Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order XXIII sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code
  • sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code.
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 11 r/w Section 141 of C.P.C
  • Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code
  • O. 23 and Section 141 of the Code
  • Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order
  • relief.25. Section 141 of CPC
  • Order XXIII Rule 1 of CPC.16.
  • Order XXIII Rule 1 of CPC
  • section 11 of the Code
  • sub-rule (1)
  • sub-rule (4)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order XXIII sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code
  • sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code.
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 11 r/w Section 141 of C.P.C
  • Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code
  • O. 23 and Section 141 of the Code
  • Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order
  • relief.25. Section 141 of CPC
  • Order XXIII Rule 1 of CPC.16.
  • Order XXIII Rule 1 of CPC
  • section 11 of the Code
  • sub-rule (1)
  • sub-rule (4)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The present matter comprises Civil Revision Petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the fair and decreetal orders dated 27.02.2015 passed by the First Additional District Munsif Court at Bhavani in I.A.Nos.20 & 21 of 2015 in O.S.No.86 of 2012.

After closure of evidence in O.S.No.86 of 2012, the respondents initially filed I.A.Nos.343 & 344 of 2014 seeking to reopen evidence and to cross-examine DW1 (the petitioner/defendant). Those applications were filed after the matter was posted for arguments and after a series of ten adjournments (from 31.10.2014 to 10.12.2014). The respondents withdrew I.A.Nos.343 & 344 on 09.01.2015. Subsequently, on 22.01.2015, the respondents filed fresh applications for similar relief as I.A.Nos.20 & 21 of 2015, which were allowed by the trial Court. The defendant (the petitioner in revision) challenged those orders by filing these Civil Revision Petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the subsequent application(s) for reopening evidence and for cross-examining DW1 were barred by the principle of res judicata under Section 11 read with Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code (as contended by the petitioner).
  2. Whether Order XXIII Rule 1 (and in particular sub-rule (4) of Rule 1) of the Code of Civil Procedure operates to bar a party from filing a fresh interlocutory application after withdrawing an earlier interlocutory application without leave of the Court, and whether this principle can be applied to interlocutory applications (as distinct from fresh suits).
  3. Whether Section 141 of the CPC permits procedural rules applicable to suits to be applied to other proceedings so as to avail the bar in Order XXIII for repeated applications and thereby prevent abuse of process.
  4. Whether, on the facts of the case, further cross-examination of the petitioner (DW1) was necessary in view of earlier cross-examination on the same document (Ex.A7) on 09.10.2014 and 16.10.2014.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • Counsel relied on Section 11 read with Section 141 of the CPC to contend that the subsequent application was barred by the law of res judicata.
  • It was argued that the applications to reopen evidence and to cross-examine the petitioner again (as DW1) were barred by Order XXIII (the counsel referred to Order 23), because earlier similar applications had been withdrawn and thus the later applications could not be permitted without leave.
  • Counsel pointed out that the affidavit filed in support of I.A.Nos.20 & 21 of 2015 contained only four paragraphs and gave only sketchy reasons (essentially that the suit was posted for arguments and documents needed to be marked) and therefore did not provide sufficient grounds to reopen evidence.
  • Counsel relied on a line of authorities (listed in the petitioner's submissions) that deprecated the filing of applications to reopen evidence at the fag end of the case and supported the proposition that such applications may be set aside when they are vague, late and appear to be an attempt to delay proceedings.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • Respondent relied on the principle that an interlocutory order which has not been passed on merits will not operate as res judicata (citing an Allahabad High Court decision).
  • Respondent's counsel referred to authorities (including a Madras High Court decision) to submit that Section 141 of the CPC does not apply to certain proceedings such as execution proceedings and that Section 141 is procedural and not an automatic extension of every provision of the Code to all proceedings.
  • In short, the respondent contended that res judicata (Section 11) was not attracted because there had been no earlier final adjudication on the merits of the earlier applications which had been withdrawn.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.K. Sreedhar vs R. Raghavan and another, 2015 (2) MWN (Civil) 230 Deprecation of practice of filing applications to reopen evidence at the fag end of a case; sketchy affidavits criticized. Referred to by petitioner; the Court noted similarity of sketchy affidavit and the earlier decision's criticism of late reopening applications.
A. Thakurdas & another vs A. Venilal & others, AIR 1977 Karnataka 60 Res judicata arises from finality of litigation; principle can be invoked in interlocutory proceedings (as observed by that Court). Cited by petitioner to support contention that res judicata can apply to interlocutory matters; Court noted the authority but found res judicata not attracted on the facts (because earlier applications were withdrawn).
Anil Nahar & another vs Vijay Nahar, 2013 (4) CTC 554 Decision rendered in interlocutory applications can amount to res judicata. Cited by petitioner; Court acknowledged the principle but distinguished the factual position where the earlier application was withdrawn and not finally decided.
M/s. Abdul Sakoor Umar Sahigara vs Hanachand Dey, AIR 1972 Orissa 263 Section 11 (res judicata) not applicable to all types of interlocutory orders; yet matters attaining finality by order cannot be re-agitated. Cited and discussed by the Court in relation to limits of res judicata for interlocutory orders; used in the reasoning that not all interlocutory orders attract res judicata but final orders can bar re-agitation.
Arjun Singh vs Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 Interlocutory orders vary; typically do not decide merits and are capable of alteration; res judicata does not generally apply to findings underlying such orders, though repeated applications may be rejected as abuse of process. Quoted in the opinion to explain that interlocutory orders normally do not attract res judicata but repeated applications on same basis may be rejected as an abuse of process.
Papinayakanahalli Venkanna & others vs Janadri Venkanna Setty (by LRs), AIR 1985 Karnataka 166 Decisions concerning the need for leave under Order XXIII to re-initiate proceedings after abandonment/withdrawal. Cited by petitioner in support of the proposition that leave under Order XXIII should be obtained; Court considered the relevance in applying the bar in Order XXIII to prevent abuse.
S. Narain Singh & another vs M/s. Ram Gopal Madan Lal & others, AIR 1981 Delhi 88 When an application for relief (e.g., injunction) is withdrawn after contest and no leave is obtained, a fresh application may be barred by sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII read with Section 141 of the Code. Relied upon by petitioner; Court referred to the decision when examining the applicability of Order XXIII and Section 141 to interlocutory applications.
Patrisha Sympli vs Nandita Das, AIR 2014 Meghalaya 13 Revision petition dismissed for want of permission under Order XXIII Rule 1 of CPC. Referred to by petitioner; Court noted its use as supporting authority for enforcement of the bar in Order XXIII where applicable.
President, Shri Chaturbhuji Sharma Sikshan Sansthan Mahavidyala Samiti & Ors vs Awadh Bihari Tiwari & Ors, AIR 2006 Allahabad 238 An order not passed on merits (interlocutory or otherwise) will not operate as res judicata. Relied on by respondent; Court considered it in concluding that res judicata did not apply since earlier applications were withdrawn and not finally decided on merits.
Periyakarupa Thevar & others vs Vellai alias Ocha Thevar & others, 1963 AIR (Madras) 338; 1963 (1) MLJ 376 Section 141 of CPC does not apply to execution proceedings; interlocutory applications in a pending suit would not fall within original proceedings; Section 141 is procedural in character. Referred to by respondent; Court used the authorities cited in that paragraph to explain the limits and procedural nature of Section 141 while deciding whether its procedures could be adopted to apply Order XXIII principles to interlocutory applications.
Sarat Krishna Bose v. Bisweswar Mitra, ILR 54 Cal 405 : AIR 1927 Cal 534 Authority interpreting the word "proceeding" and discussing the nature of proceedings to which Section 141 may apply. Listed among authorities in the Court's discussion on the nature of proceedings and the ambit of Section 141; used to contextualize limits of Section 141.
Jagannath Vasudev Pundit v. Maharaja of Kolhapur, AIR 1921 Bom 463 Listed as an authority in relation to characterization of proceedings under Section 141. Referred to in the Court's survey of authorities on Section 141 and the character of proceedings to which it applies.
Ram Gopal v. Shantilal, ILR (1941) All 807 : AIR 1942 All 85 Listed authority on the nature of proceedings and the applicability of Section 141. Used in the Court's discussion on the limits of Section 141 and on which proceedings it may properly govern.
Venkatanarasimharao v. Hemadri Suryanarayana, AIR 1926 Mad 325 Listed authority in the cluster of cases on Section 141 and characterization of proceedings. Mentioned as part of the judicial authorities relied upon to demonstrate the procedural nature of Section 141.
Salar Beg Saheb v. Karumanchi Kotayya, AIR 1926 Mad 654 Listed authority in the context of proceedings' characterization under Section 141. Referred to among other authorities as part of the discussion on the limits of Section 141.
Anantharaju Shetty vs Appu Hegade, 37 Mad LJ 162 : AIR 1919 Madras 244 Section 141 empowers a Judge to regulate certain matters but does not import the entire Code or powers such as appeal/review into other proceedings; Section 141's scope is limited. Cited to support the proposition that Section 141 is procedural and cannot be read as applying the whole Code indiscriminately to other proceedings.
Daryao vs State of U.P., 1961 DGLS 134 : (1962) SCR 574 : AIR 1961 SC 1457 Where a petition is dismissed as withdrawn there is no decision on merits and dismissal-as-withdrawn cannot operate as res judicata. Relied upon by the Court to support the conclusion that withdrawal of earlier applications meant there was no earlier final adjudication attracting res judicata.
Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1987) 1 SCC 5 : AIR 1987 SC 88 The principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII: a plaintiff who abandons or withdraws a suit without permission is precluded from instituting a fresh suit on same subject-matter; the rule is founded on public policy and is distinct from res judicata (Section 11). Quoted by the Court to explain the rationale of Order XXIII and to distinguish Order XXIII's public policy bar from res judicata; used to justify extending the same principle to prevent abuse by refiling interlocutory applications.
Ranen Roy vs Prakash Mitra, (1998) 9 SCC 689 Order XXIII sub-rule (4) precludes a plaintiff who withdraws a suit without leave from instituting a fresh suit on the same subject-matter. Cited by the Court as authority for the preclusive effect of sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII; used in the reasoning on preclusion after withdrawal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered the rival submissions and performed a step-by-step legal analysis grounded in the following propositions and applications to the facts:

  1. The Court first examined whether the rule of res judicata (Section 11 read with Section 141) applied. It emphasized that res judicata applies where a suit or an issue has been heard and finally decided. Because the earlier interlocutory applications (I.A.Nos.343 & 344 of 2014) had been withdrawn and were not finally decided on merits, res judicata did not apply in this case.
  2. The Court then turned to the rationale and scope of Order XXIII Rule 1 (and sub-rule (4)) of the CPC, and to the related principle enunciated in decisions such as Sarguja Transport Service. The Court noted that Order XXIII seeks to prevent abuse of process by precluding a plaintiff from instituting a fresh suit after withdrawal unless leave is obtained; this principle is founded on public policy and is distinct from res judicata.
  3. The principal question for the Court was whether the bar in Order XXIII (which explicitly applies to suits) could be applied to interlocutory applications to prevent parties from repeatedly filing the same interlocutory relief after withdrawing earlier applications. The Court held that the issue must be examined from the perspective of preventing abuse of the process of Court.
  4. The Court observed that Section 141 of the CPC permits the Court to apply procedural rules applicable to suits to other proceedings where appropriate. Applying that provision, the Court concluded that the principles enshrined in Order XXIII Rule 1 could be applied to the second (subsequent) interlocutory application to prevent abuse, subject to recognised exceptions (e.g., Order XXII Rule 4 regarding execution proceedings).
  5. On the facts, the Court noted the chronology: the respondents had cross-examined the petitioner on Ex.A7 on 09.10.2014 and on 16.10.2014. The Court found no necessity to allow further cross-examination on the same material. The Court concluded that I.A.Nos.343 & 344 of 2014 were earlier filed to delay proceedings, subsequently withdrawn, and thereafter I.A.Nos.20 & 21 of 2015 were filed for the same relief. This conduct demonstrated abuse and warranted interference.
  6. Summarising its outcome of the legal analysis: res judicata was not attracted because there was no prior final adjudication; however, the bar in Order XXIII (to prevent abuse) could be applied to interlocutory applications via Section 141's procedural permission; and on the facts the subsequent applications were an abuse aimed at dragging proceedings and therefore the trial Court's orders allowing the later applications required intervention.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded that the Civil Revision Petitions were ALLOWED.

Immediate consequences and directions:

  • The trial Court's orders allowing I.A.Nos.20 & 21 of 2015 (which had sought reopening of evidence and further cross-examination) were interfered with through allowance of the revision petitions (the opinion finds that the revision petitions are liable to be allowed and consequently are allowed).
  • The Court directed the lower Court to dispose of the suit (O.S.No.86 of 2012) within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
  • No costs were awarded. The connected Miscellaneous Petition was closed.

Broader implications: The Court held that, although res judicata (Section 11) did not apply where earlier interlocutory applications were withdrawn (and hence not finally adjudicated), the underlying principle of Order XXIII Rule 1 (to prevent abuse of process by refiling after withdrawal) can be applied to interlocutory applications by virtue of the procedural flexibility permitted by Section 141 of the CPC. The opinion applied that principle to the facts to curb an attempt to delay proceedings. The opinion does not explicitly declare that it is laying down a new binding precedent; it applies existing authorities and principles to the factual situation before it.

    A. Sengoda Gounder v. P. Malliga & Another

    (Common Prayer: Civil Revision Petitions filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India, to set aside the Fair & Decreetal orders of the First Additional District Munsif Court at Bhavani, dated 27.02.2015 in I.A.No.21 & 20 of 2015 in O.S.No.86 of 2012.)

    Common Order

    1. The present Civil Revision Petitions are directed against the fair and decreetal orders dated 27.02.2015 in I.A.Nos.21 and 20 of 2015 in O.S.No.86 of 2012. After the evidence was closed the respondents filed an application in I.A.Nos.343 and 344 of 2014 to reopen the evidence/(suit) and to cross examine DW1 namely the petitioner (defendant).

    2. This was filed after the case was posted for arguments and after taking ten adjournments starting from 31.10.2014 and ending with 10.12.2014. The petitioner thereafter withdrew the said applications on 09.01.2015. Thereafter the petitioner filed another application for similar relief vide I.A.Nos.20 & 21 of 2015 on 22.01.2015. These applications were allowed by the Court.

    3. Aggrieved by the same the defendant has preferred the present Civil Revision Petitions questioning the orders passed by the Court. Mr.P.Valliappan, the learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention under Section 11 r/w Section 141 of C.P.C and stated that subsequent application was barred under law.

    4. The learned counsel also submitted that the applications filed for reopening the evidence and to cross examine the petitioner (defendant) as DW1 again was barred under Order 23 of Cr.P.C in view of withdrawal of the earlier application and therefore submitted that the lower Court erred in allowing the application. The learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to affidavit filed in support of I.A.Nos.20 and 21 of 2015 wherein there are no reasons given for filing the above applications except for stating that the suit was posted for arguments.

    5. There are only four paragraphs in the affidavit of which paragraph (2) and (3) deal with the reasons and request of the petitioner which reads as under:

    (2) The case is posted today for arguments. The documents marked as Ex.A7 in the connected case in O.S.No.294 of 2010 has to be marked on our behalf to prove our case through cross of DW1. Hence it becomes necessary to recall the respondent for the purpose of marking documents.

    (3) Unless the respondent is recalled for the purpose of marking documents on our behalf, we will be put to great loss and hardship.

    6. The learned counsel for the petitioner also drew my attention to the decision of this Court in the case of S.K.Sreedhar vs R.Raghavan and another, 2015 (2) MWN (Civil) 230 wherein the Court has deprecated the practice of filing application to reopen the evidence at the fag end of the case when the case is listed for arguments.

    7. In the aforesaid decision, the Court held that it has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the order passed by the trial Court required interference and was therefore liable to set aside. There was also a very sketchy and skeletal affidavit was filed like the one that was filed by the petitioner (plaintiff) in the present case.

    8. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following decisions:-

    i. A.Thakurdas and another vs A.Venilal and others AIR 1977 Karnataka 60.

    ii. Anil Nahar and another vs Vijay Nahar 2013 (4) CTC 554.

    iii. M/s. Abdul Sakoor Umar Sahigara vs Hanachand Dey AIR 1972 Orissa 263.

    iv. Papinayakanahalli Venkanna and others vs Janadri Venkanna Setty (by LRs) AIR 1985 Karnataka 166.

    v. S.Narain Singh and another vs M/s.Ram Gopal Madan Lal and others AIR 1981 Delhi 88.

    vi. Patrisha Sympli vs Nandita Das AIR 2014 Meghalaya 13.

    9. In A.Thakurdas and another vs A.Venilal and others AIR 1977 Karnataka 60, the Court held that the concept of res judicata has its genesis in the finality of litigation. It is fairly settled that the principle of res judicata can be invoked even in the interlocutory proceedings arising out of the same suit.

    10. The division bench of this Court in Anil Nahar and another vs Vijay Nahar 2013 (4) CTC 554, held that it is settled position of law that the decision rendered in Interlocutory Applications would amount to res judicata.

    11. The Hon’bleOrissa High Court in M/s. Abdul Sakoor Umar Sahigara vs Hanachand Dey AIR 1972 Orissa 263 observed that although bar of res judicata under Section 11, not applicable to all types of interlocutory orders, at the same time, it cannot be disputed that the matters which have attained finality by order at some stage of the suit of proceedings cannot be re agitated at subsequent stage on the same grounds.

    12. There the Hon’bleOrissa High Court referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arjun Singh vs Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993, wherein the Court held that as follows:-

    “It is needless to point out that interlocutory orders are of various kinds some like orders of stay, injunction or receiver are designed to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceedings before the Court usually take. They do not in that sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not of course, put an end to it even in part such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. As they do not impinge upon the legal rights of parties to the litigation the principle of res judicata does not apply to the findings on which these orders are based, though if applications were made for relief on the same basis after the same has once been disposed of the Court would be justified in rejecting the same as an abuse of the process of Court.”

    13. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even if res judicata was not applicable, the respondent should have obtained leave under Order XXIII of CPC. In this connection he referred to the decision of Karnataka High Court in Papinayakanahalli Venkanna and others vs Janadri Venkanna Setty (by LRs) AIR 1985 Karnataka 166.

    14. The learned counsel also referred the decision of the Hon’bleDelhi High Court in S.Narain Singh and another vs M/s.Ram Gopal Madan Lal and others AIR 1981 Delhi 88, wherein the application for temporary injunction was withdrawn after contest a fresh application was filed after withdrawing the earlier application. However while withdrawing the application the party had not obtained leave. Referring to specific language of Order XXIII Rule 1 of CPC, the Court there held that in paragraph 3 as follows:-

    “Under sub-rule (4) a plaintiff is precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of the claim withdrawn by him. Thus if a plaintiff withdraws a suit, he is not entitled to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Similarly if the plaintiff files an application for the grant of a temporary injunction and after notice to the opposite party who has filed a reply and during the course of arguments the plaintiff withdraws the application for temporary injunction, it appears that the plaintiff is debarred from instituting a fresh application unless there has been change of circumstances since the date of dismissal of the previous injunction application. Section 141 of the Code makes the procedure applicable to the suits to all proceedings in court of civil jurisdiction. The proceedings for the grant of temporary injunction are proceedings in a civil court. Thus reading together O. 23 and Section 141 of the Code it appears that the present application for temporary injunction filed on 16th April, 1980 decided by the impugned order dated 15th July, 1980 is barred under sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code. On this ground alone I do not find any merit in the present appeal and I hold that the application of the plaintiffs-appellants for the grant of injunction restraining the respondents from proceeding with arbitration proceedings is not maintainable. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed but with no order as to costs.”

    15. The decision of the Hon’bleMeghalaya High Court was referred in Patrisha Sympli vs Nandita Das AIR 2014 Meghalaya 13, wherein the revision petition was dismissed for want of permission of the court under Order XXIII Rule 1 of CPC.

    16. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff drew my attention to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in President, Shri Chaturbhuji Sharma Sikshan Sansthan Mahavidyala Samiti, Oral & Ors vs Awadh Bihari Tiwari & Ors AIR 2006 Allahabad 238, wherein it was held that an order whether interlocutory or not, which has not been passed on merits will not operate as res judicata.

    17. The learned counsel for the respondent further referred to the decision of this Court in Periyakarupa Thevar and others vs Vellai alias Ocha Thevar and others 1963 AIR (Madras) 338: 1963(1) MLJ 376, wherein in paragraph 13 is held as follows:-

    13. It is now well settled that Section 141 of the CPC does not apply to execution proceedings. There is also ample authority interpreting the word “proceeding” as relating to original matters in the nature of suits. (ILR 54 Cal 405 : (AIR 1927 Cal 534) Sarat Krishna Bose v. Bisweswar Mitra; AIR 1921 Bom 463 (1), Jagannath Vasudev Pundit v. Maharaja of Kolhapur; ILR (1941) All 807 : (AIR 1942 All 85) Ram Gopal v. Shantilal; AIR 1926 Mad 325, Venkatanarasimharao v. Hemadri Suryanarayana; AIR 1926 Mad 654, Salar Beg Saheb v. Karumanchi Kotayya). The nature of a proceeding whether it is of a kind of original action bearing the characteristics of a suit is not always easy to determine. Probate, Guardianship and Matrimonial proceedings, initiated by applications provided for under special enactments, can readily be treated as being of the nature of original actions or suits. Interlocutory applications in a pending suit would not fall within the class of original proceedings. We do not think that the proceedings in a civil Court under Section 146 of the Cr PC can with any propriety be called “original” in character. They are not initiated in that Court and they do not terminate their affecting the rights of parties. The proceedings transit through the civil Court and are merely a phase of a criminal proceeding in a civil jurisdiction, though, for the nonce they may assume the garb of civil proceedings. Section 141 of the CPC cannot therefore apply to such proceedings.

    18. After referring the above paragraph and to several other decisions rendered in context of execution proceedings, it was held that Section 141 of CPC was merely procedural.

    19. The court referred to another decision of this Court in Anantharaju Shetty vs Appu Hegade 37 Mad LJ 162: AIR 1919 Madras 244 wherein the following opinion was expressed.

    “It was next argued that Section 141 of the CPC is indicative of a general enunciation of principle by the legislature that to all the judicial proceedings, the Civil Procedure Code is applicable. The section only empowers the Judge to regulate judicial trials by rules as to summoning of witnesses, etc. which are to be found in the Code and not that the Code is to be applied in its entirety to such proceedings, including power of appeal and of review.”

    20. I have considered the rival submissions of the parties. The question of invocation of res judicata would not be applied. There was no final determination as an earlier application vide I.A.No.343 & 344 of 2014 were filed and thereafter withdrawn.

    21. The rule of res judicata applies to a case where the suit or an issue has already been heard and finally decided by a Court. In the case of abandonment or withdrawal of a suit without the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit, there is no prior adjudication of a suit or an issue is involved, yet the Code provides, that a second suit will not lie in sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code when the first suit is withdrawn without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3) in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. The Court further held that the principle underlying Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code has been extended in the interest of administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also though not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy.

    22. In the case of Daryao vs State of U.P., 1961 DGLS 134: (1962) SCR 574: AIR 1961 SC 1457, it was observed as follows:-

    “If the petition is dismissed as withdrawn it cannot be a bar to a subsequent petition under Article 32, because in such a case there has been no decision on the merits by the Court. We wish to make it clear that the conclusions thus reached by us are confined only to the point ofres judicata which has been argued as a preliminary issue in these writ petitions and no other.”

    23. The Supreme Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1987) 1 SCC 5: AIR 1987 SC 88, observed as under :-

    “The principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code is that when a plaintiff once institutes a suit in a Court and thereby avails of a remedy given to him under law, he cannot be permitted to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter again after abandoning the earlier suit or by withdrawing it without the permission of the Court to file fresh suit. Invito beneficium non datur. The law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does not desire. Whoever waives or abandons or disclaims a right will lose it. In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the Court by instituting suits again and again on the same cause of action without any good reason the Code insists that he should obtain the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII. The principle underlying the above Rule is founded on public policy, but it is not the same as the rule of res judicata contained in section 11 of the Code which provides that no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly or substantially in issue has been directly or substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.”

    24. Thus, res-judicata is not applicable. However, the question to be answered is whether the principle contained in Order XXIII Rule 1 of CPC can be applied to interlocutory applications as Order XXIII Rule 1 of CPC applies only to a suit. In my view, the issue has to be examined from the point of view to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the Court by instituting fresh application after withdrawing the earlier application for the very same interlocutory relief.

    25. Section 141 of CPC also permits the court to allow procedures for suits to be followed in all proceedings. Applying the same to the facts of the case it is evident that all principle enshrined in Order XXIII Rule 1 of CPC can be applied to the 2nd application.

    26. Only exception to Order XXIII is Order XXII Rule 4 is qua execution proceedings.

    27. In the case of Ranen Roy vs Prakash Mitra, (1998) 9 SCC 689 it was held as follows:-

    “3. As would be seen from the above statement it was unqualified and no reservation had been made. Order XXIII sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that where the plaintiff either abandons any suit or part of a claim under sub-rule (1) or withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without seeking any liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or part of the claim, he shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of that subject-matter or that part of the claim.”

    28. In any event, it appears the petitioner was cross examined by the respondents on 09.10.2014 and on 16.10.2014 on Ex.A7. There is no necessity to allow the further cross examination. It is evident, I.A.Nos.343 & 344 of 2014 in O.S.No.86 of 2012 were earlier filed to drag on the proceedings. After withdrawing the I.A.Nos.343 & 344 of 2014, the respondent filed I.A.Nos.20 & 21 of 2015 for the same relief. Therefore, I am of the view that the present Civil Revision Petitions are liable to be allowed.

    29. The suit is of the year 2012. The lower Court is therefore directed to dispose the suit within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

    30. The present Civil Revision Petitions stand allowed with the above observation. No costs. Consequently connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    A. Sengoda Gounder v. P. Malliga & Another
    (Jun 21, 2019)