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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (WP No. 353/2011)

Court: High Court (author: C. V. Bhadang, J.)
Subject-matter: Challenge to executing court's order dated 24.08.2010 in Regular Execution Application No.4/2003/D directing execution of decree including demolition of structures in survey no.69/1, Cortalim, Goa.

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents (decree-holders) obtained a decree against the petitioners (judgment-debtors) on 29.08.1990 declaring the defendants as trespassers and directing demolition of specified structures (a mud structure of 15 sq. metres, two huts of 5 sq. metres each, and an extended portion of 10–12 sq. metres) and handing over vacant possession; the decree also imposed a permanent restraint on interference with the suit property. The decree was challenged in Regular Civil Appeal No. 38/2004 and that appeal was dismissed on 19.10.2006, such that the decree attained finality.

The respondents filed an execution application in 2003 seeking, among other reliefs, orders to (a) restrain the judgment-debtors from continuing construction, (b) direct demolition of illegal structures and restoration of the property, (c) civil imprisonment if necessary for non-compliance, and (d) alternatively seek assistance of the Deputy Collector for demolition. The execution application date is recorded in the opinion at two places: paragraph 4 records the filing as 08.05.2003 and paragraph 10 records that the application was filed on 14.05.2003.

The petitioners resisted execution principally on limitation grounds and by claiming mundkarial (Mundkar) rights under the Goa, Daman and Diu Mundkars (Protection from Eviction) Act, 1975, asserting registration in their favour (order dated 03.02.1983) and pending applications for declaration/purchase before the Mamlatdar. The Executing Court received evidence from the parties and, by an order dated 24.08.2010, rejected the petitioners' objections and directed execution of the decree including demolition of structures in survey no.69/1. The petitioners challenged that executing court order by filing the present petition (WP No. 353/2011).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application for execution is barred by limitation (petitioners relying on Article 135 of the Limitation Act for mandatory injunction enforcement and respondents relying on proviso to Article 136 for prohibitory/perpetual injunction enforcement).
  2. Whether the petitioners' alleged mundkarial registration and pending proceedings under Section 8A of the Goa, Daman and Diu Mundkars (Protection from Eviction) Act, 1975, required the Executing Court to stay execution until mundkarial proceedings were decided.
  3. Whether the structures sought to be demolished were properly identified and whether the Executing Court erred in ordering demolition (including where reconstruction or new construction had taken place after the decree).
  4. Whether the Executing Court's factual findings based on evidence (including photographs and inspection/panchanama) were vitiated by error requiring interference under the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The execution application is barred by limitation; Article 135 of the Limitation Act prescribes a three-year period for enforcement of mandatory injunctions.
  • The petitioners have mundkarial rights: there is an order of registration (03.02.1983) under the Mundkars Act and applications for declaration and purchase are pending before the Mamlatdar; therefore the Executing Court should have awaited resolution of those proceedings.
  • The structures which the Executing Court ordered to be demolished were not properly identified.
  • Relied upon the decision of the Kerala High Court in M.J. Simon vs. Special Grade Panchayat, Athirampuzha (AIR 2001 Kerala 132).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The question of limitation does not arise because the decree was subject to appeal and the appellate decree (dismissal of the appeal) merged and finalized the decree; the petitioners' breach is subsequent to the decree and is actionable in execution.
  • The proviso to Article 136 of the Limitation Act means that enforcement of a decree granting perpetual (prohibitory) injunction is not subject to any period of limitation.
  • The petitioners undertook extensive RCC construction (ground plus one) after the decree, in breach of the prohibitory injunction; photographs (Exhibit 64) show reconstruction/new construction without license or permission from local authority.
  • Relying on Jai Dayal & Others vs. Krishan Lal Garg & Another (AIR 1997 SC 3765), a subsequent breach of a prohibitory injunction can be remedied in execution proceedings and a separate suit would be barred under Section 47 CPC.
  • Registration as a Mundkar alone is not sufficient protection unless an order of declaration and/or purchase has been passed; therefore mundkarial registration does not automatically stay execution in these circumstances.
  • The Executing Court correctly considered the evidence and its order should not be interfered with.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M.J. Simon Vs. Special Grade Panchayat, Athirampuzha, AIR 2001 Kerala 132 Stated that an application for enforcement of a decree granting prohibitory injunction is not subject to any period of limitation; in composite decrees the prohibitory part is not time-barred while the mandatory part may be. The court held that the decision cannot advance the petitioners' case and in fact supports enforcement of prohibitory injunctions whenever violation occurs; used to confirm that the prohibitory part of a composite decree is not subject to limitation.
Jai Dayal & Others Vs. Krishan Lal Garg & Another, AIR 1997 SC 3765 Once a decree of perpetual and mandatory injunction is final, the judgment-debtor must obey it; non-compliance is continuing disobedience and a separate/fresh suit is barred by Section 47 CPC. The court relied on this authority to hold that subsequent breaches of a prohibitory injunction may be remedied in execution proceedings and to reject the contention that the decree-holder must file a fresh suit.
Roque Fernandes (Through Legal Heirs & Others) Vs. Dempo Properties and Investments, 2010(2) Bom.C.R. 802 Reference in the opinion to the proposition that registration as mundkar has only presumptive value (as described in the text). The court used this authority to emphasize that mere registration has presumptive value and is not conclusive; petitioners had no declaration/purchase order to conclusively establish mundkarial rights.
Smt. Gulabi Sangtu Devidas & Others Vs. Smt. Prema Govinda Gaonkar & Others, 1994(3) Bom.C.R. 328 Referenced for the principle that registration as mundkar carries presumptive value (as cited in the opinion). Cited by the court to support the view that registration alone does not suffice to defeat execution where there is no declaration/purchase order and where evidence indicates reconstruction/new construction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise analysis focused primarily on the limitation objection and the mundkarial claim, taking the evidence and findings of the Executing Court into account.

  1. Limitation:
    • The decree of 29.08.1990 was a composite decree containing both mandatory and prohibitory (perpetual) injunction components.
    • The court noted the distinction between Article 135 of the Limitation Act (three-year period for enforcement of mandatory injunctions) and Article 136 (and its proviso) which makes enforcement of a decree granting perpetual/prohibitory injunction not subject to any period of limitation.
    • The court accepted the respondents' argument that what was sought to be executed, insofar as demolition related to construction effected after the decree, concerned breach of the prohibitory injunction and therefore fell under the proviso to Article 136 and was not time-barred.
    • The court observed that the petitioners had undertaken extensive RCC construction (ground plus one) after the decree, and photographs at Exhibit 64 proved this reconstruction/new construction without permission, thereby constituting a breach of the prohibitory injunction enforceable in execution proceedings.
    • The court held the Kerala High Court decision in M.J. Simon did not help the petitioners and in substance supported the respondents' position that enforcement of the prohibitory part of a composite decree is not limited by time.
    • The court also applied Jai Dayal to hold that a decree-holder should not be driven to a second suit and that non-compliance is a continuing disobedience; Section 47 CPC bars a separate fresh suit for the same relief.
  2. Mundkarial Registration and Pending Mundkarial Proceedings:
    • The court noted that registration as a Mundkar has presumptive value but is not conclusive (citing Roque Fernandes and Gulabi Sangtu Devidas).
    • The petitioners had not produced any order declaring them mundkars or permitting purchase under the Mundkars Act; the claimed registration therefore did not preclude execution against structures constructed after the decree.
    • The Executing Court's factual findings were noted: photographs (Exhibit 64) did not conform to the old structure (Exhibit 104); evidence (DW-1) claimed mundkar status in respect of a different survey number (no.61) and could not substantiate the old house number (585); inspection/panchanama showed the second floor under construction and described the activity as re-construction without permission/license.
    • On this basis the High Court accepted the Executing Court's conclusion that the structure sought to be demolished was identified and that the work indicated reconstruction beyond the old structure and constituted a breach of the prohibitory injunction.
  3. Conclusion on relief and interference:
    • Having considered the statutory provisions, the evidence (photographs, inspection report, witness testimony), and the cited authorities, the High Court found no infirmity in the Executing Court's order directing execution and demolition.
    • The court declined to interfere under its supervisory jurisdiction since the Executing Court had properly considered the circumstances and evidence on record.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition dismissed; rule discharged.

Direct implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The Executing Court's order dated 24.08.2010 directing execution of the decree, including demolition of structures in survey no.69/1, stands upheld by the High Court.
  • The petitioners' contention that execution was barred by limitation was rejected; enforcement of the prohibitory part of the final decree for breaches occurring after the decree is not time-barred (proviso to Article 136 applies).
  • The petitioners' mundkarial registration and pending proceedings did not prevent execution because registration alone has only presumptive value and there was no declaration/purchase order in their favour; factual findings indicated reconstruction/new construction beyond the original structure.
  • No costs were awarded (the rule was discharged with no order as to costs).

Broader implications:
The opinion limits its discussion to the application before the court: it affirms that enforcement in execution proceedings of breaches of a perpetual/prohibitory injunction is not time-barred and that mere registration as a Mundkar, without a declaration/purchase order, is not necessarily a bar to execution. The court did not indicate that it was laying down any novel legal precedent beyond applying established authorities.

Disposition recorded by C. V. BHADANG, J.

    Benedito (Betty) Dias v. Armando Benedita Fernandes

    WP No. 353/2011

    1

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

    WRIT PETITION NO. 353 OF 2011

    1. Shri Benedito (Betty) Dias alias Benidict Dias and Power of Attorney of

    Petitioners 2,3 and 4;

    2. Smt. Milagrina Dias, wife, major, married, housewife;

    3. Shri Philip Dias, son, major;

    4. Shri Marcelo Dias, son, major; All resident of H. No. 665, Thana, Cortalim, Goa. …. Petitioners Versus

    Shri Armando Benedita Fernandes (through LR's)

    1(a) Smt. Maria Piedade Aida Adelina Fernandes;

    1(b) Smt. Meena Panjabi;

    1(c) Shri Murli Panjabi;

    1(d) Smt. Rosemary Dina A. Fernandes; 1(e) Shri Noel Fernandes;

    1(f) Shri Peter Audrey B.J. Fernandes; 1(g) Smt. Venessa R. Fernandes (through their Power of Attorney Holder Shri Abelardo Rodrigues Medeiros) All resident of "Silver Tower", Bldg. "A", First Floor, AC-1, next to Cine Vishant, Aquem, Margao, Goa. …. Respondents Shri Guru Shirodkar with Ms. Varsh Parab, Advocates for the Petitioners.

    Smt. Anarkali Agni, Senior Advocate with Ms. Aditi Kamat, Advocate for the Respondents.

    Benedito

    Alda

    Necessary

    corrections carried

    out in terms of Order

    dated 21.04.2017

    passed in M.C.A. No.

    196/2017

    2017:BHC-GOA:377

    1

    2

    CORAM:- C. V. BHADANG, J.

    DATE:- 9 th FEBRUARY, 2017

    ORAL JUDGMENT:

    The challenge in this petition, at the instance of the petitioners/judgment debtors, is to the order dated 24.08.2010, passed by the Executing Court in Regular Execution Application No.4/2003/D. By the impugned order, while rejecting the objection of the petitioners, the Executing Court has directed execution of the decree as prayed, including demolition of the structures existing in survey no.69/1 of village Cortalim, Goa.

    2. The respondents/decree holders have obtained a decree against the petitioners on 29.08.1990, in the following terms:

    "That the suit is decreed and the defendants are declared as trespassers in respect of suit property. Consequently, they are directed to demolish the mud structure admeasuring 15 square metres and two huts admeasuring 5 square metres each and extended portion of the suit structure admeasuring 10-12 square metres and hand over vacant possession of the same. That the defendants, their servants, family members, are also permanently restrained from interfering with the suit property, in any manner. In the

    3

    circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs."

    3. It is undisputed that the aforesaid decree was challenged in appeal, before the learned District Judge in Regular Civil Appeal No. 38/2004, which has been dismissed on 19.10.2006 and thus, the decree has attained finality, as it was not challenged any further.

    4. The respondents filed an application for execution of the decree on 08.05.2003, seeking following assistance from the Court:

    "(a) By an immediate order directing the Judgment Debtors from continuing with any construction in or on the suit structure and or to pass an order to maintain status-co of the suit structure.

    (b) By directing the Defendants to demolish the illegal structures put up by them in the suit property and restoring the property to its original condition/state.

    (c) In the event of the failure to comply with the Court order to lodge the Judgment Debtors in civil prison till compliance of the order.

    4

    (d) Alternatively to have suitable orders passed to the Deputy Collector/his representatives to have the illegal structure/extended portion of the suit structure demolish and have them removed from the suit structure."

    5. The petitioners resisted the execution on the ground that the execution application is barred by limitation. It was contended that the respondents have mudkarial rights in respect of the subject structures, about which application for declaration under Section 8A of the Goa, Daman and Diu Mundkars (Protection from Eviction) Act, 1975 (the Act, for short), is pending and there is an order of registration in their favour passed on 03.02.1983. It was contended that thus, the Executing Court ought to have stayed it's hands, awaiting decision in the mundkarial proceedings.

    6. Before the Executing Court, the parties led evidence. The learned Executing Court by the impugned order dated 24.08.2010 has directed the execution of the decree, including demolition of the structures existing in survey no. 69/1, which order is subject matter of challenge in this petition.

    5

    7. I have heard Shri Shirodkar, the learned Counsel for the petitioners and Smt. Agni, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have gone through the record and the impugned order passed.

    8. Shri Shirodkar, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has raised four contentions (i) that execution application is barred by limitation, as the limitation provided under Article 135 of the Limitation Act is three years from the date of the decree or where a date for performance is fixed from such date; (ii) there is an order of registration as a Mundkar in favour of the petitioners; (iii) an application for declaration and an application for purchase, under the Act are pending before the Mamlatdar and (iv) that the structures, which are directed to be demolished by way of mandatory injunction, are not identified. On behalf of the petitioners, reliance is placed on the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of M.J. Simon Vs. Special Grade Panchayat, Athirampuzha, AIR 2001 Kerala

    132.

    6

    9. It is submitted by Smt. Agni, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents that the issue of limitation would not arise in this case, in as much as the impugned decree was subject matter of challenge in appeal, which was decided on 19.10.2006. It is submitted that the decree by the Trial Court would merge with the decree of the Appellate Court. It is submitted that the petitioners have undertaken extensive construction of a ground plus one RCC structure, after the passing of the impugned decree, which is clearly in breach of the order, granting prohibitory injunction restraining the petitioners from carrying out any construction. The learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the proviso to Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in order to submit that an application for enforcement of a decree granting perpetual injunction, is not subject to any period of limitation. She has referred to the photographs, which are collectively at Exhibit 64, in order to demonstrate that in the place of existing old mud hut, extensive RCC construction of ground plus one structure has effected and that too without permission/license from the local Authority. It is submitted that in such a case, the decree holders cannot be driven to another round of litigation, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jai Dayal & Others Vs.

    7

    Krishan Lal Garg & Another, AIR 1997 SC 3765. It is submitted that the subsequent breach of a prohibitory injunction can be remedied in execution proceedings and in fact, a separate suit would be barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is submitted that mere registration as a Mundkar is not sufficient, unless there is an order of declaration and/or purchase , which is not forthcoming in this case. It is submitted that the Executing Court has properly considered the circumstances and the evidence on record and the order does not call for any interference.

    10. I have carefully considered the rival circumstances and the submissions made. I would first propose to deal with the challenge on the ground of limitation. It is a matter of record that the decree sought to be executed is passed on 29.10.1990, while the application for execution was filed on 14.05.2003. The decree as set out above, is a composite decree consisting of both, a mandatory part and the one granting prohibitory injunction. There are separate Articles dealing with the period of limitation for execution of a decree of mandatory injunction and for a decree other than granting mandatory injunction, which are contained in Articles 135 and

    8

    136 of the Limitation Act respectively. While in Article 135, the period for enforcement of the mandatory injunction is three years, provisions of Article 136 and the proviso thereto would make it explicit that execution of a decree granting perpetual injunction, is not subject to any period of limitation. It can clearly be seen that mandatory injunction was in respect of a mud structure admeasuring 15 square metres and two huts admeasuring 5 square metres each and the extended portion of the suit structure admeasuring 10 to 12 square metres. It has clearly come on record that the petitioners after the passing of the decree had carried out RCC construction of a ground plus one structure and that too, without any license/permission from the local Authority. The structure, which was originally standing on the land and the present structure, have clearly come on record by virtue of photographs at Exhibit 64, which are proved before the Executing Court.

    11. It can thus be seen that what was sought to be executed was the part of the decree granting prohibitory injunction, or so to say a breach thereof, which would be governed by proviso to Article 136 of the Limitation Act. The relief in clause (j)(b) in the execution application, is referable to

    9

    a construction made subsequent to the passing of the decree.

    12. The decision of the Kerala High Court, in the case of

    M.G. Simon (supra), cannot take the case of the petitioners any further and in fact, would assist the respondents. In that case also, it has been held that an application for enforcement of the decree granting prohibitory injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation and where there is a composite decree, granting mandatory and prohibitory injunction, one part is subjected to limitation period of three years, whereas the other is not subjected to any period of limitation. The petitioner can enforce the prohibitory injunction, whenever violation of that part takes place.

    13. In the case of Jai Dayal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that once the decree of perpetual and mandatory injunction has become final, the judgment debtor is required to obey the decree and a party cannot and should not, by his action be permitted to drive the decree holder to file a second suit. It has been inter-alia held that non-compliance is a continuing disobedience in respect of which a separate/fresh suit is barred under Section 47 of the CPC. Thus, in my considered

    10

    view, the contention based on the execution being barred by limitation, cannot be accepted.

    14. Insofar as the claim of the mudkarial rights is concerned, the petitioners are claiming that there is an order of registration, which only has a presumptive value. (See Roque Fernandes (since deceased), Through Legal Heirs & Others Vs. Dempo Properties and Investments, 2010(2) Bom.C.R. 802 and Smt. Gulabi Sangtu Devidas & Others Vs. Smt. Prema Govinda Gaonkar & Others, 1994(3) Bom.C.R. 328). That apart, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted during the course of the arguments at bar that the claim of mundkarial structure is in respect of 200 square metres of land (i.e. is in respect of the old structure) and thus, cannot be in respect of the construction, which is effected after the passing of the impugned decree. At any rate, there is no order by which the petitioners have been declared mundkars, much less have been allowed to purchase the mundkarial house. The Trial Court in para 41 has found that bare perusal of photographs at Exhibit 64 indicate that it is a structure not confirming to the old structure as found in Exhibit 104. The Executing Court has also referred to the evidence of DW-1, who

    11

    claims that he has been declared as mundkar in respect of survey no.61, but cannot substantiate his contention that the old house bearing house no.585. The Executing Court has also specifically come to the conclusion after the perusal of the inspection report that at the time of the inspection, the second floor was under construction and as per the panchanama, it is a case of re-construction of the house and that too, without permission. The contention that the structure is not identified also cannot be accepted.

    15. I have carefully gone through the impugned order passed by the Executing Court and I do not find that it suffers from any infirmity, so as to require interference under the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court.

    The petition is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged, with no order as to costs.

    C. V. BHADANG, J.

    EV

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    Benedito (Betty) Dias v. Armando Benedita Fernandes
    (Feb 9, 2017)