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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 389(1) CrPC, NDPS Act
  • Section 37 of the NDPS Act
  • Sections 23(c) and 25-A of the NDPS Act
  • Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27-A of the NDPS Act
  • Sections 23(c) and 25-A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 389(1) CrPC, NDPS Act
  • Section 37 of the NDPS Act
  • Sections 23(c) and 25-A of the NDPS Act
  • Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27-A of the NDPS Act
  • Sections 23(c) and 25-A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 2 December 2015, the Delhi Zonal Unit of the Narcotics Control Bureau (“NCB”) seized two parcels from DHL Courier after receiving information that they contained narcotics. The parcels were destined for a foreign location and were found to hold 325 g of heroin and 390 g of pseudoephedrine. The respondent, proprietor of the courier agency that had accepted the parcels at the behest of a foreign national, was tried along with a co-accused employee.

The Special Judge convicted the respondent under Sections 23(c) and 25-A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS Act”), sentencing him to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment (Section 23) and three years’ rigorous imprisonment (Section 25-A), along with fines, while the employee was acquitted.

Pursuant to an appeal filed by the respondent, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, by order dated 28 July 2020, suspended the sentence under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), primarily on the grounds that the respondent had already undergone about four years and four months of imprisonment and that the appeal was unlikely to be heard soon due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The NCB challenged this suspension order before the Supreme Court, resulting in the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Delhi High Court correctly applied the requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act when suspending the respondent’s sentence under Section 389(1) CrPC.
  2. Whether the High Court’s reasons—time already served and delay in hearing—constituted “strong compelling reasons” sufficient to justify suspension of sentence after conviction for offences involving commercial quantities of narcotics.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Narcotics Control Bureau)

  • Section 37 of the NDPS Act mandates that, before granting bail, the court must be satisfied that the accused is not guilty and will not re-offend; these stringent conditions apply with even greater force after conviction.
  • The High Court’s order gave only vague references to “facts and circumstances” and the COVID-19 delay, offering no substantive reasons to conclude that the statutory conditions were met.

Respondent

  • Relied on aspects of the trial judgment to contend that the respondent’s involvement was not conclusively established.
  • Emphasised that the respondent had already served about four years and four months of the ten-year sentence and argued that continued incarceration pending a distant appeal hearing would serve no useful purpose.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (2020) 8 SCC 645 Distinguishes between pre-trial bail under Section 439 CrPC and post-conviction suspension under Section 389 CrPC; post-conviction bail requires “strong compelling reasons”. Used to underscore that, after conviction, presumption of innocence no longer applies and detailed reasons are mandatory for suspension of sentence.
Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 22 Enunciates the principle that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” in pre-trial contexts. Cited (through Preet Pal Singh) to clarify that this liberal principle does not govern post-conviction scenarios.
State of Kerala v. Rajesh, (2020) 12 SCC 122 Reaffirms the stringent statutory requirements for granting bail under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Invoked to demonstrate that the High Court failed to engage with the mandatory twin conditions laid down in Section 37.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court’s order did not address the statutory bar contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which requires the court to record satisfaction that the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit further offences while on bail—a threshold heightened when the conviction has already been recorded.

The Court stressed that Section 389(1) CrPC empowers High Courts to suspend sentences, but such discretion must be exercised “for sufficient reasons” compatible with the public policy embodied in Section 37. Referring to Preet Pal Singh, it reiterated that post-conviction suspension demands “strong compelling reasons,” and these must be expressly articulated.

Given that the Special Judge had found the respondent complicit in exporting commercial quantities of heroin and pseudoephedrine, the Supreme Court found no material demonstrating compliance with the twin conditions of Section 37. The High Court’s reliance solely on the period already undergone and anticipated delay due to the pandemic was deemed inadequate. Consequently, the order suspending the sentence was characterised as “unsustainable”.

The Court clarified that its observations are limited to the bail question and will not prejudice the merits of the respondent’s pending appeal before the High Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed; the Delhi High Court’s order dated 28 July 2020 suspending the respondent’s sentence is set aside. The respondent must surrender forthwith.

Implications: The decision reinforces the rigorous application of Section 37 NDPS Act in post-conviction contexts, emphasising that High Courts must record explicit, compelling reasons when suspending sentences for narcotics offences. Although no new doctrinal rule was created, the judgment serves as a cautionary precedent that pandemic-related delays or elapsed incarceration, without more, do not satisfy the statutory thresholds for suspension of sentence in NDPS cases. The Supreme Court requested the High Court to expedite the respondent’s appeal, aiming for disposal by the end of 2021.

    State (nct Of Delhi) Narcotics Control Bureau v. Lokesh Chadha .

    D.Y. Chandrachud, J.— Leave granted. This appeal arises from a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi dated 28-7-2020 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1723, by which the application filed by the respondent seeking suspension of sentence under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) has been allowed.

    2. The respondent has been convicted of the offences punishable under Sections 23(c) and 25-A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“the NDPS Act”). He has been sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years in respect of the offence under Section 23(c) and for three years under the provisions of Section 25-A, apart from fine.

    3. Briefly stated, on 2-12-2015, the IO of the Narcotics Control Bureau, Delhi Zonal Unit received a phone call from DHL Courier that two parcels were lying in the office and were suspected to contain narcotic drugs. Accordingly, a team of the Narcotics Control Bureau, Delhi Zonal Unit, reached the office of DHL. Two parcels were seized. The parcels were found to contain 325 gm of heroin and 390 gm of pseudoephedrine. The parcels were booked to a foreign destination, at the behest of a foreign national, by the co-accused who was an employee of the respondent. The respondent himself is a proprietor of the courier agency which had accepted the parcels initially for booking from the foreign national.

    4. The Special Judge, after considering the entirety of the evidence on the record, came to the conclusion that the offence stood established as against the respondent, but the benefit of doubt was granted to the co-accused on the ground that he was only an employee who was acting at the behest of the respondent. An appeal has been filed before the High Court of Delhi by the respondent.

    5. While considering the application for suspending the sentence, the learned Single Judge recorded 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1723 the following submissions of the respondent in para 2 of the impugned order : (Lokesh Chadha case 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1723, SCC OnLine Del)

    “2. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that out of the total sentence of 10 years awarded to the appellant by the trial court, the appellant has already undergone a period of about 4 years and 4 months. He has taken the Court through the records to show that though the appellant who was owner of the courier company has been convicted and the employee of the company who had received the parcels, has been acquitted on the same set of evidence. It is further submitted that no investigation was made to arrest the consignor. He also submits that since the appeal is likely to take some time to come up for final hearing, no useful purpose would be served in keeping the appellant in jail till such time and prays that the appellant's sentence may be suspended during the pendency of the appeal.”

    6. The application was opposed on behalf of the Narcotics Control Bureau by the Senior Standing Counsel, who appeared to oppose the suspension of sentence. The High Court, while passing an order of suspension of sentence, indicated its reasons in para 4 of the order 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1723, which reads as follows : (Lokesh Chadha case 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1723, SCC OnLine Del)

    “4. Looking into the facts and circumstances of the case and the period undergone by the appellant and the fact that the appeal is not likely to be taken for hearing in near future on account of disruption caused by Covid-19 Pandemic, the application is allowed and the sentence of the appellant is suspended during the pendency of the appeal on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs 50,000 with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Jail Superintendent/Duty Magistrate concerned, subject to the following further conditions:
    (i) The appellant will not leave NCT of Delhi without prior permission of the Court.
    (ii) The appellant shall appear before the Court as and when the appeal is taken up for final hearing.
    (iii) In case of change of address, the appellant shall promptly inform the same to the IO concerned as well as to the Court.”

    7. Mr Aman Lekhi, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the appellant, submits that the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act contain stringent requirements before an application for bail can be allowed. The learned Additional Solicitor General submits that one of the requirements is that “the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail”. It was urged that in a case such as the present where the conviction is under the provisions of Sections 23(c) and 25-A of the NDPS Act, the requirement of Section 37 that “there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence” must apply a fortiori because the trial court after conducting a trial has, on the basis of the evidence which is adduced, come to the conclusion that the offence has been established. In the present case, it was urged that absolutely no reasons have been indicated by the learned Single Judge 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1723 of the High Court for granting bail, save and except for a vague reference to the “facts and circumstances” of the case, the period undergone by the respondent and the fact that the appeal was not likely to be taken for hearing in the near future due to the disruption caused by the Covid-19 Pandemic.

    8. On the other hand, Ms Nidhi, learned counsel appearing through the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee to represent the respondent, has adverted to the judgment of the trial Judge and submitted that prima facie the involvement of the respondent would not stand established. That apart, it has been submitted that the respondent has undergone about four years and four months of imprisonment and the High Court having exercised its discretion to grant bail, a case for interference has not been made out.

    9. While considering the rival submissions, we must at the outset advert to the manner in which the learned Single Judge 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1723 of the High Court has dealt with the application for suspension of sentence under Section 389(1) CrPC. The offence of which the respondent has been convicted by the Special Judge arises out of the provisions of Sections 23(c) and 25-A of the NDPS Act. The findings of the learned Special Judge which have been arrived at after a trial on the basis of evidence which has been adduced indicate that the respondent who was a proprietor of a courier agency was complicit with a foreign national in the booking of two parcels which were found to contain 325 gm of heroin and 390 gm of pseudoephedrine. Section 37 of the NDPS Act stipulates that no person accused of an offence punishable for the offences under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27-A and also for the offences involving a commercial quantity shall be released on bail, where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, unless the Court is satisfied “that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail”. Where the trial has ended in an order of conviction, the High Court, when a suspension of sentence is sought under Section 389(1) CrPC, must be duly cognizant of the fact that a finding of guilt has been arrived at by the trial Judge at the conclusion of the trial. This is not to say that the High Court is deprived of its power to suspend the sentence under Section 389(1) CrPC. The High Court may do so for sufficient reasons which must have a bearing on the public policy underlying the incorporation of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

    10. At this stage, we will refer to the decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P. (2020) 8 SCC 645 where Indira Banerjee, J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows :

    “35. There is a difference between grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC and grant of bail, post conviction. In the earlier case there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. (2018) 3 SCC 22 However, in case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) CrPC.”

    11. The principles which must guide the grant of bail in a case under the NDPS Act have been reiterated in several decisions of this Court and we may refer to the decision in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC 122. The High Court unfortunately, in the present case, has not applied its mind to the governing provisions of the NDPS Act. On the basis of the material which emerged before the learned Special Judge and which forms the basis of the order of conviction, we are of the view that no case for suspension of sentence under Section 389(1) CrPC was established. The order granting suspension of sentence under Section 389(1) CrPC is unsustainable and would accordingly have to be set aside.

    12. While concluding, however, we hasten to add that our observations are confined to the question as to whether a case for suspension of sentence was made out and shall not affect the merits of the case when the appeal comes up for hearing before the High Court.

    13. For the above reasons, we allow the appeal. The judgment and order of the High Court dated 28-7-2020 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1723 suspending the sentence of the respondent shall stand set aside and the respondent shall surrender forthwith to the sentence. However, having regard to the fact that the respondent has undergone four years and four months of imprisonment, we would request the High Court to take up the appeal for hearing and final disposal upon the respondent's surrendering to the sentence and dispose of it by the end of 2021.

    14. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

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    Comments

    State (nct Of Delhi) Narcotics Control Bureau v. Lokesh Chadha .
    (Mar 2, 2021)