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IA/1797/2022

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Concise Analytical Summary — FA/240/2022

Factual and Procedural Background

This summary is based exclusively on the opinion dated 09.02.2023 delivered by the Delhi State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (Coram: Justice Sangita Dhingra Sehgal (President) and Ms. Pinki (Member, Judicial)).

The appeal (First Appeal No. 240/2022) was instituted on 30.11.2022 by the applicants/appellants State Bank of India (through Branch Manager, Tis Hazari Court Branch and through General Manager, Local Head Office, New Delhi) against Mr. Dinesh Chandra Belwal (respondent). The appeal impugns an order dated 30.09.2022 by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-I (North) in Complaint Case No. 49/2017, in which the District Forum had allowed CC No.49/2017.

Along with the appeal, the appellant filed an application (IA-1797/2022) for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. That application was filed on 09.12.2022 (diary No. 9797). The appellant's stated chronology (paras 2–5 of the application reproduced in the opinion) was:

Final arguments in the consumer complaint were heard on 07.12.2021 and reserved for final orders.
The impugned final order was passed on 30.09.2022 when neither party was present, and the appellant was therefore not aware of it.
The appellant received a certified copy of the impugned order by post on 27.10.2022.
The appellant applied for certified copies of the complaint and other relevant documents before the District Forum (diary No. 1132); those documents were provided on 29.11.2022, and the appeal was filed on 30.11.2022.

The Commission examined the statutory provision (Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986), the record (including an annotation showing the impugned order was dispatched on 21.10.2022 and received by the appellant on 27.10.2022), and authorities bearing on the meaning of "sufficient cause" for condoning delay.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the delay in filing the appeal (appeal filed on 30.11.2022 against an order dated 30.09.2022) can be condoned under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 by demonstrating a "sufficient cause".
If condonation is sought, whether the appellant has furnished a satisfactory explanation that meets the threshold of "sufficient cause" as expounded by higher courts.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant contended that the final order was passed on 30.09.2022 when no party was present, so the appellant was unaware of the order.
The appellant stated it received the certified copy of the impugned order by post on 27.10.2022.
The appellant asserted it then sought certified copies of the complaint and other relevant documents (diary No. 1132), which were provided on 29.11.2022, and filed the appeal on 30.11.2022.
Implicit in these factual averments was the contention that the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned because the appellant only became aware of the order on 27.10.2022 and then needed documents to prepare the appeal.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any counter-arguments made on behalf of the respondent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Basawaraj and Ors. v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746	The definition and scope of "sufficient cause" — described as "adequate" or "enough"; the applicant must show absence of negligence, bona fide action, and that they were prevented by sufficient cause from prosecuting the case; the court must be satisfied with the explanation.	The Commission relied on the quoted passage to frame the standard that the appellant must meet to obtain condonation of delay and that a satisfactory explanation is required before exercising discretion to condone delay.
Anil Kumar Sharma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., IV (2015) CPJ 453 (NC)	Emphasis on strict observance of the special period of limitation under the Consumer Protection Act and that belated appeals/revisions defeat the object of expeditious adjudication; day-to-day delay must be explained.	The Commission cited this National Commission decision to underscore the need for strictness in consumer matters and the requirement to explain delay in detail.
Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) (as cited in Anil Kumar Sharma)	While deciding condonation applications, courts must bear in mind the special period of limitation in consumer matters and the objective of expeditious adjudication.	Cited (via the National Commission decision) as supporting authority for the principle that consumer appeals must generally comply with strict limitation periods.
Lingeswaran Etc. v. Thirunagalingam, SLP (C) Nos. 2054-2055/2022 (decided 25.02.2022)	Where delay is not properly explained and there are no merits in the condonation application, the application should be dismissed; the law of limitation must be applied with rigour as prescribed by statute.	The Commission invoked this Supreme Court view to support the proposition that unexplained delay and lack of merit require dismissal of condonation applications and to emphasise that courts cannot extend statutory limitation on equitable grounds.
Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765	The law of limitation may harshly affect a party but must be applied with full rigour when the statute prescribes it; courts lack power to extend limitation on equitable grounds.	Cited (within the discussion of Lingeswaran) to reinforce the principle that statutory limitation periods must be strictly enforced.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Commission's analysis proceeded in a sequential manner, confined to the material on the record and the applicable statute and authorities:

Statutory starting point: The Commission referred to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which prescribes that an appeal from a District Forum to the State Commission must be preferred within thirty days from the date of the order, but that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after that period if satisfied that there was "sufficient cause" for delay.
Chronology and limitation computation: The impugned judgment was pronounced on 30.09.2022. The appeal was filed on 30.11.2022, which looked like a delay of 31 days if counted from the date of the order.
Receipt date adjustment: The Court examined the record annotation showing the impugned order was dispatched on 21.10.2022 and received by the appellant on 27.10.2022. On that basis the Commission treated the limitation period as beginning from the date of receipt, i.e., 27.10.2022, so that the thirty-day period expired on 26.11.2022. Filing on 30.11.2022 therefore reflected a delay of four days.
Assessment of explanation: The Commission considered the appellant's explanation that it only became aware upon receipt on 27.10.2022, then applied for certified copies of documents and filed the appeal after receiving them on 29.11.2022. The Commission found no cogent explanation on the record as to when the appellant had applied for certified copies before the learned District Forum (i.e., the date and reason for the delay in seeking certified documents had not been satisfactorily explained).
Application of legal standard: The Commission relied on the authorities cited (Basawaraj, the NCDRC decision in Anil Kumar Sharma, Lingeswaran and cases cited therein) to articulate the governing standard: "sufficient cause" requires a satisfactory, non-negligent, bona fide explanation; Courts should be cautious in exercising discretion and must enforce special limitation periods in consumer matters with appropriate rigour.
Conclusion on sufficiency of cause: Applying that standard to the facts, the Commission concluded that the appellant had failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the short delay (four days) and had not furnished a convincing explanation for the delay in seeking or obtaining certified documents. Consequently, the Commission declined to admit the application for condonation of delay.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application for condonation of delay (IA-1797/2022) was dismissed, and accordingly the appeal that was filed beyond the statutory period was also DISMISSED.

Consequences and implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The appeal filed by the applicants/appellants (State Bank of India & Anr.) stands dismissed for being time-barred because the appellant failed to demonstrate "sufficient cause" for the delay. The District Forum's order dated 30.09.2022 (which had allowed CC No.49/2017) therefore remains intact to the extent not otherwise stayed or altered by other proceedings (the opinion does not describe any stay or further relief).
Costs: The Commission ordered that there shall be no order as to costs in the facts of the case.
Administrative closure: The file was directed to be consigned to the record room.
Precedential impact: The opinion applies established principles from the cited higher court authorities about "sufficient cause" and the strict application of limitation in consumer matters. The opinion does not purport to establish any new legal principle; it applies existing precedent and statutory provision to the facts before the Commission.

Disposition: Application for condonation dismissed; appeal dismissed; no order as to costs. Pronounced on 09.02.2023. File to be consigned to record room.

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STATE BANK OF INDIA v. DINESH CHANDRA BELWAL

FA/240/2022 STATE BANK OF INDIA & ANR. VS. DINESH CHANDRA BEL WAL DOD:09.02.2023 DISMISSED Page 1 of 7

IN THE DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL

COMMISSION

Date of Institution:30.11.2022 Date of hearing : 18.01.2023 Date of Decision :09.02.2023 FIRST APPEAL NO. 240/2022

IN THE MATTER OF

1. STATE BANK OF INDIA

THROUGH BRANCH MANAGER

TIS HAZARI COURT BRANCH

TIS HAZARI, DELHI-110054

2. STATE BANK OF INDIA

THROUGH GENERAL MANAGER

LOCAL HEAD OFFICE

11, SANSAD MARG,

NEW DELHI-110001 …APPLICANT/APPELLANT

VERSUS

MR. DINESH CHANDRA BELWAL

S/O LATE MR. PREM VALLAB R/O 4174-75, TEL MANDI

GALI KASERUWALAN PAHARGANJ,

NEW DELHI-110055

....NON-APPLICANT/ RESPONDENT

CORAM:

HON'BLE JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL (PRESIDENT) HON'BLE MS. PINKI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)

Present: Mr. Goutam Prasad, counsel for the appellant.

PER: HON'BLE MS. PINKI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)

1. The present appeal has been filed on 30.11.2022 impugning the order dated 30.09.2022 vide which CC No.49/2017 was allowed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-I (North), Ground Floor, Court Annexe-2, Building, Tis Hazari Court Complex, Delhi-

110054.

2. This order will dispose off an application (IA-1797/2022) seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. This application was filed on 09.12.2022 vide diary No.9797.

3. The submissions of learned counsel for the applicant/ appellant have been heard and considered. The record has been carefully and thoroughly perused.

4. The application has been moved without any provision of law. However, it is being considered under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as it is arising out of Complaint Case No.49/2017.

5. Application for condonation of delay has been filed on the various grounds. Para No.2 to 5 of the application read as under:

"2. THAT final arguments in Consumer Complaint was heard by the learned forum below on 7^th December 2021 and the same was reserved for final orders.

3. THAT later the final order (impugned order) was passed on 30^th September 2022, when neither party was present in court and hence the appellant was not aware of the said order.

4. THAT appellant came to know of the said order on 27^th October, 2022, when it received certified copy of the order through post.

5. THAT as appellant received the impugned order, it discussed the same with it's counsel and later decided to file appeal before this hon'ble forum. However, the appellants didn't had copy of complaint and other

relevant document required to be filed along with present appeal. Hence, it applied for certified copy of the same vide diary No.1132. Those documents was provided to the appellant on 29^th November, 2022 and on very next date i.e. 30^th November 2022 present appeal was filed."

6. To adjudicate this issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides as under:-

"Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed.

Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:

[Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of the amount or rupees thirty-five thousand, whichever is less]"

7. A perusal of the aforesaid statutory position reflects that the appeal against an order should be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of impugned judgment. On perusal of record before us, it is clear that the impugned judgment was pronounced on

30.09.2022 and the present appeal was filed on 30.11.2022 i.e. after a delay of 31 days.

8. In order to condone the delay, the Appellant has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the stipulated period. The term 'sufficient cause' has been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl.

Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:-

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word

"sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose."

9. We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. Reported in

IV(2015)CPJ453(NC), wherein the Hon'ble NCDRC held as under: -

"12. ………we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority ., IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing

appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained."

10. We further deem it appropriate to refer to Lingeswaran Etc. Versus Thirunagalingam in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.2054- 2055/2022decided on 25.02.2022,wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: -

"5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of PopatBahiruGoverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.

11. From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble National Commission, it is clear that 'sufficient cause' means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and the applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from

prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.

12. Reverting to the material available before us, we find that the impugned order was passed on 30.09.2022 and the period of limitation starts from the date of order which had expired on 30.10.2022. However, the reason stated for the delay is that the appellant had came to know of the said order on 27.10.2022, when it received certified copy of the impugned order through post.

13. The annotation mentioned at page No.4 of the impugned order reveals that the impugned order was dispatched to the parties on 21.10.2022 vide dispatched No.1146 and it was received to the appellant on 27.10.2022. Therefore, the period of limitation starts from the date of receiving of impugned order on 27.10.2022 which has expired on 26.11.2022. There is delay of four days in filing the appeal.

14. However, no cogent reason has been explained by the applicant/appellant to show as to when the appellant had applied for certified copies of the documents before the learned District Forum.

15. Having regard to the statutory position discussed in para supra and the facts of the case, the applicant/appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for the delay in filing the present appeal. Therefore, the application filed by the appellant seeking condonation of delay cannot be admitted and accordingly, the same is dismissed on the above grounds.

16. Consequently, the present appeal filed beyond the statutory period shall also stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.

17. File be consigned to record room.

JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL

(PRESIDENT)

PINKI

MEMBER (JUDICIAL)

Pronounced on 09.02.2023.

STATE BANK OF INDIA v. DINESH CHANDRA BELWAL

Concise Analytical Summary — FA/240/2022

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

STATE BANK OF INDIA v. DINESH CHANDRA BELWAL

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