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Attorney(S)
  • Mr. Vivek Darhel and Amit George, Advocates.
  • Mr. Rupinder Thakur, Additional Advocate General and Mr. Satyen Vaidya, Senior Advocate with Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate.
Judges
  • Vivek Singh Thakur, J.
Acts
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. Vivek Darhel and Amit George, Advocates.
  • Mr. Rupinder Thakur, Additional Advocate General and Mr. Satyen Vaidya, Senior Advocate with Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate.
Judges
  • Vivek Singh Thakur, J.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Vivek Singh Thakur, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The court considered an application seeking condonation of delay of 247 days in filing a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("Act, 1996"). The Arbitrator announced the impugned award on 21.11.2015 and supplied a copy on the same date. An earlier petition under Section 34 was filed on 26.2.2015 but was withdrawn on 20.10.2015 after respondents raised objections that the petition had been filed without issuing prior notice as required by Section 34(5) of the Act, 1996. After issuing the statutory notice to respondents on 21.10.2015, a fresh petition under Section 34 was filed on 25.10.2015 along with the present application for condonation of delay. The fresh petition faced scrutiny objections from the Registry (first recorded on 27.10.2015), and after removing and addressing objections it was re-filed and approved between 6.12.2015 and 12.12.2015. The court was asked to consider (a) whether delay beyond three months could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963; (b) whether the period spent pursuing the earlier (withdrawn) petition should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act; and (c) whether non-compliance with local scrutiny rules (including removal of objections beyond prescribed days) was fatal to the application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 beyond three months (but within the additional 30 days provided by proviso to Section 34(3)) can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  2. Whether the period spent pursuing a prior petition (filed without compliance of Section 34(5) and later withdrawn) can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
  3. Whether non-compliance with Section 34(5) (i.e., filing without prior notice and without the mandated affidavit) constitutes an "other cause of like nature" under Section 14 such that exclusion of time is warranted.
  4. Whether delay in removing Registry scrutiny objections beyond the maximum period specified in the Himachal Pradesh High Court rules (20 days aggregate) without a formal condonation application is fatal to institution of the petition, or whether such delay can be treated as deemed condoned when the Registry accepts and lists the refiled petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant / Petitioner

  • Submitted that delay beyond 30 days after expiry of three months cannot be condoned under Section 5 alone, but that the present application should be considered under Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act because time spent pursuing an earlier withdrawn petition should be excluded.
  • Explained that the earlier petition was filed but was withdrawn due to an inadvertent defect (non-compliance with Section 34(5)) and that the fresh petition was filed promptly after issuing the required notice (21.10.2015), so the period from 26.2.2015 to 25.10.2015 should be excluded under Section 14.
  • Argued that the applicant is an outstation company (Hyderabad) without local counsel in Shimla, and that preparatory processes within the company explain the six-day delay beyond three months; thus there was "sufficient cause" under the proviso to Section 34(3).
  • Contended that Section 14 is not limited to defects of jurisdiction but extends to "other cause of like nature" that render a court unable to entertain a proceeding, supporting reliance on authorities (including a Gujarat High Court judgment and Supreme Court precedents).

Respondents

  • Argued that the application lacks proper pleadings and has failed to invoke the correct statutory provision for condonation; thus it should be dismissed.
  • Contended Section 14 cannot be invoked here because there was no defect of jurisdiction — the petition was to be filed in the same court — and therefore exclusion of time is not permissible.
  • Pointed to local rules (Himachal Pradesh High Court Scrutiny Rules and Appellate/Original Side Rules) which limit the time for removing scrutiny objections to 7 days at a time and 20 days in aggregate, arguing that the applicant took 36 days to remove objections and failed to apply for condonation of that delay; thus the petition was not properly constituted.
  • Asserted that the applicant is a sophisticated corporate litigant and therefore must explain each day of delay; mere general explanations are insufficient to justify condonation or exclusion of time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Goa v. Western Builders, (2006) 6 SCC 239 Support that provisions of the Limitation Act apply to proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Cited to show that Limitation Act principles (including Section 14) are applicable to Section 34 petitions under the Arbitration Act.
Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169 Further authority that Limitation Act provisions apply in arbitration challenge proceedings. Used with other authorities to affirm applicability of Section 14 to Section 34 petitions.
Commissioner, M.P. Housing Board v. Mohanlal (Civil Appeal No. 6573 of 2016 arising out of SLP(C) No. 39511 of 2013), judgment dated 19.7.2016 Authority cited in support of the proposition that Limitation Act provisions (including Section 14) apply to arbitration matters. Relied upon to reinforce that Section 14 may be invoked in arbitration challenge proceedings.
Trustees of Surat Parsi Panchyat Funds and Properties Trust v. Ketan Textile (Gujarat High Court, First Appeal No. 575 of 1977, decided 29.8.1991) Interprets Section 14 as protecting parties who have pursued a bona fide prior proceeding that proved abortive due to want of jurisdiction or similar procedural defects. Cited by applicant and accepted by the court as supportive of a broad construction of Section 14 covering procedural defects that prevent adjudication on merits.
Roshan Lal Kuthalia v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi, (1975) 4 SCC 628 Holds Section 14 is wide enough to cover periods relating to proceedings incapable of entertaining the matter on merits; defects "neighbour" to jurisdiction also attract Section 14. Quoted to support the proposition that Section 14 applies to circumstances beyond strict jurisdictional defects and requires a liberal interpretation.
Raghunath Das v. Gokal Chand, (1959) SCR 811 Authority referenced in Roshan Lal for coverage of execution proceedings within Section 14's ambit. Indirectly supports the broad understanding of Section 14 relied upon by the court (via Roshan Lal).
India Electric Works Ltd. v. James Mantosh, (1971) 1 SCC 24 Supports a pragmatic test for substantial identity of subject-matter and the liberal touch in interpreting Section 14. Referenced in Roshan Lal and relied upon in the court's reasoning that Section 14 should be interpreted liberally.
Associated Hotels case, (1961) 1 SCR 259 at 273 (as referenced in Roshan Lal) Discusses initial jurisdiction preventing a court from entertaining proceedings, attracting Section 14. Used within cited authorities to illustrate that jurisdictional obstacles bring Section 14 into play; court relied on the principle in construing "other cause of like nature."

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded step-by-step and adhered strictly to the materials before it:

  1. The judge acknowledged the settled law that the Limitation Act applies to Section 34 petitions under the Arbitration Act and that delay beyond three months may only be condoned for an additional 30 days under the proviso to Section 34(3), subject to satisfaction of sufficient cause.
  2. The court accepted that the earlier petition had been filed without complying with Section 34(5) (i.e., without prior notice to the opposing party and without the required affidavit), and that the respondents rightly objected to non-compliance. Because of that objection the earlier petition was withdrawn and a fresh petition filed after issuing notice.
  3. The court considered the applicant's submission that the time spent pursuing the earlier petition (from 26.2.2015 to 25.10.2015 as pleaded) should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The court examined authority and the statutory language and concluded that Section 14's phrase "or other cause of like nature" was intended to cover more than strict jurisdictional defects.
  4. The court addressed the respondents' contention based on the High Court scrutiny rules (maximum 20 days to remove objections) and noted that although objections were removed after a longer period, the Registry nevertheless accepted and listed the re-filed petition without taking any objection at the stage of listing. Given the Registry's acceptance and listing, the court concluded that the delay in re-filing should be regarded as deemed condoned and not fatal to institution of the petition.
  5. On the combined facts — withdrawal of the first petition for non-compliance with a mandatory provision (Section 34(5)); re-filing promptly after issuing the requisite notice; the period of pursuing the earlier petition being bona fide and in good faith; and the Registry's eventual acceptance of the refiled petition after scrutiny — the court found that the defect in the earlier petition was of the nature envisaged by Section 14 ("other cause of like nature") and thus exclusion of the earlier period from limitation was appropriate.
  6. Consequently, the court permitted exclusion of time claimed from 26.2.2015 to 25.10.2015 and, after exclusion, condoned the residual delay (six days) in filing the Section 34 petition.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The application for condonation of delay is allowed; the period from 26.2.2015 to 25.10.2015 is excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and the residual delay of six days in filing the Section 34 petition is condoned. The petition under Section 34 is to be registered.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 will be registered and proceed on the merits (subject to the court's future orders in the main petition).
  • The applicant's claim for exclusion of the period spent pursuing the earlier withdrawn petition was accepted and the limited delay beyond the permissible period was condoned.

Broader implications:

The opinion reasons that Section 14 of the Limitation Act covers not only strict jurisdictional defects but also "other cause of like nature" such as non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 34(5) of the Arbitration Act; however, the court did not state that it was creating any new binding precedent beyond applying existing authorities and statutory interpretation to the facts before it.

End of summary. All points above are drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and do not introduce facts or inferences not contained in the original text.

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    M/S. Madhava Hytech Engineers Pvt. Ltd. Petitioner v. The Executive Engineers & Another S

    Vivek Singh Thakur, J.:— This application has been filed for condonation of delay of 247 days in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (herein after referred to as the Act of 1996).

    2. At the very outset, learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner submits that it is settled law that in view of specific time period provided in Section 34 of the Act, 1996, delay in filing petition under this section beyond 30 days on expiry of three months after passing award by arbitrator cannot be condoned under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (herein after referred to as Limitation Act). He further submits that applicant/petitioner had filed Arbitration 1996, but for inherent defect it was withdrawn and after removing the said defect present petition has been filed and in the present case, though, the applicant/petitioner is seeking benefit of provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, but because of his inadvertent mistake this application has been stated to be filed only under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, whereas it ought to have been filed under Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay after exclusion of time spent in pursuing first application/petition without complying mandatory provisions of Section 34(5) of the Act, 1996 and thus he prayed for considering this application under Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

    3. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that for failure to file application under appropriate provision of law and for absence of necessary pleadings for condonation of delay and exclusion of time as prayed, the application deserves to be dismissed. However, settled position of law is not disputed that for faulty nomenclature and/or for technical defects, the litigant should not be made to suffer particularly when such lapse is not affecting the merit of the case. Therefore, I proceed to decide this application by considering it under Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

    4. The Arbitrator announced impugned award on 21.11.2015 and supply copy thereof on the same date. Application/petitioner had assailed the said award by filing an application/petitioner under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 on 26.2.2015 after 6 days of expiry of three months after passing of impugned award, but within 30 days, as available to applicant/petitioner in proviso of Section 34 (3) of the Act 1996 definitely subject to satisfaction of the Court to the sufficient cause prevented the applicant/petitioner from making the application within the time of three months.

    5. It is admitted that the earlier application/petition was filed without issuing prior notice to respondents under sub clause (5) of Section 34 of the Act, 1996 and obviously affidavit in support of petition could not have been an affidavit endorsing compliance with the said mandatory requirement of issuance of notice. It is also admitted fact that respondents had raised objection of non-compliance of Section 34(5) of the Act, 1996, whereupon previous application/petition preferred by the petitioner was withdrawn on 20.10.2015, whereafter complying with the requirements of Section 34(5) of the Act 1996 by issuing notice to respondents on 21.10.2015, fresh application/petition under Section 34 of the Act 1996 challenging the impugned award has been filed on 25.10.2015 along with this application.

    6. It is also evident from record that for certain objections raised by Registry of the Court, after scrutiny of application/petition, it was returned. It was resubmitted to the Registry after removing certain objections and giving note with respect to other objections on 15.11.2016 but it could be re-filed, after removing necessary objection only on 6.12.2015. Finally, application/petition was scrutinized by dealing hand on 9.12.2015 and was approved by the concerned S.O. on 12.12.2015, whereafter it was permitted to be re-filed on 12.12.2015.

    7. After withdrawing the first application/petition, fresh application/petition with compliance of Section 34(5) of the Act 1996 was filed within four days, whereafter it remained under objection till 12.12.2015. There is gap of 4 days between withdrawing and refilling the fresh application after removing the defect as objected by the respondents, keeping in view the mandatory nature of Section 34(5) of the Act, 1996.

    8. It is settled that there is no exclusion of applicability of Indian Limitation Act to the proceedings under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, except that delay, in filing application/petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 beyond three months, can be condoned only for 30 days and not beyond that and it is also no longer resintegra that provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are applicable for proceedings under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. (See State Of Goa v. Western Builders, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 239, Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, reported in (2008) 7 SCC 169 and also Commissioner, M.P. Housing Board v. Mohanlal and Company decided vide judgment dated 19.7.2016 passed in Civil Appeal NO. 6573 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 39511 of 2013.)

    9. It is canvassed on behalf of applicant/petitioner that in absence of compliance of Section 34(5) of the Act 1996, the Court was not competent to entertain the application/petition against award passed by Arbitrator and thus previous application/petition was liable to be rejected for non-compliance of Section 34(5) of the Act despite the fact that it was filed bonafidly and the said application/petition was being pursued by applicant/petitioner in good faith from 26.2.2015 to 20.10.2016 and the same was withdrawn for curing the defect, for which the Court was unable to entertain the said petition as the said defect was equivalent to the defect of jurisdiction and after withdrawing the said petition, present petition has been filed within reasonable time of 5 days after immediate compliance of mandatory provisions of law i.e. issuing notice to respondents under Section 34(5) of the Act, 1996 on 21.10.2016 and therefore, the time spend in pursuing the previous application/petition since 26.2.2015 to 25.10.2015 deserves to be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

    10. It is also contended by learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner that applicant/petitioner Company is an out stationed company situated at Hyderabad, though also having its office at Delhi, but no office in the State of Himachal Pradesh, nevertheless in Shimla and also not having any local attorney or Advocate in Shimla, therefore, despite due diligence on the part of the applicant/petitioner, previous application/petition under Section 34 of the Act was delayed for 6 days beyond 3 months and the application and pleadings were drafted, settled and approved at various levels of the applicant/petitioner Company and in these circumstances, the application/petition could not be preferred within three months as provided under Section 34(3) of the Act 1996 and there is a sufficient cause preventing the applicant Company from filing the petition within three months, entitling it for condonation of delay, as provided under proviso to Section 34(5) of the Act, 1996. It is also submitted that even if exclusion of period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act is granted till 20.10.2015, then also there will be 11 days delay beyond three months in preferring present applicant/petition, which stands explained by appellant/petitioner.

    11. Learned counsel for respondents contested the claim of applicant/petitioner on the ground that Section 14 of Limitation Act can be invoked for prosecuting the proceedings with due diligence in a Court unable to entertain it for defect of jurisdiction and there was no defect of jurisdiction in the present case, as the application/petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 was to be filed in the same Court and therefore, the applicant/petitioner is not entitled for exclusion of time, as prayed. Further it is also argued by learned counsel for respondents that High Court has enacted Himachal Pradesh High Court (Scrutiny, Maintenance of Judicial Records, Administrative and Executive Business) Rules 1997, (in short Scrutiny Rules) and also High Court of Himachal Pradesh (Appellate Side) and (Original Side) Rules, 1997, which have been duly published in extra ordinary gazette of Himachal Pradesh and also available on website of High Court of H.P. He referred Rule 8 of Chapter-2 (dealing with scrutiny of papers) of Part-1 of Scrutiny Rules, wherein it is provided that maximum period for removing objection shall be 7 days at a time and 20 days in aggregate and in case the objections are not removed within aforesaid maximum period of 20 days, the matter shall be dealt with in accordance with Rule 7 of Chapter 6-C of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh (Appellate Side) and (Original Side) Rules, 1997 as the case may be. Rule 7 of Chapter 6-C provides that whether any objection is taken by the office to the papers presented that they are not in accordance with the relevant Rules, the maximum period for removal of such objection shall be seven days at a time and 20 days in the aggregate. If the period taken by the concerned party for removal of the objections exceeds the time limit specified above, the Registry shall not accept the papers unless the delay in removal of such objections is condoned on an application by the party. He contended that objections were raised by Registry on 27.10.2015 and removed finally by appellant on 6.12.2015 after 36 days which is beyond prescribed maximum period of 20 days and thus, the application/petition is not properly constituted as the time beyond 20 days was not extendable by the Registry and entertaining application/petition by Registry without any application for condonation of delay in removing the objections as required to be filed by the applicant/petitioner at the time of refilling of the application/petition after removing the objections beyond the period of 20 days does not mean automatic condonation of delay. It is also contended that pleadings of applicant/petitioner in present application are casual in nature and there is no explanation for delay of each and every day, as is required to be explained as the applicant/petitioner is not a lay man, illiterate and rustic villager, but a Company having business in India and abroad, being represented by experts, vigilantly contesting its cases including the arbitration proceedings in the present case and therefore condonation of delay, which cannot be claimed as a matter of right, as well as exclusion of time cannot be allowed for insufficient grounds stated in the application.

    12. In rebuttal, learned counsel for applicant/petitioner argued that for the reasons explained for causing delay in filing first application/petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, there was again delay in removing objections and refilling the present application/petition after filing it on 25.10.2015. Learned counsel for applicant has submitted that exclusion of period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act is available not only on the ground of defect of jurisdiction, but for other cause of like nature, for which Court is unable to entertain the application/petition. He has relied upon the judgment passed by High Court of Gujarat in first appeal No. 575 of 1977, decided on 29.8.1991, titled Trustees of Surat Parsi Panchyat Funds and Properties Trust v. Ketan Textile, wherein it has been held as under:—

    “13. The underlying object of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is that the bar of limitation should not affect a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on merits, but falling through the court being unable to give him such a trial. It is clear from the plain perusal of the aforesaid section that the principle is clearly applicable not only to the cases in which a man brings his suit in the court having no jurisdiction to entertain it, but also where he brings the suit in a wrong court in consequence of a bonafide mistake of law or defect of procedure. Thus, a litigant should not be deprived of his rights by reason of the applicability of the law of limitation, when he is diligently and bonafide proceeding to obtain the redress in a higher court also. Undoubtedly, thus, the purport of the legislature in enacting these provisions seems to be not to punish a litigant for mistake of procedure which had been made on wrong advice. Therefore, the ultimate design of these provisions under Section 14 of the Limitation Act is that the party should be protected where a prior bonafide proceeding proved abortive by reason of want of jurisdiction or some similar cause of like nature.

    19. It is an admitted fact that the issue of grant of menses profit in the earlier suit was decided against the plaintiffs, on account of the invalidity of the notice determining the tenancy. It cannot be said that the earlier suit was altogether misconceived. The plaintiffs' claim for menses profit had not been gone into or investigated into in that suit because the court considered that the court was not competent to grant the relief of menses profit as claimed in the said suit for want of legal and valid notice determining the tenancy. It cannot be contended, even for a moment, that there was adjudication of the suit claim on merits. A copy of the judgment in the earlier suit is produced on the records of the present case, at Ex. 35/2. Merely because there was no legal and valid notice, the court in earlier suit was not competent to pass decree for possession and the resultant menses profit from the date of the suit. Thus, invalidity and illegality of the notice under the rent legislation prevented the Trial Court in the first suit to decide the issue of menses profit on merits and this defect was of a nature which was to be decided before the merits of the claim could be adjudicated upon. As the notice was defective, relief of menses profit was rejected. The Trial Court, in the earlier suit, was called upon to decide whether the claim relating to the menses profit was at all entertain able on the frame of the suit and it reached to the conclusion that the court was not competent to pass decree for menses profit in the suit as the notice was defective and invalid. Thus, it is amply clear that the defect was of the nature which was to be decided before the merits of the claim could be analysed and examined in order nor did any occasion or necessity arise of going into or appreciating the merits of the claim relating to meson profit.”

    13. He has also relied upon Roshan Lal Kuthalia v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi, (1975) 4 SCC 628, wherein it has been held as under:

    “27. Certainly, Section 14 is wide enough to cover periods covered by execution proceedings (see Raghunath Das v. Gokal Chand, 1959 SCR 811 at 818). After all Section 47 itself contemplates transmigration of souls as it were of execution petitions and suits. The substantial identity of the subject-matter of the lis is a pragmatic test. Moreover, the defects that will attract the provision are not merely jurisdictional strictly so called but others more or less neighbours to such deficiencies. Any circumstances legal or factual, which inhibits entertainment or consideration by the court of the dispute on the merits, comes within the scope of the section and a liberal touch must inform the interpretation of the Limitation Act which deprives the remedy of one who has a right (see India Electric Works Ltd. v. James Mantosh, (1971) 1 SCC 24 : (1971) 2 SCR 397). In the Associated Hotels case (i.e. the very lis in its earlier round on the execution side) this Court pointed out (1961) 1 SCR 259 at 273) that the question was one of initial jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the proceedings. Thus in this very matter, the obstacle was jurisdictional and the exclusionary operation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act was attracted.”

    14. Considering rival contentions of parties, I am of the opinion that re-filing the application/petition without accompanying the application for condonation of delay, as provided in H.P. High Court Rules, for taking the time, to remove the objections, beyond 20 days is not fatal for the applicant/petitioner as the Registry has never objected re-filing of the petition beyond 20 days after removing the objections and for this reason it cannot be said that application/petition is not properly instituted for want of condonation of delay in re-filing the petition after removing objections as it was entertained by the Registry and listed in the Court without any such objection and therefore, there was no occasion for the applicant/petitioner to invoke Rule 7 of Chapter 6 C of Part 1 of H.P. High Court Rules. In fact the delay in re-filing deserves to be considered as deemed to have been condoned. Otherwise also for the explanation given by the applicant/petitioner supra, such delay deserves to be condoned.

    15. Considering the language of Section 14 of Limitation Act and also case law cited by the applicant/petitioner, it is undisputed that exclusion of time as provided under Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not available only for defect of jurisdiction, but also ‘other cause of like nature’ and interpretation of ‘other cause of like nature’ as only defect of jurisdiction, would be against the intention of legislation as in that eventuality there was no need to incorporate the word ‘or other cause of like nature.’

    16. Section 34(5) of the Act 1996 provides that an application under Section 34 ‘shall’ be filed by a party ‘only after’ issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application ‘shall’ be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing compliance of the said requirement. The language of sub Section indicates that compliance thereof is mandatory in nature and definitely without such compliance and affidavit related thereto, the Court was unable to entertain it and therefore, this defect falls within the scope of ‘other cause of like nature’, equivalent to defect of jurisdiction, as provided under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

    17. In my opinion, the other cause of like nature certainly covers the situation where the application/petition under Section 34 of the Act has been preferred without compliance of provisions of Section 34(5) of the Act.

    18. For the forgoing reasons, after permitting exclusion of time from 26.2.2015 to 25.10.2015 taken in pursing the first application/petition filed without compliance of provisions of Section 34(5) of the Act, 1996 and re-filing the present application/petition after compliance thereof, the delay of 6 days in filing the application/petition is condoned and the application is allowed.

    19. The application/petition under Section 34 of the Act be registered. This application stands disposed of.

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    Comments

    M/S. Madhava Hytech Engineers Pvt. Ltd. Petitioner v. The Executive Engineers & Another S
    (Aug 24, 2017)