Tarlok S h ingh Chauhan, Judge (Oral) ig
Whether a qualification acquired by a candidate H subsequent to theprescribed date can betaken into consideration to adjudge the eligibility or acquisition of higher qualification is the moot question to be decided in the instant petition?
2. The respondent-University issued an Advertisement No.Rectt.-17/2019 dated 30.12.2019 for
1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes
1
2
filling up various teaching and administrative posts through direct recruitment. In terms of the advertisement, the
.
crucial date i.e. the closing date for determining P the eligibility of all candidates in respect of H ess.entialqualification(s) and experience, if any, etc. wa s 30.01.2020; as is evident from important Instruction f No.2 appended
with the advertisement which read t s as o under:-"2. Date for determ r ining eligibility of all candidatesin respect of essential qualification(s) and experience, if a u ny, etc. shall be the prescribedclosing dat o e for submission of Online Applicationi.e. 30-01-2020 (Closing date)."
3. The C petitioner is an applicant for the post of Assistan h t Pro fessor in Computer Science (BCA/MCA/PGDCA)in g ICDEOL, Himachal Pradesh University, for which post them i inimum qualification is as per the UGC Regulations on
H Minimum Qualifications forAppointment ofTeachers and other Academic Staff inUniversities andColleges andMeasures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education, 2018 (hereinafter to be called as 'UGC
Regulations, 2018').
4. As per the decision taken in the meetings of the Executive Council held on 10.06.1981 and and 12.06.1981,
3
an advertisement is to be operational upto one year. However, in the instant case, the time limit for the
.
advertisement was extended by another six months u P pto 30thJune, 2021. .
5. It is the admitted case of the pa f rti es H that as onthe closing date for determining the el o igibility of candidatesi.e. 30.01.2020, the petitioner ha t d n ot been awarded Ph.D.Degree as the same was obtain r ed by him only in the monthof December, 2020.
6. However, o the u petitioner made a representationto the respondent-University to consider the additional higher qualifica C tion obtained by him after the closing date
as per t h he ad vertisement, but the same was rejected videcom g munication dated 30.01.2021 (Annexure P-5) anda i ggrieved thereby the petitioner has filed the instant
H petition for grant of the following relief:- "That thedecision taken by therespondentuniversity (Annexure P-5), not to consider theadditional higher educational qualification i.e. the Degree of Ph.D. obtained by the petitioner after the
issuance of the advertisement for the post of
Assistant Professor in Computer Science
(BCA/MCA/PGDCA) in ICDEOL, Himachal Pradesh
University, advertised vide Advertisement No.
4
17/2019, issued on 30/12/2019; may kindly be quashed and set aside and the writ of mandamus may kindly be issued, directing the respondent .
university to take into consideration the additio P nal higher educational qualification i.e. H Ph.D . . inComputer Science, for the above mentioned post ofAssistant Professor in Computer Science (BCA/MCA/PGDCA) in ICDEOL, HPU f , Shimla-05; for
which the interviews are y et o to be conducted andfor which the petitioner t has already applied and iseligible as per UGC r r egulations, 2018 at the time ofapplying for the said post of Assistant Professor Oralternatively th u e decision taken by the respondentuniversity o in the meeting of Executive Council on21/11/2020 (Annexure P-9) to extend the time limitof th C e advertisement for other six months after theex piry of the time limit of one year, may kindly bequashed and set aside in the interest of justice."
7. gh The respondent has filed its reply wherein it iss i tated that due to outbreak of Covid-19 Pandemic, the
H State Government imposed lockdown and, therefore, the recruitment process on the basis of the advertisement couldnot be started till mid August, 2020. Resultantly, the selection process on all the advertised posts could not be
completed within the prescribed validity period of
advertisement. Hence, the matter was placed before the
competent body of the University for decision i.e. Executive
5
Council which approved the extension of validity period of the advertisement upto 30.06.2021.
.
8. As regards the acquisition of higher qualificat P ion of Ph.D., it is averred that since this Degree was acq.uired by the petitioner after the last date of onlin e H application, therefore, the same cannot be taken into co f nsideration and the representation of the petit t ion er o has rightly beenrejected by the respondent.
9. We have heard u the r petitioner, who has appearedin person as also o Shri Ashok Sharma, Senior Advocateassisted by Shri Surender Verma, Advocate, for the respondent-U ni C versity and have also perused the materialplaced o h n record.10. g
It is more than settled that where thea i pplications are called for prescribing a particular date as
H the last date for filing applications, the eligibility ofthe candidates has to be judged with reference to that date andthat date alone. A person, who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date, cannot be
considered at all. An Advertisement or Notification
issued/published calling for applications constitutes a
representation to the public and the authority issuing it is
6
bound by such representation and it cannot act contrary to it.
.
11. Reference in this regard can conveniently P be made to the judgment rendered by three Hon'ble Judg.es of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Sh H arma and others vs. Chander Shekhar and an o othe f r (1997) 4 SCC18 wherein it was held as under:-
"6. The Review petitio r ns t cam e up for final hearing onMarch 3, 1997. We heard the learned counsel for the review petitione u rs, for the State of Jammu andKashmir and for the 33 respondent So far as the first issue refer o red to in our order dated Ist September,1995 C is concerned, we are of the respectful opinionth at majority judgment (rendered by the Dr. T.K. h Thommen and V. Ramaswami, JJ) is unsustainable inlaw,. the proposition that where applications are
ig
called forprescribing aparticular date as thelastdate for fling the applications, the eligibility of theH
candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date alone, is a well-established one. A person who acquires the prescribedqualification subsequent to such prescribed datecannot be considered at all. An advertisement or notification issued/published calling for applications
constitutes a representation to the public and the
authority issuing it is bound by such representation.
It cannot act contrary to it. One reason behind this
proposition is that if it were known that persons who
7
obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview would be allowed to appear .
for the interview, other similarly placed pers P ons could also have applied. Just because some . of the persons had applied notwithstanding th H at they hadnot acquired the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed date, they could not hav f e b een treated on
a preferential basis. Their a pp o lication ought to havebeen rejected at the ince t ption itself. This propositionis indisputable and r in fact was not doubted ordisputed in the majority Judgement. This is also theproposition affir u med in Rekha Chaturvedi (Smt.) v.University o of Rajasthan and others [1993 Suppl. (3)S.C.C 168]. The reasoning in majority opinion that byallow C ing the 33 respondents to appear for theint erview, the Recruiting Authority was able to get h the bests talent available and that such course wasin furtherance of public interest is, with respect, an
ig
impermissible Justification It is, in ourconsideredopinion, a clear error of low and an error apparent on H
the face of the record. In our opinion, R.M. Sahai, J. (and the Division Bench of the High Court) was right in holding that the 33 respondents could not haveallowed to appear for interview."
12. The entire issue has been considered at length by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Kumar Sharma
vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. 2013 (10) Scale 42
wherein while dealing with a similar case where the
8
appellant had though appeared for the B.Ed. Examination which was pre-requisite qualification for the post, but his
.
result had not been declared. It was in this background . t P hatit was observed as under:-
"4. The facts are not in dispute. H As per the advertisement, applications had to be submitted by 29.10.2007 and the Appella nt o made
f a representation that he had obtained the t B. Ed degree but could notsubmit a copy of r the marks sheet or Degreecertificate. The appointment letter dated 19.6.2009was temporary/ u provisional, subject to verification ofvarious a o spects including that of educationalqualification. The Appellant was permitted to joinserv C ices on the basis of provisional appointmentle tter and therefore, the sole question involved h herein is whether the Appellant could claim anyrelief, if for one reason or the other his result had not g
been declared upto the last date of the submission i
of the application form. 5. A three Judge Bench of this Court in State of
H
Punjab andOrs. v.Surinder Kumar andOrs., AIR 1992 SC1593 dealt with acase where regular appointment had not been made. The court held thatunless a person holds the post permanently, his services would be governed by the terms and
conditions incorporated in the appointment letter
and the court must in all circumstances enforce the
terms specifically stated therein.
9
6. There can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition that the selection process commences on the date when applications are invited. Any per P son .eligible on the last date of submission of the application has a right to be considered again . st the
said vacancy provided he fulfils th H e requisitequalification.
7. In U.P. Public Service Comm o issio f n, U.P., Allahabadand Anr. v. Alpana, (1994 ) 2 SCC 723, this Court,after considering a la t rge number of its earlierjudgments, held that r eligibility conditions should beexamined as on u last date for receipt of applicationsby the Commission. That too was a case where theresult of a o candidate was declared subsequent to thelast date of submission of the applications. This C ou C rt held that as the result does not relate back tothe date of examination and eligibility of the h candidate is to be considered on the last date of g
submission of applications, therefore, a candidate, i
whose result has not been declared upto the lastdate of submission of applications, would not be H
eligible. 8. A three Judge Bench of this Court, in Dr. M.V. Nair v. Union of India and Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 429, held asunder:
"It is well settled that suitability and eligibility have to be considered with reference to the last date for receiving the applications, unless, of course, the notification calling for applications itself specifies such a date."
10
(Emphasis added)
9. In Smt. Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director, Pun P jab
.Instructions, Punjab and Anr., 1995 Suppl 4 SC . C 706,this Court held:
"It is to be seen that when the recruitment is sought to be ma H de, thelast date has been fixed for receipt of the applications, such of those c andidates,
who possessed of all the quaflifications as
on that date, alone are eligible to apply
for and to be consider o ed for recruitment
according to R r ule t s." 10. This Court in Rekha Chaturvedi v. University ofRajasthan, 1993 u Supp (3) SCC 168 held: "Th o e contention that the requiredqualifications of the candidates should beexamined with reference to the date of C selection and not with reference to the last date for making applications hasonly to he stated to be rejected. The date h
of selection is invariably uncertain. In theabsence of knowledge of such date the g
candidates who apply for the posts would i
be unable to slate whether they arequalified for the posts in question or not,if they are yet to acquire the H
qualifications. Unless the advertisement mentions a fixed dale with reference to which the qualifications are to be judged, whether the said date is of selection orotherwise, it would not be possible forthe candidates who do not possess therequisite qualifications in praesenti even to make applications for the posts. The
uncertainty of the date may also lead to
a contrary consequence, viz., even those
candidates who do not have the
qualifications in praesenti and are likely
to acquire them at an uncertain future
date, may apply for the posts thus
swelling the number of applications. But
11
a still worse consequence may follow, in that it may leave open a scope for malpractices. The date of selection may be so fixed or manipulated as to .
entertain some applicants and reject others, arbitrarily. Hence, in the absence P
of a fixed date indicated in th . e advertisement/notification H invitingapplications with reference to which therequisite qualifications shou f ld be judged,the only certain date for the scrutiny ofthe qualifications will be the last date for making the applications. Reference in
this connection may also be made to two
recent decisions of tohis Court in A.P.
Public Service r Com mission v. B. SuratChandra, (1990) t 2 SCC 669; and DistrictCollector and Chairman. VizianagaramSocial Welfare Residential School Society
v. M o . Trip u ura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC655."11. In Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chander Shekhar, 19 93 C Supp (2) SCC 611 [hereinafter referred to asAshok Kumar (1993), the majority view was as under: h
"The fact is that the Appellants did pass g
the examination and were fully qualified i
for being selected prior to the date ofinterview. By allowing the Appellants tosit for the interview and by their H
selection on the basis of their comparative merits, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talents available. It was certainly in the publicinterest that the interview was made asbroad based as was possible on the basisof qualification. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge was thus based on
sound principle with reference to
comparatively superior merits. It was in
the public interest that better candidates
who were fully qualified on the dates of
selection were not rejected,
notwithstanding that the results of the
examination in which they had appeared
12
had been delayed for no fault of theirs. The Appellants were fully qualified on the dates of the interview and taking into account the generally followed principle .
of Rule 37 in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, we are of opinion that the P
technical view adopted by the learne . d Judges of the Division Bench was incorrect.
(Emph f as is Hadded)However, the opinion of Justice R.M. Sahai had been that these 33 persons co o uld not have beenallowed to appear for th t e interview as they didnot possess the requ r isite eligibility/qualificationon the last date of submission of applications.
12. A three-Ju u dge Bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chander Shekhar, (1997) 4 SCC 18 reco C nsidere o d and explained the judgment of AshokKu mar Sharma (1993) observing: h
"The proposition that where applicationsare called for prescribing a particular g
date as the last date for filing the i
applications, the eligibility of thecandidates shall have to be judged withreference to that date and that date H
alone, is a well-established one. A person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all. Anadvertisement or notificationissued/published calling for applicationsconstitutes a representation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by
such representation. It cannot act
contrary to it. One reason behind this
proposition is that if it were known that
persons who obtained the qualifications
after the prescribed date but before the
date of interview would be allowed to
appear for the interview, other similarly
13
placed persons could also have applied. Just because some of the persons had applied notwithstanding that they had not acquired the prescribed qualifications .
by the prescribed date, they could not have been treated on a preferential P
basis. Their applications ought to hav . e been rejected at the inception itself. This proposition is indisputable and in fact was not doubted or disp f ute d H in themajority judgment." (Emphasis added) The Court further explained th o at the majority view in Ashok Kumar Sharma (1993 ) was not correct, rather
the dissenting view by Ju t stice R.M. Sahai was correct as the Court held u as u r nder: "Th o e reasoning in the majority opinionthat by allowing the 33 Respondents toappear for the interview, the recruiting C authority was able to get the best talent available and that such course was infurtherance of public interest is, with h
respect, an impermissible justification. Itis, in our considered opinion, a clear error g
of law and an error apparent on the face i
of the record. In our opinion, R.M. Sahai,J. (and the Division Bench of the HighCourt) was right in holding that the 33 H
Respondents could not have been allowed to appear for the interview." (Emphasis added) It may also be pertinent to mention here that in theaforesaid case reference to Rekha Chaturvedi appears to have been made by a typographical error
as the said judgment is by a two-Judge Bench of this
Court. Infact the court wanted to make a reference to
the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (1993) (supra).
14
13. In Bhupinderpal Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2011 this Court placing reliance on various earlier judgments of this Court held: .
"The High Court has held (i) that the cut- P
off date by reference to which th . e eligibility requirement must be satisfied by the candidate seeking a public employment is the date appointed H by the relevant service rules and if th ere be no cut-off date appointed by th f e rules then such date as may b e o appointed for thepurpose in the advertisement calling forapplications; (ii) that if there be no suchdate appointed then the eligibility criteria shall be applied b t y reference to the last
date app u ointe r d by which the applicationshave to be received by the competentaut o hority. The view taken by the HighCourt is supported by several decisionsof this Court and is therefore well settled C and hence cannot be found fault with."14 . This Court lately in State of Gujarat v. ArvindKumar T. Tiwari, AIR 2012 SC 3281 held: h
"A person who does not possess the g
requisite qualification cannot even apply i
for recruitment for the reason that hisappointment would be contrary to thestatutory rules, and would therefore, he H
void in law. Lacking eligibility for the post cannot be cured at any stage and appointing such a person would amount to serious illegality and not mereirregularity. Such a person cannotapproach the court for any relief for thereason that he does not have a right which can be enforced through court.
(Sec Prit Singh v. S.K. Mangal, 1993
Supp1 SCC 714 and Pramod Kumar v.
U.P. Secondary Education Services
Commission, 2008 7 SCC 153.)
(Emphasis added)
15
15. A similar view has been re-iterated by this Court in Pramod Kumar v. U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission, (2008) 7 SCC 153; and State of .
Orissa v. Mamta Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436. P
16. In the instant case, the Appellant did not po.ssess the requisite qualification on the la H st date ofsubmission of the application though he applied representing that he possessed the f same. The letter
of offer of appointment was issued to him which was
provisional and condition t al suboject to the verificationof educational qualification, i.e., eligibility, character verification etc. u Clau r se 11 of the letter of offer ofappointment dated 23.2.2009 made it clear that incase chara o cter is not certified or he did not possessthe qualification, the services will be terminated. The leg al C proposition that emerges from the settledposition of law as enumerated above is that the h result of the examination docs not relate back to the g
date of examination. A person would possess i
qualification only on the date of declaration of theresult. Thus, in view of the above, no exception can H
be taken to the judgment of the High Court. 17.It also needs to be noted that like the present Appellant there could be large number of candidateswho were not eligible as per the requirement of rules/advertisement since they did not possess the
required eligibility on the last date of submission of
the application forms. Granting any benefit to the
Appellant would be violative of the doctrine of
equality, a backbone of the fundamental rights under
16
our Constitution. A large number of such candidates may not have applied considering themselves to be ineligible adhering to the statutory rules and the .
terms of the advertisement. P
There is no obligation on the court to H prote.ct anillegal appointment. Extraordinary pow er of the courtshould be used only in an appropriate case to advance the cause of justice and f not to defeat the
rights of others or create arbitrariness. Usurpation of
a post by an ineligible cand idaote in any circumstance
is impermissible. Th r e p t rocess of verification andnotice of termination in the instant case followed within a very sh u ort proximity of the appointment andwas not delayed at all so as to even remotely give rise to an e o xpectancy of continuance."
13. Si mi C lar reiteration of law can be found in thejudgmen h t rendered by this Court in CWP No. 1919/2018titl g ed Sanjay Mishra vs. State of H.P. and others alongw i ith connected matter, decided on 30.12.2019, wherein it
H was observed as under:- "18.Thequestion whether candidate must haveprescribed educational and other qualifications as ona particular date specified in the Rules or the advertisement is no longer res intergra. It is more
than settled that cut off date by reference to which
eligibility requirement must be satisfied by the
candidate seeking a public employment is the date
appointed by the relevant service rules and if there
17
be no cut off date appointed by the rules then such date as may be appointed for the purpose in the advertisement calling for applications and that if .
there be no such date appointed then the eligib P ility criteria shall be applied by reference to the las . t date appointed by which the applications have been received by the competent authority.
H
19. Reference in this regard can f c onveniently be made to the judgment of th e o Hon'ble Supreme Courtin Alka Ojha vs. R t ajasthan Public ServiceCommission and r Anr., AIR 2011 SCC 3547,wherein it was observed as under:-"14. The u question whether the candidate musthave the prescribed educational and otherqualifi o cations as on the particular date specified inthe Rule or the advertisement is no longer resintergra. In Bhupinderpal Singh vs. State of Punjab C (2000) 5 SCC 262; (AIR 2000 SC 2011: 2000 AIR SCW 1888), this Court referred to the earlierjudgments in A.P. Public Service Commission vs. B. h
Sarat Chandra (1990) 2 SCC 669, District Collectorand Chairman, Vizianagaram Social WelfareResidential School Society vs. M. Tripura Sundari g
Devi (1990) 3 SCC 655, M. V. Nair (Dr.) vs. Union of i
India (1993) 2 SCC 429:(1993) AIR SCW 1412),Rekha Chaturvedi vs. University of Rajasthan 1993Supp. (3) SCC 168, U.P. Public Service Commission, H
U.P., Allahabad vs. Alpana (1994 AIR SCW 2861) (supra) and Ashok Kumar Sharma vs. Chander Shekhar (supra) and approved the following proposition laid down by the Punjab and HaryanaHigh Court:"….. that cut off date by reference to which eligibility requirement must be satisfied by
the candidate seeking a public employment
is the date appointed by the relevant service
rules and if there be no cut off date
appointed by the rules then such date as
may be appointed for the purpose in the
advertisement calling for applications and
that if there be no such date appointed then
the eligibility criteria shall be applied by
18
reference to the last date appointed by which the applications have to be received by the competent authority."
.
14. The ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supre P me Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma's case (supra . ) has thereafter been followed consistently by th H e Hon'ble Supreme Court and reference in th f is regard can conveniently be made to two rece o nt judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
t
15. In Dheeraj M u or r vs. High Court of Delhi(2020) 7 SCC 401, it was observed as under:-
"88. This c o ourt is of the opinion that the decision inVijay C Kumar Mishra v. High Court of Patna (2016) 9SC C 313, as far as it makes a distinction between h consideration, of a candidate's eligibility, at the stageof selection, and eligibility reckonable at the time of
ig
appointment, is incorrect. There is clear authority tothe proposition that eligibility of any candidate is to H bereckoned, notfrom thedate of his or her selection, but in terms of the rules, or the advertisement for the post. In Ashok Kumar Sharma& Ors. vs. Chander Shekhar & Ors (1997) 4 SCC 18, athree-judge bench of this court held as follows:
( Ashok Kumar Sharma case42, SCC pp. 21-22, para 6)
"6….The proposition that where applications are called for prescribing a particular date as the last date for filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date
19
alone, is a well- established one. A person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at .
all. An advertisement of notification issued/published calling for application P
constitutes a representation to th . e public and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. It cannot act contrary to it. One re f ason H behindthis proposition is that if it we re knownthat persons who obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date
but before the date of interview would
be allowed to appe aro for the interview,other similarly placed persons could also have applied. Jus t t because some of the
person h u ad ap r plied notwithstanding thatthey had not acquired the prescribedqua o lifications by the prescribed date,they co ld not have been treated on apreferential basis. Their applications C ought to have been rejected at the inception itself. This proposition isindisputable and in fact was not doubtedor disputed in the majority Judgment. h
This is also the proposition affirmed inRekha Chaturvedi v. University of g
Rajasthan and Ors. 1993 Supp (3) SCC i
168. The reasoning in the majorityopinion that by allowing the 33respondents to appear for the interview, H
the Recruiting Authority was able to get the best talent available and that such course was in furtherance of public interest is, with respect, animpermissible justification. It is, in ourconsidered opinion, a clear error of lawand an error apparent on the face of the record. In our opinion, R.M. Sahai, J.(and
the Division Bench of the High Court)
was right in holding that the 33
respondents could not have been
allowed to appear for the interview."
20
This reasoning is similar to other decisions, such as U.P. Public Service Commission v Alpana (1994) 2 SCC 723 and Bhupinderpal Singh & Ors. .
vs. State of Punjab & Ors (2000) 5 SCC 262. P
Therefore, the observation in Vijay Kumar Mishr . a (supra) that: (SCC p. 320, para 7)
H
"the right of such a person f to p articipatein the selection process undertaken by the State for appointment to any post in
public service (subject to other rational
prescriptions regardingo the eligibility for
participating r in t th e selection processsuch as age, educational qualificationetc.) and be considered is guaranteedunder Art. 14 and 16 of the Con o stitu u tion." is not correct. With respect, the distinctionsoug C ht to be made, between "selection" and"a ppointment" in the context of eligibility, iswithout foundation. A selection process beginswith advertisement, calling for applications from h eligible candidates. Eligibility is usually definedwith reference to possession of stipulated g
qualifications, experience, and age, as on the i
last date (of receipt of applications, or aparticular specified date, etc). Anyone fulfillingthose eligibility conditions, with reference to H
such date, would be ineligible. Therefore, the observation that the right to participate in the selection process, without possessing the prescribed eligibility conditions, is guaranteed, isnot correct; the right is guaranteed only if thecandidate concerned fulfils the requisiteeligibility criteria, on the stipulated date. As pointed out by the three judge bench decision, if
the contrary is correct, one acquiring the
stipulated qualifications subsequent to the
prescribed date cannot be considered. Also, one
not fulfilling the conditions cannot be allowed to
participate, because, as held in Ashok Kumar
Sharma (supra), if it were known, that such
21
ineligible candidates can be considered, those who do not apply, but are better placed than the ineligible candidates who are allowed to participate, would be left out. Moreover, the .
authority publishing the advertisement/ notification represents to the members of the P
public that it is bound by such representation." .
16. In Civil Appeal No. 554/2021 titl H ed Suman Devi and others vs. State of Uttarakha f nd and others, decided on 25.03.2021, the Ho n' o ble Supreme Courtobserved as under:-
t
"….Furthermore u , it i r s useful to recollect that theeligibility of a candidate or applicant for a publicpost or ser o vice, is to be adjudged as on the last dateof receipt of applications for such post or service, interm C s of the relevant advertisement, and thepr evailing service rules. This position is recognized by h settled authority in Ashok Kumar Sharma v ChanderShekhar (1997) 4 SCC 18, a three Judge Bench of this
ig
Court ruled in this context that:"6. The proposition that where applications arecalled for prescribing a particular date as the H
last date for fling the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date alone, is a well-established one. A personwho acquires the prescribed qualificationsubsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all. An advertisement or
notification issued/published calling for
applications constitutes a representation to the
public and the authority issuing it is bound by
such representation. It cannot act contrary to
it."
22
17. From the conspectus of laws on the subject, some of which have been noted above, the position appears
.
to be as follows:-
P
(i) That the suitability and eligibility .of a candidate have to be considered with reference to the last date for receiving the applications, unless, of course, theH notification calling for the applications itsel f specifies such a date; f
(ii) When the recruitm t en t o is sought to be made,the last date has been fixed for receipt of theapplications, such of those candidates, whoare possessed of all the qualifications as on that date, u alon r e are eligible to apply for and tobe considered for recruitment according toRules;
(iii) In th o e absence of a fixed date indicated in the C advertisement/notification inviting applications with reference to which the requisitequalifications should be judged, the only h
certain date for the scrutiny of thequalifications will be the last date for making g
the applications; i
(iv) Where the applications are called forprescribing a particular date as the last date H
for filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date alone. As a necessary corollary, a person, who acquiresthe necessary qualification subsequent to theprescribed date cannot be considered at all;
(v) A person who does not possess the requisite qualification on the appointed date cannot even apply for recruitment for the reason that his appointment would be contrary to the statutory rules and therefore would be void in law. Lacking eligibility for the post cannot be cured at any stage and appointing such a person would amount to serious illegality and
23
not mere irregularity. Such a person cannot approach the Court for any relief for the reason that he does not have a right which can be enforced through court. .
The question of law, as framed, is answ . e P red accordingly.
18. To be fair to the petitioner, he h f as plHaced strongreliance on the notification dated 11 .0 o 1.2016 issued by theDepartment of Personnel and Training (DoPT) under the Ministry of Personnel, P.G. & Pe r nsi t ons, Government of India,
whereby instructions have u been given to all the Ministriesand Departments to ensure that the entire recruitment
process inclu C ding oand starting from advertisement,conducting w ritten examination or holding of interview may
be comp h leted within six months and since this has not been
24
restrictions and consequently the recruitment process in terms of the advertisement could not be initiated till mid
.
August, 2020. P
20. In addition to the above, the mere fact tha.t the University has extended time limit of the adve rt H isement for the reasons stated above does not mean th f at the University is bound to take into consideration o the higher/additional qualification that the applican r ts t ma y have acquired afterissuance of the original a u dvertisement on 30.12.2019.21. Noticeably, there is no allegation of any bias or malafides against a o ny Officer of the respondent and,
therefore, in ab C sence of such allegation, the Court will notinterfere h with the action of the respondent, which asobs g erved above, is in consonance with law. 2 i 2. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no
H merit in the instant writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed along with pending application(s), if any, leavingthe parties to bear their own costs.
(Tarlok Singh Chauhan) Judge
(Chander Bhusan Barowalia) 4th May, 2021. Judge (krt)