(ORAL)
The present Revision Petition has been filed challenging the order dated 06.03.2019 in Appeal No.221/2014 of the petitioners, wherein the order dated 24.04.2013 in CC No.100/2012 was challenged and the Appeal was dismissed. There is concurrent findings of the Fora below whereby complaint of the complainant was allowed.
The present Revision Petition has been filed with the delay of 201 days according to the petitioner and 244 days according to the Registry.
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An application IA No. 1760 of 2020 has been filed seeking condonation of delay. Arguments on the application are heard.
IA No. 1760 of 2020 ( condonation of delay)
It is argued by counsel for the petitioner that petitioner is a Government Department and that delay had occurred due to administrative reasons. It is submitted that copy of order dated 06.03.2019 was received by the petitioner from his counsel on 16.04.2019 and, thereafter, matter was sent for legal opinion and was received from department of legal affairs on 10.06.2019. This legal opinion was forwarded to Headquarter on 21.06.2019 for instructions and the instructions from the Headquarter was received on 08.07.2019. The Headquarter Regional office in their response sought all relevant documents for obtaining permission from higher authorities and for taking decision or exploring the possibility of filing a revision petition and all the relevant documents were provided on 28.08.019. The case was returned by the Headquarter Regional Office on 16.09.2019 seeking the translated copies of the relevant documents. The translated copies were supplied on 30.09.2019. Thereafter, matter was forwarded to Assistant Postmaster General on 14.10.2019 seeking permission for filing the revision petition. All the relevant documents were submitted on
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31.10.2019. A letter of APMG was received at the office of SPO Sabarkanta Divison on 05.11.2019 and copy of same letter of APMG was received through Headquater office Ahmedabad on 11.11.2019. Permission for filing the revision petition was given on 14.11.2019 which was received through Headquarter Regional Office on 24.12.2019. Thereafter, steps were taken for nomination of counsel and the counsel was contacted on 02.01.2020 and, thereafter, the revision petition was prepared and filed on 03.02.2020.
2. It is submitted that delay was not intentional but bonafide and, therefore, delay be condoned. Reliance is placed on the findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of
N.Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 (para 13), M.K.Prasad Vs. P.Arumugam (2001) 6 SCC 176 (para 10) and Bhivchandra Shankar More Vs. Balu Gangaram More and Ors. (2019) 6 SCC 387 (para 17 & 18) and it is argued that delay of about 554 days and 883 days were condoned by the Supreme Court in these cases and the delay which has occurred in this matter is of 201 days. Therefore, same be condoned.
3. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner and perused the file.
4. In the cases which have been referred by the petitioner, the Supreme Court has not dealt with an application seeking condonation of
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delay in a matter under Consumer Protection Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has itself held in the case of "Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okha Industrial Development Authority (2011) 14 SCC 578" that while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, the special period of limitation prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act for filing appeals and revisions in
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consumer matters and its object of expeditious adjudication of consumer disputes shall be kept in mind and the object of Consumer Protection Act should not be allowed to be defeated by entertaining belated petitions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"5. It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Fora."
5. It is therefore, clear from this dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal (supra) that application for condonation of delay has to be dealt differently than the application otherwise moved in civil matters. The present application has been filed in a revision petition against concurrent findings of the Fora below and even otherwise, this Commission has very limited jurisdiction under section 21 (b) of the Act
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while dealing with such petitions. This Commission is not required to re-appreciate and re- assess the evidences and substitute its own opinion to the facts of the case, especially when there are concurrent findings of facts. It has been so held by the Honble Supreme Court in
"Rubi (Chandra) Dutta Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. - (2011) 11 SCC 269", which is as under:
"23. Also, it is to be noted that the revisional powers of the National Commission are derived from Section 21 (b) of the Act, under which the said power can be exercised only if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error appearing in the impugned order, and only then, may the same be set aside. In our considered opinion there was no jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice, which could have warranted the National Commission to have taken a different view than what was taken by the two Forums. The decision of the National Commission rests not on the basis of some legal principle that was ignored by the Courts below, but on a different (and in our opinion, an erroneous) interpretation of the same set of facts. This is not the manner in which revisional powers should be invoked. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction conferred on the National Commission under Section 21 (b) of the Act has been transgressed. It was not a case where such a view could have been taken by setting aside the concurrent findings of two Fora".
6. Again in "Lourdes Society Snehanjali Girls Hostel and Ors. Vs. H&R Johnson (India) Ltd. and others, (2016) 8 Supreme Court Cases 286," the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the same principle and has held as under:
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"17. The National Commission has to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it only if the State Commission or the District Forum has either failed to exercise their jurisdiction or exercised when the same was not vested in them or exceeded their jurisdiction by acting illegally or with material irregularity. In the instant case, the National Commission has certainly -6-
exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside the concurrent finding of fact recorded in the order passed by the State Commission which is based upon valid and cogent reasons."
7. I have to proceed with this application for condonation of delay keeping in mind such dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. No doubt the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases relied upon by the petitioner are guiding rules but guiding rules have to be applicable in the present case. In this case, except the reason that delay had occurred due to administrative reasons, no other ground has been shown. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held in the case of "Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited AIR 1962 SC 361" that condonation of delay is not a matter of right and sufficient causes are required to be shown in the matter and unless it is so done, the discretion for condoning the delay should not be exercised in favour of the applicant. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown -7-
would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the catena of judgments and also in
"R.B.Ramlingam Vs. R.B.Bhavaneshwari I (2009) CLT 188 SC" that each and every case has to be examined on its own merit while dealing with application seeking condonation of delay. It has held that in such case true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with
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reasonable diligence in prosecuting his appeal/ petition. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"5. We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition."
9. It, therefore, is clear that even if the delay is bonafide but the conduct of the petitioner is such which shows that it has not acted with reasonable diligence, still he is not entitled for condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the case of Post Master Vs. Balram Singh Inaram Lodhi III (2018) CPJ 53 (NC) that Government departments are under special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
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29. "The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments."
10. From the grounds given for seeking condonation of delay, it is apparent that petitioner has not acted with diligence. From the order it is apparent that copy of the order was sent to the petitioner on 01.04.2019. There is no averment as to when the copy of the order was received by the petitioner in its office. It must have been received by the petitioner within 2-3 days or within a week of its posting. The ground given is that period of limitation qua the petitioner arises from 16.04.2019 when its advocate had handed over the copy of the impugned order. There is no mention as to whom this copy of the impugned order was handed over by the advocate. It is also apparent that even after copy of the order was received on 16.04.2019, it took about 14 days for the regional authority to apply for legal opinion and it seems that authority from whom legal opinion was sought did not submit its legal opinion and letter dated 13.05.2019 was issued. Another letter was written on 15.05.2019 for legal opinion and legal opinion it seems was finally given on 29.05.2019 and received by SPO Sabarkantha on 10.06.2019. It seems that petitioner has lost almost two months in just receiving the legal opinion
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and this state of affairs clearly shows that they have not been acting diligently. Not only that they sat on the opinion received on 10.06.2019 and forwarded it only after 11 days i.e. on 21.06.2019 for instruction and further directions. Regional Office, however, took its own time
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and further time was spent in seeking documents and this shows that for seeking legal opinion, documents were not sent to the appropriate authority and this act shows casual approach of the petitioner. Besides the administrative reasons for such delay, no other ground has been shown. The reasons for delay given in the application clearly show that officers of the petitioner had not acted diligently. The petitioner has its own legal department and was very well aware of the period of limitation under the Act and it was their incumbent duty to honour the statute and finish the work within the statutory period. They cannot be said to be on better footing than an ordinary citizen of this country. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in reason decision in "Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) AIR2019 SC 505" has clearly held that
"administrative difficulties would not be a valid reason to condone a delay above and beyond the statutory prescribed period Under Section 34 of the 1996 Act", like under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, special period of limitation is provided under Consumer Protection Act.
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11. For the aforegoing reasons, I found no ground to condone the delay. Application is dismissed.
Revision Petition
Consequently, thereupon, since the application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, the revision petition is also dismissed as barred by limitation.
......................J
DEEPA SHARMA
PRESIDING MEMBER
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