Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

A/266/2022

Disposition

dismissed

Attorney(S)

Acts

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Case Summary: FA/266/2022 Baldev Sharma v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors. (10.02.2023)

Factual and Procedural Background

The present First Appeal No. 266/2022 was instituted on 21.12.2022 by Mr. Baldev Sharma (appellant) challenging an impugned order dated 14.10.2022 in Complaint Case No. 501/2012 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-II (South), New Delhi.

Along with the appeal, the appellant filed an application (IA-1894/2022) seeking condonation of delay allegedly of 23 days in filing the appeal. The State Commission considered the application under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The appellant appeared in person (a practicing counsel). The appeal was heard and decided on 10.02.2023.

The appellant's factual explanation for the delay, as recorded in the opinion, includes that he applied for a certified copy of the impugned order on 09.11.2022 and only then came to know that the District Forum had passed the order on 14.10.2022; he later applied for certified copies of documents on 22.11.2022 which were received on 15.12.2022; and on 15.12.2022 the appellant took his mother (who suffers from sugar, heart disease and lung infection) to Safdarjung Hospital, Delhi, for treatment. The appellant produced an OPD card dated 15.12.2022.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the delay in preferring the appeal beyond thirty days from the date of the impugned order (14.10.2022) can be condoned under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 by satisfaction of "sufficient cause".

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant explained that the impugned order was reserved on 09.06.2022 and that he only applied for and (effectively) obtained the certified copy of the impugned order on 09.11.2022, at which time he discovered that the order had been passed on 14.10.2022.
The appellant further asserted that he applied for certified copies of other documents on 22.11.2022 (received 15.12.2022), which caused delay in preparing and filing the appeal.
The appellant stated that on 15.12.2022 he had to take his mother (who suffers from diabetes, heart disease and lung infection) to Safdarjung Hospital for treatment; an OPD card dated 15.12.2022 was annexed.
Implicitly, the appellant sought that these circumstances together constituted "sufficient cause" for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Basawaraj and Ors. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746	Explanation of the meaning of "sufficient cause" — that it must be adequate, the party must not have acted negligently or without bona fide and must satisfy the court that they were prevented by sufficient cause from prosecuting their case.	The Commission reproduced relevant paras of this judgment and used the definition to assess whether the appellant's reasons qualified as "sufficient cause".
Anil Kumar Sharma v. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., IV (2015) CPJ 453 (NC)	Emphasized the need for satisfactory explanation for long delays and referenced that the special period of limitation under the Consumer Protection Act should be kept in mind to preserve expeditious adjudication of consumer disputes.	The Commission cited the decision to underline that belated appeals/revisions which are highly delayed should not lightly be entertained and to require adequate explanation of day-to-day delay.
Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC)	Noted (as cited in the NCDRC decision) that while deciding condonation applications courts must keep in mind the special period of limitation under the Consumer Protection Act and the object of expeditious adjudication.	Referenced (via the NCDRC discussion) to support the principle that special limitation periods in consumer matters warrant strict consideration and that undue delays undermine expeditious adjudication.
Lingeswaran Etc. v. Thirunagalingam, SLP (C) Nos.2054-2055/2022 (decided 25.02.2022)	Holds that where a court finds delay is not properly explained and there are no merits in the condonation application, the application should be dismissed; the court cannot give a premium to a person who fails to explain delay and is guilty of delay and laches.	The Commission relied upon this dictum to support dismissal of the condonation application where explanations were found insufficient and the appellant had failed to act diligently.
Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765	Reiterates that where a statute prescribes a period of limitation, the law of limitation must be applied strictly and courts have no power to extend the period on equitable grounds merely because hardship may result.	The Commission invoked this principle to emphasize that statutory limitation periods under the Consumer Protection Act must be enforced and cannot be extended on equitable grounds absent sufficient cause.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Commission first identified and applied Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, which prescribes that an appeal to the State Commission against an order of the District Forum must be preferred within thirty days from the date of the order, subject to the proviso that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period if it is satisfied there was "sufficient cause" for not filing within that period.

The Commission noted the chronology in the record: the impugned order was pronounced on 14.10.2022; the statutory thirty-day period therefore expired on 13.11.2022; the present appeal was filed on 21.12.2022 — which the opinion states is a delay of 38 days beyond the period.

To evaluate whether the delay could be condoned, the Commission examined the appellant's explanations in light of the authorities cited. The Commission highlighted the authoritative meaning of "sufficient cause" (reproducing paras from Basawaraj) — that the applicant must not have acted negligently, must show bona fide conduct and must furnish a satisfactory explanation preventing prosecution of the case.

The Commission then considered the appellant's stated reasons: (i) that he only became aware of the order on 09.11.2022 upon applying for a certified copy, (ii) that he applied for other documents on 22.11.2022 and received them on 15.12.2022, and (iii) that his mother visited Safdarjung Hospital on 15.12.2022. The Commission observed that the OPD card showed tests and medicines but no admission or advice for rest, and that her condition was stable.

Critically, the Commission found that the appellant had not provided specific or cogent reasons in the condonation application. It concluded that the appellant had been "moving at his own pace" and was unmindful of the statutory thirty-day limit. Applying the cited precedents, the Commission found that the appellant failed to demonstrate "sufficient cause" — there was neither a satisfactory explanation nor evidence of lack of diligence or bona fide prevention from filing the appeal within time.

On this reasoning — grounded in Section 15 and the authorities cited — the application for condonation of delay was held to be not maintainable and was dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Commission dismissed the application for condonation of delay and, consequently, the appeal filed beyond the statutory period is also dismissed.

Implications:

Direct effect: The appellant's application for condonation (IA-1894/2022) was dismissed and the First Appeal No. 266/2022 was accordingly dismissed for being filed beyond the statutory period.
Costs: The Commission ordered that there shall be no order as to costs in the facts of the case.
Administrative: The file was directed to be consigned to the record room.
Precedential effect: The opinion applies established law on "sufficient cause" and limitation under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986; the decision does not purport to create new law but applies existing authorities to the facts before the Commission.

Disposition pronounced: 10.02.2023 — Members: Hon'ble Ms. Pinki (Member Judicial) and Hon'ble Mr. J.P. Agrawal (Member General).

Show full summary ...

BALDEV SHARMA v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

FA/266/2022 BALDEV SHARMA VS. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS DOD:10.02.2023 Dismissed Page 1 of 7

IN THE DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL

COMMISSION

Date of Institution:21.12.2022 Date of hearing : 05.01.2023 Date of Decision :10.02.2023 FIRST APPEAL NO. 266/2022

IN THE MATTER OF

MR. BALDEV SHARMA

S/O MR. DHARAMBIR SHARMA, R/O VILLAGE SEHNOLI, P.O. HASSANPUR,

TEHSIL HODAL, DISTT. PALWAL,

AT PRESENT R/O H.NO. 2663, GF, SECTOR-3, HOUSING BOARD COLONY, FARIDABAD-121004

…APPLICANT/APPELLANT

VERSUS

1. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

D-BLOCK, VIKAS SADAN, NEW DELHI-110023

THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (HOUSING)

LIG DEPARTMENT

2. ASSTT. DIRECTOR (HOUSING) LIG DEPARTMENT

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,

D-BLOCK, VIKAS SADAN, NEW DELHI-110023

3. MS. VARSHA SINHA DIRECTOR (H)-II

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,

D-BLOCK, VIKAS SADAN, NEW DELHI-110023

4. THE CHIEF ENGINEER, EAST ZONE

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,

VIKAS MINAR, NEW DELHI

5. THE CHIEF ENGINEER ELECTRICAL

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,

VASANT KUNJ, NEW DELHI

....NON-APPLICANTS/ RESPONDENTS

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. PINKI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL) HON'BLE MR. J.P. AGRAWAL, MEMBER (GENERAL)

Present : Appellant in person, who is a practicing counsel.

PER: HON'BLE MS. PINKI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)

1. The present appeal has been filed on 21.12.2022 challenging the impugned order dated 14.10.2022 vide which CC No.501/2012 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-II (South), Udyog Sadan, C-22 & 23, Qutub Institutional Area (Behind Qutub Hotel), New Delhi-110016.

2. This order will dispose off an application (IA-1894/2022) seeking condonation of delay of 23 days in filing the appeal, filed alongwith the appeal.

3. The submissions of the applicant/ appellant have been heard and considered. The record has been carefully and thoroughly perused.

4. The application has been moved without any provision of law. However, it is being considered under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as it is arising out of Complaint Case No.501/2012.

5. Application for condonation of delay has been filed on the ground that the arguments in the complaint were heard and the same was reserved for orders by the learned District Forum on 09.06.2022. On 09.11.2022, appellant applied for certified copy of the impugned order after waiting for more than three months and received the copy of impugned order free of cost, the appellant came to know that the order had already been passed by the learned District Forum on 14.10.2022. Thereafter, appellant had applied for certified copy of the documents on 22.11.2022 vide dairy No.2165 which was duly received on 15.12.2022. It is further submitted that on 15.12.2022, appellant's mother who is patient of sugar, heart disease and lungs infection was taken to

Safdarjung Hospital Delhi for treatment by the appellant and his wife. Therefore, the delay in filing appeal was neither deliberate nor intentional.

6. To adjudicate this issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides as under:-

"Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed.

Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:

[Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of the amount or rupees thirty-five thousand, whichever is less]"

7. A perusal of the aforesaid statutory position reflects that the appeal against an order should be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of impugned judgment. On perusal of record before us, it is clear that the impugned order was pronounced on 14.10.2022 and the present appeal was filed on

21.12.2022 i.e. after a delay of 38 days.

8. In order to condone the delay, the Appellant has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the stipulated period. The term 'sufficient cause' has been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:-

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context,

"sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose."

9. We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. Reported in

IV(2015)CPJ453(NC), wherein the Hon'ble NCDRC held as under:

"12. ………we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority ., IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained."

10. We further deem it appropriate to refer to Lingeswaran Etc. Versus Thirunagalingam in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.2054-2055/2022 decided on 25.02.2022, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: -

"5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of PopatBahiruGoverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.

11. From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble National Commission, it is clear that 'sufficient cause'

means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and the applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.

12. Reverting to the material available before us, we find that the impugned order was passed on 14.10.2022 and the period of limitation starts from the date of order which had expired on

13.11.2022. However, the reason stated for the delay is that order dated 14.10.2022 came to the knowledge of the appellant on 09.11.2022 when the appellant applied for certified copy of the impugned order. Thereafter, appellant had applied for other document on 22.11.2022 before the learned District Forum after knowing the procedure of filing of the appeal and the same were received by the appellant on 15.12.2022 which cause delay in filing the appeal. On 15.12.2022, mother of the appellant was taken to Safdarjung Hospital Delhi for treatment by the appellant as she is suffering from sugar, heart disease and lung infection. Copy of OPD paper of Safdarjung Hospital, Delhi of mother of the appellant is annexed with the appeal. As per OPD card dated 15.12.2022, certain tests (KFT/LFT) have been advised and medicines have been prescribed. She has neither been advised rest nor admitted. Her condition was stable.

13. However, no specific reasons have been mentioned in the application seeking condonation of delay filed by the applicant/appellant. Therefore, it is abundantly clear from the above that the appellant was moving at his own pace unmindful that the appeal is to be filed within 30 days from the date of order.

14. However, no cogent reason has been explained by the applicant/appellant.

15. Having regard to the statutory position discussed in para supra and the facts of the case, the applicant/appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for the delay in filing the present appeal. Therefore, the application filed by the appellant seeking

condonation of delay cannot be admitted and accordingly, the same is dismissed on the above grounds.

16. Consequently, the present appeal filed beyond the statutory period shall also stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.

17. File be consigned to record room.

PINKI

MEMBER (JUDICIAL)

J.P. AGRAWAL

MEMBER (GENERAL)

Pronounced on 10.02.2023.

BALDEV SHARMA v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Case Summary: FA/266/2022 Baldev Sharma v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors. (10.02.2023)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

BALDEV SHARMA v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Comments