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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 18 A UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION ACT 1967
  • SECTION 121 PENAL CODE 1860
  • SECTION 304 A PENAL CODE 1860
  • EXPLOSIVE SUBSTANCES ACT
  • ARTICLE 21 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provisions of Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act
  • Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act.
  • provisions of Section 229 of Cr.P.C
  • provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of Cr.P.C.
  • sub-section (1). (3)
  • provisions of Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act
  • Section 229 of Cr.P.C. Court
  • provisions of Section 121 of IPC and 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act
  • Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act.
  • provisions of Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substance Act
  • Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act
  • Substances Act, 1908 and Sections 3, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Unlawful Activities (P) Act, 1967.
  • provisions of 120B, 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act,
  • Section 229 of Cr.P.C.
  • provisions of Sections 120B, 121, 121A, 123, 212, 435, 307, 201 of IPC and Sections 3
  • (ii) Section 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act
  • Section 229 of Q.P.C.
  • Section 3(b)
  • Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908
  • Section 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act, 1908
  • Section 121 of IPC and 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act
  • provisions of Article 39A of the Constitution of India
  • sub-section (1); (b)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 18 A UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION ACT 1967
  • SECTION 121 PENAL CODE 1860
  • SECTION 304 A PENAL CODE 1860
  • EXPLOSIVE SUBSTANCES ACT
  • ARTICLE 21 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provisions of Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act
  • Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act.
  • provisions of Section 229 of Cr.P.C
  • provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of Cr.P.C.
  • sub-section (1). (3)
  • provisions of Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act
  • Section 229 of Cr.P.C. Court
  • provisions of Section 121 of IPC and 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act
  • Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act.
  • provisions of Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substance Act
  • Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act
  • Substances Act, 1908 and Sections 3, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Unlawful Activities (P) Act, 1967.
  • provisions of 120B, 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act,
  • Section 229 of Cr.P.C.
  • provisions of Sections 120B, 121, 121A, 123, 212, 435, 307, 201 of IPC and Sections 3
  • (ii) Section 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act
  • Section 229 of Q.P.C.
  • Section 3(b)
  • Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908
  • Section 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act, 1908
  • Section 121 of IPC and 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act
  • provisions of Article 39A of the Constitution of India
  • sub-section (1); (b)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from a judgment dated 22.06.2020 convicting accused Nos. 3 and 4 for offences under Section 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 read with Sections 120B, 121, 121A, 123 of the IPC, and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 read with Sections 120B and 121A of IPC and Section 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The accused were sentenced to 8 years imprisonment, including 1 year rigorous imprisonment, with fines and default clauses. The State filed appeals seeking enhancement of the sentence, arguing that the statutory provisions prescribe punishment of death or life imprisonment, and the trial court erred in imposing lesser sentences.

The prosecution case was that the accused were active members of the unlawful association Indian Mujahideen (IM), conspiring to establish an Islamic State in India through violent means including terrorist acts. Conspiracy meetings were held to plan bomb blasts, including at the Chinnaswamy Stadium during IPL matches. The accused prepared improvised explosive devices at a leased premises. Charges were framed under various IPC sections and special statutes.

Accused Nos. 3 and 4 initially pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. During trial, after examination of some witnesses, they filed applications to plead guilty under Section 229 Cr.P.C., seeking parity with other accused who had pleaded guilty and received 7 years imprisonment. The prosecution opposed this, contending the applications were not maintainable as the offences were serious, punishable with life imprisonment or death, and the accused did not admit guilt. The trial court allowed the accused to plead guilty and imposed the 8-year sentences, leading to the present appeals by the State.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned judge was justified in imposing a sentence of eight years with fine for offences under Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 against accused Nos. 3 and 4?
  2. Whether the State has made out a case to remand the matter for a fresh trial in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant-State's Arguments

  • The trial court erred in imposing lesser sentences than prescribed by law under Section 121 IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, which mandate death or life imprisonment with fine.
  • Pleading guilty does not entitle accused Nos. 3 and 4 to reduced punishment, especially given the gravity of the offences.
  • The accused, being prime accused facing charges of waging war against the Government of India, cannot claim parity with other accused who faced less serious charges.

Respondents (Accused Nos. 3 and 4) Arguments

  • The trial court was justified in convicting and sentencing the accused to 8 years imprisonment with fine based on their plea of guilty.
  • The court failed to explain the consequences and punishment for pleading guilty under the relevant provisions, which was a procedural lapse.
  • The accused pleaded guilty based on advice and in a disturbed mental state; they sought parity with other accused who had pleaded guilty and received lesser sentences.
  • Enhancing the sentence in appeal would violate Article 21 of the Constitution, as it would amount to inducing a plea of guilty under false assurances.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Thippaswamy v. State of Karnataka to support their contentions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thippaswamy v. State of Karnataka, (1983) 1 SCC 194 The principle that plea bargaining leading to a disproportionately low sentence cannot be used to enhance sentence on appeal without violating Article 21; courts must ensure accused understands consequences of pleading guilty; if sentence is enhanced on appeal, case should be remanded for trial. The court relied on this precedent to hold that the trial court erred in imposing lesser punishment without properly explaining consequences to accused Nos. 3 and 4, and that the conviction and sentence must be set aside and remanded for fresh trial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully examined the statutory provisions under Section 121 IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, which prescribe death or life imprisonment with fine for the offences charged. It emphasized that the courts have no discretion to impose lesser sentences than those prescribed under these statutes.

The court found that the trial judge failed to properly explain to accused Nos. 3 and 4 the nature of the charges and the mandatory punishment attached to them before accepting their plea of guilty under Section 229 Cr.P.C. The plea of guilty must be a clear and unambiguous admission of the facts constituting the offence, made with full understanding of the consequences.

The court noted that the accused pleaded guilty on the mistaken belief, influenced by parity with other accused, that they would receive lesser sentences. This amounted to an unfair trial and violated Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees protection of life and personal liberty according to procedure established by law.

Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Thippaswamy, the court held that it was improper to enhance the sentence on appeal based on the plea of guilty without the accused having had a fair opportunity to defend themselves. The appropriate course is to set aside the conviction and sentence and remand the case for fresh trial.

Holding and Implications

The appeals filed by the State are allowed.

The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 22.06.2020 is set aside. The matter is remanded to the trial court for fresh consideration, with directions to afford accused Nos. 3 and 4 adequate opportunity to defend themselves and to proceed strictly in accordance with law. The court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

The direct effect is that the accused's conviction and sentence are quashed, and the trial court must conduct a fresh trial ensuring procedural fairness. No new precedent beyond the application of established principles regarding plea of guilty and sentencing discretion is set.

    State Of Karnataka By Cubbon Park Police v. Ghayur Ahmad Jamali And Another

    B. Veerappa, J.:— These Criminal Appeals arc arising out of the common impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.06.2020 made in S.C. Nos. 868, 869, 870, 871 & 872/2013 on the file of the XLIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, (Special Court of NLA Cases), Bengaluru convicting accused Nos. 3 and 4 for imprisonment of 8 years, including 1 year rigorous imprisonment (simple imprisonment for 7 years and 1 year rigorous imprisonment) for the offences punishable under Section 18 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 read with Sections 120B, 121,121 A, 123 of IPC with fine of Rs. 10,000/- each and in default to pay the fine, to undergo 3 months rigorous imprisonment; and imprisonment of 8 years including 1 year rigorous imprisonment (simple imprisonment for 7 years + 1 year R.I) for the offence punishable under Section 3(b) of The Explosive Substances Act, 1908 read with Sections 120B & 121A of IPC and Section 18 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 with fine of Rs. 5,000/- each and in default to pay the fine, accused Nos. 3 and 4 shall undergo 3 months rigorous imprisonment.

    The appellant-State has filed these appeals for enhancement of sentence, mainly on the ground that the provisions of Section 121 of IPC, stipulates “either punished with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine”. Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 stipulates “punished with death or rigorous imprisonment for life and also be liable to fine”.

    2. It is the case of the prosecution that all the accused including accused Nos. 3 and 4 being active members of unlawful association called Indian Muzahideen (IM) having the intention of establishing Islamic State (Dar-Ul-Islam) in India, by force conversion or by violence and thus the accused have committed the terrorist acts in the name of religious war called as ‘Jihad’. It is further alleged that all the accused including the accused Nos. 3 and 4 used to assemble at Flat No. D-76, Abdul Fazal Enclave-2, Shahinbag, Okhla, Jamianagar, New Delhi, which was in possession of accused No. 6, Mohammed Tharlah Anjum Ahsan @ Tariq, so as to conduct conspiracy meetings. In the said meeting the accused had discussions about committing of terrorist acts and about plans of causing explosion at KSCA, Chinnaswamy Stadium, Bengaluru during the IPL cricket matches scheduled to be held at that time by making use of financial aid provided by Lushkere-e-Taiba (LeT) a terrorist outfit and thereby to cause death of innocent public and cause damage to the public property and also to cause adverse effect on the economy of the nation and its social status. That in the said conspiracy meetings, the task of causing bomb blast at the aforesaid place was assigned to the first accused. It was decided that accused persons who had filed applications for pleading guilty were assigned with the job of assisting accused No. 1 and others of the case on hand besides the job of recruiting youths belonging to Muslim community to their gang.

    3. It is further alleged in the charge-sheet that in furtherance of said conspiracy meetings held at the flat which was in possession of accused No. 6, two other conspiracy meetings were held. As a result of the said conspiracy meetings, accused No. 1 and others had obtained a premises for lease at Sadashivanagar, Tumkur, Tumkur District. At the said leased premises, accused Nos. 1 to 4 had prepared Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) by using Ammonium nitrate, paper pieces, yellow plastic thread, electrical detonators, 9 volt batteries and etc. Accordingly, on the complaint lodged, the jurisdictional police after investigation in the matter had filed charge sheet against all the accused persons under the provisions of Sections 120B, 121, 121A, 123, 212, 435, 307, 201 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of The Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Sections 3, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Unlawful Activities (P) Act, 1967.

    4. After committal of the case, Learned Sessions Judge, framed charges against all the accused persons on 22.07.2016, read over the same to all the accused persons including accused Nos. 3 and 4. Since accused Nos. 3 and 4 pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried, the matter was posted for trial. When trial had commenced and few witnesses were examined, at that stage, accused Nos. 3 and 4 filed an application seeking discharge specifically contending that, as per the advice of family members, close friends and their advocates, they have filed applications; they did not plead guilty, since they were not in appropriate mindset as they were mentally disturbed and as such, they could not understand the charges leveled against them. It was also claimed that already accused Nos. 5 and 12 to 14 had pleaded guilty before the Court by filing similar application and the Court has awarded 7 years substantive imprisonment with fine under different heads by Orders dated 09.07.2018 and 10.01.2020. Since they are also facing similar charges they are seeking parity in the sentence and fine and hence, they have filed the application for the relief sought for therein.

    5. The said application of accused Nos. 3 and 4 were seriously opposed by the Learned Public Prosecutor (hereinafter referred to as ‘PP’ for short) contending that the application filed by accused Nos. 3 and 4 is neither maintainable in law nor on fact, as the same is filed after framing of charges and during trial. It was further contended that as the offences alleged against the accused Nos. 3 and 4 were very serious in nature, involving minimum punishment of life imprisonment and the capital punishment, hence, the accused as a matter of right cannot seek the relief prescribed under the provisions of Section 229 of Cr.P.C. The accused who intends to file application under Section 229 of Cr.P.C. pleading guilty should admit the facts and offences alleged against them. But, in the instant case, the accused have contrarily claimed that they are innocent of the alleged offences and nowhere in the application, they have admitted that they have committed the alleged offence; The allegations made against the accused are very grave in nature and the punishment prescribed for the said offences is life imprisonment; but allegations made against the remaining accused, who have already pleaded guilty, are less serious than the allegations made against these accused. Therefore, these accused persons cannot claim parity in imposition of sentence on par with the other accused, who have already pleaded guilty.

    6. The Learned PP further contended that accused Nos. 3 and 4 are the prime accused in the present case and they are facing the charges of waging war or attempting to wage war against Government of India which is an offence punishable under Section 121 of IPC and the punishment for the said offence is death or imprisonment for life with fine. Therefore, only on the ground of parity they cannot be permitted to plead guilty and sought to reject the application.

    7. Based on the aforesaid pleadings the Learned Sessions Judge framed two points for consideration.

    1. Whether accused Nos. 3 and 4 be permitted to plead guilty of the alleged offences at this stage?

    2. If so, what is the quantum of sentence to be imposed on accused?

    3. What order?

    8. Considering the application and objections filed by the Learned PP, the Learned Sessions Judge recorded a finding that accused Nos. 3 and 4 have made out a case to permit them to plead guilty of the alleged offences at that stage and quantum of sentence and accordingly, imposed sentence to undergo imprisonment for a period of 8 years including RI for one year and SI for 7 years for the offences punishable under Section 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act read with Sections 12 IB, 121, 123 of IPC with fine of Rs. 10,000/- with default clauses and 8 years including 1 year under Section 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act, 1908 with default clauses. Hence, present criminal appeals are filed by the State.

    9. We have heard Learned Counsel for both the parties.

    10. Sri. Sheelavanth, Learned SPP for the State contended with vehemence that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court awarding 8 years imprisonment including one year rigorous imprisonment under the provisions of 120B, 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, is erroneous, contrary to the materials on record and cannot be sustained. He would contend that the provisions of Section 121 of Penal Code, 1860 contemplates the punishment with death or imprisonment for life and shall also liable to pay fine”. The offence under Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act clearly depicts the minimum sentence, “shall be with death, or rigorous imprisonment for life, shall also liable to fine”. Ignoring the statutory provisions, Learned Judge was not justified in convicting accused Nos. 3 and 4 with lesser punishment. He would further contend that merely because accused Nos. 3 and 4 have filed an application pleading guilty of the charges, Learned Sessions Judge cannot impose lesser punishment than that prescribed under Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act. Therefore, he sought to allow the appeals.

    11. Per contra, Sri. M. Tahir, Learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 - accused Nos. 3 and 4 while justifying the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court on the basis of application filed by accused Nos. 3 and 4, pleading guilty, contended that Trial Court was justified in convicting and sentencing them for a period of 8 years with fine for the offences punishable under Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act. He would further contend that at the time of filing application, it was the duty of the Trial Court to explain to the accused persons about the punishment to be imposed for the offences as made out in the charge. Unfortunately, the Learned Sessions Judge has not explained the consequences of pleading guilty along with the punishment under Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act. The Learned Sessions Judge without appraising the accused persons proceeded to pass the impugned judgment and order of sentence. Therefore, he would contend that in the instant case, Learned Judge has observed that the only offence which is serious in nature, is punishable under Section 121 of IPC with death sentence or imprisonment for life. If we look at the case on hand, in the light of the charges levelled against the accused, mere conspiracy to commit the offence makes it very clear that the remaining accused are the real culprits. Therefore, he contended that the decisions relied upon by the prosecution before the Trial Court are not applicable.

    12. Learned Counsel for accused would further contend that the Learned Sessions Judge taking into consideration the other accused persons who were similarly placed on par with the present accused, has rightly passed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of and sentence.

    13. Alternatively, Learned Counsel for the accused contended that while considering Article 21 of the Constitution of India, plea-bargaining, the accused-respondents pleading guilty and did not avail the opportunity to defend themselves against the charges framed, which is a course they would certainly ought to have followed, if they had known that they would not be let off with a mere sentence of fine, but would be sentenced to imprisonment. It would be clearly violative of Article 21 of the Constitution to induce or lead an accused to plead guilty under a promise or assurance that he would be let off lightly and then in appeal or revision, to enhance the sentence.

    14. In support of his contentions, the Learned Counsel for accused/respondents relied upon the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Thippaswamy : v. State Of Karnataka . . (1983) 1 SCC 194, para 1 and 2 (by Full Bench). Therefore, he sought to dismiss the appeals.

    15. In view of the rival contentions urged by the Learned Counsel for the parties, the points that would arise for our consideration in the present appeals are:

    “1. Whether learned judge is justified in imposing the punishment of eight years with fine for the offences made out against accused Nos. 3 and 4 in the charge framed under Section 121 of IPC and Section 3 (b) of the Explosive Substances Act 1908?

    2. Whether the State has made out a case to remand the matter for fresh trial in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case?”

    16. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the entire material on record carefully.

    17. It is the specific case of the appellant-State that all the accused including accused Nos. 3 and 4 being active members of unlawful association called Indian Muzahideen (IM) having the intention of establishing Islamic State (Dar-Ul-Islam) in India, by force conversion or by violence and thus the accused have committed the terrorist acts in the name of religious war called as ‘Jihad’ and further alleged that all the accused persons are involved in the offences as alleged in the charge memo. Accordingly, case has been registered against the accused persons. It is also not in dispute that some of the accused persons, who pleaded guilty of the offences as alleged in charge framed against them, the Trial Court convicted and sentenced them for lesser punishment with fine. It is also not in dispute that the present accused persons inspite of charges read out and explained to them did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried. Therefore, the matter was posted for trial. During the course of the trial, when few witnesses were examined, at that stage, the present application has been filed by the accused under the provisions of Section 229 of Cr.P.C pleading guilty. It was the specific case of the present accused Nos. 3 and 4 that as per the advice of the family members, well-wishers, close friends and advocates, they have filed the present application. It is contended by accused Nos. 3 and 4 that when the charges were framed and read over to them, they did not understand the charges as they were mentally disturbed. Further accused Nos. 5, 12 to 14 who had pleaded guilty, by filing similar applications were awarded 7 years substantive imprisonment with fine for different offences. As such, accused Nos. 3 and 4 are also facing similar charges.

    18. The Learned public prosecutor opposed the application, specifically contending that charges made against accused Nos. 3 and 4 are waging war against India, which is an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 121 of IPC and charge were framed under Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, where the applicable punishment of death or imprisonment shall have to be imposed. Unfortunately, the Learned Sessions Judge has observed that after filing applications, accused Nos. 3 and 4 were examined by the Court in person. During the examination the Court has made an attempt to explain the distinction between the plea-bargaining and pleading guilty and also the consequences of their pleading guilty to the accused during their personal examination. Despite of the same, both accused Nos. 3 and 4 have unequivocally submitted that they urge to plead guilty on their own volition and there was no external pressure or force on them.

    19. The charges were framed against accused Nos. 3 and 4 under the provisions of Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substances Act reads as under:

    (i) “Waging or attempting to wage war or abetting waging of war against the Government of India - Whoever wages war against the Government of India, or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death or imprisonment of life, and shall be liable to fine” and

    (ii) Section 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act reads as:

    “3(b) Any special category Explosive Substance an explosion of a nature likely to endanger life or to cause serious injury to property shall, whether any injury to person or property has been actually caused or not, be punished with death or rigorous imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.”

    20. By a careful reading of the provisions of Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of the Explosive Substance Act clearly depicts that “Whoever wages war against Government of India or attempts to wage such war or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine” and “any special category explosive substance an explosion of a nature likely to endanger life or to cause serious injury to property shall, whether any injury to person or property has been actually caused or not be punished with death or rigorous imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.”

    21. A careful reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that the Courts have no discretion to reduce sentences other than imposed under the said provisions. Unfortunately, the Learned Sessions Judge has observed that the punishment imposed under Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act is death sentence or imprisonment for life with fine. But if we look at the case on hand, in the light of the charges leveled against accused Nos. 3 and 4, it becomes very clear that they were only involved in the conspiracy of committing the offence, but the remaining accused were the real culprits. Therefore, Learned Judge proceeded to impose 8 years punishment stated supra which is impermissible and Court has no jurisdiction to reduce the punishment prescribed either under the IPC and Explosive Substances Act (Statute).

    22. It is also relevant to state at this stage, that when an application is filed under Section 229 of Cr.P.C. bv the accused, if he pleads guilty of the charges alleged against him, then Learned Sessions Judge has to record the plea and thereafter, decide whether to convict the accused or not. The plea made thereof does not mean that the Learned Sessions Judge can use discretion to reduce the sentence other than what is imposed either in IPC or in Explosive Substances Act. The Learned Sessions Judge has failed to notice that the plea of guilty tantamounts to admission of all the facts constituting the offence. It is. therefore, essential that before accepting and acting on the plea, the Judge must feel satisfied that the accused admits the facts or ingredients constituting the offence.

    23. The plea of the accused must, therefore, be clean and unambiguous and the Court must be satisfied that the accused has understood the nature of the allegations made against him and admits them. The Court must act with caution and circumspection before accepting and acting on the plea of guilt under Section 229 of Cr.P.C. The Learned Sessions Judge before accepting and acting on that plea, must administer the same caution unto himself.

    24. By careful reading of the impugned judgment and sentence passed by the Trial Court, clearly depicts that the Learned Sessions Judge has not appraised accused Nos. 3 and 4. Even though they had filed the application under Section 229 of Q.P.C. on the presumption that other accused persons, who were similarly situated, had also filed the similar application and the Court had awarded 7 years substantive imprisonment and when accused Nos. 3 and 4 who are also facing similar and identical charges and seeking parity in sentence and fine, “it is the duty of the Court to appraise accused Nos. 3 and 4 in the open Court to explain the consequents of pleading guilty of the charges framed against them under Section 121 of IPC and 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act and that they are rendered to be convicted for life imprisonment.”

    25. Unfortunately, Learned Sessions Judge without explaining the punishment to be imposed on accused Nos. 3 and 4 for the charges framed against them, erroneously convicted them by imposing lesser punishment of 8 years with fine against the statutory provisions of Section 121 of IPC and 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act which is impermissible.

    26. By a careful reading of the provisions of Section 229 of Cr.P.C. would make it Ipso Facto clear that the expression, ‘may’ employed in the provision indicates that the Court has option either to act on such a plea or to proceed with the trial. If the Learned Judge had explained to the accused the nature of the charge and the circumstance in proper perspective acting as “Societal parents” the accused would not have pleaded guilty. The accused in the present case has casually accepted the guilt, being under the impression that they will be let off by imposing substantive punishment as that of similarly situated other accused persons. The Learned Sessions Judge bas committed an error in not explaining the circumstances, and the charges framed against accused Nos. 3 and 4, and proceeded to pass the impugned Judgment of conviction and order of sentence and the same is against the statutory provisions which amounts to unfair trial and in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of Constitution of India.

    27. Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which reads as under:

    “21. Protection of life and personal liberty — No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”

    28. The provisions of Article 39A of the Constitution of India reads as under:

    “38-A. Equal justice and free legal aid—The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.”

    29. The provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of Cr.P.C. reads as under:—

    “303. Right of person against whom proceedings are instituted to be defended.—Any person accused of an offence before a Criminal Court, or against whom proceedings are instituted under this Code, may of right be defended by a pleader of his choice.

    304. Legal aid to accused at State expense in certain cases.—

    (1) Where, in a trial before the Court of Session, the accused is not represented by a pleader, and where it appears to the Court that the accused has not sufficient means to engage a pleader, the Court shall assign a pleader for his defence at the expense of the State.

    (2) The High Court may, with the previous approval of the State Government, make rules providing for—

    (a) the mode of selecting pleaders for defence under sub-section (1);

    (b) the facilities to be allowed to such pleaders by the Courts;

    (c) the fees payable to such pleaders by the Government, and generally, for carrying out the purposes of sub-section (1).

    (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct, that, as from such date as may be specified in the notification, the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply in relation to any class of trials before other Courts in the State as they apply in relation to trials before Courts of Session”

    The accused persons can either be convicted or acquitted, only after following fair procedure as contemplated. In the present case, by careful reading the entire material on record, it clearly depicts that Learned Judge has not explained the consequences to the accused persons and it is the duty of the Court to explain the accused persons before proceeding to pass judgment and sentencing even for lesser punishment.

    30. It is also not in dispute that when a serious charge is framed against accused Nos. 3 and 4. where capital punishment is provided for, exercising discretion under Section 229 of Cr.P.C. Court has mechanically convicted the accused on their plea of guilty which may amount to arbitrary exercise of the discretion, without explaining circumstances to the accused persons about the provisions of Section 121 of IPC and 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act that they have to be convicted for imprisonment for life. In the absence of explanation of the consequential circumstances, the Learned Sessions Judge was not justified in passing with the impugned judgment and sentence. It is also not in dispute that merely because accused Nos. 3 and 4 pleaded guilty of the charges, it was obvious that bv reason of plea-bargaining accused Nos. 3 and 4 pleaded guilty and did not avail the opportunity to defend themselves against the charge, which is a course they would certainly not have followed, if they had known that they would not be let off with a mere sentence of fine, but would be sentenced to imprisonment. It would be clearly violative of Article 21 of Constitution of India to induce or lead an accused to plead guilty under a promise or assurance that they would be let off lightly. Admittedly, in the present case, in the absence of proper explanation by the Court, the accused were under impression that they would be let off from the charges framed and punished with minimum punishment on par with the other accused persons. Unfortunately, it was not brought to the notice of accused persons by Learned Counsel appearing for the accused persons. Learned PP and Learned Sessions Judge ought to have noticed the fact that the charges framed are punishable with death or imprisonment for life and with fine. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court cannot be sustained.

    31. Our view is fortified by the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Thippaswamy : v. State Of Karnataka ., (supra) relied upon by the counsel for the accused at para 1 and 2 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

    “We are of the view that this is a case in which plea bargaining seems to have taken place, because on the appellant pleading guilty to the charge, the learned Magistrate imposed upon him only a sentence of fine of Rs. 1000 even though the offence of which he was convicted was one under Section 304-A of the Penal Code, 1860. The High Court, in appeal by the State, acting upon the plea of guilty, maintained the sentence of fine and additionally imposed a substantive sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. It is obvious that by reason of plea-bargaining, the appellant pleaded guilty and did not avail of the opportunity to defend himself against the charge, which is a course he would certainly not have followed if he had known that he would not be let off with a mere sentence of fine but would be sentenced to imprisonment. It would be clearly violative of Article 21 of the Constitution to induce or lead an accused to plead guilty under a promise or assurance that he would be let off lightly and then in appeal or revision, to enhance the sentence. Of course, when we say this, we do not for a moment wish to suggest that the Court of appeal or revision should not interfere where a disproportionately low sentence is imposed on the accused as a result of plea-bargaining. But in such a case, it would not be reasonable, fair and just to act on the plea of guilty for the purpose of enhancing the sentence. The Court of appeal or revision should, in such a case, set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused and remand the case to the trial court so that the accused can, if he so wishes, defend himself against the charge and if he is found guilty, proper sentence can be passed against him.

    We would therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant and remand the case to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Chittradurg so that the appellant may be tried in accordance with law and if he wishes to defend himself, he should have proper and adequate opportunity to do so. While passing this Order, we may make it clear that we should not be taken to have expressed any opinion on the merits of the case against the appellant. If the appellant is found guilty as a result of the trial, the Judicial Magistrate may impose a proper sentence upon him and if on the other hand, he is found not guilty, he may he acquitted.”

    32. For the reasons stated above, the first point raised in the present appeals is answered in negative holding that Learned Sessions Judge was not justified in convicting accused Nos. 3 and 4 for offence punishable under the provisions of Section 121 of IPC and Section 3(b) of Explosive Substances Act and sentencing them to undergo lesser punishment of 8 years with fine. Accordingly, the second point raised is answered in affirmative holding that the State has made out a case to remand the matter to consider afresh after giving adequate opportunity to accused persons to defend their case and proceed in accordance with law.

    33. In view of the above, we pass the following:

    (i) The appeals filed by the State are hereby allowed.

    (ii) The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.06.2020 made in S.C. Nos. 868, 869, 870, 871 and 872/2013 on the file of XLIX Additional City Civil And Sessions Judge (Special Court for Trial of NIA cases), Bengaluru (CCH-50) are hereby set aside.

    (iii) The matters are remanded to the Learned Sessions Judge for fresh consideration and it is for accused Nos. 3 and 4/respondents No. 1 and 2, if they wish to defend themselves, they should be given adequate opportunity to do so and pass appropriate judgment, only in accordance with law.

    (iv) This Court has not expressed any opinion on merits of the case against the accused persons.

    (v) The Learned Sessions Judge shall proceed with case strictly in accordance with law.

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