding that the cause of action was same and identical.

    20. By the order impugned in the present appeal, the writ petition was disposed of observing that 'in the situation, while the suit is pending for adjudication upon evidence of the parties, any observation or decision about the impugned report, as revisited, may cause prejudice to either of the parties. Therefore, refraining myself from entering into merits and keeping liberty of the parties in tact and keeping all points pertaining to

    12

    the report of EMA claims dated 8th July, 2015, as was assailed in the writ petition, open for raising in the civil suit (supra), if so requires, the writ petition being held not maintainable, is disposed of without going into merits'.

    21. A perusal of the order impugned reveals that the Court did not go into the merits of the claim, instead disposed of the writ petition as not maintainable since, according to the learned Single Judge, the second writ petition has been preferred on the self-same cause of action which was involved in the suit. Both in the writ petition as well as in the suit, the appellants had claimed disbursement of an amount of Rs.10,97,86,570/-. The notification dated 12thDecember, 2007 was issued referring to a letter dated 19thNovember, 2007 issued by the Secretary, NJB and after conducting an enquiry. From the contents of the same it would be explicit that the amount was withheld on the ground of lack of certification and it was also observed that there is a necessity to look into those cases from recovery point of view. The order impugned in the second writ petition would reveal that apart from the issue of certification there were other irregularities.

    22. The facts which have a direct bearing on the lis give rise to the cause of action. What is to be seen is whether a particular fact is of substance and can be said to be material, integral or essential part of the lis between the parties. To determine the cause of action, the facts need to be considered together and not in isolation. A particular fact cannot be taken up and highlighted. Improper certification and other

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    irregularities are the ultimate reasons towards non-disbursement of Rs.10,97,86,570/-, as claimed in the suit and the writ petition. The said reasons are inextricably connected with the web of facts involved in the lis. In view thereof, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Kar that the cause of action involved in the writ petition is different from the cause of action involved in the second writ petition and that the claim for disbursement is a consequential relief since the issue of certification has already been decided in favour of the appellants in the earlier writ petition.

    23. As per the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action. Once the petitioner/plaintiff approach a Court of law for getting any redress basing his case on an existing cause of action, he must include in the suit the whole claim pertaining to that cause of action. On the date the suit was filed, the whole claim on the basis of the existing cause of action was a claim for disbursement of an amount of Rs.10,97,86,570/-. On the date of filing of the second writ petition also the claim pertaining to the cause of action existing on that date was also a claim for an amount of Rs.10,97,86,570/- and that as such we do not find any error with the observation that 'this parallel proceeding before the writ court upon hearing the point of maintainable is held as barred'. Both the notification dated 12thDecember, 2007 as well as the order dated 8thJuly, 2015 debars the entitlement of the appellants. In the second order apart from certification various other

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    irregularities have been point out. The reasons towards withholding of the claim may be different but the claim is identical. The orders dated 12thDecember, 2007, 8thJuly, 2015 and 19th/20thNovember, 2015 are incidental to the cause of action and as such the second writ petition has rightly been held to be barred.

    24. It is well known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. Even a slight distinction in fact or an additional fact may make a lot of difference in decision making process. There is no dispute as regards the proposition of law laid down in the judgments cited by the respective parties but the application of such proposition is certainly dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of the respective cases. Judgment is a precedent for the issue of law that is raised and decided and not observations made in the facts of any particular case. Plentitude of pronouncements leaves cleavage in the opinions formed in the respective cases.

    25. The learned Single Judge, upon dealing with all the judgments cited and considering the arguments advanced, has arrived at specific findings and we do not find any error, least to say any patent error of law in the order impugned. The scope of judicial review is very narrow and limited and such jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the Court dictates. The impugned judgment does not suffer from any jurisdictional error or any substantial failure of justice or any manifest injustice warranting interference of this Court.

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    26. For the reasons discussed above, the appeal and the connected application are dismissed.

    27. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

    28. Urgent Photostat copy of this judgment, if applied for, shall be granted to the parties as expeditiously as possible, upon compliance of all formalities.

    (Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.) (Tapabrata Chakraborty, J.)

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