Ujjal Bhuyan, J.:— Heard Mr. M. K. Choudhury, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. N. Barua, learned counsel for the appellants. We have also heard Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. I. Ahmed, learned counsel for respondent No. 1/writ petitioner.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 13.10.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition i.e. WP(C) No. 2824/2014 filed by the respondent No. 1 as the writ petitioner.

3. Matter relates to termination of dealership of respondent No. 1 for alleged violation of Marketing Discipline Guidelines, 2012 of the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL).

4. Respondent No. 1 was the writ petitioner whereas appellants were respondent Nos. 2 to 8 in the writ petition.

5. Respondent No. 1 is a physically disabled person. He was appointed as a dealer by IOCL for retail sale of petrol/HSD/motor oil/grease and such other petroleum products from its depot located at Ghograpar, National Highway-31 in the district of Nalbari. In this connection, an agreement was entered into between appellants and the respondent No. 1 on 20.12.1995.

6. On account of expansion works of National Highway (NH) 31, which is part of the East-West Corridor Project, respondent No. 1 suffered loss of business in the year 2011. Sale and supply from the Retail Outlet of respondent No. 1 was ordered to be suspended vide IOCL letter dated 06.05.2013. Suspension was ordered on the ground that in the course of joint inspection of the Retail Outlet, stock variation of HSD was found beyond permissible limit and the reference density of Tank No. 2 was not available. Another ground given was that tanker truck retention sample of the corresponding tank was not available at the time of inspection for which sample could not be collected. Therefore, it was alleged that there was violation of Clauses 5.1.9 and 5.1.11 of the Marketing Discipline Guidelines, 2012 (2012 Guidelines). Respondent No. 1 was asked to explain as to why action should not be taken for the violations alleged.

7. Respondent No. 1 submitted his explanation on 21.05.2013 giving justification. The allegations were denied. It was stated that the Dispensing Unit was not working properly and therefore wrong reading was being shown. The Retail Outlet was temporarily closed for the last two years due to expansion work of NH-31, because of which there was very little traffic and consequential use of retail outlet.

8. Respondent No. 1 was informed by the appellants on 27.06.2013 that test report of the HSD samples drawn from the tanks on 06.05.2013 had been received. As per the test report, the samples failed to meet the specifications. The following non-conformities detected were mentioned:—

“1. Stock Variation of HSD: 12740 Ltrs (Allowable limit 59 Ltrs)Clause no. 5.1.11

2. Non availability of reference density at the time of inspection, (Density Register was produced but the reference density was not recorded).Clause no. 5.1.9

3. Failure of Nozzle sample of HSD collected on 06.05.2013 Clause no. 5.1.1

4. Non retention of TT retention sample Notes-i)”

9. Respondent No. 1 was therefore asked to show-cause and explain the nonconformities detected.

10. In his reply, respondent No. 1 denied the allegation and requested for a re-test of the umpire sample which was drawn on the same day whereafter it was sealed and certified by IOCL authorities. It was pointed out that the Dispensing Unit was 20 years old and due to lack of maintenance on account of the road-widening project, the totalizer had been showing wrong readings.

11. Request of respondent No. 1 for re-test of the umpire sample was accepted by the IOCL on 06.08.2013 whereafter re-test was carried out in the IOCL laboratory at Betkuchi, Guwahati. Two sets of HSD sample including the one retained by the IOCL authorities were tested. In their letter dated 19.08.2013, IOCL informed the respondent No. 1 that the retention sample of Field Survey Officer i.e. of the IOCL did not meet the BIS III specifications with respect to test done as per the 2012 Guidelines. In so far the sample of respondent No. 1 was concerned, it was stated that the dealer sample was found not fit for testing due to presence of sludge.

12. Thereafter there were certain correspondences between the parties following which IOCL issued show-cause notice to respondent No. 1 on 10.12.2013 for termination of dealership. The violations alleged were as follows:—

“(a) Stock variation beyond permissible limit, which is in violation of MDG-2012, Clause 5.1.11;

(b) Nozzle sample failure of HSD, which is in violation of MDG-2012, Clause 5.1.1;

(c) Non availability of reference density, being in violation of MDG-2012, Clause 5.1.9;

(d) Non availability of TT (Tanker Truck) retention sample, being in violation of MDG-2012, Chapter 5 Notes-i.”

13. In the show-cause notice, it was mentioned that violation of (a) & (b) above would invite termination at the first instance itself as per Clause 8.2 of the 2012 Guidelines.

14. In response to the same, respondent No. 1 submitted his reply on 02.01.2014 and denied any variation in his stock. Conclusion arrived at by IOCL that HSD in the retail outlet of respondent No. 1 was adulterated was denied on the ground that the conclusion was arrived at only on the basis of the test result of the sample collected and retained by the IOCL officials. Ultimately, IOCL issued the letter of termination of dealership to respondent No. 1 on 25.04.2014. The irregularities alleged were found established and accordingly the dealership agreement with respondent No. 1 was terminated with immediate effect.

15. Aggrieved, by the aforesaid, respondent No. 1 preferred the related writ petition WP(C) No. 2824/2014 before this Court assailing the legality and validity of the aforesaid termination of dealership dated 25.04.2014 primarily on the ground that procedural safeguards were not adopted.

16. The writ petition was contested by the appellants by filing a common affidavit. While disputing the challenge made by respondent No. 1, appellants supported the impugned decision.

17. Learned Single Judge after hearing the matter at considerable length, allowed the writ petition vide the judgment and order dated 13.10.2015.

18. Hence, this appeal.

19. Detailed submissions were made at the time of hearing. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the time limit prescribed under the 2012 Guidelines is not mandatory and is flexible. In this connection reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111 : AIR 2003 SC 511 and Sharif-Ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone reported in (1980) 1 SCC 403 : AIR 1980 SC 303. However, all the submissions made including the decisions cited at the Bar have been duly considered.

20. Question before the learned Single Judge was whether IOCL was justified in terminating the dealership agreement with respondent No. 1 and while doing so whether it had followed the guidelines laid down under the 2012 Guidelines.

21. Referring to the provisions contained in Clause 2.4.4 Notes (2), Clause 2.5 and Clause 2.10 of the 2012 Guidelines, learned Single Judge held that the time limit prescribed for sending the sample to the laboratory from the date of collection as well as the time limit within which the sample should be tested from the date when it reached the laboratory are provisions that requires strict adherence. The argument of the appellants that use of the expression “preferably” in the said clauses is indicative of a directory nature of the provisions was negatived by the learned Single Judge whereafter it was held as under:—

“27. Turning to the provisions under Clause 2.4.4 Notes (2), Clause 2.5 and Clause 2.10 of the Guidelines, the time-limits prescribed for sending the samples to the laboratory from the date of collection as well as the time within which the sample should be tested from the date when it reached the laboratory, are provisions that requires strict adherence. If a contrary view is adopted to allow the respondent Corporation to take as much time at its discretion for sending the sample to the laboratory and thereafter to get it tested, the said provisions prescribing time-limits would be rendered otiose and redundant. On that account, the time-limits ought not to have been prescribed/mentioned in the said Clauses in the first place. Surely, this cannot be the intention of IOCL being full well aware that time gap between the sample taken and laboratory test is essentially to be maintained so as to avert any variations in the density test of the sample so collected. The argument of Mr. MK Choudhury that the word “preferably” occurring in the said clauses cannot be construed as “mandatory”, this Court rejects the said contention and holds that the adherence of the time-limits prescribed under the Guidelines is directly proportionate to the ultimate decision that would be reached. The time-limits and adherence thereof is a contractual obligation that has to be discharged by the Oil Corporation in letter and spirit.”

21.A. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge. The decisions cited by Mr. M. K. Choudhury would be of no assistance to the appellants.

22. Learned Single Judge also carried out a detailed examination of the four irregularities/non-conformities for which the dealership agreement was terminated whereafter it was held as under:—

“28. ………….. From a perusal of Clause 8.2 above, this Court is constrained to say that irregularity in respect of “stock variation beyond permissible limit”, being a violation of Clause 5.1.11 of the Guidelines, is not a critical irregularity within the meaning of Clause 8.2. The irregularities mentioned under Clause 8.2 nowhere takes within its fold any irregularity which may be in violation of Clause 5.1.11 of the Guidelines. Clause 5.1.11 only permits that in case of stock variation beyond permissible limits, the dealer would be called upon to explain and while sales and supplies to the RO would be permitted to continue during the investigation period, such supply would be suspended (emphasis mine) in case the explanation of the dealer is not found satisfactory. Having perceived the provisions under Clause 8.2 and that of Clause 5.1.11 of the Guidelines, the contention put forth by Mr. MK Choudhury have no legs to stand. Any irregularity in respect of “stock variation beyond permissible limit” under Clause 5.1.11 cannot entail termination of dealership under Clause 8.2 of the Guidelines.”

23. Finally, learned Single Judge concluded as under:—

“31. On a conspectus of the above, it is seen that the essential conditions under Clause 2.4.4 Notes (2), Clause 2.5 and Clause 2.10 of the Guidelines had been conveniently ignored. In other words, there is no semblance of adherence to the time-limits as envisaged in the said Clause under the Guidelines. The conditions under Clause 2.4.4 Notes (2), Clause 2.5 and Clause 2.10 being essentially mandatory, the cancellation of the dealership agreement is held to be flawed being a creation of a decision-making process which clearly marks a departure from the Guidelines. The procedural obligations under the Guidelines having been given no significance, rather thrown to the winds, there can be no second option but to hold that the action of the respondent Corporation in terminating the Agreement is fallacious and not sustainable in law.

32. For the reasons aforesaid, this writ petition stands allowed and the order dated 25.4.2014 issued by IOCL terminating the dealership agreement dated 20.12.1995 is hereby set aside and quashed.”

24. The factual aspect of the dispute was duly examined by the learned Single Judge at great length. Therefore we do not feel it necessary to once again embark upon the above factual exercise. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Super Highway Services reported in (2010) 3 SCC 321, Supreme Court held that cancellation of dealership agreement of a party is serious business and cannot be taken lightly. In order to justify the action taken to terminate such an agreement, the concerned authority has to act fairly and in complete adherence to the rules/guidelines framed for the purpose.

25. This position was reiterated in the subsequent decision in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jagannath and Company reported in (2013) 12 SCC 278 wherein Supreme Court held that test should be held in the presence of the dealer in order to justify termination of agreement. The authority concerned has to act fairly and in complete adherence to the guidelines framed.

26. Adverting to the case in hand, we find that learned Single Judge had painstakingly noted non-conformity by the IOCL authorities to the relevant guidelines more particularly the delay in testing the sample after it was collected beyond the time limit prescribed which has been held to be obligatory. Such a finding returned by the learned Single Judge is a plausible finding based on facts and circumstances of the case. In Tractor & Farm Equipment Ltd. v. Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Dept of Agriculture reported in 2004 (1) GLT 117, a Division Bench of this Court had examined the nature and scope of writ appeals which are filed in this Court. It was held that a writ appeal is really not a statutory appeal preferred against the judgment and order of an inferior Court to the superior Court. Writ appeal is an appeal on principle and therefore unlike a criminal appeal where the whole evidence on record is examined anew by the appellate Court, what is really examined in a writ appeal is the legality and validity of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and it can be set aside only if there is a patent error on the face of the record or the judgment is against the established or settled principle of law. If two views are possible and a view, which is reasonable and logical has been adopted by a Single Judge, the other view, howsoever appealing such a view may be to the Division Bench, it is the view adopted by the Single Judge, which should normally be allowed to prevail.

27. This position has been re-stated in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Management of Nerendra and Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Workmen reported in (2016) 3 SCC 340 wherein Supreme Court has held that in an intra-court appeal, on a finding of fact, unless the appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the same. Merely because another view or a better view is possible, there should be no interference with or disturbance to the order passed by the Single Judge.

28. On a thorough consideration of the matter, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is a reasonable and logical view and therefore, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the same.

29. Consequently, writ appeal is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.