The complainant in a proceeding under section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is the appellant. The learned Magistrate, by his judgment dated 30.4.2008 in C.C.No. 30050/2006, convicted the respondent/accused for the offence under section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short hereinafter referred to as the Act) and directed him to pay fine of Rs.4,05,000/- and undergo simple imprisonment of six months in case of default in paying fine. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (ACMM for short), the appellant preferred an appeal to the Sessions Court. The learned Sessions Judge by his judgment dated 7.9.2010 allowed the appeal, reversed the judgment of ACMM and acquitted the accused of the offences and hence the complainant is before this court in this appeal.
2. I have heard the arguments of Sri B.R.Deepak, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Rajendra Prasad Shetty, learned counsel for the respondent.
3. The complainants case is that the complainant is a representative of Anoushak Logistics. In connection with services provided by the complainant to M/s. Span Floritech Private Limited, the latter was due in a sum of Rs.9,29,810/- and in order to discharge this liability, the said company issued two cheques bearing Nos. 291164 and 291165 for Rs.2,00,000/- each drawn on Indian Bank, M.G.Road Branch, Bengaluru, to the complainant. The complainant presented the cheques before its bank for encashing them and they were returned with an endorsement insufficient funds in the account of the drawer of the cheque. Therefore, on 17.8.2005, the complainant got issued a legal notice to the accused as per Ex.P5. Since the accused failed to honour the notice, the complainant initiated action under section
138 of the Act.
4. After appreciating the evidence, the trial court recorded a finding that the accused had committed an offence punishable under section 138 of the Act. But, in the appeal, the Sessions Court has given two reasons to allow the appeal and dismiss the complaint. The first reason is that the notice was not issued to the company which issued the cheques. Second reason is that the complainant has no locus standi to file the complaint as he failed to produce letter/resolution passed by the company authorizing him to represent the company Anoushak Logistics.
5. Sri B.R.Deepak, learned counsel for the appellant, while arguing referred to Ex.P5, the legal notice, Ex.P6, the certificate of posting and Ex.P7, the postal receipt and argued that the notice was addressed to M/s Span Floritech Private Limited, the company and Sri T.Mukunda, the Managing Director of the Company. Ex.P6 shows that the notices were sent to both the addresses. Ex.P7 evidences issuance of notice to the accused by registered post acknowledgment due. Then he refers to Ex.P8 and submits that the registered post was not served on the accused and it was returned to the sender because the addressee did not claim the notice even though information was delivered to him. Therefore, it was his argument that notice was duly issued and served. It is not the case of the accused that the address written on the postal cover is incorrect. Notice sent through certificate of posting was not returned and therefore it must be presumed that the accused should have received the notice sent to him through certificate of posting.
6. With regard to the locus standi of the complainant, he submits that the complainant is a proprietorship concern. It is clearly written in the cause title of the complaint that he represents M/s Anoushak Logistics. For this reason the complainant can file the complaint in his individual capacity being the proprietor of Anoushak Logistics. Third point is that though the cheque was issued by the Company Span Floritech Private Limited, the accused is the Managing Director and therefore complaint is very much maintainable against the Managing Director. In support of his argument, he refers to the judgment of this court in Mr.H.S.Bedi vs Bennet Coleman and Company Limited [2019 (5) KCCR 1507]. He further submitted that the accused does not dispute issuance of cheques and their dishonour. A presumption is available under section 139 of the Act that the cheques were issued in connection with discharging legally enforceable debt. He argues for allowing the appeal.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the Sessions Court has not committed any error in reversing the judgment of ACMM. His argument is that in the cause title of the complaint, it is just stated that the complainant K.Gopal represents Anoushak Logistics, but nothing is mentioned there whether Anoushak Logistics is a company or not. If Anoushak Logistics is a company, the complainant should have produced a resolution of the Board of Directors authorizing him to lodge complaint. No such document is produced. Therefore, the complainants ineligibility to lodge complaint is rightly observed by the Appellate Court. His second point of argument is that Exs.P1 and P2 clearly show that they were issued by the company Span Floritech Private Limited. T.Mukunda, the accused, did not issue the cheque in his individual capacity. The company should have been the accused and not T.Mukunda. He refers to section 141 of the Act and also the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Aneeta Hada vs Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited [(2012) 5 SCC 661]. The last point he argued was that Exs.P6 and P7 do not indicate that the notice was served on the company by registered post acknowledgment due. In Ex.P5, the first addressee is shown as M/s Span Floritech Private Limited. Ex.P7 shows that notice by registered post acknowledgment due was sent only to second addressee, i.e., T.Mukunda. Ex.P8, the returned postal cover, also shows the name and address of Sri T.Mukunda. Therefore it is clear that notice was not sent to the company and for this reason the complaint should fail.
8. Having heard both sides, I may say in the beginning itself that the Appellate Court has not committed any error in reversing the judgment of the ACMM. So far as the locus standi of the complainant is concerned, it is not clear, as has been observed by the Sessions Court, whether the complainant filed the complaint in his individual capacity as a proprietor or representing the company, Anoushak Logistics. It is just shown as he represents Anoushak Logistics. If Anoushak Logistics is a company, necessarily he must produce an authorization letter or a resolution passed by the Board of Directors authorizing him to initiate action under section 138 of the Act. If it is assumed for the argument sake that Anoushak Logistics is a proprietorship concern and therefore the complainant K.Gopal can initiate action, still complaint can be said to be maintainable because the cheques in question were issued by the company Span Floritech Private Limited. Therefore it is clear that it is the company which is the accused and not its Managing Director.
9. The judgment of this Court in H.S.Bedi has laid down a proposition that if the complaint is filed by the Managing Director of a company, it is not necessary that there must be specific averment in the complaint that the Managing Director is in in-charge of the affairs of the company because the word managing itself denotes the meaning the Managing Director is in charge of the affairs of the company. There cannot be second word with this proposition of law. But, what is to be stated here is that if cheques are issued by the company, none other than the company should be arrayed as accused and not its Director. Because section 141 of the Act fastens vicarious liability on the Director or other Officers of the company who were responsible for the affairs of the company, they are made parties. It is not as though that the Directors or Officers are personally liable for dishonour of cheques. In this case company is not arrayed as an accused. The cause title of the complaint clearly discloses the presence of only one accused i.e., T.Mukunda, who might have been described as Managing Director of Span Floritech Private Limited. But it does not indicate that company is the accused. For this reason the complaint should have been dismissed by the learned ACMM and rightly this has been noticed by the Appellate Court.
10. With regard to service of notice on the company, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted because section 138(b) does not say that the notice must always be sent through registered post acknowledgment due. What clause (b) says is that there must be demand by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque. Here Ex.P5 shows notices being issued and Ex.P6 shows that the notices were sent through certificate of posting. Therefore, the notices were issued. However, one infirmity can be noticed from the notice. Accused issued two cheques for Rs.2,00,000/- each, but in the legal notice the amount demanded is only Rs.10,000/-. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that it is just a typographical error. Section 138(b) contemplates issuance of notice demanding the amount covered under the cheque. In this view it can be stated that the notice is defective.
11. Therefore, even though there is issuance of notice to the company as observed above, for other reasons the argument of the appellants counsel cannot be accepted. I do not find any infirmity in the judgment of the Sessions Court. In this view, the following :- ORDER Appeal is dismissed. Sd/- JUDGE